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Articles 31 - 43 of 43
Full-Text Articles in Securities Law
There Are Plaintiffs And . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Lynn Bai
There Are Plaintiffs And . . . There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical Analysis Of Securities Class Action Settlements, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox, Lynn Bai
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums - small relative to the "provable losses" suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendant-company, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears …
Public Pension Funds As Shareholder Activists: A Comment On Choi And Fisch, Randall Thomas
Public Pension Funds As Shareholder Activists: A Comment On Choi And Fisch, Randall Thomas
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The world of shareholder activism has expanded dramatically over the past twenty years so that it now contains a broad set of actors carrying on a wide range of activities. At one end of the spectrum, hedge fund activist shareholders have taken large investment positions in targeted companies and spent significant amounts of money lobbying aggressively for a host of structural changes at these corporations. At a more intermediate level of activism are the labor union pension funds. The union funds have been active, making innovative uses of the federal securities laws to get shareholder proposals on corporate ballots and …
Does The Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis Of Lead Plaintiffs In Securities Class Actions, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Does The Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis Of Lead Plaintiffs In Securities Class Actions, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
The PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision was adopted in order to encourage large shareholders with claims in a securities fraud class action to step forward to become the class' representative. Congress' expectation was that these investors would actively monitor the conduct of a securities fraud class action so as to reduce the litigation agency costs that may arise when class counsel's interests diverge from those of the shareholder class. Proponents of the provision claimed that there would be substantial benefits from having institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs. Now, ten years later, the claim that the lead plaintiff is a more …
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence And Legal Implications Of The Failure Of Financial Institutions To Participate In Securities Class Action Settlements, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence And Legal Implications Of The Failure Of Financial Institutions To Participate In Securities Class Action Settlements, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This article presents the results of an empirical investigation of the frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled securities class actions. We combine an empirical study of a large set of settlements with the results of a survey of institutional investors about their claims filing practices. Our sample for the first part of the analysis contains 118 settlements that were not included in our earlier study. We find that less than 30% of institutional investors with provable losses perfect their claims in these settlements. We then explore the possible explanations for this widespread failure. We suggest a wide …
Public And Private Enforcement Of The Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Public And Private Enforcement Of The Securities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this paper, we examine how those corporations that have been the targets of SEC enforcement efforts compare in terms of their size and financial health vis-a-vis firms that are targeted only by the private securities class action. We also ask whether the SEC or the private bar systematically proceeds against violators that cause the greatest loss to investors. In this regard, we are intrigued by the most basic question posed by private suits, whether settlements bear any relationship to the losses suffered by the class and whether those losses bear any relationship to the size of either the firm …
The Public And Private Faces Of Derivative Lawsuits, Randall S. Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
The Public And Private Faces Of Derivative Lawsuits, Randall S. Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Derivative suits, long the principal vehicle for discussions about representative litigation in corporate and securities law, now share the stage with younger cousins - securities fraud class actions and state law fiduciary duty class actions. At the same time alternative governance vehicles - independent directors, auditors and other reforms that have followed in the wake of Enron - potentially diminish the relative place of litigation such as derivative suits. This article presents data from all derivative suits filed in Delaware over a two-year period. We find a relatively small number, certainly as compared to fiduciary class action and securities fraud …
The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within corporations. Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In each instance, early hopes these suits would effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with concerns about the size of the litigation agency costs of such representative litigation, which can arise when a self-selected plaintiff's attorney and her client that are appointed to pursue the claims of an entire class of …
Sec Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Sec Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement actions from 1997 to 2002. We find that the volume of SEC enforcement proceedings is relatively modest. We next examine the scope of the recently enacted "Fair Fund" provision that authorizes the SEC to designate civil penalties it recovers from defendants to benefit defrauded private investors. We conclude that this provision offers only limited potential relief for private investors. We complete this Part of the Article with an analysis of the serious resource …
Leaving Money On The Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail To File Claims In Securities Class Actions?, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Leaving Money On The Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail To File Claims In Securities Class Actions?, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this paper, we examine the role of institutional investors in securities fraud class actions. We begin by surveying the first five years of experience with the Lead Plaintiff provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). In particular, we look at those cases where the lead plaintiff position has been contested and the outcome of those disputes. We find that institutional investors have been very successful in obtaining the position of lead plaintiff where they have sought it, but that there are a number of cases where they were unsuccessful. In part two of the paper, we dissect …
Measuring Securities Market Efficiency In The Regulatory Setting, Randall Thomas, James F. Cotter
Measuring Securities Market Efficiency In The Regulatory Setting, Randall Thomas, James F. Cotter
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In the "Aircraft Carrier," the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed changes in federal securities disclosure requirements in an attempt to enhance and facilitate the process of issuing new securities. Under the proposed regulatory regime, the registration process would be simplified so that many larger, more experienced issuers would be able to use a new, shorter registration statement called Form B (as opposed to the more extensive Form A) whenever they sell securities to the public. To qualify to use Form B, a company with at least twelve months reporting history under the Exchange Act must either have a public …
The Determinants Of Shareholder Voting On Stock Option Plans, Randall S. Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin
The Determinants Of Shareholder Voting On Stock Option Plans, Randall S. Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Over the past decade, executive compensation has become a controversial topic. Increasingly, corporate boards of directors are confronted by angry shareholder groups over the size and composition of executive pay packages. One of the most important focal points for these tensions arises when shareholders are asked by the board to approve the creation of new stock option plans, or the amendment of existing plans. This article seeks to identify the factors that lead shareholders to support or oppose stock option plans. We examine the justifications for the widespread use of stock options and identify several benefits from stock option plans …
Should Labor Be Allowed To Submit Shareholder Proposals?, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin
Should Labor Be Allowed To Submit Shareholder Proposals?, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Article, we investigate whether labor unions and related entities should be permitted to continue to make shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 of the federal securities laws. We focus on the claim that labor is using the shareholder proposal mechanism to further the interests of workers at the expense of other shareholders. In particular, corporate management groups have suggested that when labor is involved in collective bargaining negotiations with management, it should be barred from submitting shareholder proposals because labor proposals seek to further interests not shared by other security holders of the company. Using data on shareholder proposals …
Using State Inspection Statutes For Discovery In Federal Securities Fraud Actions, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin
Using State Inspection Statutes For Discovery In Federal Securities Fraud Actions, Randall Thomas, Kenneth J. Martin
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
We propose that plaintiffs in securities fraud actions should use state inspections statutes to obtain discovery about potential securities fraud cases. First, we argue that the Private Securities Law Reform Act has substantially increased shareholders' difficulty in uncovering securities fraud. Next, we show that shareholders have an alternative method of investigating fraud: state inspections statutes. We then analyze cases filed under the Delaware inspection statute to examine the costs to plaintiffs of pursuing claims under this statute. We find that the statutory inspection process is a largely successful, although expensive and time-consuming, process. Nevertheless, potential plaintiffs could realize substantial benefits …