Securities Law Commons^™

Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate Law's "Duty Of Care As Responsibility For Systems", Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Revisiting section 3.4.2 of Clark's Corporate Law ('Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems") reminds us, however, that the internal controls story actually goes back many decades, and that many of the strategic issues that are at the heart of section 404 have long been contentious. My Article will briefly update Clark's account through the late 1980s and 1990s before returning to Sarbanes-Oxley and rulemaking thereunder by the SEC and the newly created Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"). My main point builds on one of Clark's but digs deeper. Internal controls requirements, whether federal or state, are incoherent unless …

The Role Of Empirical Evidence In Evaluating The Wisdom Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

An Empirical Study Of Securities Disclosure Practice, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi

Faculty Scholarship

Using a dataset of sovereign bond offering documents and underlying bond contracts for ten sovereign issuers from 1985-2005, we examine the securities disclosure practices of issuers and attorneys. The sovereign bond market is comprised of sophisticated issuers with highly paid law firms. If anyone complies fully with federal securities disclosure requirements, we expect sovereign issuers and their attorneys to do so. On the other hand, network effects that determine what information issuers chose to disclose as well as the high cost of determining what information is required for disclosure may lead issuers to fail to meet their disclosure duties. We …

The Missing Monitor In Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, Tom Baker, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This article reports the results of empirical research on the monitoring role of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) companies in American corporate governance. Economic theory provides three reasons to expect D&O insurers to serve as corporate governance monitors: first, monitoring provides insurers with a way to manage moral hazard; second, monitoring provides benefits to shareholders who might not otherwise need the risk distribution that D&O insurance provides; and third, the "bonding" provided by risk distribution gives insurers a comparative advantage in monitoring. Nevertheless, we find that D&O insurers neither monitor corporate governance during the life of the insurance …

Merrill Lynch V. Dabit: Federal Preemption Of Holders' Class Actions, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Next Epidemic: Bubbles And The Growth And Decay Of Securities Regulation, Erik F. Gerding

Publications

This article explores how speculative bubbles undermine the effectiveness of securities regulations and spawn epidemics of securities fraud. A brief historical survey demonstrates that stock market bubbles almost invariably coincide with epidemics of securities fraud, and provides a compelling argument that the outbreak of fraud in the Enron era did not stem merely from factors unique to the 1990s, but from the dynamics of an asset price bubble as well.

Drawing on perspectives from securities law practice and economic theory, the article argues that bubbles dilute the deterrent effect of antifraud rules and promote deregulation. Both effects alter the calculus …