Securities Law Commons^™

Securities Law In The Roberts Court: Agenda Or Indifference?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

To outsiders, securities law is not all that interesting. The body of the law consists of an interconnecting web of statutes and regulations that fit together in ways that are decidedly counter-intuitive. Securities law rivals tax law in its reputation for complexity and dreariness. Worse yet, the subject regulated-capital markets-can be mystifying to those uninitiated in modem finance. Moreover, those markets rapidly evolve, continually increasing their complexity. If you do not understand how the financial markets work, it is hard to understand how securities law affects those markets.

The Price Of Pay To Play In Securities Class Actions, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Drew T. Johnson-Skinner

Articles

We study the effect of campaign contributions to lead plaintiffs—“pay to play”—on the level of attorney fees in securities class actions. We find that state pension funds generally pay lower attorney fees when they serve as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions than do individual investors serving in that capacity, and larger funds negotiate for lower fees. This differential disappears, however, when we control for campaign contributions made to offcials with infuence over state pension funds. This effect is most pronounced when we focus on state pension funds that receive the largest campaign contributions and that associate repeatedly as lead …

Revitalizing Motive And Opportunity Pleading After Tellabs, Marvin Lowenthal

Michigan Law Review

Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") to prevent frivolous lawsuits that had been draining resources from businesses. This legislation included provisions for heightening the pleading requirements for the scienter, or state of mind, requirement for securities law violations. Many circuit courts debated whether the motive and opportunity test for scienter, applied initially by the Second and Third Circuits, survived the passage of the PSLRA. This Note argues that while the motive and opportunity test has been discounted by numerous circuits, it not only remains viable for pleading scienter under the PSLRA, but it accomplishes the …

The Unjustified Judicial Creation Of Class Certification Merits Trials In Securities, Michael J. Kaufman, John M. Wunderlich

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The class action device is vital to deterring securities fraud and remedying its victims, who almost never suffer losses sufficient to justify an individual suit. Nonetheless, the federal courts have begun to convert the class certification process into a premature trial on the merits, thereby precluding victims of securities fraud from pursuing otherwise valid claims of financial wrongdoing. In particular, in a series of important decisions, the federal courts have required plaintiffs to prove the essential elements of their securities fraud claims at the preliminary class certification stage.

This Article demonstrates why this trend should end. The judicial creation of …

The Multienforcer Approach To Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, Amanda M. Rose

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Participants in the U.S. capital markets can be sued for securities fraud by a mishmash of enforcers, including the SEC, class action plaintiffs, and state regulators. Does this multi-enforcer approach make sense from a deterrence perspective? This Article suggests that the answer is probably no. Although in theory there are conditions under which a multi-enforcer approach would promote optimal deterrence, it is unclear at best that those conditions exist in the United States. And further empirical research, while warranted, is unlikely to resolve the issue definitively. The status quo tends to persevere in the face of this sort of irreducible …

Corporate Governance In The Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Conventional wisdom is that shareholder derivative suits are dead. Yet this death knell is decidedly premature. The current conception of shareholder derivative suits is based on an empirical record limited to suits filed in Delaware or on behalf of Delaware corporations, leaving suits outside this sphere in the shadows of corporate law scholarship. This Article aims to fill this gap by presenting the first empirical examination of shareholder derivative suits in the federal courts. Using an original, hand-collected data set, my study reveals that shareholder derivative suits are far from dead. Shareholders file more shareholder derivative suits than securities class …

Securities Class Actions Move North: A Doctrinal And Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Actions In Canada, Adam C. Pritchard, Janis P. Sarra

Articles

The article explores securities class actions involving Canadian issuers since the provinces added secondary market class action provisions to their securities legislation. It examines the development of civil liability provisions, and class proceedings legislation and their effect on one another. Through analyses of the substance and framework of the statutory provisions, the article presents an empirical and comparative examination of cases involving Canadian issuers in both Canada and the United States. In addition, it explores how both the availability and pricing of director and officer insurance have been affected by the potential for secondary market class action liability. The article …

Is "Pay-To-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism In Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

The recent emergence of public pension funds as frequent lead plaintiffs in securities class actions has prompted speculation that the funds’ litigation activism is driven by “pay-to-play”. “Pay-to-play” posits that public pension funds are driven by politician board members to obtain lead plaintiff appointments in securities class actions because of campaign contributions made by plaintiffs’ lawyers to those board members. This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the securities litigation activity of 111 such funds from the years 2003 through 2006. Three of the paper’s findings cast doubt on the “pay-to-play” theory, including that: (1) politicians and political control negatively …

Loss Causation And Class Certification, Steven Serajeddini

Michigan Law Review

Courts have long faced difficulty interpreting loss causation under Section 10b-5 of the Securities Act of 1934. This difficulty stems from the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between this core element of common law fraud and the procedural demands of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the typical vehicle for a 10b-5 class action. Recently, some courts and commentators have begun to consider loss causation as an individualized inquiry that is not common among class members, and one that therefore warrants consideration at the class certification stage. The existing justifications center on the conceptually distinct 10b-5 element of reliance, …

The Screening Effect Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Karen K. Nelson

Articles

Prior research shows that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) increased the significance of merit-related factors in determining the incidence and outcomes of securities fraud class actions (Johnson et al. 2007). We examine two possible explanations for this finding: the PSLRA may have reduced the incidence of nonmeritorious litigation, or it may have changed the definition of merit, effectively precluding claims that would have survived and produced a settlement pre-PSLRA. We find no evidence that pre-PSLRA claims that settled for nuisance value would be less likely to be filed under the PSLRA regime. There is evidence, however, that pre-PSLRA …

Mapping The American Shareholder Litigation Experience, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this paper, we provide an overview of the most significant empirical research that has been conducted in recent years on the public and private enforcement of the federal securities laws. The existing studies of the U.S. enforcement system provide a rich tapestry for assessing the value of enforcement, both private and public, as well as market penalties for fraudulent financial reporting practices. The relevance of the U.S. experience is made broader by the introduction through the PSLRA in late 1995 of new procedures for the conduct of private suits and the numerous efforts to evaluate the effects of those …

A New Look At Judicial Impact: Attorneys' Fees In Securities Class Actions After Goldberger V. Integrated Resources, Inc., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller, Michael A. Perino

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Judicial impact studies have generally found widespread compliance by lower courts. Often, however, these studies employ relatively insensitive measures of compliance, limit their focus to compliance with Supreme Court precedent, and only occasionally examine the impact of judicial decisions on the ultimate consumers of those rulings - the members of society who are subject to them. Significant questions thus remain, such as whether and to what extent lower courts in fact comply with precedent and what if any role fear of reversal plays in compliance. To address these gaps, we use regression analysis to examine how the district courts in …

There Are Plaintiffs And ... There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, Lynn Bai

Vanderbilt Law Review

Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three different groups-the Committee on Capital Market Regulation,' the Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets in the 21st Century, and McKinsey & Company.3 Each of the reports focuses on a single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. While the reports target multiple regulatory forces in their calls for reform, each report singles out securities class actions as one of the prime villains that place …

Stoneridge Investment Partners V. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy Of Securities Class Action Reform, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

I begin in Part II by explaining the wrong turn that the Court took in Basic. The Basic Court misunderstood the function of the reliance element and its relation to the question of damages. As a result, the securities class action regime established in Basic threatens draconian sanctions with limited deterrent benefit. Part III then summarizes the cases leading up to Stoneridge and analyzes the Court's reasoning in that case. In Stoneridge, like the decisions interpreting the reliance requirement of Rule 10b-5 that came before it, the Court emphasized policy implications. Sometimes policy implications are invoked to broaden the reach …

Retail Investor Remedies Under Rule 10b-5, O'Hare Jennifer

Faculty Publications

This paper assesses the private remedies available under Rule 10b-5 to retail investors who have been defrauded by false corporate disclosures. After comparing the treatment received by retail investors to the treatment received by institutional investors, I identify several areas in which the federal securities laws disfavor retail investors who have been defrauded by false corporate disclosures, including the creation of a two-tiered system of investor remedies for securities fraud. Institutional investors are permitted to pick and choose which law and forum offers them the most attractive chance for recovery, but retail investors typically do not have this opportunity. They …

Public Pension Funds As Shareholder Activists: A Comment On Choi And Fisch, Randall Thomas

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The world of shareholder activism has expanded dramatically over the past twenty years so that it now contains a broad set of actors carrying on a wide range of activities. At one end of the spectrum, hedge fund activist shareholders have taken large investment positions in targeted companies and spent significant amounts of money lobbying aggressively for a host of structural changes at these corporations. At a more intermediate level of activism are the labor union pension funds. The union funds have been active, making innovative uses of the federal securities laws to get shareholder proposals on corporate ballots and …

Does The Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis Of Lead Plaintiffs In Securities Class Actions, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision was adopted in order to encourage large shareholders with claims in a securities fraud class action to step forward to become the class' representative. Congress' expectation was that these investors would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that may arise when class counsel's interests diverge from those of the shareholder class. Proponents of the provision claimed that there would be substantial benefits from having institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs. Now, ten years later, the claim that the lead plaintiff is a more …

What Counts As Fraud? An Empirical Study Of Motions To Dismiss Under The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Hillary A. Sale

Articles

This article presents the findings of a study of the resolution of motions to dismiss securities fraud lawsuits since the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995. Our sample consists of decisions on motions to dismiss in securities class actions by district and appellate courts in the Second and Ninth Circuits for cases filed after the passage of the Reform Act to the end of 2002. These circuits are the leading circuits for the filing of securities class actions and are generally recognized as representing two ends of the securities class action spectrum. Post-PSLRA, the Second …

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Articles

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 ("PSLRA"), the Act's "lead plaintiff' provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel's compensation. Congress's stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional investors-pension funds, mutual …

Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. And The Counterrevolution In The Federal Securities Laws, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

The confirmation of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to the Supreme Court coincided with a dramatic shift in the Court's approach to securities law. This Article documents Powell's influence in changing the Court's direction in securities law. Powell's influence was the product of his extensive experience with the securities laws as a corporate lawyer, which gave him much greater familiarity with that body of law than his fellow Justices had. That experience also made him skeptical of civil liability, particularly class and derivative actions. Powell's skepticism led him to interpret the securities law in a consistently narrow fashion to reduce liability …

To The Lowest Bidder? The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act And Auctioning The Role Of Lead Counsel, Analisa Valle

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Did The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

In 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA or the Act) to address abuses in securities fraud class actions. In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other high profile securities frauds, critics suggest that the law made it too easy to escape liability for securities fraud and thus created a climate in which frauds are more likely to occur. Others claim that the Act has largely failed because it did little to deter plaintiffs' lawyers from filing nonmeritorious cases. This article employs a database of the 1449 class actions filed from 1996 through 2001 to …

Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, Adam C. Pritchard

Other Publications

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs’ bar. In particular, the high-technology industry, accountants, and investment bankers thought that they had been unjustly victimized by class action lawsuits based on little more than declines in a company’s stock price. Prior to 1995, the plaintiffs’ bar had free rein to use the discovery process to troll for evidence to support its claims. Moreover, the high costs of litigation were a powerful weapon with which to coerce companies to settle claims. The plaintiffs’ bar and its allies in Congress have called …

Who Cares?, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Jim Cox and Randall Thomas have identified an interesting phenomenon in their contribution to this symposium: institutional investors seem to be systematically "leaving money on the table" in securities fraud class actions. For someone who approaches legal questions from an economic perspective, the initial response to this claim is disbelief. As the joke goes, economists do not bend over to pick up twenty-dollar bills on the street. The economist knows that the twenty dollars must be an illusion. In a world of rational actors, someone else already would have picked up that twenty-dollar bill, so the effort spent bending over …

Markets As Monitors: A Proposal To Replace Class Actions With Exchanges As Securities Fraud Enforcers, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Fraud in the securities markets has been a focus of legislative reform in recent years. Corporations-especially those in the high-technology industry-have complained that they are being unfairly targeted by plaintiffs' lawyers in class action securities fraud lawsuits. The corporations' complaints led to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("Reform Act"). The Reform Act attempted to reduce meritless litigation against corporate issuers by erecting a series of procedural barriers to the filing of securities class actions. Plaintiffs' attorneys warned that the Reform Act and the resulting decrease in securities class actions would leave corporate fraud unchecked and deprive defrauded …

State Securities Litigation May No Longer Be A Class Act: Federal Preemption Looms On The Horizon, Susan J. Becker

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

State courhouse doors may soon be closed to class actions by shareholders of nationally traded stocks seeking redress for alleged misstatements and omissions in the issuer's financial forecasts.

The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act Of 1998: The Sun Sets On California's Blue Sky Laws, David M. Lavine, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

It is often said that California sets the pace for changes in America's tastes. Trends established in California often find their way into the heartland, having a profound effect on our nation's cultural scene. Nouvelle cuisine, the dialect of the Valley Girl and rollerblading all have their genesis on the West Coast. The most recent trend to emerge from California, instead of catching on in the rest of the country, has been stopped dead in its tracks by a legislative rebuke from Washington, D.C. California's latest, albeit short-lived, contribution to the nation was a migration of securities fraud class actions …

Fraud And Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud Causes Of Action, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

The passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has engendered a significant forum shift in class action securities fraud litigation, from federal to state court. This unintended by-product of the Act has reignited debate over our dual federal-state system of securities regulation and in turn has inspired a discussion as to whether Congress should now preempt state securities fraud causes of action. This article argues that preemption is an appropriate, but not the only, solution to these concerns. To support this argument, this article first traces the history of dual state-federal securities regulation within the context of …

The Pentium Papers: A Case Study Of Collective Institutional Investor Activism In Litigation, Joseph A. Grundfest, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

This article suggests that institutional investors have rational incentives to become more active in the litigation arena, but that the current debate is falsely constrained because it rests on the assumption that institutional investors must participate either by (1) assuming the formal role of lead plaintiff, class representative, or intervenor or, (2) not participating at all. This is a false dichotomy because, as this article demonstrates, institutions have available to them a rich array of flexible, informal, and relatively inexpensive mechanisms by which they can make their views known to litigants and courts alike.

Our hypothesis that institutional investor activism …

Annual Survey Of Antitrust Developments-Class Actions, Mergers, And Market Definition: A New Trend Toward Neutrality, John H. Shenefield

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.