Securities Law Commons^™

Responsibility Of Investment Bankers To Shareholders, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

No abstract provided.

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …

Protecting Nonshareholder Interests In The Market For Corporate Control: A Role For State Takeover Statutes, Frank J. Garcia

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note describes a phenomenon of modern corporate activity first identified over fifty years ago as the "separation of ownership and control." This separation gives rise to the need for a governing corporate norm; recognizing the normative aspect of this phenomenon has direct implications for the takeover debate.

Part II analyzes the problem of a target board's fiduciary duty as the modern version of the fundamental normative issue of corporate law. It argues that the norm of shareholder wealth maximization, assumed as the starting point by those most in favor of an active and minimally regulated control …

Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has been subtly transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of capital to a system of dominance by the managers, dubbed "managerialism." In many respects, managerialism is beneficial to investors and other enterprise constituencies, since managers' rewards typically grow with the profitability of the enterprise. But managerialism permits drastic wastes of resources when managers hang on to their jobs after they have become inefficient or spend lavishly to defend themselves against takeover bids. Derivative suits, shareholder proposals, independent directors, and other prescriptions have failed to stifle managerial abuses. This is the message …

Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, Victor P. Goldberg

Faculty Scholarship

Should accountants be liable to third parties if they conduct an audit in negligent manner? A half century ago, in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, Niven & Co., Cardozo argued that they should not, unless their performance could be characterized as fraud. In recent years, courts in a minority of jurisdictions have concluded that Cardozo's argument is no longer compelling and they have found that "foreseeable" third parties could bring a tort action for ordinary negligence against the accountants. In addition to being subject to tort actions, accountants may also be liable under federal and state securities laws.

Suits against …

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate Web, John C. Coffee Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Part I will seek to understand why firms trade in the stock market at a substantial discount from their asset value. It will answer that existing theories of the firm have not given adequate attention to a critical area where shareholders and managers have an inherent conflict, one that the existing structure of the firm does not resolve or mitigate. Despite the significant changes in the internal structure of the corporation over the last half century that have been described by business historians, there remains a deep internal strain between shareholders, on the one hand, and managers and employees, on …

Of Lollipops And Law -- A Proposal For A National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, Ted J. Fiflis

Publications

Early last year, Mesa Petroleum Company made a tender offer for shares of Unocal Corporation in an effort to take over Unocal. Unocal responded by using the "lollipop" defense, which is a discriminatory issuer self-tender offer. Unocal's use of this defense resulted in huge economic losses to many of Unocal's small shareholders who were not knowledgeable about the ramifications of their participation or non-participation in the tender offer. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld Unocal's use of this defense as an appropriate exercise of business judgment. A federal district court in California refused to strike down the lollipop under federal law …

Federal Decisional Law Under The Williams Act, Robert A. Profuse

Cleveland State Law Review

The legal requirements relating to tender offers have become a subject of great interest to a broad spectrum of corporate America. Given the frequency of litigation in this context, and the fact that the Williams Act itself and the SEC's rules provide clear answers to only the most basic of questions, analysis and understanding of the federal decisional law relating to tender offers - the principal focus of this Article - is of obvious significance. It constitutes an effort to analyze generally the principal issues raised in the many tender offer cases decided since the enactment of the Williams Act …

Equity Insolvency And The New Model Business Corporation Act, Daniel T. Murphy

Law Faculty Publications

By eliminating earned and capital surplus, the new Model Business Corporation Act may be perceived as providing directors with some additional flexibility regarding distributions to shareholders. As a practical matter however, the statute does not dramatically enlarge the ambit of their discretion. Directors have always had the flexibility to make distributions from both earned or capital surplus. The distributions are still tempered, as they were under the old statute, by the notion of equity solvency. On the other hand, the Comment to new section 45 provides the board of directors with substantial guidance of the proper methodology to use in …

Social Investing And The Law Of Trusts, John H. Langbein, Richard A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

In Part I, after presenting a brief primer on the economics of securities markets, we analyze the economic and policy issues presented by social investing. We conclude that the usual forms of social investing involve a combination of reduced diversification and higher administrative costs not offset by net consumption gains to the investment beneficiaries. Social investing may therefore be economically unsound even though there is no reason to expect a portfolio constructed in accordance with the usual principles of social investment to yield a below-average rate of return - provided that administrative costs are ignored.

Part II relates our policy …

Voluntary Recapitalization, Fairness, And Rule 10b-5: Life Along The Trail Of Santa Fe, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In corporate recapitalizations, the board of directors will sometimes propose a recapitalization plan which substantially alters the “bundle of rights” represented by preferred shares. Although these plans cannot usually be completed without the approval of a majority of the preferred shareholders, the preferred shareholders are at a disadvantage to protect their interests for several reasons. Thus preferred shareholders who are dissatisfied with the change in their rights will sometimes call upon state courts to enjoin the recapitalization on the grounds that it is unfair or fraudulent; state courts, however, have provided only slight protection for preferred shareholders. In this article, …

Securities Law - Rule 10b-5 - Oral Executory Contract To Purchase Securities Held To Provide Sufficient Basis For Standing To Bring Private 10b-5 Action, And Fraud Occuring During The Pendency Fo The Executory Contract Held To Be In Connection With The Purchase Of Securities, Lisa S. Hunter

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

A Reconsideration Of The Stock Market Exception To The Dissenting Shareholder's Right Of Appraisal, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note engages in such a reassessment. It contends, first, that appraisal has not been an unreasonable burden on corporations and that adjustments in the appraisal procedure can eliminate remaining inequities. Next, it asserts that the stock market exception inadequately protects the dissenting shareholder, since a market might, for a variety of reasons, price a shareholder's stock at less than its intrinsic value. Finally, this Note concludes that an appraisal procedure with modifications, and not the stock market exception, reflects the appropriate balance of corporate and shareholder interests.

Providing An Effective Remedy In Shareholder Suits Against Officers, Directors, And Controlling Persons, Michael H. Woolever

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Corporate officers, directors, and controlling persons occupy a fiduciary relationship toward the corporation and its shareholders in the exercise of control over corporate affairs. This fiduciary obligation requires that officers, directors, and controlling persons act in good faith and perform their offices in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders and not to their own advantage. When this duty is breached, a shareholder may bring an action against these fiduciaries, either in his own name or derivatively for the benefit of the corporation. Under present law, however, it may be impossible for an American court to secure jurisdiction …

Perlman V. Feldmann: A Case Study In Contemporary Corporate Legal History, Jan G. Deutsch

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The author gives the following introduction to this article: “When I was a law student, taking a course in introductory corporate law, what was heard around the halls was that most of corporate law would be learned if one understood Perlman v. Feldmann. I agree with that statement, and I have agreed more strongly each year I myself have taught introductory corporate law. Indeed, I now believe one would also learn a good deal about the significance of-the corporation in American life during the past two decades. Unfortunately, however, it seems to me-on the basis of having read everything …

Res Judicata In The Derivative Action: Adequacy Of Representation And The Inadequate Plaintiff, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

It is the purpose of this Note to examine the adequacy of representation in a derivative suit and to consider the appropriateness of applying res judicata to foreclose the corporate cause of action. Discussion will focus on the following areas: (1) the problem of the inadequate plaintiff; (2) the efficacy of judicially created devices designed to ensure the adequacy of representation; and, (3) the feasibility of partially exempting the derivative cause of action from the operation of res judicata.

Shareholder Derivative Actions: A Modest Proposal To Revise Federal Rule 23.1, Robert A. Kessler

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The purpose of this article is to suggest the addition of two words, "if necessary"-or better yet, the phrase "if necessary under the law of the forum state"-to clause (1) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1. This Rule sets forth the requirements for a shareholder's derivative action in the federal courts.

Warrants In Bond-Warrant Units: A Survey And Assessment, Henry B. Reiling

Michigan Law Review

This Article surveys the warrant in the context of a bond-warrant unit (the typical medium of issuance), and in four main subdivisions assesses (I) the warrant's role in corporate finance, and several major implications and features of its use today for (II) shareholders of the prospective issuer, (III) warrant holder, and (IV) issuer. The present status of the warrant as a highly significant mode of financing requires that particular attention be given to the justification for the issuance of warrants in the light of earlier authoritative criticism, and to the tax consequences and concepts now attending their use. Fortunately, several …

The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections On Campaign Gm, Donald E. Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

Proxy contests are generally fought for control of a corporation. The rules governing this form of corporate combat seek to provide shareholders with adequate information about the rival forces for control so that they can intelligently choose between them. The information furnished in proxy materials and discussions at annual meetings have traditionally been devoted almost entirely to subjects such as finance, production, acquisitions, and the like.

Taxation Of Preferred Stock In Corporate Reorganizations, Bruce E. Gagnon

Vanderbilt Law Review

Among the sections added to the revised version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was section 306, designed to close a gaping loophole which might have permitted many taxpayers to withdraw earnings and profits from a corporation through the distribution and sale of preferred stock and to receive capital gains treatment at the shareholder level rather than the dividend treatment ordinarily applicable to such distributions. In this article, Professor Gagnon argues that, as applied to corporate reorganizations, section 306 falls far from its mark. After discussing the purpose and operation of section 306 and related sections, the author suggests …

Restrictions On The Alienation Of Shares Of Stock

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Corporations-Class Actions Under Section 16(B) Of The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934-Federal Rule 23, Richard. J. Archer

Michigan Law Review

Pursuant to section 16 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 an action was commenced by a shareholder to recover for the corporation profits realized by another shareholder through "short swing" transactions in securities of the corporation, the estimated profits being $50,770. Plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit stating the reasons why recovery of the full amount was doubtful and made application for , leave to settle and compromise for $5,000. The corporation's attorney agreed to this proposal. Held, the merits of the compromise cannot be considered until in conformance with Rule 23 ( c), actual notice of the …

Corporations-The Fair And Equitable Test In Recapitalizations, Robert O. Hancox

Michigan Law Review

Changes in capital structures of corporations which modify rights of security holders generally occur under one of two circumstances: (1) reorganization of insolvent corporations which affects the rights of creditors as well as shareholders and necessitates judicial supervision; and (2) recapitalization of solvent corporations involving only the relative rights of the different classes of shareholders. It is the author's present purpose to focus attention on the effect of the latter type of modification on the most zealously guarded right of the preferred shareholder--the right to accrued dividends on cumulative preferred stock.

Taxation-Income Tax-Dealings By Corporation In Its Own Stock, John N. Seaman

Michigan Law Review

From 1921 to 1929, appellee corporation bought shares of its own stock, not for retirement, but to sustain the market, to increase the number of shareholders by resale in smaller blocks, and for other reasons. This stock was held as treasury stock. In 1929 it was sold by the corporation, at a profit. From 1920 to 1934 the Treasury Regulations exempted the proceeds of such a transaction from income tax, treating the purchase and sale as separate decrease and increase in the capital, and not as resulting in income. But in 1934 the regulation was changed, so as to tax …

Corporations - Capital, Capital Stock And Stock, Frederick K. Brown

Michigan Law Review

The recent case of Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co. is typical of the nominalistic confusion occasioned by the use of the terms "capital" and "capital stock." Whatever progress the courts have made toward making them words of precise signification has not been reflected in the drafting of statutes, where they are employed to represent a bewildering number of connotations. The courts have recognized this and have not sought to make them words of art with a single, definitive meaning but through the mechanics of statutory interpretation have sought to divine the legislative intent.

The Income Tax Liability Of Dividends In Liquidation, Roswell F. Magill

Michigan Law Review

The development of a scheme at once equitable and constitutional for the taxation of corporate distributions has been one of the more difficult problems confronting Congress and the courts since the adoption of the income tax amendment. Doubtless the chief reason for this difficulty has been the fact that the income tax liability of a shareholder upon such a distribution "has not been determinable merely by ascertaining whether the amounts received are the variety of receipts commonly regarded by their recipients as income,- in a word, by determining whether they constitute a "gain" to the shareholder. Rather, it is a …

Purchase Of Shares Of Corporation By A Director From A Shareholder, Harold R. Smith

Michigan Law Review

As suggested by the title to this paper, a discussion of the relationship between the directors of a corporation and the corporate entity is not within its scope. Neither is the lrelationship between the directors-and the entire body of the shareholders. These two subjects are generally treated in another branch of the law of corporations and generally are not governed by the same rules of law.' The purchase of shares of stock by a director from a nonofficial shareholder naturally brings into question the relationship between the director and the shareholder in his individual capacity, and not in his capacity …

Watered Stock Commissions Blue Sky Laws Stock Without Par Value, William W. Cook

Michigan Law Review

Stockholders' exemption from liability for corporate debts is a modern invention. It was not until 18x1 that New York extended that exemption to stockholders in manufacturing corporations.' Massachusetts did not grant it until 1830.2 England did not allow it to stockholders in business and manufacturing cornpanies until I855. s As President Eliot of Harvard has pointed out, this privilege of limited liability is "the corporation's most precious characteristic."'

Respective Rights Of Preferred And Common Stockholders In Surplus Profits, George Jarvis Thompson

Michigan Law Review

The movement in the field of co5perative commercial undertakings has been; school-book-like, a movement from the simple to the complex, from the common-la* sitaation of persons associating together to conduct a busines for profit to the modern statutory association and the corporation possessing an enormous capital ,derived from a host of individuals whose respective interests are represented -by various -classes -of transferable shares.

Corporations, Shareholders' Right To Have A Dividend Declared And Paid Out Of Surplus, Horace Lafayette Wilgus

Articles

In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. (Mich. 1919), 170, N. W. 668, the questions were not new, and with one exception, the decision was not unusual, but the sums involved were enormos. The Motor Company was incorporated in 1903, under the general manufacturing incorporating act of Michigan (P. A. 232, 1903), for the manufacture and sale of automobiles, motors and devices incident to their construction and operation, with an authorized Capital Stock of $150,000-$100,000 then paid up, $49,000 in cash, $40,000 in letters patent issued and applied for, and $11,000 in machinery and contracts. In 1908 the stock was increased …