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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 181 - 205 of 205
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, Jill E. Fisch
Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It Work?, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Controlling The Dark Side Of Relational Investing, Edward B. Rock
Controlling The Dark Side Of Relational Investing, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Labor Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
Labor Law Successorship: A Corporate Law Approach, Edward B. Rock, Michael L. Wachter
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
As Time Goes By: New Questions About The Statute Of Limitations For Rule 10b-5, Jill E. Fisch
As Time Goes By: New Questions About The Statute Of Limitations For Rule 10b-5, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
In this Article. Professor Fisch examines the history and legacy of Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberston, the controversial 1991 Supreme Court decision that established a federal statute of limitations for private causes of action brought under Rule 10b-5. In Part I Professor Fisch reviews the history of the 10b-5 statute of limitations prior to LampE Part II then analyzes both the issues resolved and questions raised by Lampf. Part III traces the congressional reaction to Lampf that culminated in the addition of section 27A to the Securities Act of 1934. In Part IV, Professor Fisch concludes by …
Taxing Prometheus: How The Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation And Risk-Taking, Michael S. Knoll
Taxing Prometheus: How The Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages Innovation And Risk-Taking, Michael S. Knoll
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper uses recent developments in the theory of optimal capital structure to demonstrate how the federal corporate income tax with an interest deduction, but without a corresponding dividend deduction, misallocates capital within the corporate sector by encouraging investment in low-risk, low-growth projects employing tangible assets over high-risk, high-growth projects employing intangible assets.
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, And The Structure Of Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Confronting The Ethical Case Against The Ethical Case For Constituency Rights, William W. Bratton
Confronting The Ethical Case Against The Ethical Case For Constituency Rights, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Markets, Courts, And The Brave New World Of Bankruptcy Theory, David A. Skeel Jr.
Markets, Courts, And The Brave New World Of Bankruptcy Theory, David A. Skeel Jr.
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
From Legitimacy To Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
On October 16, 1992, after a comprehensive review of its system of proxy regulation and after two separate amendment proposals that drew more than 1700 letters of comment from the public, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission" or the "SEC") voted to reform the federal proxy rules. The reforms were "intended to facilitate shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy voting, and to reduce the cost of compliance with the proxy rules for all persons engaged in a proxy solicitation.' The SEC explained the amendments by stating that the rules were "impeding shareholder communication and participation in the corporate …
Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock
Corporate Law Through An Antitrust Lens, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Economic Structure Of The Post-Contractual Corporation, William W. Bratton
The Economic Structure Of The Post-Contractual Corporation, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Public Values And Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
Public Values And Corporate Fiduciary Law, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Bargaining And The Division Of Value In Corporate Reorganization, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
Bargaining And The Division Of Value In Corporate Reorganization, Howard F. Chang, Lucian A. Bebchuk
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Preaching To Managers, Edward B. Rock
Start Making Sense: An Analysis And Proposal For Insider Trading Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
Start Making Sense: An Analysis And Proposal For Insider Trading Regulation, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Logic And (Uncertain) Significance Of Institutional Shareholder Activism, Edward B. Rock
The Logic And (Uncertain) Significance Of Institutional Shareholder Activism, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch
Frankenstein's Monster Hits The Campaign Trail: An Approach To Regulation Of Corporate Political Expenditures, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The New Economic Theory Of The Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, William W. Bratton
The New Economic Theory Of The Firm: Critical Perspectives From History, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Antitrust And The Market For Corporate Control, Edward B. Rock
Antitrust And The Market For Corporate Control, Edward B. Rock
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton
The "Nexus Of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory In A Time Of Restructuring, William W. Bratton
Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory In A Time Of Restructuring, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Classical Corporation In American Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Classical Corporation In American Legal Thought, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
Classical political economy was dedicated to the principle that the state could best encourage economic development by leaving entrepreneurs alone, free of regulation and subsidy. The development of classical economic policy in the United States dramatically changed the concept of the business corporation. Within the preclassical, mercantilist model, the corporation was a unique entity created by the state for a special purpose and enjoyed a privileged relationship with the sovereign. The very act of incorporation presumed state involvement. State subsidy and the incorporators' public obligation were natural corollaries. Business firms that relied on the market alone to determine their prospects …
Rethinking The Rules Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual Quandries For The Common Law, Anita L. Allen
Rethinking The Rules Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual Quandries For The Common Law, Anita L. Allen
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
The Economics And Jurisprudence Of Convertible Bonds, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
Professor Bratton examines judicial regulation of issuer-bondholder conflicts of interest within three different, but closely related doctrinal frameworks: neoclassical contract interpretation; contract avoidance; and corporate law fiduciary restraint. After discussing the elements of convertible bond valuation and their interaction with issuer actions giving rise to conflicts of interest, he evaluates the case for judicial intervention to protect bondholder interests. He concludes that ·bondholder protective intervention is fair and tolerably efficient, provided it is kept within the bounds of contract interpretation. But he finds that more aggressive judicial intervention under the frameworks of contract avoidance and fiduciary restraint carries an unnecessary …
The Interpretation Of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, William W. Bratton
The Interpretation Of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, William W. Bratton
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.