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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually allocate their private goods among consumption, investment in production, and replenishing/ refurbishing a depreciating public facility in a dynamic game with long-term investment opportunities. The public facility is financed either by voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC) or taxes. We find that rates of taxation chosen by majority vote remain at an intermediate level (far from zero or 100%), and the experimental economies sustain public goods at levels between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima. This contrasts with a rapid decline of public goods under VAC. Both the payoff …
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Theory And Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Financing Of Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Theory And Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public facility is financed either by anonymous voluntary contributions or by taxing agents on their income from private production. Agents start with an endowment of private goods and money, while the government starts with an endowment of public good and money. All private goods produced are tendered for sale in exchange for money in a sell-all market mechanism. Agents’ proceeds from sale are taxed, and they individually allocate their private goods between current consumption and investment in production for the following period. The optimal levels of supply …
Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Public Goods Through Taxation In A General Equilibrium Economy: Experimental Evidence, Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, Shyam Sunder
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in which agents individually allocate their private goods among consumption, investment in production and maintenance of a depreciating public facility. The public facility is financed either by voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC) or taxes. We find that rates of taxation chosen by majority vote remain at an intermediate level, converging neither to zero nor to 100%, and the experimental economies sustain public goods at levels between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima. This contrasts with a rapid decline of public goods under voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC). Both the payoff efficiency and production …
Financial Control Of A Competitive Economy Without Randomness, Ioannis Karatzas, Martin Shubik, William D. Sudderth
Financial Control Of A Competitive Economy Without Randomness, Ioannis Karatzas, Martin Shubik, William D. Sudderth
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The monetary and fiscal control of a simple economy without outside randomness is studied here from the micro-economic basis of a strategic market game. The government’s bureaucracy is treated as a public good that provides services at a cost. A conventional public good is also considered.
Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat Of Expropriation, Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer
Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts Under Threat Of Expropriation, Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner’s optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended …