Securities Law Commons^™

The Marginal Incentive Of Insider Trading: An Economic Reinterpretation Of The Case Law, Kristoffel R. Grechenig

ExpressO

Commentators on insider trading are divided into two camps, one in favor of regulation, the other in favor of deregulation. The arguments for the two positions are manifold but not irreconcilable. I show that important gains to social welfare come with insider trading on negative information (sales), whereas losses often result from the use of positive information (purchases). Thus, I look at a regulation that allows insiders to use negative but not positive non-public information. Because positive information will be disclosed much sooner than negative information, the marginal incentive (and marginal gain to social welfare, respectively) of insider trading as …

Equal Treatment Of Foreign Shareholders In Transnational Securities Class Action Against A Foreign Issuer—A Chinese Example, Clark Yao

ExpressO

As the world economy and financial markets become increasingly more integrated, cross-boarder securities transaction becomes a daily event. Because Unite States has the world’s largest and arguably most liquid capital markets, it has attracted a significant number of foreign companies to cross-list their stocks in a U.S. stock exchange. Unavoidably, such transactions will not only bring out fortune, but also disputes between transacting parties. Relying on the powerful federal securities law , U.S. investors who have bought or sold such stocks have routinely sued foreign stock issuers through class action when the stock prices went down, alleging their loss is …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …

Comparative Corporate Governance: Irish, American, And European Responses To Corporate Scandals, Manish Gupta

ExpressO

A comparative review of legislative reactions to corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. This paper examines American, Irish, and European Union legislation meant to deal with regulating corporations.

Tattlers And Trail Blazers: Attorneys' Liability For Clients' Fraud, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

No abstract provided.

The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession …

Well-Known Seasoned Issuers In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently adopted a series of rules relaxing the restrictions imposed on public offerings. The largest public companies - defined as “well-known seasoned issuers” (WKSIs) - received the most extensive regulatory relief. Canada could adopt a version of WKSI status for the top tier of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) issuers as part of a streamlined POP system.

Careful consideration must be given, however, as to the appropriate standards for WKSI status in Canada. The standards adopted in the U.S. – US$700 million in market capitalization or US$1 billion in nonconvertible debt issued over …

Tracing, Peter B. Oh

ExpressO

Tracing is a method that appears within multiple fields of law. Distinct conceptions of tracing, however, have arisen independently within securities and remedial law. In the securities context plaintiffs must “trace” their securities to a specific offering to pursue certain relief under the Securities Act of 1933. In the remedial context victims who “trace” their misappropriated value into a wrongdoer’s hands can claim any derivative value, even if it has appreciated.

This article is the first to compare and then cross-apply tracing within these two contexts. Specifically, this article argues that securities law should adopt a version of the “rules-based …

Casenote: Killing Life Partners: Why Viatical Settlements Constitute Securities – In Light Of The Sec V. Mutual Benefits Corporation And Other Recent Cases Explicitly Rejecting Life Partners, Brian Levin

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Is The Dutch Auction Ipo A Good Idea?, Anita I. Anand

ExpressO

The Google IPO raised the question of whether Dutch auctions are preferable to the traditional bookbuilding method of financing. Some argue that Dutch auctions make public offerings more efficient in terms of price discovery by leaving less money on the table. They further argue that Dutch auctions are more fair, since underwriters do not allocate securities to preferred clients, thereby allowing for a more equitable allocation among institutional and retail investors. I suggest that the Dutch auction is not necessarily more fair and may in fact lead to less efficient capital markets. I argue that reform of the current system …

What Makes Asset Securitization "Inefficient"?, Kenji Yamazaki

ExpressO

Despite the damage caused by the recent Enron scandal , the asset securitization market has been vibrant and has become a popular financing alternative . A number of academics emphasize its merits and suggest that it is a more favorable way of financing, and Congress’s proposal to make sales of asset in securitization immune from characterization as secured transactions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001 (the “Reform Act”) almost materialized when the Enron scandal hit the scene. Conversely, there have been accusations that securitization is not a legitimate way of financing because, for example, it fosters fraudulent transactions.

Why …

Voluntary Vs Mandatory Corporate Governance: Towards An Optimal Regulatory Framework, Anita I. Anand

ExpressO

This article fills a gap in the legal literature by comparing mandatory corporate governance regimes to voluntary corporate governance regimes. It encourages market participants, including regulators, to acknowledge that firms have incentives to adopt enhanced governance practices voluntarily and to make disclosure about the same. The article argues that an optimal governance regime is a hybrid one in which adoption of best practice guidelines is voluntary but disclosure of corporate governance practices is mandatory. Such a regime is optimal because it balances the benefits and costs to all stakeholders, particularly issuers and investors. The cost analysis should be completed by …

Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets And The Dog That Did Not Bark, Henry G. Manne

ExpressO

This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual investors, and executive compensation. The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation. It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the …

Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, And The Dog That Did Not Bark, Henry G. Manne

ExpressO

This Essay briefly reexamines the great debates on the role of insider trading in the corporate system from the perspectives of efficiency of capital markets, harm to individual investors, and executive compensation. The focus is on the mystery of why trading by all kinds of insiders as well as knowledgeable outsiders was studiously ignored by the business and investment communities before the advent of insider trading regulation. It is hardly conceivable that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders would have remained totally silent in the face of widespread insider trading if they had seen the practice as being harmful to the …

Price, Path & Pride: Third-Party Closing Opinion Practice Among U.S. Lawyers (A Preliminary Investigation), Jonathan C. Lipson

ExpressO

This article presents the first in-depth exploration of third-party closing opinions, a common but curious – and potentially troubling -- feature of U.S. business law practice. Third-party closing opinions are letters delivered at the closing of most large transactions by the attorney for one party (e.g., the borrower) to the other party (e.g., the lender) offering limited assurance that the transaction will have legal force and effect.

Hundreds, if not thousands, of legal opinions are delivered every week. Yet, lawyers often complain that they create needless risk and cost, and produce little benefit. Closing opinions thus pose a basic question: …

The Legal Status Of “Dump & Sue”: Should Plaintiffs And Their Attorneys Be Prohibited From Trading The Stock Of Companies They Sue? – A Law And Economics Approach, Moin A. Yahya

ExpressO

There is some evidence that plaintiffs and their attorneys are profitably short-selling the stock of the companies they intend to sue. The status of such short sales is undecided in the law. Lawsuits against companies can cause large drops in market value, and hence such an action by the plaintiff should cause concern. Plaintiffs, however, are not traditional insiders, and they do not owe the shareholders any fiduciary duties. They can therefore consent to their attorneys also short-selling the stock of the defendant corporation. The attorneys need to receive such permission to avoid misappropriating the information concerning their client’s decision …

Shareholder Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, And Poison Pills, Brett H. Mcdonnell

ExpressO

Shareholder bylaws limiting or directing board action raise a tough and fascinating question of statutory interpretation under state law as well as an important policy question. In particular, over the last decade shareholders have sought to use bylaws to limit poison pills and to grant shareholders access to the corporate proxy materials to nominate directors. This paper argues that an expansive, although not unlimited, shareholder power to enact bylaws is both a plausible interpretation of Delaware’s statutory scheme and desirable as a policy matter. Shareholder bylaws that set general rules of corporate governance and procedure should be valid unless more …

The "Duty" To Be A Rational Shareholder, David A. Hoffman

ExpressO

How and when do courts determine that corporate disclosures are actionable under the federal securities laws? The applicable standard is materiality: would a (mythical) "reasonable investor" have considered the disclosures important. As I establish through empirical and statistical testing of 500 cases analyzing the materiality standard, judicial findings of immateriality are remarkably common, and have been stable over time. Materiality's scope results in the dismissal of a large number of claims, and creates a set of cases in which courts attempt to explain and defend their vision of who is, and is not, a "reasonable investor." Thus, materiality provides an …

The Corporation As God, Douglas Litowitz

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Regulation Nms: Has The Sec Exceeded Its Congressional Mandate To Facilitate A “National Market System” In Securities Trading?, Dale A. Oesterle

The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Working Paper Series

The SEC is currently holding hearings on sweeping changes to the micro-structure of the country's securities trading markets - modifying the trade through rule, for example. Professor Oesterle argues that the SEC should not be in the business of so structuring the country's securities markets in the first place. In the piece he chronicles the SEC's expansive interpretation of its power under Congress's 1975 National Market System Amendments to the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act and questions whether Congress intended to grant the SEC such a mandate.

Preemption Under The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: If It Looks Like A Securities Fraud Claim And Acts Like A Securities Fraud Claim, Is It A Securities Fraud Claim?, Jennifer O'Hare

Working Paper Series

This Article addresses the removal and preemption provisions of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”). In SLUSA, Congress preempted class actions alleging “an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” SLUSA clearly applies to preempt the typical state securities fraud action, forcing plaintiffs into federal court where they will be subject to the rigorous procedural requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Preemption of false corporate publicity cases was expected and, in fact, intended by SLUSA. However, many courts have also extended …

Expensing Isn't The Only Option: Alternatives To The Fasb's Stock Option Expensing Proposal, Benjamin A. Templin

ExpressO

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the Financial Accounting Standard Board's (FASB) proposal to require that corporations expense options. It identifies two major goals of the proposed rule -- 1) clarity in financial statements and 2) a reduction of corporate fraud by removing the incentive of options. To address these two goals, I adopt a framework of Information Reforms v. Rules of the Game Reforms. The article starts with a history of FASB Statement No. 123 Accounting for Stock-based Compensation and also analyzes the Congressional legislation that attempts to block the measure, the Stock Option Accounting Reform Act. …

Reconsidering The Prohibition Against General Solicitation During Section 3(C)(7) Offerings, Daniel P. Taub

ExpressO

This paper examines the seventy year history of the general solicitation prohibition during private offerings and then analyzes its continuing relevance as applied to Section 3(c)(7) offerings. The S.E.C. Staff recently issued a report questioning the continuing value of prohibiting general solicitation during private offerings made pursuant to Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. If the S.E.C. were to follow the recommendation in the S.E.C. Staff Report, this would have tremendous implications for a growing number of hedge funds, and other investment companies utilizing the Section 3(c)(7) exemption. By allowing general solicitation, the S.E.C. would be reversing a policy …

Gentleman's Agreement: The Antisemitic Origins Of Restrictions On Stockholder Litigation, Lawrence E. Mitchell

ExpressO

A deeply ingrained, seemingly ineradicable, hostility to plaintiffs’ lawyers and especially to plaintiffs’ lawyers in stockholder suits seems to have existed for most of the past century. This hostility is manifest not only in the tone of judicial opinions but in law review articles, the popular press, and, often, in legislation. This article analyzes the circumstances under which the first security-for-expense statute was adopted in New York in 1944, including the contemporaneous justification for the statute, focusing on the demographics of the New York bar at the time and the ethnic sociology of New York. In so doing, it concludes …

A New Product For The Corporation Law Market: Audit Committee Certifications, Lawrence A. Cunningham

ExpressO

In the swirling corporate governance reforms led by SOX, the SEC, SROs and PCAOB, Delaware and other states are playing minor roles at best. State absence creates a missing arc in the evolving US corporate governance circle. The circle is drawn as follows: state corporation law charges boards of directors with managing corporations and authorizes board committees; SOX charges audit committees with tasks, including supervising external auditors; SROs require audit committee characteristics like independence and compel disclosure; PCAOB requires external auditors to evaluate audit committee effectiveness. This last step could close the circle except that auditors performing this evaluation generate …

Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclosure?, Sharon Hannes

ExpressO

Comparisons among firms play a major role in securities analysis. This essay asks if this fact justifies the mandatory nature of securities regulation. Once a firm approaches the public securities markets, federal securities regulations compel it to disclose financial information to the public. A seminal theory argues that firms would not otherwise commit to maintain optimal disclosure levels, since a disclosing firm bears all disclosure costs but does not gain all disclosure benefits.

This paper examines the robustness of this argument in relation to disclosure benefits which arise from comparisons among firms. Financial data of peer firms allows shareholders to …

Public Company Shareholders Acting As Owners: Three Reforms--Introducing The "Oversight Shareholder" (With E. Fogel & D. Addis), Edward C. Harris

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …

Exchanges Of Multiple Stocks And Securities In Corporate Divisions Or Acquisitive Reorganizations, Douglas A. Kahn, Jeffrey S. Lehman

Articles

If specified conditions are satisfied, the Internal Revenue Code provides nonrecognition for gain or loss realized when stocks and securities of one corporation are exchanged for stocks and securities of another corporation. When the exchange is made as part of a corporate division (a split-off or a split-up), the principal nonrecognition provision is section 355; and when the exchange is made as part of an acquisitive reorganization, the principal nonrecognition provision is section 354. Complete nonrecognition is provided only when stock is exchanged solely for stock and securities are exchanged solely for securities of no greater principal amount. If, in …