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Articles 31 - 60 of 384
Full-Text Articles in Life Sciences
Lack Of Imagination Can Bias Our View Of Animal Sentience, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Lack Of Imagination Can Bias Our View Of Animal Sentience, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Animal Sentience
How an animal reacts to a sensory stimulus is often used to assess whether that animal can experience feelings such as pain and pleasure. This behavioural path is typically complemented with reference to how a human would normally respond to and experience an analogous stimulus. Together, these approaches can lead to a “hard to imagine otherwise” argument for feelings. It is time to go beyond these qualitative assessments and to now determine whether a nervous system can execute the neural functions necessary for sentience.
A Framework For Evaluating Evidence Of Pain In Animals, Matilda Gibbons, Lars Chittka
A Framework For Evaluating Evidence Of Pain In Animals, Matilda Gibbons, Lars Chittka
Animal Sentience
Crump et al. define eight criteria indicating sentience in animals, with a focus on pain. Here, we point out the risk of false negative or false positive diagnoses of pain. Criteria of different levels of inclusivity are useful for using the precautionary principle in animal welfare considerations, and for more formal scientific evidence of pain. We suggest tightening the criteria -- from more general evidence of sentience to pain alone -- because crucial evidence for animal welfare decisions might otherwise be missed for animals subjected to invasive and injurious procedures.
The Reality And Prevalence Of Animal Sentience, Antonio Damasio
The Reality And Prevalence Of Animal Sentience, Antonio Damasio
Animal Sentience
Rowan et al use findings from neurobiology, clinical neurology, and general biology to argue for the extensive presence of sentience in animals, but they are wisely cautious concerning when in the phylogenetic scale that emergence occurred.
Animal Sentience: History, Science, And Politics, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience: History, Science, And Politics, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer
Animal Sentience
This target article has three parts. The first briefly reviews the thinking about nonhuman animals’ sentience in the Western canon: what we might know about their capacity for feeling, leading up to Bentham’s famous question “can they suffer?” The second part sketches the modern development of animal welfare science and the role that animal-sentience considerations have played therein. The third part describes the launching, by Compassion in World Farming, of efforts to incorporate animal sentience language into public policy and regulations concerning human treatment of animals.
Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley
Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley
Animal Sentience
Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Invertebrates deserve moral consideration. Definition of terms clarifies the relationship between sentience and welfare. All animals have welfare but humans give more protection to sentient animals. Humans should be less human-centred.
Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.
Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell make a compelling case that some invertebrates may be sentient and that our moral obligations in the context of welfare should hence extend to them. Although the case is similar to that made for fishes, there is one obvious difference in that examples of invertebrate sentience probably arose independently from vertebrate sentience. We have unequivocal proof that complex cognition arose multiple times over evolutionary history. Given that cognition is our best tool for indirectly quantifying sentience, it seems highly likely that this multiple polygenesis may also have occurred for sentience. In acknowledging this, we must accept that …
Minds, Morality And Midgies, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Minds, Morality And Midgies, Brian Key, Deborah Brown
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and sentience in these organisms. The implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are dependent on phenomenal consciousness needs to be reconsidered in light of current neuroscientific evidence. We conclude by proposing a neural algorithmic approach for deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience.
Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates
Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates
Animal Sentience
Attention needs to be directed to the processes that control behavior in humans and the adaptive problems that they solved in our early evolutionary environment. The evolutionary mismatch between the current environment and the human brain can yield important insights into the problems that beset us in the context of environmental degradation and nonhuman animal welfare.
Impact Of Uk Sport Fishing On Fish Welfare And Conservation, Tim Q. Holmes
Impact Of Uk Sport Fishing On Fish Welfare And Conservation, Tim Q. Holmes
Animal Sentience
Sport fishing or angling is the capture of fish for recreation or competition, i.e., for entertainment. Contrary to the claims of Key (2016), there is good evidence that fish feel pain and have the capacity for self-awareness (Sneddon et al., 2018; Woodruff, 2017). Wild fish experience a variety of adverse conditions in nature that can harm their welfare, but this does not justify humans intentionally inflicting such conditions on fish solely for our pleasure. This commentary summarises the many ways fish suffer harm to their welfare as a result of sport fishing. There are also discussions on associated activities that …
Affective Sentience And Moral Protection, Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich
Affective Sentience And Moral Protection, Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich
Animal Sentience
We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?
Can Human Neurological Tests Of Consciousness Be Applied To Octopus?, Benedetta Cecconi, Jitka Annen, Steven Laureys
Can Human Neurological Tests Of Consciousness Be Applied To Octopus?, Benedetta Cecconi, Jitka Annen, Steven Laureys
Animal Sentience
If the anatomy, physiology and behaviour of a species differ substantially from our own, can we infer that the species is unconscious? In the daily clinical care of patients with disorders of consciousness we face many similar challenges: our current approach with these patients - a combination of behavioural and brain imaging-based assessments - might also be a viable route to investigating octopus consciousness.
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Exploring Eight-Armed Intelligence Through Film, Tierney M. Thys
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides a rich overview of the elements underlying octopus cognition and behavioral flexibility. Recently, two remarkable natural history films, My Octopus Teacher and The Octopus in My House have explored intimate human-octopus relationships with a wild (Octopus vulgaris) and a captive octopus (Octopus cyanea) respectively. Both films show rare behaviors that offer observations to test new hypotheses as well as a novel perspective on our own human relationships and place within the natural world. An interview with filmmaker Craig Foster from My Octopus Teacher reveals the profound and transformative power of forming a trusting …
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Comparative Cognition And Nonhuman Individuality, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Commentators Washington (2019) and Tiffin (2019) point out that the individual vs. collective dichotomy is much more complex than what is considered in the target article. This commentary will focus on why individuals are more important than collectives. Species differences in cognition and emotional processes and individuals’ feelings and experiences need to be taken into account.
Invertebrates Should Be Given Ethical Consideration, Marie-Claire Cammaerts
Invertebrates Should Be Given Ethical Consideration, Marie-Claire Cammaerts
Animal Sentience
Invertebrates are far more numerous than vertebrates. Most of them are essential to the survival of humanity. Their physiology, behavior, know-how, and cognitive abilities are often as complex as those of vertebrates. Invertebrates should be considered and studied as are vertebrates, i.e., ethically, and cautiously.
Do Arthropods Respond To Noxious Stimuli Purely By Reflex?, Robert W. Elwood
Do Arthropods Respond To Noxious Stimuli Purely By Reflex?, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong to dismiss the idea of sentience in invertebrates. Here, I expand on the evidence for crustaceans responding to noxious stimuli in ways that are not explained by mere reflexes, and that are consistent with pain. I consider the idea that male praying mantids must not feel pain because they may continue to mate whilst being consumed by the female. I finish with thoughts about the idea that because robots may be constructed to act as if they experience pain, the argument that animals might experience pain is diminished.
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Ethical Considerations For Invertebrates, Scarlett R. Howard, Matthew R.E. Symonds
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) have built on the discussion about which species deserve inclusion in animal ethics and welfare considerations. Here, we raise questions concerning the assessment criteria. We ask how to assess different species for their ability to fulfill the criteria, which criteria are most important, how we quantify them (absolute or on a continuum), and how non-animals such as fungi and plants fit into this paradigm.
Zoonotic Realism, Computational Cognitive Science And Pandemic Prevention, Tyler Davis, Molly E. Ireland, Jason Van Allen, Darrell A. Worthy
Zoonotic Realism, Computational Cognitive Science And Pandemic Prevention, Tyler Davis, Molly E. Ireland, Jason Van Allen, Darrell A. Worthy
Animal Sentience
Using animals in food and food production systems is one of many drivers of novel zoonoses. Moving toward less dependence on animal proteins is a possible avenue for reducing pandemic risk, but we think that Wiebers & Feigin’s proposed change to food policy (phasing out animal meat production) is unrealistic in its political achievability and its current capacity to feed the world in a cost-effective and sustainable manner. We suggest that improvements in communication strategies, precipitated by developments in computational cognitive neuroscience, can lead the way to a safer future and are feasible now.
Tribal Brains In The Global Village: Deeper Roots Of The Pandemic, Robert Gerlai
Tribal Brains In The Global Village: Deeper Roots Of The Pandemic, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
I briefly recap the messages of the target article by Wiebers & Feigin (2020) and the accompanying peer commentaries about what we learn from the COVID-19 pandemic. Using the rapid evolution of viruses as an example of the importance of prevention, I explore why it is difficult for our species to foresee and prevent unintended global changes resulting from human activity. I end with a discussion about the long-term future, the ultimate problem inherent in our current mindset and the structure of our economy: growth.
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Problems With Basing Insect Ethics On Individuals’ Welfare, Susana Monsó, Antonio J. Osuna-Mascaró
Animal Sentience
In their target article, Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) argue that we should extend moral protection to arthropods. In this commentary, we show that there are some unforeseen obstacles to applying the sort of individualistic welfare-based ethics that M&P have in mind to certain arthropods, namely, insects. These obstacles have to do with the fact that there are often many more individuals involved in our dealings with insects than our ethical theories anticipate, and also with the fact that, in some sense, some insects count as more than an individual and, in another sense, they sometimes count as less than an …
Insect Sentience And The Rise Of A New Inclusive Ethics, David Baracchi, Luigi Baciadonna
Insect Sentience And The Rise Of A New Inclusive Ethics, David Baracchi, Luigi Baciadonna
Animal Sentience
Welfare protections for vertebrates are grounded in the belief that vertebrates are sentient and capable of feeling whereas invertebrates are not. We agree with Mikhalevich & Powell that the exclusion of small-brained invertebrates from bioethics is not warranted by the current state of the scientific evidence. The choice to promote protection for certain invertebrates should be based on the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP). This principle should not prevent us from conducting experimental research with non-human animals to advance knowledge. However, we believe that it is important to outline practical guidelines to manage the wellbeing of invertebrates, while accumulating further …
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Whether Invertebrates Are Sentient Matters To Bioethics And Science Policy, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates.
Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara
Lessons From Miniature Brains: Cognition Cheap, Memory Expensive (Sentience Linked To Active Movement?), Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
Studies on invertebrate minds suggest that the neural machinery for basic cognition is cheap, and that bigger brains are probably associated with greater memory storage rather than more advanced cognition. Sentience may be linked to feedforward mechanisms (Reafferenzprinzip) that allow organisms with active movement to distinguish active and passive sensing. Invertebrates may offer special opportunities for testing these hypotheses.
Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez
Becoming The Good Shepherds, Eze Paez
Animal Sentience
It is very important that we clarify what we owe to nonhuman animals. To that end, we need a better understanding of animal cognition and emotion. Marino & Merskin’s target article is a welcome contribution to this project. Sheep, like most other animals, are sentient beings with interests of their own. It is wrong to discriminate against them based on species-membership or cognitive sophistication. We are morally required not to harm them, and to help them have the best possible lives, just as we would be in the case of human beings with similar interests. We must become the good …
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Animal Sentience
Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman propose that dropping the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman animals may reduce the atrocious acts of humans towards nonhuman animals, but will it? Taking Darwinism seriously means accepting physical and behavioral continuity across species, including the capacity to feel pain.
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Domestic sheep (Ovis aries) are among the earliest animals domesticated for human use. They are consumed worldwide as mutton, hogget, and lamb, kept as wool and milk producers, and used extensively in scientific research. The popular stereotype is that sheep are docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid, but a review of the research on their behavior, affect, cognition, and personality reveals that they are complex, individualistic, and social.
Sacrificial Lambs, Clive Phillips
Sacrificial Lambs, Clive Phillips
Animal Sentience
Sheep evolved from the mouflon as mountain animals, able to escape predation by leaping between rock ledges. Their defense was their agility. Humans brought them to the plains, where the agility was less useful, but their lack of aggression, speed or weaponry against predators made them a prime target to become one of man’s meat providers. A perfect animal in many ways, with extraordinary perceptive powers and some remarkable cognitive skills, they are often treated with complete disregard for their welfare. Yet sheep themselves won’t tell us this, for a sheep that alerted others to its weakness really would be …
The Intelligence Of Sheep, David Gamez
The Intelligence Of Sheep, David Gamez
Animal Sentience
This commentary suggests how recent theories about the predictive brain could help us understand the evidence put forward by Marino & Merskin for intelligence in sheep. I contrast predictive intelligence in sheep with automatic behaviors that do not require intelligence, and I consider the flexibility of sheep intelligence.
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Adding Sheep To The Spectrum Of Comparative Psychology, James King
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s comprehensive review of cognitive complexity in sheep is a laudable and important contribution to comparative psychology. It is also valuable because it shows promising directions for future research on this neglected species. The relatively small number of neurons in the bovid cerebral cortex indicates that sheep cognitive performance on traditional measures of complex learning is limited. Nevertheless, the social and emotional complexity of sheep underscores the importance of further research into domains including personality and psychological well-being.