Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Zoology (432)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (421)
- Ecology and Evolutionary Biology (415)
- Arts and Humanities (409)
- Philosophy (408)
-
- Evolution (396)
- Psychology (380)
- Ethics and Political Philosophy (377)
- Cognition and Perception (373)
- Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology (356)
- Philosophy of Mind (348)
- Neuroscience and Neurobiology (341)
- Cognitive Neuroscience (336)
- Animal Studies (25)
- Medicine and Health Sciences (15)
- Behavior and Ethology (11)
- Law (11)
- Veterinary Medicine (11)
- Animal Law (10)
- Comparative Psychology (9)
- Aquaculture and Fisheries (8)
- Other Animal Sciences (8)
- Behavioral Neurobiology (7)
- Bioethics and Medical Ethics (7)
- Biology (7)
- Biodiversity (6)
- Environmental Studies (6)
- Marine Biology (6)
- Keyword
-
- Sentience (44)
- Consciousness (35)
- Pain (27)
- Welfare (24)
- Fish (23)
-
- Cognition (20)
- Animal welfare (18)
- Evolution (14)
- Animal cognition (11)
- Emotions (11)
- Sheep (11)
- Dogs (9)
- Emotion (9)
- Ethics (9)
- Jealousy (9)
- Nociception (9)
- Animal sentience (8)
- Brain (8)
- Animal consciousness (7)
- Animal rights (7)
- Feelings (7)
- Mind (7)
- Precautionary principle (7)
- Animal ethics (6)
- Animal suffering (6)
- Cognitive dissonance (6)
- Hard problem (6)
- Intelligence (6)
- Invertebrates (6)
- Wild animal suffering (6)
Articles 1 - 30 of 454
Full-Text Articles in Animal Sciences
What Does Sentience Mean At The Neural Level?, Björn Brembs
What Does Sentience Mean At The Neural Level?, Björn Brembs
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch's (2025) LSE criteria for sentience include motivational trade-offs, exemplified by C. elegansweighing hunger against desiccation risk. Yet once the neural circuit is known, this "trade-off" reduces to a single inhibitory synapse—an ‘elemental’ account discrediting the ‘molar’ one. My commentary illustrates the same discrepancy in Drosophila: dopaminergic ramping during courtship as it progressively suppresses threat-detecting neurons; so persistence past danger reflects recalibrated valuation rather than a weighed decision. As neurobiology increasingly discovers such discrepancies, all criteria resting on behavioral classifications risk being defined away without altering the behavior's validity.
Dimensional Welfare Beyond Pain: Extending The Precautionary Principle In Birch’S “The Edge Of Sentience”, Willa M. Lane, Nicola S. Clayton
Dimensional Welfare Beyond Pain: Extending The Precautionary Principle In Birch’S “The Edge Of Sentience”, Willa M. Lane, Nicola S. Clayton
Animal Sentience
Birch's (2024) The Edge of Sentience identifies sentience candidates primarily through the pain-focused LSE Criteria. Yet, as Birch himself notes in Proposal 17, sentience is not pain. We argue that statutory welfare protections must therefore reach beyond pain, and that the right tool for doing so is Birch et al.’s (2020) dimensionality framework, which characterises conscious experience across five domains. Used together, the LSE Criteria establish that welfare is at stake, while the dimensionality framework maps what is at stake beyond pain to provide a taxon-specific profile of where captivity impoverishes experience. We apply this approach to invertebrate welfare and …
Natural Behavior Vs. Subjective Experience In Fish Welfare Assessments, Ronald G. Oldfield
Natural Behavior Vs. Subjective Experience In Fish Welfare Assessments, Ronald G. Oldfield
Animal Sentience
Several commentaries on the Oldfield & Bonano (2024) target article proposed that natural behavior should play a larger role in assessing the welfare of fishes in zoos and aquariums. However, the natural-behavior concept of animal welfare has been widely criticized because natural behaviors do not necessarily improve welfare, and unnatural behaviors do not necessarily reduce it. I review the three major concepts of animal welfare — physical health, natural behavior, and affect/feelings — and argue that behavior patterns, whether natural or otherwise, should be evaluated according to their effects on health and subjective experience. Using the affect/feelings concept and the …
Aggression And Fish Welfare: Challenges And Opportunities, Christine M. Soper, Peter D. Dijkstra
Aggression And Fish Welfare: Challenges And Opportunities, Christine M. Soper, Peter D. Dijkstra
Animal Sentience
Oldfield & Bonano’s (2024) [O&B] target article discusses the wellbeing and sociality of bony fishes. Many fish species, such as cichlids, are not only social but territorial. Aggression is normal, but territorial aggression in a captive environment can have a negative impact on welfare. Aggression-related injuries and deaths are prevalent in pet stores as well as research settings. We discuss the need to develop effective methods to minimize the negative consequences of aggression.
The Consciousness Inherent In Chasing Your Tail, Sergio M. Pellis Dr.
The Consciousness Inherent In Chasing Your Tail, Sergio M. Pellis Dr.
Animal Sentience
Who is conscious and how do we know? Complexity in behavior and cognition is certainly a clue that cannot be ignored in identifying this trait, and as Mather’s target article shows, it is hard not to imagine consciousness arising in cephalopods. But how complex is complex? An alternative may be gleaned from the fact that all living things rely on negative feedback to navigate their worlds, and this requires all sentient beings knowing what is to be stabilized in reflection to themselves. If so, consciousness is a universal trait.
More Equal Than Others: Taxonomic Bias In Animal Management, Barrett L. Christie
More Equal Than Others: Taxonomic Bias In Animal Management, Barrett L. Christie
Animal Sentience
Oldfield & Bonano (2024) point out not only the scarcity of research on fish welfare but also significant taxonomic bias in broader research on these species. This bias extends to the management practices of aquaria and zoos, where the focus is on higher vertebrates. More resources need to be allocated to research to address this disparity. We also need to develop welfare constructs that recognize the inherent differences between aquatic and terrestrial species, taking into account the unique ecological contexts and behavioral patterns of fishes.
How Aza Zoos And Aquariums Are Helping To Fill The Gap, Erika Bauer, Grace Fuller, Candice Dorsey
How Aza Zoos And Aquariums Are Helping To Fill The Gap, Erika Bauer, Grace Fuller, Candice Dorsey
Animal Sentience
Oldfield & Bonano (2024) identify significant gaps in scientific knowledge about certain animal taxa, such as reptiles, amphibians, invertebrates, and fish. Despite some efforts, published literature remains limited, forcing decision-makers to rely more on experiential knowledge than scientific evidence. AZA-accredited zoos and aquariums are uniquely positioned to bridge these gaps and advance animal welfare science by fostering collaboration, building partnerships, and promoting multi-disciplinary approaches to welfare assessments.
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Précis Of The Edge Of Sentience: Risk And Precaution In Humans, Other Animals, And Ai, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
We often face grave practical decisions that seem to hinge on whether a system is sentient. This family of cases includes invertebrate animals, people who are unresponsive after brain injury, fetuses, neural organoids, and now AI technologies. We must decide what to do despite ongoing disagreement about the nature of sentience. In our state of uncertainty, we should pragmatically transform the question from “Is it sentient?” to “Is it a sentience candidate, an investigation priority, or neither?”. When a system is a sentience candidate, it is negligent to fail to consider precautions. We should instead evaluate precautions for their proportionality …
Social Learning And Cultural Enrichment For Fish Welfare, Chiawen Chiang, Becca Franks
Social Learning And Cultural Enrichment For Fish Welfare, Chiawen Chiang, Becca Franks
Animal Sentience
This commentary examines how understanding animal culture—shared behaviors and knowledge transmitted through social learning—plays a role in advancing welfare practices for captive fishes. Despite extensive evidence of fishes' complex sociocultural capacities, their psycho-social needs remain underestimated and unmet in zoos and aquaria. We explore what considering fish culture might mean for welfare practices: diverse social learning opportunities, cultural development, and thoughtful group management. More knowledge about wild fishes' lives will help bridge the gap between their full, complex lives and current captive welfare practices.
Why Is Fish Welfare Still So Neglected?, Caroline M. Maia
Why Is Fish Welfare Still So Neglected?, Caroline M. Maia
Animal Sentience
Oldfield & Bonano (O&B) address an important problem in the field of fish welfare, one that calls for greater attention from scientists and practitioners. O&B show that fish welfare, particularly at the psychological level, is under-investigated. They focus mainly on zoos and aquaria, but their concerns extend also to other domains, including fish farming. Fish are sentient animals; priority should be given to their welfare in all environments where they are under human care.
Understanding The Welfare Of Aquarium Fish, Paul Rose
Understanding The Welfare Of Aquarium Fish, Paul Rose
Animal Sentience
Bony fishes (Osteichthyes) are prevalent in public and domestic aquaria, yet evidence-based welfare practices exist for only a limited number of species. Oldfield & Bonano’s (O&B’s) target article highlights critical questions about the wellbeing and sociality of Osteichthyes. Advancing research on their biology, physiology, psychology, and behavior is essential to develop and validate welfare measures, ensuring guidelines for welfare-focused housing and husbandry.
Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau
Précis Of: "Birds, Bats And Minds: Tales Of A Revolutionary Scientist, Donald R. Griffin", Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
Donald Griffin co-discovered bat sonar and founded the field of echolocation. He studied bird migration and founded Cognitive Ethology, the study of animal awareness and mental experiences. In all these endeavors, he faced hostile opposition. The biography (Ristau 2024) examines Griffin's life and the scientific explorations by him and others in these fields. This Précis emphasizes his arguments and supporting evidence for animal consciousness as well as his later research. Griffin considered the inhibiting assumptions made by scientists, including Cartesian views, the misunderstanding of innate behaviors, prejudice against lower animals, concern with violations of parsimony, and the assertions of the …
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Psychological And Social Well-Being Of Bony Fishes In Zoos And Aquariums, Ronald G. Oldfield, Patrick Bonano
Animal Sentience
Research on the behaviour of animals in zoos has been conducted for decades, and observations have provided information that has improved the psychological and social well-being of animals. However, research on fishes in zoos and aquariums seems to be lacking. Here, we assess the current state of research on fishes in zoos and aquariums by surveying the peer-reviewed literature. Our assessment differs from previous surveys in that we examine the taxonomic classes Chondrichthyes (sharks and rays) and Osteichthyes (bony fishes) separately. Our survey finds that bony fishes have been drastically underrepresented in zoo journals, more drastically than chondrichthyans, revealing an …
Species Vary In Within-Species Variability, Jennifer Vonk
Species Vary In Within-Species Variability, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Owens et al. (2024) add to the growing voices stressing the importance of considering individual differences in animal welfare and conservation. I advocate for an additional emphasis on the importance of between species comparisons of the degree of individual variation in cognition and emotion within species. A better understanding of the factors predicting within-species variability will help conservationists target their efforts. Additionally, I caution against invoking circularity in using “behavioural traits” to predict related behaviours.
Complexities Of Consistent Individual Behavioral Differences In Effective Wildlife Management, Nathalie R. Sommer
Complexities Of Consistent Individual Behavioral Differences In Effective Wildlife Management, Nathalie R. Sommer
Animal Sentience
The study of animal personality, or consistent individual behavioral differences, has faced numerous challenges since its inception, including terminological disputes, labor-intensive methodologies, and notable retractions. This commentary explores the mechanisms behind personality traits, questioning the link between personality and sentience, and highlights the bias towards megafauna in wildlife management. It underscores the ecological and ethical significance of considering arthropod personalities and the complexities of integrating personality into wildlife reintroductions. Caution is advised in generalizing personality effects, and the limitations of current measurement techniques are discussed, suggesting that personality traits should be one of many factors in comprehensive management strategies.
Limits To Sentience, Donald M. Broom
Limits To Sentience, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
There are many parallels between cellular function in animals and plants. Plants can have complex interactions with their environments. But they lack a central nervous system, which is a prerequisite for sentience (the capacity to feel). In my view the suggestion that plants are sentient is not only empirically incorrect but potentially harmful to the efforts to protect the welfare of sentient beings.
Complex Floral Behavior Of An Angiosperm Family, Tilo Henning, Moritz Mittelbach
Complex Floral Behavior Of An Angiosperm Family, Tilo Henning, Moritz Mittelbach
Animal Sentience
Segundo-Ortin & Calvo provide a comprehensive overview of the many aspects of plant behavior examined to date. In our view, multiple lines of evidence make it difficult to deny plant sentience. We add further evidence to support the conclusion that plants are sentient organisms. As in animals, the behavior of plants can be seen and studied as an evolutionary trait, subject to and a consequence of increasing complexity in the interactions of plants with their environment. Our example is the evolution of floral behavior in Loasaceae, where complex patterns of stamen movement have co-evolved in interaction with specialized pollinators.
Plant Sentience: A Hypothesis Based On Shaky Premises, Carel Ten Cate
Plant Sentience: A Hypothesis Based On Shaky Premises, Carel Ten Cate
Animal Sentience
Plants may produce fascinating behavioural phenomena for which the label ‘cognitive process’ may be applicable, at least by some definitions. Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (2023) base their hypothesis that plants might be sentient on the premise of demonstrated presence of cognitive complexity. However, the way phenomena are ascribed, and how the term ‘cognitive’ is used by Segundo-Ortin & Calvo, deviates from the common practice in studies of animal cognition, implying greater complexity than seems justified. It thus provides a questionable basis for attributing sentience to plants.
Stress: An Adaptive Problem Common To Plant And Animal Science, Özlem Yilmaz
Stress: An Adaptive Problem Common To Plant And Animal Science, Özlem Yilmaz
Animal Sentience
It is very hard to determine whether plants have “felt states,” but they do have specific states, such as stress, that depend on sensory input from their environment. Plants do not have neurons or brains, but they do have xylem and phloem, as well as many signalling molecules that are dynamically distributed in their bodies, enabling them to produce systemic responses to environmental stimuli. One common topic in plant and animal science that may or may not prove to involve sentience but that does involve the same molecules is stress.
What Can Plant Science Learn From Animal Nervous Systems?, Luiz Pessoa
What Can Plant Science Learn From Animal Nervous Systems?, Luiz Pessoa
Animal Sentience
I welcome Segundo-Ortin & Calvo’s (2023) call for a rigorous science of plant behavior and physiology. My commentary addresses three points drawn from the literature on animal brains that could help elucidate the possibility of cognition and sentience in plants: (1) the presumed requirement of a centralized brain; (2) centralization of control versus heterarchical organization; and (3) connecting plant research with research on animal nervous systems.
Questions About Sentience Are Not Scientific But Cultural, Yoram Gutfreund
Questions About Sentience Are Not Scientific But Cultural, Yoram Gutfreund
Animal Sentience
Abstract: The findings of complex cognitive-like behaviours in plants are surprising and exciting. However, they do not provide a scientific reason for ascribing sentience to plants. The target article, in trying to provide evidence for sentience in plants, exposes the weakness of the science of animal consciousness in general. In this commentary, I try to explain why the scientific method is incapable of resolving the question of which organisms or systems are sentient.
Insentient “Cognition”?, Stevan Harnad
Insentient “Cognition”?, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
A sentient state is a state that it feels like something to be in. Cows have them, cars don’t. Cognitive capacities are a subset of behavioral capacities. Not all behavioral capacities are cognitive (but the distinction is fuzzy). Might the difference have something to do with whether the behaver is sentient?
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Free Will And Animal Suicide, Sabina Schrynemakers
Animal Sentience
David Peña-Guzmán presents two arguments against the view that because only humans have free will only humans can commit suicide: (1) nonhuman animals may possess free will, and (2) the libertarian notion of free will is incompatible with scientific explanation. The free will objection to animal suicide is indeed mistaken, but Peña-Guzmán’s criticism of the libertarian notion of free will seems misplaced. His target should instead be the assumption that free choices must be made consciously or self-reflectively or the assumption that freedom cannot come in degrees.
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Pain Sentience Criteria And Their Grading, Eva Jablonka, Simona Ginsburg
Animal Sentience
On the basis of the target article by Crump and colleagues, we suggest a more parsimonious scheme for evaluating the evidence for sentience. Since some of the criteria used by Crump et al. are not independent and some are uninformative we exclude some criteria and amalgamate others. We propose that evidence of flexible learning and prioritization, in conjunction with relevant data on brain organization, is sufficient for assigning pain-sentience to an animal and we suggest a scoring scheme based on four criteria.
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Truly Minimal Criteria For Animal Sentience, Mark Solms
Animal Sentience
The criteria for determining animal sentience proposed in the target article are sensible but they lack an explicit functional justification for the focus on pain. This commentary provides an abbreviated account of the most basic functional principles that underpin animal sentience and articulates some minimal criteria for determining its presence.
Fine-Tuning The Criteria For Inferring Sentience, Culum Brown
Fine-Tuning The Criteria For Inferring Sentience, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
“Sentience” means the capacity to feel, and feelings are private affairs. Sentience is hence extremely difficult to quantify in nonhuman animals. We have no direct means of determining whether an animal is sentient. Thus we rely on a series of indirect measures or criteria which collectively provide some level of confidence about the probability that an animal is sentient. Crump et al. propose a modified framework based on 8 criteria for estimating the likelihood of sentience in a target taxon. Whereas I very much like their proposed framework, I would suggest a couple of amendments that may improve it further: …
Sentience In Decapods: An Open Question, Mark Briffa
Sentience In Decapods: An Open Question, Mark Briffa
Animal Sentience
Crump et al.’s framework is a powerful tool designed to assist decisions on the ethical treatment of decapod crustaceans. However, the question of whether decapods are sentient (i.e., whether they feel), remains open, perhaps indefinitely. More optimistically, we might design experiments that distinguish among different levels of awareness, sometimes viewed as components of sentience. We should strike a balance between assuming that all organisms are sentient and making unnecessary anatomical assumptions about sentience. Refining current experiments may provide concrete insights about awareness in Decapoda and other taxa.
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Does The Sentience Framework Imply All Animals Are Sentient?, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
The eight criteria proposed in Crump et al.’s framework for evaluating pain sentience in decapod crustaceans are just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to markers that could increase confidence in an animal’s sentience more generally. Some of the commentaries have already pointed out that pain is only one kind of sentience (Souza Valente). It has also already been pointed out that there are other criteria for pain that could be usefully added to the framework’s eight (Burrell). This expansive thinking about criteria that can be used to increase confidence in sentience raisess the question: in an expansive …
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Distinguishing Epistemic And Moral Grounds For Legal Protection, Carlos Montemayor
Animal Sentience
The criteria proposed by Crump et al. are based on various cognitive roles associated with sentience. A subset of them may be sufficient for certain kinds of welfare, but the presence of all of them should be considered as clearly sufficient for substantial kinds of legal protection based on their relation to capacities that we consider essential for moral standing in human beings.
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Sentience In Decapods: Difficulties To Surmount, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
In the target article Crump et al. present 8 criteria to assess whether decapods experience pain. Four of these -- sensory integration, motivational trade-offs, flexible self-protection, and associative learning -- could be used to assess sentience in general. In this commentary I discuss difficulties with using these criteria to provide evidence of sentience in decapods, particularly if this evidence is to change public opinion and policies. These difficulties are lack of evidence, the potential to eventually explain the neurobiological basis of the behaviors chosen as criteria, thereby eliminating any explanatory work for sentience, and the reluctance to bring animals that …