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City University of New York (CUNY)

Mechanism design

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Full-Text Articles in Physical Sciences and Mathematics

An Assessment Of Strategies For Choosing Between Competitive Marketplaces, Tim Miller, Jinzhong Niu Jan 2012

An Assessment Of Strategies For Choosing Between Competitive Marketplaces, Tim Miller, Jinzhong Niu

Publications and Research

Traders that operate in markets with multiple competing marketplaces must often choose with which marketplace they will trade. These choices encourage marketplaces to seek competitive advantages against each other by adjusting various parameters, such as the price they charge, or how they match buyers and sellers. Traders can take advantage of this competition to improve utility. However, appropriate strategies must be used to decide with which marketplace a trader should shout. In this paper, we assess several different solutions to the problem of marketplace selection by running simulations of double auctions using the JCAT platform. The parameter spaces of these …


A Grey-Box Approach To Automated Mechanism Design, Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Xin Yao, Maria Fasli Jan 2012

A Grey-Box Approach To Automated Mechanism Design, Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Xin Yao, Maria Fasli

Publications and Research

This paper presents an approach to automated mechanism design in the domain of double auctions. We describe a novel parameterized space of double auctions, and then introduce an evolutionary search method that searches this space of parameters. The approach evaluates auction mechanisms using the framework of the TAC Market Design Game and relates the performance of the markets in that game to their constituent parts using reinforcement learning. Experiments show that the strongest mechanisms we found using this approach not only win the Market Design Game against known, strong opponents, but also exhibit desirable economic properties when they run in …


What The 2007 Tac Market Design Game Tells Us About Effective Auction Mechanisms, Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter Mcburney, Enrico Gerding Jan 2010

What The 2007 Tac Market Design Game Tells Us About Effective Auction Mechanisms, Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter Mcburney, Enrico Gerding

Publications and Research

This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these entries. The paper also attempts to relate market dynamics to the auction rules adopted by these entries and their adaptive strategies via a set of post-tournament experiments. Based on this analysis, the paper speculates about the design of effective auction mechanisms, both in the setting of this competition and in the more general case.