Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Business Organizations Law (76)
- Comparative and Foreign Law (17)
- Legislation (16)
- Banking and Finance Law (15)
- Litigation (15)
-
- State and Local Government Law (15)
- Law and Economics (12)
- Organizations Law (10)
- Law and Society (9)
- Supreme Court of the United States (7)
- Contracts (6)
- Legal History (6)
- Tax Law (6)
- Agency (4)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (4)
- Business (4)
- Courts (4)
- Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (4)
- Legal Profession (4)
- Administrative Law (3)
- Commercial Law (3)
- Legal Remedies (3)
- President/Executive Department (3)
- Taxation-Federal (3)
- Accounting Law (2)
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations (2)
- Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics (2)
- Civil Procedure (2)
- Institution
-
- University of Michigan Law School (66)
- Seattle University School of Law (9)
- University of Cincinnati College of Law (7)
- Pepperdine University (4)
- University of Denver (4)
-
- Maurer School of Law: Indiana University (3)
- University of Maine School of Law (3)
- Southern Methodist University (2)
- University of Colorado Law School (2)
- University of Georgia School of Law (2)
- University of Richmond (2)
- Vanderbilt University Law School (2)
- Boston University School of Law (1)
- Cleveland State University (1)
- Columbia Law School (1)
- Duke Law (1)
- Fordham Law School (1)
- Georgetown University Law Center (1)
- Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School (1)
- Northwestern Pritzker School of Law (1)
- Pace University (1)
- St. John's University School of Law (1)
- The University of Akron (1)
- Touro University Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (1)
- University of Kentucky (1)
- University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (1)
- University of San Diego (1)
- Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (1)
- Washington and Lee University School of Law (1)
- William & Mary Law School (1)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- Articles (25)
- Michigan Law Review (22)
- Seattle University Law Review (9)
- Faculty Articles and Other Publications (7)
- Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review (7)
-
- University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform (7)
- Faculty Scholarship (4)
- Pepperdine Law Review (4)
- Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship (4)
- Maine Law Review (3)
- Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters (2)
- Indiana Law Journal (2)
- Law Faculty Publications (2)
- Michigan Law Review First Impressions (2)
- Publications (2)
- Scholarly Works (2)
- Akron Law Review (1)
- Articles by Maurer Faculty (1)
- Book Chapters (1)
- Cleveland State Law Review (1)
- Faculty Publications (1)
- Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law (1)
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (1)
- Law Faculty Scholarly Articles (1)
- Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review (1)
- Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business (1)
- Other Publications (1)
- Pace Law Review (1)
- San Diego International Law Journal (1)
- Touro Law Review (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 31 - 60 of 124
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto
Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere— are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits …
'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson
Articles
From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization ” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all - encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case — wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States …
The Future Of Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Companies: China And Comity Concerns, Dana M. Muir, Junhai Liu, Haiyan Xu
The Future Of Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Companies: China And Comity Concerns, Dana M. Muir, Junhai Liu, Haiyan Xu
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application of U.S. securities fraud law in transnational situations. The Supreme Court noted that its decision was influenced by international comity considerations. In this Article, we evaluate the availability of class actions in China in cases involving alleged securities fraud. Because we find that the availability of those actions is too limited to fully protect U.S. shareholders, we argue that U.S. investors should be permitted to bring securities fraud class actions against non-U.S. companies whose securities are traded on a U.S. exchange regardless of where those investors …
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn A. Stout
Seattle University Law Review
In their 1932 opus "The Modern Corporation and Public Property," Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously documented the evolution of a new economic entity—the public corporation. What made the public corporation “public,” of course, was that it had thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small fraction of outstanding shares. As a result, the public firm’s shareholders had little individual incentive to pay close attention to what was going on inside the firm, or even to vote. Dispersed shareholders were rationally apathetic. If they voted at all, they usually voted to approve …
The Future Of Shareholder Democracy In The Shadow Of The Financial Crisis, Alan Dignam
The Future Of Shareholder Democracy In The Shadow Of The Financial Crisis, Alan Dignam
Seattle University Law Review
This Article argues that the U.K. regulatory response to the financial crisis, in the form of “stewardship” and shareholder engagement, is an error built on a misunderstanding of the key active role shareholders played in the enormous corporate governance failure represented by the banking crisis. Shareholders’ passivity, rather than activity, has characterized the reform perception of the shareholder role in corporate governance. This characterization led to the conclusion that if only they were more active they would be more responsible “stewards” of the corporation. If, as this Article argues, shareholder activity was part of the problem in the banks, then …
Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill
Limits Of Disclosure, Steven M. Davidoff, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
One big focus of attention, criticism, and proposals for reform in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis has been securities disclosure. Many commentators have emphasized the complexity of the securities being sold, arguing that no one could understand the disclosure. Some observers have noted that disclosures were sometimes false or incomplete. What follows these issues, to some commentators, is that, whatever other lessons we may learn from the crisis, we need to improve disclosure. How should it be improved? Commentators often lament the frailties of human understanding, notably including those of everyday retail investors—people who do not understand or …
Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter
Seattle University Law Review
This Article addresses the questions of whether and how shareholders matter for social welfare, finding that different and contrasting answers have prevailed during different periods of recent history. Observers in the mid-twentieth century believed that the socioeconomic characteristics of real-world shareholders were highly pertinent to social welfare inquiries. But those observers went on to conclude that there followed no justification for catering to shareholder interest, for shareholders occupied elite social strata. The answer changed during the twentieth century’s closing decades, when observers came to accord the shareholder interest a key structural role in the enhancement of economic efficiency even as …
Corporation Code Sections 309 And 1203: California Redefines Directors' Duties Towards Shareholders, Ernest F. Batenga, Mark Willis
Corporation Code Sections 309 And 1203: California Redefines Directors' Duties Towards Shareholders, Ernest F. Batenga, Mark Willis
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Supreme Court And The Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. V. Levinson In Context, Jayne W. Barnard
The Supreme Court And The Shareholder Litigant: Basic, Inc. V. Levinson In Context, Jayne W. Barnard
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja
The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja
Faculty Scholarship
Under the dominant account, securities fraud by public firms harms the firms’ shareholders and, more generally, capital markets. Recent financial legislation—the JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act—as well as the influential 2011 D.C. Circuit decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC reinforce that same worldview. This Article contends that the account is wrong. Misreporting distorts economic decision-making by all firms, both those committing fraud and not. False information, coupled with efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection, impairs risk assessment by providers of human and financial capital, suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and labor to lower-value projects. If fraud …
Owning Stock While Making Law: An Agency Problem And A Fiduciary Solution, Donna M. Nagy
Owning Stock While Making Law: An Agency Problem And A Fiduciary Solution, Donna M. Nagy
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Private Regulation Of Insider Trading In The Shadow Of Lax Public Enforcement: Evidence From Canadian Firms, Laura Nyantung Beny, Anita Anand
Articles
Like firms in the United States, many Canadian firms voluntarily restrict trading by corporate insiders beyond the requirements of insider trading laws (i.e., super-compliance). Thus, we aim to understand the determinants of firms’ private insider trading policies (ITPs), which are quasi-contractual devices. Based on the assumption that firms that face greater costs from insider trading (or greater benefits from restricting insider trading) ought to be more inclined than other firms to adopt more stringent ITPs, we develop several testable hypotheses. We test our hypotheses using data from a sample of firms included in the Toronto Stock Exchange/Standard and Poor’s (TSX/S&P) …
The Limited Liability Company As A Security, Mark I. Steinberg, Karen L. Conway
The Limited Liability Company As A Security, Mark I. Steinberg, Karen L. Conway
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, Mark A. Sargent
Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, Mark A. Sargent
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Politicization Of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic Discretion, The Sec, And Shareholder Ratification Of Auditors, J. Robert Brown Jr.
The Politicization Of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic Discretion, The Sec, And Shareholder Ratification Of Auditors, J. Robert Brown Jr.
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship
The role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the corporate governance process has shifted dramatically in recent years. The Commission has increasingly supplanted state law in determining substantive standards of corporate governance. The replacement of states with the Commission will have significant consequences.
The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han
The Facebook Ipo's Face-Off With Dual Class Stock Structure, Anna S. Han
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Caveat
The Facebook initial public offering (“Facebook IPO”) is premised on a dual class stock structure, which the media criticizes as a circumvention of regulations designed to protect shareholders. I argue that Facebook’s use of dual class stock not only is likely to benefit its shareholders, but also follows in the footsteps of seasoned, influential companies like Google.
A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer
A Very Quiet Revolution: A Primer On Securities Crowdfunding And Title Iii Of The Jobs Act, Thaya Brook Knight, Huiwen Leo, Adrian A. Ohmer
Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review
This essay introduces the complex regulatory regime that governs the public sale of all securities, no matter how small the offeror. It is intended as a rudimentary roadmap for the start-up or its counsel and will, hopefully, help to illuminate the traps for the unwary while providing an overview of the regulatory universe in which securities crowdfunding will operate.
The New Section 1202 Tax-Free Business Sale: Congress Rewards Small Businesses That Survived The Great Recession, Beckett G. Cantley
The New Section 1202 Tax-Free Business Sale: Congress Rewards Small Businesses That Survived The Great Recession, Beckett G. Cantley
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
On September 27, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Creating Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (“SBJA”) that contains a temporary amendment to Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) § 1202. The amendment permits original shareholders of eligible corporation stock to sell the stock without being taxed on the sale. The temporary amendment initially only applied to certain stock acquired after the enactment of the SBJA and before January 1, 2011, but the amendment was extended on December 17, 2010 for another year ending January 1, 2012. With the impending sunset of the 15% capital gains rate at the end of 2012, …
Dodd-Frank, Compensation Ratios, And The Expanding Role Of Shareholders In The Governance Process, J. Robert Brown Jr.
Dodd-Frank, Compensation Ratios, And The Expanding Role Of Shareholders In The Governance Process, J. Robert Brown Jr.
Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship
The Dodd-Frank Act included a number of provisions designed to reform the executive compensation process. One of the provisions, Section 953(b), requires disclosure of a ratio that compares CEO compensation with the median income of employees. Although hardly noticed at the time of adoption, the provision has since generated opposition, with many of the concerns involving the logistics associated with implementation. Efforts to repeal Section 953(b) have surfaced in Congress.
Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten
Why Governance Might Work In Mutual Funds, Michael C. Schouten
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. has highlighted the potential for agency conflicts in mutual funds, whose advisors have the de facto power to award themselves high fees. While the surrounding debate has focused on the extent to which market competition replaces the need for fee litigation, there appears to be a growing consensus that fund governance, through the use of voice, is unlikely to be effective. The use of voice is commonly said to be hampered by collective action problems. More recently, scholars have argued that it is further weakened by the easy availability …
The Securities And Exchange Commission's 2010 Proxy Access Proposals: A Poison Pill For Corporate Health, Stephen W. Kiefer
The Securities And Exchange Commission's 2010 Proxy Access Proposals: A Poison Pill For Corporate Health, Stephen W. Kiefer
William & Mary Business Law Review
The SEC has proposed proxy access rules in the wake of the recent financial crisis. With the stated purpose of removing impediments to the exercise of shareholder voice and increasing director accountability, the proposed rule changes are not without problems. The proposed rules enter a mix in which the corporate governance landscape, shaped by powerful role players, already presents troubling possibilities for activist shareholder abuse. This Article argues that adoption of the proposed rules could be the final piece to a puzzle in which shareholder power is achieved at the expense of long-term corporate health and shareholder value.
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner
Articles
We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …
Corporate Governance In An Age Of Separation Of Ownership From Ownership, Usha Rodrigues
Corporate Governance In An Age Of Separation Of Ownership From Ownership, Usha Rodrigues
Scholarly Works
The shareholder empowerment provisions enacted as part of the recent bailout legislation are internally incoherent because they fail to address the short-termist realities of shareholder ownership today. Ownership has separated from ownership in modern corporate America: individual investors now largely hold stock through mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds. The incentives of these short-term financial intermediaries only imperfectly reflect the interests of their long-term holders - an imbalance only exacerbated by the bailout’s corporate governance legislation. The bailout’s focus on shareholder empowerment tactics - such as proxy access, say-on-pay, and increased disclosure - makes little sense if shareholders are …
On The Role And Regulation Of Proxy Advisors, Paul Rose
On The Role And Regulation Of Proxy Advisors, Paul Rose
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In anticipation of proxy season-the springtime ritual where companies prepare and deliver proxy statements in preparation for annual shareholder meetings-U.S. public companies typically reexamine their corporate governance structures and policies. Many corporate governance structures that were acceptable ten years ago are now considered outmoded or even evidence of managerial entrenchment. For example, consider the classified board of directors. In recent years, many companies have shifted from a classified board of directors to an annually elected board. A company might adopt an annually-elected board structure for a number of reasons. A classified board can serve as an entrenchment device, for instance, …
The Redemption Puzzle, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
The Redemption Puzzle, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Articles
After the adoption of partial integration in 2003, there has been only a modest rise in dividends, but a sixfold increase in redemptions. This article argues that the explanation for that lies in the different treatment of dividends and capital gains to foreign shareholders and that Congress should respond by making sections 302 and 304 inapplicable to foreign shareholders.
Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard
Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, …
Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal And Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Actions In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard, Janis P. Sarra
Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal And Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Actions In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard, Janis P. Sarra
Articles
The article explores securities class actions involving Canadian issuers since the provinces added secondary market class action provisions to their securities legislation. It examines the development of civil liability provisions, and class proceedings legislation and their effect on one another. Through analyses of the substance and framework of the statutory provisions, the article presents an empirical and comparative examination of cases involving Canadian issuers in both Canada and the United States. In addition, it explores how both the availability and pricing of director and officer insurance have been affected by the potential for secondary market class action liability. The article …
Then And Now: Professor Berle And The Unpredictable Shareholder, Jennifer G. Hill
Then And Now: Professor Berle And The Unpredictable Shareholder, Jennifer G. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Shareholders, and the relationship between shareholders and management, lay at the heart of Professor Berle’s scholarship. The goal of this Article is to compare the image of shareholders emerging from The Modern Corporation and Private Property and the Berle/Dodd debate with a range of contemporary visions of the shareholder that underpin some international regulatory responses to recent financial debacles, from Enron to the current global financial crisis. As the Article dis- cusses, these recent developments in the era of financial crises have prompted a reevaluation of the traditional image of the shareholder—and the role of the shareholder in the modern …
Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under The Radar, Barbara Black
Eliminating Securities Fraud Class Actions Under The Radar, Barbara Black
Faculty Articles and Other Publications
At least since Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the business community and many influential scholars have challenged the existence of the securities fraud class action on a variety of grounds. Recently, two proposals have been advanced to "fix" the problem of "abusive" securities fraud class actions. One proposal requires arbitration of all securities fraud class actions; the other eliminates the corporate defendant in most actions. Proponents assert that shareholders should have the right to adopt these proposals through amendment of the company's certificate of incorporation. In reality, adoption of either proposal would substantially curtail, if not eliminate, the securities fraud class …
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
London As Delaware?, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Jurisdictional competition in corporate law has long been a staple of academic-and sometimes, political-debate in the United States. State corporate law, by long-standing tradition in the United States, determines most questions of internal corporate governance-the role of boards of directors, the allocation of authority between directors, managers and shareholders, etc.-while federal law governs questions of disclosure to shareholders-annual reports, proxy statements, and periodic filings. Despite substantial incursions by Congress, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, this dividing line between state and federal law persists, so state law arguably has the most immediate impact on corporate governance outcomes.