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Full-Text Articles in Securities Law

Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor Jan 2005

Introduction: The Fifth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Welcome and Introduction to the Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, November 9, 2004 at Fordham University School of Law.

Fordham Law School, with the support of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, inaugurated the A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture Series in the fall of 2000 with the timely insights of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (the "SEC" or the "Commission") then-Chair Arthur Leavitt. Since then, the Sommer Lecture has continued to bring to Fordham such heavyweights as Mary Schapiro, President of National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Regulation, Inc., SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, and …


Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton Jan 2004

Rules, Principles, And The Accounting Crisis In The United States, William W. Bratton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Securities Exchange Commission move too quickly when they prod the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the standard setter for US GAAP, to move immediately to a principles-based system. Priorities respecting reform of corporate reporting in the US need to be ordered more carefully. Incentive problems impairing audit performance should be solved first through institutional reform insulating the audit from the negative impact of rent-seeking and solving adverse selection problems otherwise affecting audit practice. So long as auditor independence and management incentives respecting accounting treatments remain suspect, the US reporting system holds out no actor plausibly positioned …


Panel Presentation: Securities Regulation And Corporate Responsibility, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2003

Panel Presentation: Securities Regulation And Corporate Responsibility, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What I want to do is talk about the big picture, as John suggested, and consider the likely spillover effects of Sarbanes-Oxley. I want to do this in a discretely administrative law-oriented way, taking two themes that were very visible and driving forces behind the legislation. The first, as Mary suggested in her opening remarks, is a question about federalism. It has been common for the last twenty years, at least, to trot out - as John just did - a distinction between federal and state spheres of competency. The SEC is on the disclosure side, while the substance of …


Are Judges Motivated To Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine?, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2002

Are Judges Motivated To Create "Good" Securities Fraud Doctrine?, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

‘How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else Does – Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions’, by Stephen M. Bainbridge and G. Mitu Gulati, confronts the reader with a theory about judicial behavior in the face of complex, "unexciting" cases such as those involving securities fraud. The story is simple: few judges find any opportunity for personal satisfaction or enhanced reputation here, so they simply try to minimize cognitive effort, off-loading much of the work that has to be done to their clerks. The evidence that Bainbridge and Gulati offer is the creation of some ten or …


Hester Prynne, Lydia Bennet, And Section 306 Stock: The Concept Of Tainting In The American Novel, The British Novel, And The Internal Revenue Code, Stephen B. Cohen, Stephen B. Cohen Jan 2001

Hester Prynne, Lydia Bennet, And Section 306 Stock: The Concept Of Tainting In The American Novel, The British Novel, And The Internal Revenue Code, Stephen B. Cohen, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Did Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel, The Scarlet Letter, inspire Section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code? This code provision adopts a peculiarly Hawthorne-like solution to a tax avoidance scheme known as the "preferred stock bailout." Section 306 taints the stock used in the scheme as "Section 306 stock." Special rules then govern all subsequent dispositions of the tainted stock. With its concept of a taint that can dog a stock from acquisition to disposition, Section 306 might have been designed by a novelist rather than a tax technician.


Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow: The Sec's Pursuit Of Managerial Accountability, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2001

Seeking Sunlight In Santa Fe's Shadow: The Sec's Pursuit Of Managerial Accountability, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My aim in this paper is not to justify at length an expansive "new corporation law" perspective, though I do believe in it. Nor do I want to try to resolve a controversial question that the new learning admittedly leaves open: which jurisdictional body should set the disclosure and antifraud standards insofar as they are designed to promote better corporate governance? To say that corporate and securities law are largely unitary does not necessarily mean that centralization of authority in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is the right choice. Perhaps the states, foreign countries, or stock exchanges …


Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability In A Continuous Disclosure Environment, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2000

Deconstructing Section 11: Public Offering Liability In A Continuous Disclosure Environment, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article is an effort to rethink civil liability in capital-raising transactions by large capitalization issuers. After a brief digression about who should set liability standards, the article then addresses two related questions. The first deals with a natural question: Should not the primary regulatory effort for large issuers be to assure continuous disclosure in the secondary marketplace, given the far larger volume of such trading in that market compared to that in primary transactions? Second, if we have developed a satisfactory regime of disclosure responsibilities for this setting, what more, if anything, in terms of liability protection, is needed …


Cross-Border Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort Jan 2000

Cross-Border Insider Trading, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Currently, there is no formal SEC policy on when U.S. insider trading rules (or indeed Rule l0b-5 generally) will be applied extraterritorially. If one can glean anything from SEC action during the last twenty years, it is that the trading site - the use of U.S. market mechanisms - that counts most. Certainly, neither the trader nor the issuer need be U.S.-based. What I wish to do in this paper is articulate what I think is sensible enforcement policy for a nation - whether the U.S. or any other - to adopt. By this, I do not want to focus …


Tax Metamorphosis, Stephen B. Cohen Jan 1999

Tax Metamorphosis, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

My favorite course ever, fourth-year high school Latin, was also the most demanding. We translated all twelve books of Virgils epic poem, The _Eneid, line by dactylic hexameter line, and large chunks of Ovids Metamorphoses besides. The course was valuable in many ways, not least of which was that only my youthful reading of Ovid's Metamorphoses later enabled me to make sense of the U.S. Tax Court's otherwise inscrutable decision in Edwards v. Commissioner.


Taxing Stock Dividends And Economic Theory, Stephen B. Cohen Jan 1974

Taxing Stock Dividends And Economic Theory, Stephen B. Cohen

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Since 1936, the Internal Revenue Code has treated elective stock dividends on common stock, which are taxed on receipt as shareholder ordinary income gain, differently from pro rata stock dividends on common, which are received tax-free. This difference in treatment was reenacted in Section 305 of the 1954 Code; and while the Tax Reform Act of 1969 changed many details of stock dividend taxation, the basic distinction between elective and pro rata stock dividends was, if anything, reinforced. The major purpose of the 1969 amendments to Section 305 was to impose a shareholder ordinary income tax on transactions with the …