Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Obstruction Scores - Chamber-Congress - 1789-1901.Xlsx, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

Senate Filibuster List 1901-2008.Xlsx, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

Strategic Party Government And The 2010 Elections, Gregory Koger, Matthew Lebo

Gregory Koger

This article applies the strategic parties framework to the 111th Congress and 2010 election results that followed. In 2009-2010, the Democrats pursued an ambitious agenda over the nearly unanimous opposition of Congressional Republicans, leading to a high level of partisanship on both sides. This partisanship was costly in the 2010 elections. Like other papers on this election, we find some evidence that key roll calls were linked to decreased electoral vote share. However, the clearer pattern is that overall patterns of partisanship had a consistent detrimental effect on incumbents running for reelection.

The Rise Of The 60-Vote Senate, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

How did the Senate transform into a supermajority legislature? To answer this question, we must have a clear understanding of what filibustering was like before 1960, and why senators abandoned this system. I begin with some definitions and a quick historical survey, and then explain the emergence of the sixty-vote Senate.

The Past And Future Of The Supermajority Senate, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

The distinguishing feature of the modern U.S. Senate is the ability of any senator to block legislation and nominations, forcing the rest of the chamber to limit debate using a slow process that requires a 60-vote supermajority. This article explains the development of this new and powerful veto in the legislative process, its use as a minority party veto, and then reviews options for restoring the balance between governance and deliberation.

The Electoral Consequences Of Party Loyalty In Congress, Jamie Carson, Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, Everett Young

Gregory Koger

To what extent is party loyalty a liability for incumbent legislators? Past research on legislative voting and elections suggests that voters punish members who are ideologically “out of step” with their districts. In seeking to move beyond the emphasis in the literature on the effects of ideological extremity on legislative vote share, we examine how partisan loyalty can adversely affect legislators' electoral fortunes. Specifically, we estimate the effects of each legislator's party unity—the tendency of a member to vote with his or her party on salient issues that divide the two major parties—on vote margin when running for reelection. Our …

Cooperative Party Factions In American Politics, Gregory Koger, Seth Masket, Hans Noel

Gregory Koger

What are the primary factions within the Democratic and Republican parties, and to what extent do rival factions cooperate? We address these questions using a unique data set of information sharing between party organizations, media outlets, 527s, and interest groups. Using social network methods, we identify two major information-sharing clusters, or expanded party networks; these networks correspond to a liberal/Democratic grouping and a conservative/Republican grouping. We further identify factions within each party network, but we find a high degree of cooperation between party factions. That is, our data suggest that beneath the intraparty disagreements we observe in primary elections and …

Making Change: A Six-Month Review, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

This article surveys President Obama's policy agenda-setting for the first six months of his term. I consider whether the conditions ripe for an ambitious policy agenda and summarize the logic of Presidential agenda-setting. I use this framework to explain the Democrats' agenda for 2009, summarize their progress thus far, and discuss the implications for the Democratic Party in 2010 and after. Although the Democrats have made significant progress on their policy goals, they have not reaped the full political rewards from this success. Instead, the majority party will likely be judged on the pace of economic recovery and whether they …

Polarized Agents: Campaign Contributions By Lobbyists, Gregory Koger, Jennifer Nicoll Victor

Gregory Koger

Are professional lobbyists loyal partisans? There are thousands of professional lobbyists in Washington, D.C., who work with members of Congress and their staffs, many of whom also make contributions to congressional candidates and political parties. Although many lobbyists have backgrounds in partisan politics, they may have incentives to give money to candidates from both parties. This article finds that professional lobbyists tend to make personal contributions to their preferred party exclusively.

Partisan Webs: Information Exchange And Party Networks, Gregory Koger, Seth Masket, Hans Noel

Gregory Koger

What is a party? We argue that the formal party apparatus is only one part of an extended network of interest groups, media, 527s, and candidates. We systematically measure a portion of this network by tracking transfers of names between political organizations. Our analysis reveals two distinct and polarized networks corresponding to a more liberal Democratic group and a more conservative Republican group. Formal party organizations, like the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee, tend to receive information within their respective networks, which suggests that other groups serve to funnel information toward the formal party.

Effort, Intensity And Position Taking: Reconsidering Obstruction In The Pre-Cloture Senate, Kathleen Bawn, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

Effort is a crucial element of the legislative process — writing bills, forming coalitions, crafting strategies, and debating. We develop a model in which legislative decisions are the product of competitive effort by two teams, one trying to pass new legislation, and the other to block it. Teams choose effort levels based on preferences over the policy outcome, political rewards for effort, and opportunity costs, and the team that produces more effort wins. We apply this model to four cases of major legislation from the pre-cloture Senate: passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the Ship Purchase Act of …

Filibustering And Majority Rule In The Senate: The Contest Over Judicial Nominations, 2003-2005, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

This chapter proves a simple point: the Senate could be a much more majoritarian chamber than it is. Presumably, as in the House, the majority party would benefit from restrictions on filibustering. Howevver, senators have been reluctant to make major reforms, even when they are members of the majority party and their party’s agenda is being thwarted by Senate minorities. The”nuclear option” contest over judicial nominations from 2003 to 2005 illustrates one source of this stability: the minority party may refrain from obstruction in the face of a threat to curtail the right to filibuster.

Strategic Party Government: Party Influence In Congress, 1789-2000.”, Matthew J. Lebo, Adam J. Mcglynn, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

Why does the influence of Congressional parties fluctuate over time Building on prevailing answers, we develop a model, Strategic Party Government, which highlights the electoral motives of legislative parties and the strategic interaction between parties. We test this theory using the entire range of House and Senate party behavior from 1789 to 2000 and find that the strategic behavior of parties complements members' preferences as an explanation for variation in party influence. Specifically, the strongest predictors of one party's voting unity are the unity of the opposing party and the difference between the parties in the preceding year. Moreover, we …

Filibuster Reform In The Senate, 1913-17, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

This chapter explains the adoption of the Senate's first cloture rule in 1917, specifically why the Senate adopted a supermajority (2/3) rule and why this event occurred in 1917.

Cloture Reform And Party Government In The Senate, 1918 To 1925, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

Why does filibustering persist in the U.S. Senate? This article analyzes senators' preferences toward majority cloture from 1918 to 1925, a crucial period in Senate history. I find that majority party members were more likely to support stricter cloture rules, but support for cloture reform diminished within both parties for senators far from the party median. I find little evidence that support or opposition to cloture reform was linked to seniority, prior House experience, legislative activism, or state size. These findings are consistent with the micro-level claims of conditional party government theory.

Position-Taking And Cosponsorship In The U.S. House, Gregory Koger

Gregory Koger

Bill cosponsorship has become an important part of the legislative and electoral process in the modern House of Representatives. Using interviews with congressional members and staff, I explain the role of cosponsorship as a signal to agenda setters and a form of position taking for constituents. Regression analysis confirms that cosponsoring varies with a member's electoral circumstances, institutional position, and state size, but generally members have adapted slowly to the introduction of cosponsorship to the rules and practice of the House.