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SelectedWorks

Behavioral Economics

2006

Articles 1 - 16 of 16

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft Dec 2006

Simulation Of The Colombian Firm Energy Market, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

We present a simulation analysis of the proposed Colombian firm energy market. The main purpose of the simulation is to assess the risk to suppliers of participation in the market. We also are able to consider variations in the market design, and assess the impact of alternative auction parameters. Three simulation models are developed and analyzed. The first model (Model 1) uses historical price data from October 1995 through May 2006 to assess the performance risk of hypothetical thermal and hydro generating units. The second model (Model 2) uses historical price and operating data to assess performance risk of the …

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Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Aug 2006

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …

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New England’S Forward Capacity Auction, Peter Cramton Jun 2006

New England’S Forward Capacity Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This note provides a brief description of New England’s Forward Capacity Auction (FCA) for the procurement of electricity capacity. The description is based on the 6 March 2006 Settlement Agreement. The description here presents a simpler description of the auction mechanics, and limits the presentation to the key elements relevant to someone providing software and other support to implement the primary auction. In addition, some motivation for the approach is given. The description here is not a software specification, but rather a high-level description of the auction. Many implementation details are yet to be resolved. These details will be resolved …

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The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft Apr 2006

The Convergence Of Market Designs For Adequate Generating Capacity, Peter Cramton, Steven Stoft

Peter Cramton

This paper compares market designs intended to solve the resource adequacy (RA) problem, and finds that, in spite of rivalrous claims, the most advanced designs have nearly converged. The original dichotomy between approaches based on long-term energy contracts and those based on short-term capacity markets spawned two design tracks. Long-term contracts led to call-option obligations which provide market-power control and the ability to strengthen performance incentives, but this approach fails to replace the missing money at the root of the adequacy problem. Hogan’s energy-only market fills this gap. On the other track, the short-term capacity markets (ICAP) spawned long-term capacity …

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Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Mar 2006

Assessment Of Capital Returns And Economics Of Investment In Khartoum Stock Exchange Market, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Financial markets in a country are parts of modern economic systems and have definite impacts of its economic performance. However, in an underdeveloped economic structure there can be other targets o hidden activities for them. Such assumptions are provoked under totalitarian economic systems that impose cartel monopolies in a autocratic compradorism that own most of the companies and their stocks. The institutional structure of the prevailing economic system avails negative cost/benefits dealings to continue unaffected as the main profits have to come from other resources, e.g., money laundry. The private sector has to be monopolized in order to sustain the …

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Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Mar 2006

Affidavit Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Affidavit in support of the settlement agreement defining the New England Forward Capacity Market. For ISO New England.

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Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton Feb 2006

Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.

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Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton Feb 2006

Reply Declaration Of Peter Cramton On The Aws Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Reply declaration on various auction rules for the AWS auction. On behalf of T-Mobile US.

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Child Schooling In A Community In Transition: A Case Of Scheduled Tribe In Andhra Pradesh, India, Venkatanarayana Motkuri Mr. Jan 2006

Child Schooling In A Community In Transition: A Case Of Scheduled Tribe In Andhra Pradesh, India, Venkatanarayana Motkuri Mr.

Venkatanarayana Motkuri Mr.

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The Psychology Of Residential Developers: Lessons From Behavioral Economics And Additional Explanations For Satisficing, Rayman Mohamed Jan 2006

The Psychology Of Residential Developers: Lessons From Behavioral Economics And Additional Explanations For Satisficing, Rayman Mohamed

Rayman Mohamed

Researchers have repeatedly observed satisficing by residential developers. The phenomenon has been attributed to their bounded rationality. In response, policy makers have designed policies that reduce risks to assist developers in overcoming bounds on their rationality. However, after decades of such policies, there is little evidence that developers have stopped satisficing. This article argues that bounded rationality is an insufficient explanation for satisficing by small developers. Lessons from behavioral economics suggest additional reasons for satisficing by developers. Satisficing is common because developers bracket projects one at a time, bracket each investment decision in isolation of others, create nonfungible investment accounts, …

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Dewey: The First Ghost-Buster?, Leslie Marsh Jan 2006

Dewey: The First Ghost-Buster?, Leslie Marsh

Leslie Marsh

Ghost-busting, or less colloquially, anti-Cartesianism or non-representationalism, is a loose and internally fluid coalition (philosophical and empirical) comprising Dynamical, Embodied, Extended, Distributed, and Situated (DEEDS) theories of cognition. Gilbert Ryle – DEEDS’ anglophonic masthead [1] – supposedly exorcised the Cartesian propensity to postulate mind as an apparition-like entity somehow situated in the body. Ryle’s behaviouristic recommendation was, that just as we don’t see the wind blowing but only see the trees waving, so too should we conceive intelligence as manifest though action. The Cartesian ghost of old has mutated, taking the form of the ‘Machine in the Machine’, the brain …

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Introduction To Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Jan 2006

Introduction To Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

Combinatorial auctions are those auctions in which bidders can place bids on combinations of items, called “packages,” rather than just individual items. The study of combinatorial auctions is inherently interdisciplinary. Combinatorial auctions are in the first place auctions, a topic extensively studied by economists. Package bidding brings in operations research, especially techniques from combinatorial optimization and mathematical programming. Similarly, computer science is concerned with expressiveness of various bidding languages, and algorithmic aspects of the combinatorial problem. The study of combinatorial auctions thus lies at the intersection of economics, operations research, and computer science. In this book, we look at combinatorial …

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The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom Jan 2006

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Paul Milgrom

Peter Cramton

We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-final proxy round. The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock auction with the efficiency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve efficiency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents most collusive bidding strategies.

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Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Jan 2006

Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

A comprehensive book on combinatorial auctions―auctions in which bidders can bid on packages of items. The book consists of original material intended for researchers, students, and practitioners of auction design. It includes a foreword by Vernon Smith, an introduction to combinatorial auctions, and twenty-three cross-referenced chapters in five parts. Part I covers mechanisms, such as the Vickrey auction and the ascending proxy auction. Part II is on bidding and efficiency issues. Part III examines computational issues and algorithmic considerations, especially the winner determination problem―how to identify the (tentative) winning set of bids that maximizes revenue. Part IV discusses implementation and …

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Dynamic Auctions In Procurement, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Jan 2006

Dynamic Auctions In Procurement, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

We study the theory and practical implementation of dynamic procurement auctions. We consider the procurement of many related items. With many related items, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner’s curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder’s decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Three auction formats are considered: simultaneous descending auctions are preferred if the items are not divisible, simultaneous clock auctions are desirable for procuring many divisible goods, and the clock-proxy auction is best if complementarities among items are strong and varied across the suppliers. We examine the properties …

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Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg Jan 2006

Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, Richard Steinberg

Peter Cramton

The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids enable price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.

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