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Articles 61 - 69 of 69
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Collective Choice And The Lindahl Allocation Method, Ted Bergstrom
Collective Choice And The Lindahl Allocation Method, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper contains a proof of the existence of Lindahl equilibrium in a very general model of externalities, public goods, and non-selfish preferences. The trick in this paper is to treat all goods as pure public goods, with private goods and their competitive prices treated as special cases induced by special structure within the public goods, Lindahl framework.
How To Discard Free Disposability--At No Cost, Ted Bergstrom
How To Discard Free Disposability--At No Cost, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper shows how to prove the existence of competitive equilibrium without assuming either monotonic preferences or free disposability--and without adding any new assumptions.
The Existence Of Maximal Elements And Equilibria In The Absence Of Transitivity, Ted Bergstrom
The Existence Of Maximal Elements And Equilibria In The Absence Of Transitivity, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper generalizes results of Ky Fan and Hugo Sonnenschein on the existence of maximal elements for non-transitive binary relations. It proves a generalization of Nash's theorem on the existence of non-cooperative equilibrium. It also shows that existence of competitive equilibrium can be proved as a consequence of the existence of a maximal element for an appropriately chosen binary relation.
The Core When Strategies Are Restricted By Law, Ted Bergstrom
The Core When Strategies Are Restricted By Law, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
The alpha-core is defined to be the set of feasible allocations such that no coalition can do better for its members by selecting alternative strategies given “worst-case” assumptions about the behavior of other players. This paper explores the way that the alpha-core of a game is affected by restrictions on the legally admissible strategies of the players. It also explores the relation between Lindahl equilibrium and alpha-cores with suitable restrictions on strategies.
Competitive Equilibrium Without Transitivity, Monotonicity, Or Free Disposal, Ted Bergstrom
Competitive Equilibrium Without Transitivity, Monotonicity, Or Free Disposal, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper shows how to relax several of the standard assumptions used to prove the existence of competitive equilibrium. I thought it was more interesting than the referees did. Some of the ideas in this paper appear in my other papers on general equilibrium.
On Efficient Provision Of Social Overhead Goods, Ted Bergstrom
On Efficient Provision Of Social Overhead Goods, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper was my attempt to build a theory of "public factors of production" such as scientific knowledge and to see whether there is any way that Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory can cope with the nonconvexities that arise. I propose that the economy might be partitioned into provision of "social overhead goods" and ordinary goods in such a way that given the quantities of social overhead goods, the remaining activities satisfy the assumptions needed for the existence of competitive equilibrium. I proposed and examined a notion of "Lindahl-Hotelling equilibrium" in which individuals were assigned Lindahl prices for the social overhead …
Interrelated Consumer Preference And Voluntary Exchange, Ted Bergstrom
Interrelated Consumer Preference And Voluntary Exchange, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper presents a model of interrelated preferences for pairs of individuals. It investigates the possibility of an equilibrium with voluntary transactions. It identifies the puzzling case of two people who disagree because each wants the other to have the better part and shows that if this is assumed away, then there exists a competitive equilibrium with voluntary bilateral gifts.
A Scandinavian Consensus Solution For Efficient Income Distribution Among Nonmalevolent Consumers, Ted Bergstrom
A Scandinavian Consensus Solution For Efficient Income Distribution Among Nonmalevolent Consumers, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
If Persons A and B are both benevolent to C, then a gift from A to C also benefits B. Thus C's income is like a public good to A and B. What happens with lots of people whose affections are entangled? This paper shows that a "distributional Lindahl equilibrium" exists and leads to an efficient income redistribution.
Human Capital In An Economic Growth Model, Ted C. Bergstrom
Human Capital In An Economic Growth Model, Ted C. Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This is my Stanford Ph D thesis. It incorporates "human capital" into an economic growth model. Human capital accumulates because it is a luxury consumption good.