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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Strategic Party Government And The 2010 Elections, Gregory Koger, Matthew Lebo
Strategic Party Government And The 2010 Elections, Gregory Koger, Matthew Lebo
Gregory Koger
This article applies the strategic parties framework to the 111th Congress and 2010 election results that followed. In 2009-2010, the Democrats pursued an ambitious agenda over the nearly unanimous opposition of Congressional Republicans, leading to a high level of partisanship on both sides. This partisanship was costly in the 2010 elections. Like other papers on this election, we find some evidence that key roll calls were linked to decreased electoral vote share. However, the clearer pattern is that overall patterns of partisanship had a consistent detrimental effect on incumbents running for reelection.
Polarized Agents: Campaign Contributions By Lobbyists, Gregory Koger, Jennifer Nicoll Victor
Polarized Agents: Campaign Contributions By Lobbyists, Gregory Koger, Jennifer Nicoll Victor
Gregory Koger
Are professional lobbyists loyal partisans? There are thousands of professional lobbyists in Washington, D.C., who work with members of Congress and their staffs, many of whom also make contributions to congressional candidates and political parties. Although many lobbyists have backgrounds in partisan politics, they may have incentives to give money to candidates from both parties. This article finds that professional lobbyists tend to make personal contributions to their preferred party exclusively.
Strategic Party Government: Party Influence In Congress, 1789-2000.”, Matthew J. Lebo, Adam J. Mcglynn, Gregory Koger
Strategic Party Government: Party Influence In Congress, 1789-2000.”, Matthew J. Lebo, Adam J. Mcglynn, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we …
Cloture Reform And Party Government In The Senate, 1918 To 1925, Gregory Koger
Cloture Reform And Party Government In The Senate, 1918 To 1925, Gregory Koger
Gregory Koger
Why does filibustering persist in the U.S. Senate? This article analyzes senators' preferences toward majority cloture from 1918 to 1925, a crucial period in Senate history. I find that majority party members were more likely to support stricter cloture rules, but support for cloture reform diminished within both parties for senators far from the party median. I find little evidence that support or opposition to cloture reform was linked to seniority, prior House experience, legislative activism, or state size. These findings are consistent with the micro-level claims of conditional party government theory.