Supreme Court of the United States Commons^™

Originalism's General-Law Turn, Nina Varsava, Bill Watson

Northwestern University Law Review

Originalists are increasingly turning to a general-law theory of constitutional rights. Under this theory, constitutional enactment declared but did not create constitutional rights. The content of those rights was, and remains, a question of general law—a species of common law, regularly employed at the Founding, that transcends jurisdictional boundaries. This preoccupation with general law has precipitated a wave of scholarship developing general-law accounts of various constitutional rights. Yet the nature of general law itself remains poorly understood.

This Article offers a theory of general law. Using philosophical methods to reexamine early American cases and recent work in legal history, the …

Is Originalism Orthodoxy?, Neel Sukhatme

Articles

What theory of constitutional interpretation has the Supreme Court followed? We search Supreme Court opinions for a wide range of sources that originalists identify as central to their methodology, over the entire universe of cases beginning in 1791. We find that for much of Supreme Court history, conventional indicators of originalist practice--citations to Founding-era sources--are largely absent, raising questions about originalism's past orthodoxy. Originalist citation practices are absent for much of the 19th century and grow sharply in the late 20th century. The Article elaborates the implications of these findings for debates in constitutional law.

Should Judicial Opinions Be Read Like Statutes?, Margaret H. Lemos

Northwestern University Law Review

Should judicial opinions be interpreted with an eye to their purpose, context, or the intent of their authors, or should interpreters focus on the ordinary meaning of the text? Opinions present the same sorts of interpretive puzzles as other legal texts, and yet they have been omitted from the debates over interpretive methodology that dominate the fields of constitutional and statutory interpretation. The omission is no accident: the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly—and with increasing frequency in recent years—that judicial opinions are not to be read like statutes. Yet neither courts nor commentators have explained why the principles that ground …

Popular Constitutionalism In A Populist Age, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Popular constitutionalism burst onto the scene as a challenge to the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court. Decades later, popular constitutionalists remain susceptible to one of the earliest (and most potent) critiques of their project—the charge that they have done far too little to explain how their theory might work in practice. With the rise of modern populism, it’s also fair to ask whether popular constitutionalism is an approach that’s capable of meeting the challenges of the current constitutional moment. In this Article, I offer a new vision for popular constitutionalism—one that shows how the theory might work in practice, …

Reconstituting A Constitution, And A Republic: The Architecture Of Authoritarian Rule, J. Maria Glover

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A constitution can be remade without tearing it down, or even changing a single word. It is done by law.

“The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as Congress may establish,” whose “province and duty” it is to “say what the law is.” U.S. Const. Art. III §1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 1 (Cranch) 137 (1803). It is not the power to remake the Constitution that grants it.

The Supreme Court is turning the inherited powers that hold power to law into instruments of its own aggrandizement. It is taking authority from …

From Myers To Slaughter: A Brief Theory Of The Constitutionalization Of Secondary Sources, Dana Neacsu, Paul D. Callister

Faculty Works

For more than two centuries, American constitutional adjudication has relied upon secondary sources. Yet constitutional theory has almost entirely ignored them. Originalism debates constitutional text. Living constitutionalism debates constitutional evolution. Theories of precedent debate judicial authority. None asks a more fundamental question: What role do secondary sources play in constitutional adjudication? This Article argues that the answer has fundamentally changed in the last 100 of years. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's opinion in Myers v. United States (1926) marked a constitutional revolution by transforming secondary authorities from explanatory materials into evidence of constitutional continuity. Exactly one century later, Chief Justice …

Rethinking Judicial Power & Remedial Restraint, Caprice L. Roberts

Catholic University Law Review

This Article maintains that groundbreaking Supreme Court cases reshaping judicial power and restraint are frequently remedies centric. The much- anticipated ruling in Trump v. CASA illustrates this correlation. Interpreting traditional equity, the Supreme Court circumscribed federal judicial power to issue universal relief. The Court relied on Marbury v. Madison to bolster its reasoning on the limits of judicial power. Ironically, both cases denied any remedy while enhancing the potential for future judicial power. Whether via judicial review and supremacy power or the Court’s future ability to now be the only federal court able to issue universal remedies—the Court’s role in …

Popular Originalism, Thomas G. Donnelly

Law Faculty Publications

Scholars are obsessed with the Roberts Court’s recent turn to history and tradition. But another source of authority has also emerged as an important feature of the Roberts Court’s approach to constitutional cases. In previous work, I have referred to this source of authority as popular meaning. While original meaning identifies the best reading of the Constitution’s text at the time of its ratification, popular meaning draws on sources of authority outside the courts to capture the constitutional views of the American people today. In this Article, I demonstrate how interpreters might draw on the Constitution’s popular meaning to help …

A Conversation With Justice Brett Kavanaugh, Brett M. Kavanaugh, J. Joel Alicea

Catholic University Law Review

On Thursday, September 26th, 2024, the Center for the Constitution and the Catholic Intellectual Tradition at The Catholic University of America hosted a conversation between Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh and Professor J. Joel Alicea. This was the inaugural event of the new Center. The conversation covered topics such as constitutional interpretation, the separation of powers, religious liberty, and the Catholic intellectual tradition. This is a transcript of the conversation, and the text appears substantially as it was delivered. The video of the event may be found at this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sKvSwzkmqo.

Second Amendment: Incompatible Methodologies And The Bruen And Heller Opinions' Underlying Misalignment, Henry H. Robinson

Touro Law Review

In its 2022 Bruen opinion, the Supreme Court characterized the Heller opinion as having applied a “methodological approach” for interpretation of the Second Amendment. However, Bruen’s description and summary partially omitted, and was materially misaligned with, Heller’s actual reasoning. In Heller’s first step of constitutional interpretation, which addressed the first clause of the sentence comprising the Second Amendment, the opinion had selectively not applied the methodological approach described in Bruen; Heller’s first step had applied a different, incompatible methodological approach. Bruen’s description was aligned only with the second step of Heller’s constitutional reasoning, which had addressed the sentence’s second clause. …

The Anti-Innovation Supreme Court: Major Questions, Delegation, Chevron And More, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court of the United States has generally been a very aggressive enforcer of legal limitations on governmental power. In various periods in its history, the Court has gone far beyond enforcing clearly expressed and easily ascertainable constitutional and statutory provisions and has suppressed innovation by the other branches that do not necessarily transgress widely held social norms. Novel assertions of legislative power, novel interpretations of federal statutes, statutes that are in tension with well-established common law rules and state laws adopted by only a few states are suspect simply because they are novel or rub up against tradition. …

Orders Without Law, Thomas P. Schmidt

Faculty Scholarship

This Review has two goals. The book, by design, largely steers clear of concrete reform proposals; its object is to trace the ways that the Court’s practices around emergency applications shifted over the Trump years and to urge that these developments warrant critical attention (pp. 24–25). My first goal, then, is to propose some reforms. These proposals orbit around a central contention: Any critique of the shadow docket and any proposed solution must depend, explicitly or implicitly, on a theory of the Court — its role in the constitutional order and how it can best serve that role. As a …

Corpus Linguistics And The Original Public Meaning Of The Sixteenth Amendment, Thomas R. Lee, Lawrence B. Solum, James C. Phillips, Jesse A. Egbert

Faculty Scholarship

Moore v. United States raises the question whether unrealized gains, such as an increase in property value or a stock portfolio, constitute “incomes, from whatever source derived” under the original meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. Moore is widely viewed as the most important tax case to reach the United States Supreme Court in decades. It is also an opportunity for the Court to refine its theory and method of finding original meaning.

We focus here on the original public meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment—the ordinary, common meaning attributed to its text by the general public in 1913. So far, the …

Constitutional Losses And (Some) Statutory Wins For Criminal Defendants: Select Criminal Law And Procedure Cases From The Supreme Court's 2022-2023 Term., Eve Brensike Primus, Mark Rucci

Articles

The Supreme Court’s 2022–23 Term included a number of important statutory interpretation rulings, as well as significant cases concerning the scope of the Confrontation Clause; the Venue, Vicinage, and Double Jeopardy Clauses; the federal courts’ ability to entertain claims of legal innocence; and the contours of the adequate and independent state ground doctrine. It also was the first term for Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson—the first former public defender and first Black woman to join the centuries-old institution. Although Justice Jackson joined a Court ruptured along ideological lines and confronting serious challenges to its legitimacy and ethical standards, she quickly proved …

Ordered Liberty After Dobbs, Linda C. Mcclain, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay explores the implications of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization for the future of substantive due process (SDP) liberties protecting personal autonomy, bodily integrity, familial relationships (including marriage), sexuality, and reproduction. We situate Dobbs in the context of prior battles on the Supreme Court over the proper interpretive approach to deciding what basic liberties the Due Process Clause (DPC) protects. As a framing device, we refer to two competing approaches as “the party of [Justice] Harlan or Casey” versus “the party of Glucksberg.” In Dobbs, the dissent co-authored by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan represents the party of …

Living Traditionalism, Sherif Girgis

Journal Articles

From the Article

This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis of the Court’s living traditionalism, which turns out to include scores of cases spanning every subject and Justices of every stripe. Next, the Article identifies a fundamental but previously unrecognized tension in the method itself: If the Court gives living-traditionalist cases full weight as precedent, it defeats the reasons for using the method at all. Put another way, it is incoherent to treat political practices as a ratchet: capable of moving law in one direction (e.g., against a right in 2022) but not the other (in favor of the right …

Holmes V. Walton And Its Enduring Lessons For Originalism, Justin W. Aimonetti

Marquette Law Review

Originalism is nothing new. And the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1780 decision in Holmes v. Walton shows it. In that case, the New Jersey Supreme Court disallowed a state law as repugnant to the state constitution because the law permitted a jury of only six to render a judgment. To reach that result, the court looked to the fixed, original meaning of the jury trial guarantee embedded in the state constitution, and it then constrained its interpretive latitude in conformity with that fixed meaning. Holmes thus cuts against the common misconception that originalism as an interpretive methodology is a modern …

The Meaning Of Sex: Dynamic Words, Novel Applications, And Original Public Meaning, William N. Eskridge Jr., Brian G. Slocum, Stefan Th. Gries

Michigan Law Review

The meaning of sex matters. The interpretive methodology by which the meaning of sex is determined matters Both of these were at issue in the Supreme Court’s recent landmark decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, where the Court held that Title VII protects lesbians, gay men, transgender persons, and other sexual and gender minorities against workplace discrimination. Despite unanimously agreeing that Title VII should be interpreted in accordance with its original public meaning in 1964, the opinions in Bostock failed to properly define sex or offer a coherent theory of how long-standing statutes like Title VII should be interpreted over …

The People's Court: On The Intellectual Origins Of American Judicial Power, Ian C. Bartrum

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

This article enters into the modern debate between “consti- tutional departmentalists”—who contend that the executive and legislative branches share constitutional interpretive authority with the courts—and what are sometimes called “judicial supremacists.” After exploring the relevant history of political ideas, I join the modern minority of voices in the latter camp.

This is an intellectual history of two evolving political ideas—popular sovereignty and the separation of powers—which merged in the making of American judicial power, and I argue we can only understand the structural function of judicial review by bringing these ideas together into an integrated whole. Or, put another way, …

Textualism’S Gaze, Matthew L.M. Fletcher

Michigan Journal of Race and Law

This Article attempts to address why textualism distorts the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in Indian law. I start with describing textualism in federal public law. I focus on textualism as described by Justice Scalia, as well as Scalia’s justification for textualism and discussion about the role of the judiciary in interpreting texts. The Court is often subject to challenges to its legitimacy rooted in its role as legal interpreter that textualism is designed to combat.

Translating The Constitution, Jack M. Balkin

Michigan Law Review

Review of Lawrence Lessig's Fidelity and Constraint: How the Supreme Court Has Read the American Constitution.

The Traditions Of American Constitutional Law, Marc O. Degirolami

Faculty Publications

This Article identifies a new method of constitutional interpretation: the use of tradition as constitutive of constitutional meaning. It studies what the Supreme Court means by invoking tradition and whether what it means remains constant across the document and over time. Traditionalist interpretation is pervasive, consistent, and recurrent across the Court’s constitutional doctrine. So, too, are criticisms of traditionalist interpretation. There are also more immediate reasons to study the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation. The Court’s two newest members, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, have indicated that tradition informs their understanding of constitutional meaning. The study of traditionalist …

Gun Safety In The Age Of Kavanaugh, Joseph S. Hartunian

Michigan Law Review Online

This Essay takes stock of the different approaches adopted and advocated for in evaluating constitutional challenges in Second Amendment opinions throughout the country. The author’s hope is that doing so will help highlight the contours for debate when the Supreme Court does finally start to define some of the limits purported to exist by Justice Scalia. Part I analyzes the paths explicitly rejected by Heller I by reviewing the limits considered allowable by Justice Scalia. Part II considers the ongoing debate between the courts on the application of “strict” or “intermediate” scrutiny for Second Amendment challenges. Part III examines then-Judge …

Article Ii And Antidiscrimination Norms, Aziz Z. Huq

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Trump v. Hawaii validated a prohibition on entry to the United States from several Muslim-majority countries and at the same time repudiated a longstanding precedent associated with the Japanese American internment of World War II. This Article closely analyzes the relationship of these twin rulings. It uses their dichotomous valences as a lens on the legal scope for discriminatory action by the federal executive. Parsing the various ways in which the internment of the 1940s and the 2017 exclusion order can be reconciled, the Article identifies a tension between the Court’s two holdings in Trump …

Fourth Amendment Textualism, Jeffrey Bellin

Michigan Law Review

The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of “unreasonable searches” is one of the most storied constitutional commands. Yet after decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence, a coherent definition of the term “search” remains surprisingly elusive. Even the justices know they have a problem. Recent opinions only halfheartedly apply the controlling “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and its wildly unpopular cousin, “third-party doctrine,” with a few justices in open revolt.

These fissures hint at the Court’s openness to a new approach. Unfortunately, no viable alternatives appear on the horizon. The justices themselves offer little in the way of a replacement. And scholars’ proposals exhibit …

What Members Of Congress Say About The Supreme Court And Why It Matters, Carolyn Shapiro

Chicago-Kent Law Review

Republican and Democratic senators took strikingly different approaches to Justice Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing. Republicans focused on judicial process—what judges are supposed to do, how they are constrained, and the significance of the constitutional separation of powers—evoking rhetoric long used by the political right. Democrats, by contrast, focused primarily on case outcomes, complaining, for example, that Gorsuch favored “the big guy” over “the little guy” in cases he decided as a judge on the Tenth Circuit. This Article critiques the Democrats’ failure to discuss judicial process and to promote their own affirmative vision of the judiciary and the Constitution. A …

Precedent And Disagreement, Glen Staszewski

Michigan Law Review

A review of Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent.

The Constitutional Law Of Incarceration, Reconfigured, Margo Schlanger

Articles

On any given day, about 2.2 million people are confined in U.S. jails and prisons—nearly 0.9% of American men are in prison, and another 0.4% are in jail. This year, 9 or 10 million people will spend time in our prisons and jails; about 5000 of them will die there. A decade into a frustratingly gradual decline in incarceration numbers, the statistics have grown familiar: We have 4.4% of the world’s population but over 20% of its prisoners. Our incarceration rate is 57% higher than Russia’s (our closest major country rival in imprisonment), nearly four times the rate in England, …

Contra Scalia, Thomas, And Gorsuch: Originalists Should Adopt A Living Constitution, R. Randall Kelso

University of Miami Law Review

Two main approaches appear in the popular literature on constitutional interpretation: originalism and non-originalism. An originalist approach refers back to some aspect of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action to justify a decision. A non-originalist approach bases the goal of constitutional interpretation in part on consideration of some justification independent of the framers’ and ratifiers’ intent or action.

What is often unappreciated in addressing the question of whether to adopt an originalist or non-originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is the complication that emerges if one concludes that the framing and ratifying generation believed in the model of a living …

Conservatives And The Court, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.