Securities Law Commons^™

Fiduciary Duty - Now And In The Future, Christine Lazaro

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

The celebrated jurist Benjamin Cardozo opined that the fiduciary duty is “the duty of finest loyalty”, and that a fiduciary “is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.” The question most customers have is whether their broker is subject to this duty of finest loyalty, or if they are bound merely by the morals of the marketplace. Currently this is a very difficult question to answer, and will depend on whether the customer is dealing with a …

Introduction: Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d Ed.), William K.S. Wang, Marc I. Steinberg

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

This paper is the introductory chapter to Insider Trading (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2010). This treatise analyzes the application of various laws to stock market insider trading and tipping. Among the federal laws are Exchange Act section 10(b), SEC Rule 10b-5, mail/wire fraud, SEC Rule 14e-3, Exchange Act section 16, and Securities Act section 17(a). The state law discussed is both state common law and a state law claim by the issuer.

Another chapter addresses government enforcement of the insider trading/tipping prohibitions. A chapter on compliance programs deals with how firms can try to prevent illegal insider trading and …

Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis Of Free Speech And Corporate Personhood In Citizens United, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation And The Case For Federal Merit Review, Daniel J. Morrissey

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Praise Of Process: Examining The Sec, Rule 14a-8(I)(8), And Afscme V. Aig, Jena Martin

Faculty Articles

Part one of this essay will discuss the rule, including a brief analysis of proxy access generally and the "election exclusion" specifically. Part two will examine the AFSCME v. AIG case and the SEC's response thereto in more detail-discussing the arguments posited both for and against increased shareholder access, as well as the aftermath of the SEC's decision. Part three will analyze how the SEC's failure to change Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to allow greater shareholder access specifically caused one thread in the financial crisis-as a direct result of a loss of shareholder empowerment. Finally, part four offers an epilogue-a discussion of …

Protecting The Retail Investor In An Age Of Financial Uncertainty, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This essay, originating in a presentation made at the University of Dayton School of Law's Fallout from the Bailout Symposium on March 20, 2009, first sets forth some comparisons between other recent financial crises and the 2008 financial meltdown. It then provides an assessment of the SEC's role during the financial crisis and concludes with a review of the key provisions of the Obama Administration's proposed financial regulatory reform that affect the SEC and investor protection. The Obama proposal offers no redesign of the SEC, relying instead on SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro's commitment to re-energize and re-commit the agency to …

A Requiem For The Retail Investor?, Alicia J. Davis

Articles

The American retail investor is dying. In 1950, retail investors owned over 90% of the stock of U.S. corporations. Today, retail investors own less than 30% and represent a very small percentage of U.S. trading volume. Data on the overall level of retail trading in U.S. equity markets are not available. But recent New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") data reveal that trades by individual investors represent, on average, less than 2% of NYSE trading volume for NYSE-listed firms. There is no question that U.S. securities markets are now dominated by institutional investors. In his article, "The SEC, Retail Investors, and …

The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure And The Business Education Of Lawyers, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This essay suggests that a deficiency in legal education is a contributing cause of the regulatory failure. The most scandalous malfeasance of this new era, the Madoff Ponzi scheme, evinces the failure of improperly trained lawyers and regulators. It also calls into question whether the prevailing regulatory philosophy of disclosure is sufficient in a complex market. This essay answers an important question underlying these considerations: What can legal education do to better train business lawyers and regulators for a market that is becoming more complex. One answer, it suggests, is a simple one: law schools should teach a little more …

Proving Preemption By Proving Exemption: The Quandary Of The National Securities Market Improvement Act, Jeffrey D. Chadwick

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Sec In A Time Of Discontinuity., Joel Seligman

Scholarship@WashULaw

In Jack Coffee and Hillary Sale’s article, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?, the authors address the dominant reality today—that “[t]he natural superiority of the U.S. model for securities regulation is no longer an article of faith” and analyze whether the Department of the Treasury Blueprint provides a wiser structure of financial regulation.

Jim Cox in Coping in a Global Marketplace: Survival Strategies for a 75-Year-Old SEC similarly begins, “data bear witness to the fact that government agencies come and go,” but highlights the complexities of creating an international approach to accounting standards.

Judge Easterbrook begins …

When Is An Equity Participant Actually A Creditor? The Effects Of In Re Afi Holding On Ponzi Scheme Victims And The Good Faith Defense, James Butler Cash Jr.

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The Securities Laws And The Mechanics Of Legal Change, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This essay, prepared for the Virginia Law Review symposium marking the 75th anniversary of the Securities Exchange Commission, explores the mechanisms through which the Roosevelt Administration secured the Supreme Court's approval of various features of the New Deal's securities law program.

Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

Securities class actions are on the chopping block-again. Traditional commentators continue to view class actions with suspicion; they see class suits as nonmeritorious byproducts of self-interest and the attorneys who bring them as rent-seekers. Their conventional approach has popularized securities class actions' negative effects. High-profile commissions capitalizing on this rhetoric, such as the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, have recently recommended eliminating or severely curtailing securities class actions. But this approach misses the point: in the ongoing push and pull of securities regulation, corporations are winning the battle.

Thus, understanding the full picture and texture of securities class actions necessitates …

The Uptick Rule Of Short Sale Regulation: Can It Alleviate Downward Price Pressure From Negative Earnings Shocks?, Lin (Lynn) Bai

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This paper empirically examines the effect of the uptick rule (including the bid test applicable to NASDAQ stocks) of short sale regulations on stock prices and short selling activities immediately after negative earnings surprises that occurred during the period of May to November 2005. It compares price paths and short selling activities of stocks restricted by the uptick rule with stocks that were exempted from the rule as a result of the SEC's Pilot Program. The study has not found any evidence that prices of stocks subject to the rule declined at a slower speed than prices of exempted stocks …

Too Close For Comfort: The Potential Dilemma Facing The Securities And Exchange Commission And The Public Accounting Oversight Board, David H. Roberts

Pace Law Review

No abstract provided.

Should The Sec Be A Collection Agency For Defrauded Investors?, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

One of the important functions of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ("the SEC") is enforcing the securities laws and punishing violators. Collecting damages for defrauded investors was not, historically, an important part of the agency's mission; rather that was the function of private securities fraud class actions. Section 308 (the "Fair Fund provision") of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 gives the SEC a more prominent role in compensating investors and allows the agency, in some circumstances, to distribute civil penalties to defrauded investors. The SEC has established Fair Funds in a number of high-profile cases and has taken pride …

The Sec, Corporate Governance, And Shareholder Access To The Board Room, J. Robert Brown Jr.

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

In the shareholder governance area, one of the most contentious issues concerns the right of shareholders to nominate directors and include the nominees in management's proxy statement.

This article examines the conflict in the context of the growing importance of independent directors. State law and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have increasingly relied upon independent directors to protect shareholders and ensure the integrity of the financial disclosure process. Yet because of weak definitions and problems of enforcement, these directors are often not truly independent. One method of addressing these concerns is to allow shareholders to nominate and elect their …

How Arbitrary Really Was The S.E.C.'S "Hedge Fund Rule"? The Future Of Hedge Fund Regulation In Light Of Goldstein, Amaranth Advisors, And Beyond, Joshua Hess

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

In Re Cardinal Health, Inc. Securities Litigation, Lucas T. Charleston

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will Criticism Of Sox Undermine Its Benefits?, Cheryl L. Wade

Faculty Publications

(Excerpt)

In 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act1 ("SOX" or the "Act") not only changed the details relating to financial reporting, internal controls, and corporate governance in general, but also changed the discussion about corporate climates and cultures, at least temporarily. The political discourse leading up to SOX's enactment in the aftermath of the accounting debacles of 2001 and 2002 was replete with discussions about more ethical and responsible corporate governance. The Act's passage, accompanied by the get-tough-on-Corporate-America speeches made by President George W. Bush and others changed the way corporate actors discuss their ethical obligations. The Act's strict requirements regarding financial …

Corporate Governance, The Securities And Exchange Commission, And The Limits Of Disclosure, J. Robert Brown Jr.

Sturm College of Law: Faculty Scholarship

This article explores the role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the corporate governance process. Traditionally, most have viewed substance as a matter for the states and disclosure for the Commission. This "neat" dichotomy has been long accepted but little examined.

The Commission was always meant to play a role in the governance process. Congress assigned to the SEC the authority to regulate disclosure in part to prevent various abusive practices by management, including the payment of excessive compensation and self perpetuation. Disclosure largely eliminated secrecy but did end self interest. Instead, pressure built on states to loosen substantive …

From Federal Rules To Intersystemic Governance In Securities Regulation, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In this brief essay, prepared as part of a symposium on The New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World, I explore the regulatory dynamics at work: (1) in the operation of Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, (2) in the interventions of then-Attorney General Eliot Spitzer in the national securities markets, and (3) in recent steps by the Securities and Exchange Commission to reconcile U.S. and international accounting standards. In each case, a distinct dynamic of regulatory interaction - what I term intersystemic governance - can be observed. In such cases, overlapping jurisdiction combines with various sources of interdependence to …

Kegs, Crude, And Commodities Law: On Why It Is Time To Reexamine The Suitability Doctrine, Andrew M. Pardieck

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Criminalization Of Corporate Law: The Impact Of Criminal Sanctions On Corporate Misconduct, Donna M. Nagy

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

Hedge Fund Regulation: The Amended Investment Advisers Act Does Not Protect Investors From The Problems Created By Hedge Funds, Sean M. Donahue

Cleveland State Law Review

Hedge funds are a viable investment alternative for financially sophisticated investors. However, because traditional hedge funds and funds of funds are unsuitable for average investors, these investors should be restricted from making such investments. Regardless of who invests in hedge funds, advisers of these entities must be regulated to assure that they do not commit fraud. In addition to monitoring advisers, the SEC must limit hedge funds' use of leverage to assure that market collapse does not occur. Part II of this Note describes the history and development of hedge funds. Part III illustrates the current problems facing the hedge …

Sec Enforcement And Examinations Concerning Hedge Funds, Barry W. Rashkover, Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Social Defense Of Sarbanes-Oxley, James Fanto

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

From Lapdog To Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 And A New Role For Corporate Lawyers, Peter C. Kostant

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Goldstein V. Sec, Elizabeth A. Veit

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Challenge Of Hedge Fund Regulation, Houman B. Shadab

Articles & Chapters

Currently en vogue concerns about hedge funds are not nearly as substantial as is often claimed. Moreover, the funds themselves are reducing their risks to investors and the broader markets, in accordance with investor demands. As hedge funds benefit the broader market by mitigating price downturns, bearing risks that others will not, making securities more liquid, and ferreting out inefficiencies, policymakers should consider whether stricter regulation of hedge funds could do more harm than good.