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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Trust In Public Programmes And Distributive (In)Justice In Taxation, Orkhan Nadirov, Bruce Dehning
Trust In Public Programmes And Distributive (In)Justice In Taxation, Orkhan Nadirov, Bruce Dehning
Accounting Faculty Articles and Research
In the tax psychology literature, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the degree of distributive justice in taxation. This article aims to test the relationship between trust in public programmes and distributive justice in taxation at the cross-country level. The sample consists of 47 countries. Trust in public programmes and distributive justice in taxation are measured based on data collected from Wave 7 of the World Values Survey, which took place worldwide in 2017-2022. An Ordered Probit Model was utilised for the empirical analysis. This study finds that if taxpayers support preferential organisations like the police and universities, …
Land Assembly With Taxes, Not Takings, Mark Desantis, Matthew W. Mccarter, Abel Winn
Land Assembly With Taxes, Not Takings, Mark Desantis, Matthew W. Mccarter, Abel Winn
ESI Publications
We use a novel tax mechanism – ‘rejected offer reassessment’ (ROR) – in laboratory experiments to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly. Under this mechanism, if a landowner rejects a developer’s offer, his taxable property value is reassessed to be equal to the rejected offer, increasing his taxes. We find that, relative to a control treatment, ROR discourages the magnitude of seller holdout (but not its frequency) and increases the rate of successful land assembly by almost 60%. It also increases the gains from trade by 22.1% relative to the control treatment, but the difference is not statistically significant.
The Paradox Of Power: Principal-Agent Problems And Fiscal Capacity In Absolutist Regimes, Debin Ma, Jared Rubin
The Paradox Of Power: Principal-Agent Problems And Fiscal Capacity In Absolutist Regimes, Debin Ma, Jared Rubin
ESI Working Papers
Tax extraction in Qing China was low relative to Western Europe. It is not obvious why: China was much more absolutist and had stronger rights over property and people. Why did the Chinese not convert their absolute power into revenue? We propose a model, supported by historical evidence, which suggests that i) the center could not ask its tax collecting agents to levy high taxes because it would incentivize agents to overtax the peasantry; ii) the center could not pay agents high wages in return for high taxes because the center had no mechanism to commit to refrain from confiscating …
Notes On The Effect Of Capital Gains Taxation On Non-Austrian Assets, Dan Kovenock, Michael Rothschild
Notes On The Effect Of Capital Gains Taxation On Non-Austrian Assets, Dan Kovenock, Michael Rothschild
Economics Faculty Books and Book Chapters
This paper is an attempt to assess the effect of capital gains taxation on non-Austrian assets, such as claims to profits of continuing enterprises. As compared to taxation on an accrual basis, the capital gains tax discourages sales of appreciated assets. This is the "lock-in" effect. Because assets subject to capital gains taxation are generally held a long time, conventional estimates suggest that the effective rate of capital gains taxation is low. We contend that conventional estimates could seriously underestimate the effective rate of capital gains taxation because they ignore uncertainty. We construct a model which allows us to calculate …
Taxes And Share Valuation In Competitive Markets, Vernon L. Smith
Taxes And Share Valuation In Competitive Markets, Vernon L. Smith
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
This paper extends the fundamental theorem of share (or capital) valuation under conditions of certainty and purely competitive markets, to allow for the distinction between capital gains and income in the taxation of personal income. The objective is to develop the theorem for the tax case in a form general enough to allow for corporations both currently and not currently paying a dividend. However, the general derivation is sufficiently tedious to warrant a presentation which begins with less general cases. Accordingly, we will first develop the share valuation equation for a continuous discount version of the taxless case for corporations …