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Articles 31 - 60 of 95
Full-Text Articles in Supreme Court of the United States
The Distinctive Role Of Justice Samuel Alito: From A Politics Of Restoration To A Politics Of Dissent, Neil S. Siegel
The Distinctive Role Of Justice Samuel Alito: From A Politics Of Restoration To A Politics Of Dissent, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
Justice Samuel Alito is regarded by both his champions and his critics as the most consistently conservative member of the current Supreme Court. Both groups seem to agree that he has become the most important conservative voice on the Court. Chief Justice John Roberts has a Court to lead; Justice Antonin Scalia and his particular brand of originalism have passed on; Justice Clarence Thomas is a stricter originalist and so writes opinions that other Justices do not join; and Justice Anthony Kennedy can be ideologically unreliable. Justice Alito, by contrast, is unburdened by the perceived responsibilities of being Chief Justice, …
Re-Ordering The First Amendment, Melissa Hart
Time, Institutions, And Adjudication, Gary S. Lawson
Time, Institutions, And Adjudication, Gary S. Lawson
Faculty Scholarship
Some of my earliest and fondest memories regarding constitutional theory involve Mike McConnell. He was a participant at the very first Federalist Society conference in 1982, at a time when the entire universe of conservative constitutional theorists fit comfortably in the front of one classroom. More importantly, at another Federalist Society conference in 1987, he gave a speech on constitutional interpretation that, unbeknownst to him, profoundly shaped my entire intellectual approach to the field by emphasizing the obvious but oftoverlooked point that different kinds of documents call for different kinds of interpretative methods.1 In 2015, it is more than an …
Paths Of Resistance To Our Imperial First Amendment, Bertrall L. Ross Ii
Paths Of Resistance To Our Imperial First Amendment, Bertrall L. Ross Ii
Michigan Law Review
In the campaign finance realm, we are in the age of the imperial First Amendment. Over the past nine years, litigants bringing First Amendment claims against campaign finance regulations have prevailed in every case in the Supreme Court. A conservative core of five justices has developed virtually categorical protections for campaign speech and has continued to expand those protections into domains that states once had the authority to regulate. As the First Amendment’s empire expands, other values give way. Four key cases from this era illustrate the reach of this imperial First Amendment. In Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. …
The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson
The Original Meaning Of "God": Using The Language Of The Framing Generation To Create A Coherent Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, Michael I. Meyerson
All Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court’s attempt to create a standard for evaluating whether the Establishment Clause is violated by religious governmental speech, such as the public display of the Ten Commandments or the Pledge of Allegiance, is a total failure. The Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been termed “convoluted,” “a muddled mess,” and “a polite lie.” Unwilling to either allow all governmental religious speech or ban it entirely, the Court is in need of a coherent standard for distinguishing the permissible from the unconstitutional. Thus far, no Justice has offered such a standard.
A careful reading of the history of the framing …
Constructed Constraint And The Constitutional Text, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel
Constructed Constraint And The Constitutional Text, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
In recent years, constitutional theorists have attended to the unwritten aspects of American constitutionalism and, relatedly, to the ways in which the constitutional text can be “constructed” upon by various materials. This Article takes a different approach. Instead of considering how various materials can supplement, implement, or interact with the constitutional text, the Article focuses on how the text itself is often partially constructed in American constitutional practice. Although interpreters typically regard clear text as controlling, this Article contends that whether the text is perceived to be clear is often affected by various “modalities” of constitutional interpretation that are normally …
Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques And Standards Of Application, Kent Greenawalt
Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques And Standards Of Application, Kent Greenawalt
Faculty Scholarship
At the end of June 2014, the Supreme Court decided one of the most publicized controversies of decades. In a decision covering two cases, widely referred to as Hobby Lobby, the Court held that closely held for-profit corporations, based on their owners' religious convictions, have a right under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to decline to provide employees with insurance that covers contraceptive devices that may prevent a fertilized egg "from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus."
The result has been widely approved by those who favor an extensive scope for religious liberty and …
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
The Limits Of Enumeration, Richard A. Primus
Articles
According to a well-known principle of constitutional interpretation here identified as the “internal-limits canon,” the powers of Congress must always be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would. This Article argues that the internallimits canon is unsound. Whether the powers of Congress would in practice authorize any legislation that a police power would authorize is a matter of contingency: it depends on the relationship between the powers and the social world at a given time. There is no reason why, at a given time, the powers cannot turn out to authorize any legislation that a police …
None Of The Laws But One, Neil S. Siegel
None Of The Laws But One, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
This Symposium contribution explores differences in how congressional Republicans responded to Medicare and how they responded to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Given the narrowness of the constitutional challenges to the ACA that congressional Republicans promoted and the many federal taxes, expenditures, and regulations that they support, this Article rejects the suggestion that today's Republicans in Congress generally possess a narrow view of the constitutional scope of federal power. The Article instead argues that congressional Republicans then and now-and the two parties in Congress today-fracture less over the constitutional expanse of congressional authority and more over the …
Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism And Diet Originalism: Health Benefits And Risks For The Constitutional System, Neil S. Siegel
Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism And Diet Originalism: Health Benefits And Risks For The Constitutional System, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
In Living Originalism, Jack Balkin reasons from two points of view — the perspective of the constitutional system as a whole and the perspective of the faithful participant in that system. First, he provides a systemic account of constitutional change, which he calls “living constitutionalism.” Second, he offers an individual approach to constitutional interpretation and construction, which he calls “framework originalism” or “the method of text and principle.” Reasoning from the systemic perspective, Balkin develops a compelling theory of the processes of constitutional change. Balkin may insufficiently appreciate, however, that public candor about — or even deep awareness of — …
What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority, And The Case Of Originalism, Christopher J. Peters
What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority, And The Case Of Originalism, Christopher J. Peters
All Faculty Scholarship
It is a remarkable fact of American constitutional practice that we cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional interpretation. What can explain our disagreement? Is it the product of a deeper, principled dispute about the meaning of constitutional law? Or is it just a veneer – a velvet curtain obscuring what is really a back-room brawl over political outcomes?
This Article suggests that these, in essence, are the only viable possibilities. Either we disagree about interpretation because we disagree (or are confused) about constitutional authority – about why the Constitution binds us in the first place; or we disagree because …
The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court And The Language Of Abortion Stigma, Paula Abrams
The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court And The Language Of Abortion Stigma, Paula Abrams
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
Why does the Supreme Court refer to the woman who is seeking an abortion as "mother"? Surely the definition has not escaped the attention of a Court that frequently relies on the dictionary to define important terms or principles. And why does the Court choose to describe the fetus as a child? What message does this language send about abortion and the woman who seeks an abortion? The Court's abortion decisions embody an ongoing debate on the legitimacy of constitutional protection of the right to choose. This debate unfolds most obviously as a discourse on constitutional interpretation; disagreements within the …
Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell
Stare Decisis And Constitutional Text, Jonathan F. Mitchell
Michigan Law Review
Almost everyone acknowledges that stare decisis should play a significant role when the Supreme Court of the United States resolves constitutional cases. Yet the academic and judicial rationales for this practice tend to rely on naked consequentialist considerations, and make only passing efforts to square the Court's stare decisis doctrines with the language of the Constitution. This Article offers a qualified defense of constitutional stare decisis that rests exclusively on constitutional text. It aims to broaden the overlapping consensus of interpretive theories that can support a role for constitutional stare decisis, but to do this it must narrow the circumstances …
Taking Responsibilities As Well As Rights Seriously, James E. Fleming
Taking Responsibilities As Well As Rights Seriously, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
In his first book, Ronald Dworkin famously called for “taking rights seriously” by treating them as “trumps” over considerations of utility or the general welfare.1 Taking Rights Seriously (along with other works) provoked calls for taking responsibilities as well as (or instead of) rights seriously, or for engaging in “responsibility talk,” not just “rights talk.”2 In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin himself got on the responsibility bandwagon in justifying the right to procreative autonomy and the right to die.3 He countenanced that government may encourage women to take the decision whether to have an abortion responsibly, so long as it does not …
Prudentialism In Mcdonald V. City Of Chicago, Neil S. Siegel
Prudentialism In Mcdonald V. City Of Chicago, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
At least two kinds of prudential argument have been identified in the literature on constitutional interpretation: court-centered prudentialism and system-centered prudentialism. Commentators often characterize court-centered prudentialism as animated by concern over the Supreme Court’s preservation of its public legitimacy, which can be undermined when the Justices decide controversial questions in ways that cause backlash. By contrast, system-centered prudentialism asks not only what judicial decision is best for the Court’s effectiveness, but also what response is best for the constitutional system as a whole when the Court’s legitimacy is not at stake.
The Court’s recent decision in McDonald v. City of …
Public Consensus As Constitutional Authority, Richard A. Primus
Public Consensus As Constitutional Authority, Richard A. Primus
Articles
Barry Friedman's new book The Will of the People attempts to dissolve constitutional law's countermajoritariand ifficulty by showing that, in practice,t he Supreme Court does only what the public will tolerate. His account succeeds if "the countermajoritarian difficulty" refers to the threat that courts will run the country in ways that contravene majority preference, but not if the "the countermajoritarian difficulty" refers to the need to explain the legitimate sources of judicial authority in cases where decisions do contravene majority preference. Friedman's book does not pursue the second possibility, and may suggest that doing so is unimportant, in part because …
Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley
Constitutional Interpretation And Judicial Review: A Case Of The Tail Wagging The Dog, Michael Halley
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
A response to John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003 (2009). Professor John Manning's analysis of the Supreme Court's recent federalism decisions works as a platform to further the cause of textualism. His argument fails to persuade, however, because the textualism he says the Court should embrace in federalism cases is antithetical to the atextual nature of the Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislation. Manning prefaces his work by telling readers that his analysis is not an end in itself. His aim, rather, is to "use the methodology" the …
Limits Of Interpretivism, Richard A. Primus
Limits Of Interpretivism, Richard A. Primus
Articles
Justice Stephen Markman sits on the Supreme Court of my home state of Michigan. In that capacity, he says, he is involved in a struggle between two kinds of judging. On one side are judges like him. They follow the rules. On the other side are unconstrained judges who decide cases on the basis of what they think the law ought to be. This picture is relatively simple, and Justice Markman apparently approves of its simplicity. But matters may in fact be a good deal more complex.
When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus
When Should Original Meanings Matter?, Richard A. Primus
Articles
Constitutional theory lacks an account of when each of the familiar sources of authority-text, original meaning, precedent, and so on-should be given weight. The dominant tendency is to regard all sources as potentially applicable in every case. In contrast, this Article proposes that each source of authority is pertinent in some categories of cases but not in others, much as a physical tool is appropriate for some but not all kinds of household tasks. The Article then applies this approach to identify the categories of cases in which original meaning is, or is not, a valid factor in constitutional decisionmaking.
Umpires At Bat: On Integration And Legitimation, Neil S. Siegel
Umpires At Bat: On Integration And Legitimation, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
During his confirmation hearings. Chief Justice Roberts captured the public's imagination when he offered an interpretation of the role that judges play in our society when interpreting the Constitution. Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around, he said. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see an umpire.
In this inquiry, I identify some tensions between the …
The New Constitutional Order And The Heartening Of Conservative Constitutional Aspirations, James E. Fleming
The New Constitutional Order And The Heartening Of Conservative Constitutional Aspirations, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
The basic question for this conference is whether we as a people have entered, or are on the verge of entering, a new constitutional order. In 2003, Mark Tushnet published a terrific book, The New Constitutional Order, an expansion of his insightful Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Ambition in the Harvard Law Review.2 The title of that book was an inspiration for the title of this conference. And the title of that article is the basis for the title of my article. For years, liberals and progressives have been anticipating or announcing a conservative revolution …
The Riddle Of Hiram Revels, Richard A. Primus
The Riddle Of Hiram Revels, Richard A. Primus
Articles
In 1870, a black man named Hiram Revels was named to represent Mississippi in the Senate. Senate Democrats objected to seating him and pointed out that the Constitution specifies that no person may be a senator who has not been a citizen of the United States for at least nine years. Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the Democrats argued, Revels had not been a citizen on account of the Supreme Court's 1857 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Thus, even if Revels were a citizen in 1870, he had held that status for only two years. …
Judicial Power And Mobilizable History, Richard A. Primus
Judicial Power And Mobilizable History, Richard A. Primus
Articles
One contribution that law professors can make to constitutional discourse, I suggest, is the nurturing of new mobilizable histories. A "mobilizable history," as I will use the term, is a narrative, image, or other historical source that is sufficiently well-known to the community of constitutional decisionmakers so as to be able to support a credible argument in the discourse of constitutional law. It draws upon materials that are within the collective memory of constitutional interpreters; indeed, a necessary step in nurturing a new mobilizable history is to introduce new information into that collective memory or to raise the prominence of …
A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel
A Theory In Search Of A Court, And Itself: Judicial Minimalism At The Supreme Court Bar, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
Cass Sunstein has prominently and provocatively advocated a theory of judicial minimalism. He has claimed that minimalism provides both an accurate descriptive account of how the Supreme Court decides constitutional cases and a persuasive normative theory of how the Justices should exercise their power of judicial review. In fact, he has written that the October 2003 Term demonstrates the Court's commitment to judicial minimalism.
In this Article, I demonstrate a deep tension between Professor Sunstein's aspiration that minimalism serve as an empirically testable (and thus descriptively accurate) account of the Supreme Court's work, and his ambition that minimalism provide a …
...A Rendezvous With Kreplach: Putting The New Deal Court In Context, Richard D. Friedman
...A Rendezvous With Kreplach: Putting The New Deal Court In Context, Richard D. Friedman
Reviews
The Supreme Court of the New Deal era continues to captivate lawyers and historians. Constitutional jurisprudence changed rapidly during the period. Moreover, some of the most significant changes seemed--whatever the reality--to result from pressure imposed in 1937 by President Franklin Roosevelt's plan to pack the Court. The structure of constitutional law that emerged within a few years of Roosevelt's death remains intact in significant respects today.
Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel
Free-Standing Due Process And Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search For Interpretive Guidelines, Jerold H. Israel
Articles
When I was first introduced to the constitutional regulation of criminal procedure in the mid-1950s, a single issue dominated the field: To what extent did the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment impose upon states the same constitutional restraints that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments imposed upon the federal government? While those Bill of Rights provisions, as even then construed, imposed a broad range of constitutional restraints upon the federal criminal justice system, the federal system was (and still is) minuscule as compared to the combined systems of the fifty states. With the Bill of Rights provisions …
Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis Of Tradition's Role In Constitutional Interpretation, Adam C. Pritchard, Todd J. Zywicki
Articles
In this Article, Professor Pritchard and Professor Zywicki examine the role of tradition in constitutional interpretation, a topic that has received significant attention in recent years. After outlining the current debate over the use of tradition, the authors discuss the efficiency purposes of constitutionalism--precommitment and the reduction of agency costs--and demonstrate how the use of tradition in constitutional interpretation can serve these purposes. Rejecting both Justice Scalia's majoritarian model, which focuses on legislative sources of tradition, and Justice Souter's common-law model, which focuses on Supreme Court precedent as a source of tradition, the authors propose an alternative model--the "finding model"-- …
Progress And Constitutionalism, Robert F. Nagel
Hiding The Ball, Pierre Schlag
Art Of Judgement In Planned Parenthood V. Casey, James Boyd White
Art Of Judgement In Planned Parenthood V. Casey, James Boyd White
Articles
This article was excerpted and abridged with permission from a chapter in Professor White's recent book Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics. In the book, he explores the nature of authority in various cultural contexts. Here he examines the Joint Opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which has been attacked both from the right, on the grounds that it tried to keep Roe v. Wade alive, and from the left, on the grounds that it significantly weakens the force of that case. Professor White, by contrast, admires it greatly, and in this chapter explains …