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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 271 - 281 of 281
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Visibility Of Contributions And Cost Of Information: An Experiment On Public Goods, Anya Savikhin, Roman M. Sheremeta
Visibility Of Contributions And Cost Of Information: An Experiment On Public Goods, Anya Savikhin, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
We experimentally investigate the impact of visibility of information about contributors on contributions in the public goods game. We systematically consider several treatments that are similar to a wide range of situations in practice. First, we vary the cost of viewing identifiable information about contributors. Second, we vary recognizing all, top or bottom contributors. We find that recognizing all contributors significantly increases contributions relative to the baseline. Recognizing only the top contributors is not significantly different from not recognizing contributors, but recognizing only the bottom contributors is as effective as recognizing all contributors. When viewing information about contributors is costly, …
Fight Or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks In The Game Of Siege, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta
Fight Or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks In The Game Of Siege, Cary Deck, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
This paper examines theory and behavior in a two-player game of siege, sequential attack and defense. The attacker’s objective is to successfully win at least one battle while the defender’s objective is to win every battle. Theoretically, the defender either folds immediately or, if his valuation is sufficiently high and the number of battles is sufficiently small, then he has a constant incentive to fight in each battle. Attackers respond to defense with diminishing assaults over time. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our experimental results indicate that the probability of successful defense increases in the defenders valuation and it decreases in …
Personality And The Consistency Of Risk Taking Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes
Personality And The Consistency Of Risk Taking Behavior: Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jungmin Lee, Javier Reyes
ESI Working Papers
Researchers have found that an individual’s risk attitude is not stable across elicitation methods. Results reported by Deck et al. (2009) suggest that personality may help explain the apparent inconsistency, offering support to Borghans et al.’s (2008) argument that economists should consider a multi‐domain approach to measuring risk attitudes. This paper uses laboratory methods to compare risk attitudes as measured by the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure under two different frames. We find that, as in Deck et al. (2009), one’s willingness to take financial risks (as measured by Weber et al. 2002) significantly affects behavior; however the effect is …
Perfect And Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring In A Minimum-Effort Game, Cary Deck, Nikos Nikiforakis
Perfect And Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring In A Minimum-Effort Game, Cary Deck, Nikos Nikiforakis
ESI Working Papers
This paper presents the results from a minimum-effort game in which individuals can observe the choices of others in real time. We find that under perfect monitoring almost all groups coordinate at the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, when individuals can only observe the actions of their immediate neighbors in a circle network, monitoring improves neither coordination nor efficiency relative to a baseline treatment without real-time monitoring. We argue that the inefficiency of imperfect monitoring is due to information uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the interpretation of the information available regarding the actions of others.
Price Increasing Competition? Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jingping Gu
Price Increasing Competition? Experimental Evidence, Cary Deck, Jingping Gu
ESI Working Papers
Economic intuition suggests that increased competition generates lower prices. However, recent theoretical work shows that a monopolist may charge a lower price than a firm facing a competitor selling a differentiated product. The direction of the price change when competition is introduced is dependent upon the joint distribution of buyer values for the two products. We explore this relationship using controlled laboratory experiments. Our results indicate that the distribution of buyer values does affect prices in a manner consistent with the theoretical predictions, although price increasing competition is rare due in part to overly intense competition regardless of the distribution …
The Attack And Defense Of Weakest-Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta
The Attack And Defense Of Weakest-Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta
ESI Working Papers
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker‟s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender‟s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of …
Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, Vernon Smith
Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, Vernon Smith
ESI Working Papers
In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the “price system.” The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took …
Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson
Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson
ESI Working Papers
If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this paper we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. We find that the absence of property rights clearly decreases wealth in our environment and that interest in establishing property rights is a key determinant of the decision to migrate to a new region. Theft is nearly eliminated among migrants, resulting in strong growth, and non-migrants …
High Stakes Behavior With Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences With Holt-Laury Gambles, John Dickhaut, Daniel Houser, Jason A. Aimone, Dorina Tila, Cathleen Johnson
High Stakes Behavior With Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences With Holt-Laury Gambles, John Dickhaut, Daniel Houser, Jason A. Aimone, Dorina Tila, Cathleen Johnson
ESI Working Papers
A continuing goal of experiments is to understand risky decisions when the decisions are important. Often a decision’s importance is related to the magnitude of the associated monetary stake. Khaneman and Tversky (1979) argue that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices (since subjects have no incentive to answer questions falsely.) However, results reported by Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL), as well as replications by Harrison (2005) suggest that decisions in “high” monetary payoff environments are not well-predicted by questionnaire responses. Thus, a potential implication of the HL results is that studying …
Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers?, Ryan Oprea, David Porter, Chris Hibbert, Robin Hanson, Dorina Tila
Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers?, Ryan Oprea, David Porter, Chris Hibbert, Robin Hanson, Dorina Tila
ESI Working Papers
We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they signicantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we find evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to influence the beliefs of observers, we find no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result.
Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut
Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut
ESI Working Papers
This article develops a method for drawing samples from which it is impossible to infer any quantile or moment of the underlying distribution. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects, essentially because it is impossible for the experimenter. We describe our method mathematically, illustrate it in simulations, and then test it in a laboratory experiment. Our technique does not withhold sampling information, does not assume that the subject is incapable of making statistical inferences, is replicable across experiments, and requires …