Securities Law Commons^™

Temporary Securities Regulation, Anita Krug

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In times of crisis, including the 2020-21 global pandemic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has engaged in a type of securities regulation that few scholars have acknowledged, let alone evaluated. Specifically, during recent market crises, the SEC has adopted rules that are temporary, designed to help the securities markets and its participants—both public companies and public investment funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs—weather the crisis at hand but go no further. Once that goal has been accomplished, these rules usually expire, replaced by the permanent rules that they temporarily supplanted. Although the temporary-rulemaking endeavor is laudable—and arguably …

The Corporation Reborn: From Shareholder Primacy To Shared Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

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The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …

Crowdfunding Capital In The Age Of Blockchain Based Tokens, Patricia H. Lee

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Less than three years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) adopted investment crowdfunding regulations (“Reg. CF”) to facilitate small companies’ efforts to raise capital and jumpstart employment, providing companies potentially one of the most disruptive transformations in capital markets.

As the lion share of securities are offered under public offerings or Reg. D safe harbor exemptions, outcomes and impacts of Reg. CF offerings are not studied or monitored to the same extent. One line of inquiry is the scope of Reg. CF, including questions about the level of company participation, the types of businesses seeking capital formation, and the …

Reconstructing The Corporation: A Mutual-Control Model Of Corporate Governance, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

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The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated profit-maximizers, are looking for ways to express a wider range of values in allocating their funds. Workers are agitating for greater voice at their workplaces. And prominent legislators have recently proposed corporate law reforms that would put a sizable number of employee representatives on the boards of directors of large public companies. These rumblings of public discontent are echoed in recent corporate law scholarship, which has cataloged the costs of shareholder control, touted the advantages of nonvoting stock, and questioned whether activist holders of various stripes are …

Shareholder Voting And The Symbolic Politics Of Corporation As Contract, Matthew T. Bodie, Grant M. Hayden

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American corporations are structured in such a way that shareholders, and shareholders alone, have the right to vote in all significant corporate decisions. Over the years, this exclusive shareholder franchise has been supported by an ongoing procession of justifications. But as those arguments have fallen by the wayside, shareholder primacists have circled back and latched upon a final argument for the special voting status of shareholders, arguing that this fundamental feature of corporate governance is the product of the set of freely-bargained-for agreements among all corporate constituents. Because this set of agreements reflects the preferences of all parties to the …

Investing And Pretending, Anita Krug

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One of the more prominent components of Dodd–Frank’s regulatory changes was Title VII, providing for the regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives known as “swaps.” A swap is a financial instrument whose value is based on an asset—the “reference asset”—that is wholly unrelated to the swap itself. Although there was much ado about swap regulation immediately after Dodd–Frank’s enactment, the same cannot be said of the many rules that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has subsequently adopted pursuant to its authority under Title VII. This Article critically evaluates the CFTC’s “swap rules” and identifies the regulatory vision that they reflect. …

Downstream Securities Regulation, Anita Krug

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Securities regulation wears two hats. Its “upstream” side governs firms in connection with their obtaining financing in the securities markets. That is, it regulates firms’ and issuers’ offers and sales of securities, whether in public offerings to retail investors or in private offerings to institutional investors. Its “downstream” side, by contrast, governs financial services providers, who assist with investors’ activities in those markets. Their services include providing advice regarding securities investments, as investment advisers do; aggregating investors’ assets for purposes of enabling those investors to invest their assets collectively, as mutual funds do; and acting as “middlemen” between buyers and …

Global Regulatory And Ethical Framework, Henry Ordower

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This chapter reviews statutory and court sanctioned private regulatory frameworks affecting the creation of private equity (PE) funds and their primary activity of acquiring corporate enterprises. The chapter reviews U.S. legislation regulating securities, investment companies, and tender offers, state antitakeover legislation, state court decisions on hostile corporate takeovers and “poison pill” defenses, as well as European Union directives on takeovers and alternative investment fund managers. It concludes that regulation in the United States has shifted the balance of power in corporate acquisitions to incumbent management. The chapter also examines the diametrically opposed ethical views of PE funds as investment entities …

Escaping Entity-Centrism In Financial Services Regulation, Anita Krug

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In the ongoing discussions about financial services regulation, one critically important topic has not been recognized, let alone addressed. That topic is what this Article calls the “entity-centrism” of financial services regulation. Laws and rules are entity-centric when they assume that a financial services firm is a stand-alone entity, operating separately from and independently of any other entity. They are entitycentric, therefore, when the specific requirements and obligations they comprise are addressed only to an abstract and solitary “firm,” with little or no contemplation of affiliates, parent companies, subsidiaries, or multi-entity enterprises. Regulatory entity-centrism is not an isolated phenomenon, as …

The Modern Corporation Magnified: Managerial Accountability In Financial Services Holding Companies, Anita Krug

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This Article first recalls the primary contours of Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s acclaimed observations regarding the separation of ownership and control in the “modern corporation,” as well as their conclusions about the implications of those observations for the doctrine of shareholder primacy. Second, the Article describes how the activities of FSHCs generally differ from what we think corporations do and, certainly, from what Berle and Means conceived of as the purpose of corporations or, indeed, any business enterprise. Third, this Article articulates how those business activities render more acute the problem of the separation of ownership and control that …

Investment Company As Instrument: The Limitations Of The Corporate Governance Regulatory Paradigm, Anita Krug

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U.S. regulation of public investment companies (such as mutual funds) is based on a notion that, from a governance perspective, investment companies are simply another type of business enterprise, not substantially different from companies that produce goods or provide (noninvestment) services. In other words, investment company regulation is founded on what this Article calls a “corporate governance paradigm,” in that it provides a significant regulatory role for boards of directors, as the traditional governance mechanism in business enterprises, and is “entity centric,” focusing on intraentity relationships to the exclusion of superentity ones. This Article argues that corporate governance norms, which …

Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation, Anita Krug

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(Excerpt)Now, in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank's enactment and the SEC's associated bout of rulemaking, one might think that the Advisers Act's regulatory regime is a workable and effective one, equipped to address - and address efficiently - the investor-protection risks that the twenty-first-century investment adviser industry produces. In fact, however, Dodd-Frank did not touch - and, indeed, Dodd-Frank's crafters indicated no awareness of - many of the Advisers Act's longstanding troubles. Additionally, the changes Dodd-Frank brought about have their own considerable deficiencies. As this Article contends, the U.S. investment adviser regulatory regime, now seventy-four years old, is in need of …

The Supreme Court's Theory Of The Fund, William Birdthistle

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Just as the firm has long served as the foundational molecule of the U.S. capitalist economy, theories of the firm have for more than a century dominated legal and economic discourse. Ever since Ronald Coase published The Nature of the Firm in 1937 and asked why firms should exist in an efficient market, classicists and neoclassicists have competed to develop theories — predominantly managerialist and contractual — that best explain the structure and behavior of business organizations.

The investment fund, by contrast, has languished at the margins of corporate theory, relegated as simply a minor, if somewhat curious, example of …

Becoming The Fifth Branch, William Birdthistle, M. Todd Henderson

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Observers of our federal republic have long acknowledged that a fourth branch of government comprising administrative agencies has arisen to join the original three established by the Constitution. In this article, we focus our attention on the emergence of perhaps yet another, comprising financial self-regulatory organizations. In the late eighteenth century, long before the creation of state and federal securities authorities, the financial industry created its own self-regulatory organizations. These private institutions then coexisted with the public authorities for much of the past century in a complementary array of informal and formal policing mechanisms. That equilibrium, however, appears to be …

The Bizarre Law & Economics Of 'Business Roundtable V. Sec', Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

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Corporations are legal entities designed to foster certain kinds of collective economic activity. The decisionmaking power within a corporation ultimately rests with a board of directors elected by shareholders. Shareholders, however, do not use anything like a conventional ballot in these elections; instead, they fill out a “proxy ballot,” delivered to them by the incumbent board. This proxy ballot lists only the incumbent board’s chosen nominees, very often the board members themselves. If a shareholder wants to run for director or propose another nominee for the board, she needs to provide all other shareholders with a separate proxy ballot — …

Chevron, Greenwashing, And The Myth Of 'Green Oil Companies', Miriam A. Cherry, Judd F. Sneirson

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As green business practices grow in popularity, so does the temptation to “greenwash” one’s business to appear more environmentally and socially responsible than it actually is. We examined this phenomenon in an earlier paper, using BP and the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe as a case study and developing a framework for policing dubious claims of corporate social responsibility. This Article revisits these issues focusing on Chevron, an oil company that claims in its advertisements to care deeply about the environment and the communities in which it operates, even as it faces an $18 billion judgment for polluting the Ecuadorean Amazon and …

American Legal History Survey: Syllabus, Anders Walker

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This syllabus provides an overview of American Legal History, focusing on the manner in which law has been used to organize American society. Several themes will be traced through the semester, including law’s role in encouraging innovation and regulating social relations, in part through the elaboration of legal disciplines like property, tort, contract, criminal law, tax, business associations, administrative law, environmental law, securities regulation, commercial law, immigration, and health law. Emphasis will also be placed on the origins and evolution of constitutional law, from the founding to the present.

The Regulation Of Private Equity, Hedge Funds And State Funds, Henry Ordower

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This United States report responds to a questionnaire that the general reporter for the project prepared. The project describes United States law features of hedge funds, private equity funds and sovereign wealth funds and identifies critical current issues in their regulation and governance. The report also includes discussion of recent United States legislation on financial services that affects those pooled investment vehicles.

Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, And The Hedge Fund Problem, Anita Krug

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This Article contends that more effective regulation of investment advisers could be achieved by recognizing that the growth of hedge funds, private equity funds, and other private funds in recent decades is a manifestation of institutionalization in the investment advisory context. That is, investment advisers today commonly advise these “institutions,” which have supplanted other, smaller investors as advisory clients. However, the federal securities statute governing investment advisers, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, does not address the role of private funds as institutions that now intermediate those smaller investors’ relationships to investment advisers. Consistent with that failure, investment adviser regulation …

Investors Beware: Assessing Shareholder Derivative Litigation In India And China, Ann M. Scarlett

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In response to the 2008 financial crisis, the United States government bailed out many business entities in exchange for equity and debt interests in such entities. It also dramatically increased the regulations imposed on businesses. This level of government ownership and intervention in corporations is rare in free-market capitalist systems such as the United States. Government ownership and control, however, are common among historically socialist countries such as India or communist countries such as China. Yet, the United States’ recent actions stand in stark contrast to the trend in India and China, which have both been moving toward more capitalist …

Imitation Or Improvement? The Evolution Of Shareholder Derivative Litigation In The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, And Australia, Ann M. Scarlett

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Shareholder derivative litigation is a target of constant criticism within the United States (U.S.). Many scholars advocate for its abolition and others propose strict limitations on its use. If shareholder derivative litigation were universally disfavored, one would expect countries to be abandoning such litigation through legislative enactments or judicial rulings. Instead, many countries are expanding shareholder derivative litigation.

This Article compares the shareholder derivative action as developed in the U.S. with such actions in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. The U.S. has the most recognized and frequent uses of shareholder derivative actions, whereas such actions are rare in the …

What's In A Name? - The Tale Of Louis Wolfson's Affirmed, Alan M. Weinberger

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Why would someone choose to name a thoroughbred racehorse "Affirmed" after his conviction for federal securities laws violations had been affirmed on appeal? This inquiry is the basis for exploring the enigmatic life and spectacular career of Louis E. Wolfson, owner and breeder of the last winner of horse racing's Triple Crown.

Perhaps best known as the central figure in the scandal that resulted in the forced resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas, Wolfson left a sizable footprint on corporate legal history. He has been described as the original corporate raider, the inventor of the market for corporate control …

Breaking Bucks In Money Market Funds, William A. Birdthistle

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This Article argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s first and most significant response to the economic crisis increases rather than decreases the likelihood of future failures in money market funds and the broader capital markets. In newly promulgated regulations addressing the "breaking of the buck" in the $3 trillion money market - a debacle at the fulcrum of the 2008 financial meltdown - the SEC endorses practices that obfuscate rather than illuminate the capital markets, including fixed pricing for money market funds, potentially riskier portfolio requirements, and the continued use of discredited ratings agencies. These policies, premised implicitly upon …

Breaking Bucks: Sec Regulation By Obfuscation, William A. Birdthistle

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This Article argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission’s first and most significant response to the economic crisis profoundly contradicts widely accepted theoretical and regulatory approaches to financial oversight. More alarmingly, the SEC’s newest rules increase rather than decrease the likelihood of future failures in money market funds and the broader capital markets.

Scholars – of both neoclassical and behavioral economic theory – have long insisted that transparency and disclosure play essential roles in ensuring efficient capital markets and sound financial regulation. Professors Gilson and Kraakman notably argued that the efficient capital market hypothesis, and its reliance on a market …

Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Approach To Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, William A. Birdthistle

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Next Term, in Jones v. Harris, the Supreme Court will be called upon to resolve philosophical divergences on a massive, critical, yet academically slighted subject: the dysfunctional system through which almost one hundred million Americans attempt to save more than ten trillion dollars for their retirement. When this case was in the Seventh Circuit, two of the foremost theorists of law and economics, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook and Judge Richard Posner, disagreed vociferously on competing analyses of the investment industry. The Supreme Court’s ruling will not only resolve the intricate fiduciary and doctrinal issues of this dispute but also have …

Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

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Corporate law is consumed with a debate over shareholder democracy. The conventional wisdom counsels that shareholders should have more voice in corporate governance, in order to reduce agency costs and provide democratic legitimacy. A second set of theorists, described as “board primacists,” advocates against greater shareholder democracy and in favor of increased board discretion. These theorists argue that shareholders need to delegate their authority in order to provide the board with the proper authority to manage the enterprise and avoid short-term decision making.

In the last few years, the classical economic underpinnings of corporate law have been destabilized by a …

The Case For Employee Referenda On Transformative Transactions As Shareholder Proposals, Matthew T. Bodie

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This Comment describes and advocates for employee referenda as implemented through a SEC Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal. The proposal provides for a nonbinding referendum amongst all employees whenever the corporation's shareholders must vote to approve a merger, acquisition, sale of substantially all assets, or other transformative transaction. The purpose of the referendum is to provide employees with a voice in the transaction and to provide shareholders with a mechanism for tapping into employee sentiment. Because the referendum would be nonbinding, it is best viewed as an informational tool for shareholders and employees to use in policing management's transactions. Given the …

Private Fund Adviser Registration Act Hr-3818, Anita Krug

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This paper comments on the Obama administration's 2009 proposal for the regulation of hedge fund investment advisers.

Financial Regulatory Reform And Private Funds, Anita Krug

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This white paper comments on the Obama administration's June 2009 proposal for the regulation of hedge fund investment advisers.

The Regulatory Response To Madoff, Anita Krug

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This white paper evaluates investor protection mechanisms in the securities regulatory regime at the time the Madoff fraud was exposed. It considers whether the post-Madoff call for additional regulation of hedge funds and/or their managers - and/or their respective activities - was warranted.