Securities Law Commons^™

The Wreck Of Regulation D: The Unintended (And Bad) Outcomes For The Sec’S Crown Jewel Exemptions, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Regulation D is—or at least should be—the crown jewel of the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulatory exemptions from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. It offers businesses—especially businesses with relatively small capital requirements—fair and efficient access to vital, external capital.

In this article, I present data derived from deep samples of recent Form Ds filed with the Commission. The data show that Regulation D is not working in the way the Commission intended or in a way that benefits society The data reveal that companies attempting to raise relatively small amounts of capital under Regulation D overwhelmingly …

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.

The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner

Articles

We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …

Populist Retribution And International Competition In Financial Services Regulation, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The pattern of regulatory reform in financial services regulation follows a predictable pattern in democratic states. A hyperactive market generates a bubble, the bubble deflates, and much financial pain ensues for those individuals who bought at the top of the market. The financial mess brings the scrutiny of politicians, who vow "Never again!" A political battle ensues, with representatives of the financial services industry fighting a rearguard action to preserve its prerogatives amidst cries for the bankers' scalps. Regulations, carefully crafted to win the last war, are promulgated. Memories fade of the foolish enthusiasm that fed the last bubble. Slowly, …

Insider Trading In Congress: The Need For Regulation, Matthew Barbabella, Daniel Cohen, Alex Kardon, Peter Molk

UF Law Faculty Publications

Is regulation of Congressional insider trading desirable? We intend to use the STOCK Act (H.R. 682) as a springboard for approaching the need for Congressional insider trading regulation from a slightly more academic perspective. First, we describe the STOCK Act by placing it in recent historical context. Understanding the motivation to reform Congressional ethics that existed earlier this decade is crucial to evaluating the STOCK Act and its prospects for eventual passage by Congress. Second, we review the body of insider trading law that already operates to restrain corporate insiders and others from making some trades. The most important SEC …

Securities Law And The New Deal Justices, Adam C. Pritchard, Robert B. Thompson

Articles

In this Article, we explore the role of the New Deal Justices in enacting, defending, and interpreting the federal securities laws. Although we canvass most of the Court's securities law decisions from 1935 to 1955, we focus in particular on PUHCA, an act now lost to history for securities practitioners and scholars. At the time of the New Deal, PUHCA was the key point of engagement for defining the judicial view toward New Deal securities legislation. Taming the power of Wall Street required not just the concurrence of the legislative branch, but also the Supreme Court, a body that the …

Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

Indiana Law Journal

Orthodox corporate law and economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law and economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This Article provides anecdotal evidence of such self interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history-primarily congressional hearings-this Article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy effect of insider trading legislation in …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …

The Irrational Auditor And Irrational Liability, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article argues that less liability for auditors in certain areas might encourage more accurate and useful financial statements, or at least equally accurate statements at a lower cost. Audit quality is promoted by three incentives: reputation, regulation, and litigation. When we take reputation and regulation into account, exposing auditors to potentially massive liability may undermine the effectiveness of reputation and regulation, thereby diminishing integrity of audited financial statements. The relation of litigation to the other incentives that promote audit quality has become more important in light of the sea change that occurred in the regulation of the auditing profession …

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the pathologies of the SEC and explores the relation between those pathologies and the SEC's status as an independent agency. Part II then outlines an alternative regulatory structure primarily situated within the executive branch. I also argue that such a relocation of authority would enhance regulatory effectiveness while simultaneously reducing the cost of excessive regulation. The Article concludes with some thoughts about the viability of my proposal.

The Sec At 70: Time For Retirement?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

As one grows older, birthdays gradually shift from being celebratory events to more reflective occasions. One's 40th birthday is commemorated rather differently from one's 2lst, which is, in turn, celebrated quite differently from one's first. After a certain point, the individual birthdays become less important and it is the milestone years to whch we pay particular attention. Sadly for entities like the Securities and Exchange Commission, it is only the milestone years (the ones ending in five or zero, for some reason), that draw any attention at all. No one held a conference to celebrate the SEC's 67th anniversary. Clearly …

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Articles

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 ("PSLRA"), the Act's "lead plaintiff' provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel's compensation. Congress's stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors-pension funds, mutual …

Standing Up To Wall Street (And Congress), Richard W. Painter

Michigan Law Review

In 1992, Arthur Levitt co-chaired a fundraising dinner for William Clinton. The dinner raised $750,000 (p. 7). Clinton was elected President, and Levitt got the job he wanted: Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Levitt, a former Chairman of the American Stock Exchange and a connected Democrat, was well qualified for the job. His, however, became a pyrrhic victory when accountants, issuers, broker-dealers, and other special interests used their own political connections to frustrate just about everything he sought to do. Levitt tells the story of his struggle against these well-funded interests in Take on the Street. One of …

Self-Regulation And Securities Markets, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Enron, Arthur Andersen, Tyco, ImClone, WorldCom, Adelphia - as American investors reel from accounting scandals and self-dealing by corporate insiders, the question of trust in the securities markets has taken on a new urgency. Securities markets cannot operate without trust. Markets known for fraud, insider trading, and manipulation risk a downward spiral as investors depart in search of safer investments. Today, many investors are rethinking the wisdom of entrusting their financial futures to the stock market. Absent trust in the integrity of the securities markets, individuals will hoard their money under the proverbial mattress.

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

The Insidious Remnants Of State Rules Respecting Capital Formation, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

As we move into the Twenty-First Century, state blue sky laws and regulations continue to govern a significant portion of the capital formation activities of our domestic businesses. As a result, state administrators, influenced by their historically informed preferences and local traditions, continue to play important roles when businesses attempt to access external capital sources.

Today, however, the effects of state blue sky laws, regulations, and administrators on capital formation are felt almost exclusively by small businesses. The capital formation activities of larger businesses generally have been freed from state control, most recently by the preemption contained in the National …

Constitutional Federalism, Individual Liberty, And The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides background on the historical development of constitutional federalism, the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, and the apparent demise of constitutional limits on federal power. Part II then reviews the Court's revival of constitutional federalism over the last decade. Based on this review, I argue that the Supreme Court's current federalism doctrine can be understood as a "constrained libertarianism" that attempts to use constitutional structure as a check on government interference with individual liberty. In this model, states are respected in our constitutional system because of the counterbalance that they provide …

In Re Silicon Graphics Inc.: Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting From The Interpretation Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's Pleading Standard, Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This Article presents an empirical study of changes in shareholder wealth resulting from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, which interpreted the pleading provision established in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the "Reform Act"). Congress passed the Reform Act as part of an ongoing effort to protect corporations from abusive suits alleging "fraud by hindsight." In such suits, plaintiffs claimed that a sudden drop in a company's stock price was evidence that the issuer and its management covered up the bad news that led to the price drop. …

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998: The Sun Sets On California's Blue Sky Laws, David M. Lavine, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

It is often said that California sets the pace for changes in America's tastes. Trends established in California often find their way into the heartland, having a profound effect on our nation's cultural scene. Nouvelle cuisine, the dialect of the Valley Girl and rollerblading all have their genesis on the West Coast. The most recent trend to emerge from California, instead of catching on in the rest of the country, has been stopped dead in its tracks by a legislative rebuke from Washington, D.C. California's latest, albeit short-lived, contribution to the nation was a migration of securities fraud class actions …

Blue Sky Laws And The Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Laws regarding the sale of securities may be understood as responses to perceived bargaining failures. The most extreme examples of these bargaining failures are seen in instances in which investors are intentionally misled or defrauded regarding the quality of the investments they receive for their money. Even without the presence of such culpability, however, bargaining failures are likely anytime the trading parties lack sufficient, accurate information necessary to effect value-enhancing trades. When that occurs in trades for capital, the parties to the transaction are misinformed respecting the trade, expectations are not protected, and that precious commodity, capital, may be turned …

The Pattern Of Racketeering Element Of Rico Liability, Committee On Federal Courts Of The New York State Bar Association

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Combine And Conquer: Rethinking The Regulation Of Stock Index Futures, Marianne T. Spinelli

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

An Open Attack On The Nonsense Of Blue Sky Regulation, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

The evolution of state securities laws (hereinafter "blue sky laws") in this country is a classic example of regulation that was, perhaps, initially justified and that was apparently promulgated with the best of motives, but which now is actually harmful to society. Today, blue sky laws are ineffective, philosophically unsound, and unnecessarily expensive, and they should be substantially eliminated. Because of the vested interests that have developed, however, it is unlikely that states will respond to this problem, and it will probably take action by the United States Congress to preempt the area. Such an action is appropriate and, indeed, …