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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Neuroscience and Neurobiology
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological phenomenon of consciousness.
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Insects Have The Capacity For Subjective Experience, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
To what degree are non-human animals conscious? We propose that the most meaningful way to approach this question is from the perspective of functional neurobiology. Here we focus on subjective experience, which is a basic awareness of the world without further reflection on that awareness. This is considered the most basic form of consciousness. Tellingly, this capacity is supported by the integrated midbrain and basal ganglia structures, which are among the oldest and most highly conserved brain systems in vertebrates. A reasonable inference is that the capacity for subjective experience is both widespread and evolutionarily old within the vertebrate lineage. …
Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown
Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Arguments against the fact that fish feel pain repeatedly appear even in the face of growing evidence that they do. The standards used to judge pain perception keep moving as the hurdles are repeatedly cleared by novel research findings. There is undoubtedly a vested commercial interest in proving that fish do not feel pain, so the topic has a half-life well past its due date. Key (2016) reiterates previous perspectives on this topic characterised by a black-or-white view that is based on the proposed role of the human cortex in pain perception. I argue that this is incongruent with our …
Fighting Forms Of Expression, Paul J.B. Hart
Fighting Forms Of Expression, Paul J.B. Hart
Animal Sentience
Even though Key (2016) has done a very thorough job of assembling evidence showing that fish are unlikely to have the neurological capacity to be conscious and feel pain, there will still be a significant number of behavioural biologists who want to continue maintaining that fish do have consciousness and suffer from pain. In this commentary the reasons for people resisting the conclusions of the evidence are discussed. The reasons revolve around three aspects of the debate: the overblown respect humans have for the powers of consciousness in our day-to-day behaviour, the often used assumption that the possession of complex …
Drawing The Line On Pain, Bjorn Merker
Drawing The Line On Pain, Bjorn Merker
Animal Sentience
The structure of Key's (2016) argument that fish do not feel pain is flawed, betraying a fundamental lack of understanding of the nature of feelings and their role in the brain's functional division of labor. The evidence Key marshals in support of his premature commitment to an exclusively corticocentric view of consciousness in humans is plagued by repeated failures of scholarship.