Securities Law Commons^™

The Non-Binding Bind: Reframing Precatory Stockholder Proposals Under Delaware Law, Kyle A. Pinder

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allows stockholders to submit proposals for inclusion in a company’s proxy materials. The rule assumes that Delaware law provides stockholders with the right to submit non-binding proposals for stockholder approval. But as many have observed, this assumption lacks a firm basis in state law, particularly in Delaware. If such a right exists, a stockholder conducting its own proxy solicitation could submit numerous precatory proposals, including those advancing narrow or special interests. This article concludes that, under Delaware law, stockholders do not have an inherent right to submit precatory proposals. Accordingly, a …

Denizens Of Dexit: Why Controlled Companies Are The First To Leave The First State, Jack Kanzler

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

A series of high-profile companies announcing plans to leave the state of Delaware and reincorporate out of state has sparked many commentators to predict a coming wave of corporate exodus from the First State called “DExit.” This paper seeks to explore the DExit “movement” with a particular focus on “controlled companies” and the recent doctrinal developments that have created a perception that Delaware law has become hostile to such governance arrangements. I will begin by discussing a brief history of Delaware’s corporate law and its current role in the American corporate legal system. I will then move to a robust …

Is Delaware Different? Stockholder Lawyering In The Court Of Chancery, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

Delaware corporate law relies on stockholder litigation to police corporate misconduct. Judges in turn use attorneys’ fees to shape the incentives of the lawyers who pursue this litigation. This system of corporate accountability has come under increased scrutiny in recent years, with a series of decisions causing several high-profile companies to leave Delaware and prompting lawmakers to call for reform. Yet little empirical evidence exists about how Delaware judges set the attorneys’ fee awards that sustain this enforcement system. Using a hand-collected dataset of stockholder suits filed in the Court of Chancery, this Article offers the most comprehensive empirical analysis …

Who Gets A Seat At The Table? Stakeholder Participation In Sec Rulemaking, Yuliya Guseva, Irena Hutton, Adam C. Pritchard, Joseph Grundfest

Law & Economics Working Papers

We study how public participation shapes financial regulation using a novel dataset of 453 SEC rules proposed between 1995 and 2024. We collect over 81,000 public comments and 5,600 meetings between regulators and stakeholders related to those rules. Using large language models, we identify participants and extract structured measures of comment content and tone. We document asymmetries in stakeholder participation: retail investors dominate comment volume with shorter submissions, while institutional actors engage primarily through detailed comments and meetings with the SEC officials. Input from sophisticated stakeholders is more likely to be incorporated into the final rule release and informs rule …

Rethinking Transnational Adjudication: The Normative Foundations Of Institutional Design, Sanctions-Related Arbitration Frameworks, And Digital Recognition Systems, Avaskhan Asanaliyev

SJD Dissertations

This dissertation examines how emerging judicial and dispute resolution architectures can sustain cross-border commerce, investment, and enforcement in the post-Soviet space and beyond, at a time of institutional fragility, geopolitical tension, and rapid digitalization. Drawing on the experience of Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and key global hubs, it argues that institutional innovation in courts, arbitration, and enforcement mechanisms is central to rebuilding credible governance frameworks for international business. It does so through three interconnected studies that together explore the evolution of modern adjudication: first, through the transplantation of a common law judiciary model within a civil law state; second, through the …

Liability For Non-Disclosure In Ipos, Albert H. Choi, Kathryn E. Spier

Articles

A privately-informed entrepreneur may withhold material information from prospective investors who may sue the firm ex post for (alleged) non-disclosure. Absent liability, the entrepreneur has an excessive incentive to withhold bad news and pursue socially-wasteful projects. Liability deters inefficient non- disclosure and prevents capital misallocation. Any damage award received by investors is partially offset by a reduction in equity value. Depending on the likelihood of court error and litigation cost, the socially-optimal damage award may be either zero or the minimum necessary for full deterrence. The private incentive to waive liability may be socially excessive or insufficient. Positive and normative …

Crypto Kleptocracy, W. Robert Thomas, Jeffery Y. Zhang

Michigan Law Review Online

Many Americans are worrying about whether they will soon be living in a postdemocracy autocracy. But in the meantime, they may already be living in a crypto-fueled kleptocracy. Less than one year into his second presidential term, Donald Trump has reportedly taken his wealth to new heights by embracing, both as a businessman and a politician, the crypto industry. Trump’s family businesses are involved in minting Trump-themed meme coins, creating America- themed stablecoins, and mining crypto assets—so successfully that most of Trump’s wealth is likely now from crypto, not real estate. All the while, the Trump Administration is rolling back …

Is Confidential Supervisory Information Material To Investors? Evaluating The Conflict Between Banking And Securities Law, Peter Conti-Brown, Patrick M. Corrigan, Jeffery Y. Zhang

Law & Economics Working Papers

A central goal of modern US securities law is the transparency of corporate information through mandatory public disclosures. This goal is in tension with a central goal of banking law, namely, the practice of preserving opacity of the information exchanged between banks and bank supervisors to ensure the safety and soundness of individual banks and the entire banking system. That informational opacity in banking known as "confidential supervisory information" (CSI) applies equally to all banks, whether or not they sell securities subject to public disclosure requirements. The disclosure of CSI is prohibited by law and practice, with dire consequences for …

Crypto Regulation In The Time Of Trump, Lawrence J. Trautman

Michigan Technology Law Review

Donald Trump’s election as president during November 2024 results in perhaps the most dramatic philosophical change in approach to governmental regulation in over ninety years. The Great Depression of the 1930s created a need for regulatory reform and resulted in the advent of such new regulatory frameworks as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It has been the purpose of the SEC to create and nurture efficient securities markets enabling vibrant capital formation while preventing fraud upon the investing public. At issue is the contrast between the regulatory regime in place since 1933-34 and the Trump Administration’s desire to …

Shadow Banking And Securities Law, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Jeffery Yufeng Zhang

Articles

Shadow banking may be the single greatest challenge facing financial regulation. Financial institutions that function like banks, but fall outside the scope of banking regulation—aptly termed “shadow banks”—were at the heart of the Global Financial Crisis and most episodes of serious financial stress since then. Scholars have largely focused on one response to this problem: extending traditional banking regulation to shadow banks. Yet more than fifteen years after the crisis, major regulatory efforts along this route have stalled.

In this Article, we explore the uneasy case for greater regulation of shadow banking through a different route—securities law. Our first contribution …

Solving The Proxy Advisory Problem: Minimum Regulation For Maximum Competition, Dominic P. Keilty

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The proxy advisory industry is often criticized on two primary accounts: the lack of accountability for informational accuracy in the development of voting standards and the conflicts of interest faced by advisors when they make proxy voting recommendations on issuers to which they have previously provided corporate governance consulting services. The industry has also been accused of having “anemic” levels of competition, since only two advisors command a vast majority of the market share. While much has been written about curtailing the prevalence and effects of proxy advisor conflicts of interest through increased regulation, the regulatory route toward increased informational …

How Artificial Intelligence Will Shape Securities Regulation, Gabriel Rauterberg

Other Publications

How will the increasing prevalence and sophistication of artificial intelligence (AI) change the doctrine and practice of securities law? My main thesis is that it will push securities regulation toward a more systems-oriented approach. This approach will replace securities law's emphasis, in areas like manipulation, on forms of enforcement targeted at specific individuals and accompanied by punitive sanctions with a greater focus on ex ante rules designed to shape an ecology of actors and information.

Anticipating The Effects Of The Brazilian New Business Environment Law's Corporate Governance Provisions On Minority Shareholder Protection, Dean Farmer

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

To encourage minority shareholder protections and public investment in Brazilian corporations, Brazil passed the New Business Environment Law. The New Business Environment Law’s Corporate Governance Provisions require that all corporations have at least one independent board member, have different individuals serving as their CEO and board chairperson, and grant increased power to the general shareholders’ meeting. This Note predicts that the New Business Environment Law’s Corporate Governance Provisions will have an inconsequential effect on Brazilian minority shareholder protections. Traditional American means of achieving minority shareholder protections may be ineffective in Brazil, due to legal, institutional, and cultural differences between the …

Unveiling Misconceptions Of Tunneling: Market Capitalization-Based Analysis, Sang Yop Kang

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

In internal transactions between affiliated companies, there are two opposite directions of wealth-transfer: (1) in the “forward transfer of wealth” (FTW), the wealth-transfer arises from an affiliated company where a controller’s “economic interest” (i.e., “cash-flow right”) is smaller relative to another affiliated company where the controller’s economic interest is larger; (2) in the “reverse transfer of wealth” (RTW), the wealth-transfer arises from an affiliated company where a controller’s economic interest is larger relative to another affiliated company, where the controller’s economic interest is smaller. This Article puts forward a new finding that the extent of internal-transaction tunneling is affected not …

Paying For Performance? Attorneys' Fees In Fraud Class Actions, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica M. Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

This paper studies whether plaintiffs' lawyers matter in securities class actions. We use inverse propensity score weighting (IPW) to compare the results in cases led by top-tier firms against those brought by lower-tier firms. This technique addresses case selection effects by using all of the cases led by a top-tier firm and then weighting the cases led by lower-tier firms based on how similar these cases are to the cases led by top-tier firms. We do find that top-tier lawyers obtain better outcomes for shareholders in a subset of securities class actions, specifically the cases against the larger (although not …

Shadow Banking And Securities Law, Gabriel Rauterberg, Jeffery Y. Zhang

Law & Economics Working Papers

Shadow banking may be the single greatest challenge facing financial regulation. Financial institutions that function like banks, but outside the scope of banking regulation—aptly termed “shadow banking”—were at the heart of the Global Financial Crisis and most episodes of serious financial stress since then. Scholars have largely focused on one response to this problem—extending traditional banking regulation to shadow banks. Yet more than fifteen years after the crisis, major regulatory efforts along this route have stalled.

In this Article, we explore the uneasy case for greater regulation of shadow banking through securities law. Our first contribution is analytical. We demonstrate …

Paying For Performance? Attorneys’ Fees In Securities Fraud Class Actions, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica M. Erickson, A. C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

This Article studies whether plaintiffs' lawyers matter in securities class actions. We use inverse propensity score weighting (IPW) to compare the results in cases led by top-tier firms against those brought by lower-tier firms. This technique addresses case selection effects by using all of the cases led by a top-tier firm and then weighting the cases led by lower-tier firms based on how similar these cases are to the cases led by top-tier firms. We do find that top-tier lawyers obtain better outcomes for shareholders in a subset of securities class actions, specifically the cases against the larger (although not …

Now You Have It, Now You Don’T: Taxing Crypto, Part 2, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Articles

In “Coinbase: Are Cryptoassets Securities?” Tax Notes contributing editor Lee A. Sheppard highlights a recent district court decision indicating that some forms of cryptoassets are securities for securities law purposes and therefore fall under the jurisdiction of the SEC:

There are potential tax ramifications. Some, indeed many, cryptoassets could be securities under the securities law. That means that losses can’t be recognized on wash sales (section 1091). The IRS should issue a notice stating that many cryptoassets other than bitcoin are securities, so losses on wash sales can’t be recognized. A notice would not be a heavy lift. The taxpayers …

Beyond Profit Motives, William J. Moon

Michigan Law Review

A review of The Profit Motive: Defending Shareholder Value Maximization By Stephen M. Bainbridge.

Covid-19 Risk Factors And Boilerplate Disclosure, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Xuan Liu, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

The SEC mandates that public companies assess new information that changes the risks that they face and disclose these if there has been a “material” change. Does that theory work in practice? Or are companies copying and repeating the same generic disclosures? Using the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, we explore these questions. Overall, we find considerable rote copying of boilerplate disclosures. Further, the factors that correlate with deviations from the boilerplate seem related more to the resources that companies have (large companies change updated disclosures more) and litigation risks (companies vulnerable to shareholder litigation update more) rather than general …

Retail Investors And Corporate Governance: Evidence From Zero-Commission Trading, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

We examine the effects of the sudden abolition of trading commissions by major online brokerages in 2019, which lowered stock market entry costs for retail investors, on corporate governance. Firms already popular with retail investors experienced positive abnormal returns around the abolition of commissions. Firms with positive abnormal returns in response to commission-free trading subsequently saw a decrease in institutional ownership, a decrease in shareholder voting, and a deterioration in environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) metrics. Finally, these firms were more likely to adopt bylaw amendments to reduce the percentage of shares needed for a quorum at shareholder meetings. …

Tying Law For The Digital Age, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Tying arrangements, a central concern of antitrust policy since the early days of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, have come into renewed focus with re-spect to the practices of dominant technology companies. Unfortunately, tying law’s doctrinal structure is a self-contradictory and incoherent wreck. A con-ventional view holds that this mess is due to errant Supreme Court precedents, never fully corrected, that expressed hostility to tying based on faulty economic understanding. That is only part of the story. Examination of tying law’s origins and development shows that tying doctrine was built on a now-dated paradigm of what constitutes a tying arrangement. …

The Macroprudential Myth, Jeremy C. Kress, Jeffery Yufeng Zhang

Articles

According to conventional wisdom, the 2008 fnancial crisis fundamen- tally changed how policymakers approach fnancial regulation. Before the crisis, regulators sought to prevent individual fnancial institutions from collapsing, but this “microprudential” strategy proved inadequate to stop the market-wide meltdown. In response, policymakers purportedly turned to a new “macroprudential” approach that prioritizes the stability of the fnancial system as a whole instead of individual institutions in isolation. Regulators in the United States and abroad enthusiastically embraced macroprudential policy, implementing stress tests, capital buffers, liquidity requirements, and other supposed macroprudential tools. As the United States’ top bank regulator declared in 2015, “[W]e …

Bank Runs During Crypto Winter, Gary B. Gorton, Jeffery Yufeng Zhang

Articles

“Crypto Winter” refers to a systemic event that occurred in the cryptocurrency ecosystem—what we call “crypto space”—in 2022. Crypto space was wracked by plummeting crypto prices, the troubles of a large crypto hedge fund, and runs on many crypto lending platforms. Several large crypto firms went bankrupt. Collectively, everyday people lost billions of dollars. And crypto investors are still feeling the aftershocks.

We begin with two observations: First, despite mass marketing campaigns to the contrary, crypto lending platforms recreated and replicated traditional banking. They were vulnerable to runs because, like all banks, they borrowed short and lent long. This is …

Pricing Corporate Governance, Albert Choi

Articles

Scholars and practitioners have long theorized that by penalizing firms with unattractive governance features, the stock market incentivizes firms to adopt the optimal governance structure at their initial public offerings (IPOs). This theory, however, does not seem to match with practice. Not only do many IPO firms offer putatively suboptimal governance arrangements, such as staggered boards and dual-class structures, but these arrangements have been gaining popularity among IPO firms. This Article argues that the IPO market is unlikely to provide the necessary discipline to incentivize companies to adopt the optimal governance package. In particular, when the optimal governance package differs …

The Business Of Securities Class Action Lawyering, Stephen J. Choi, Jessica Erickson, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

Plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States play a key role in combating corporate fraud. Shareholders who lose money as a result of fraud can file securities class actions to recover their losses, but most shareholders do not have enough money at stake to justify overseeing the cases filed on their behalf. As a result, plaintiffs’ lawyers control these cases, deciding which cases to file and how to litigate them. Recognizing the agency costs inherent in this model, the legal system relies on lead plaintiffs and judges to monitor these lawyers and protect the best interests of absent class members. Yet …

Meme Corporate Governance, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi, Yoon-Ho Alex Lee

Law & Economics Working Papers

Can retail investors revolutionize corporate governance and make public companies more responsive to social concerns? The U.S. stock market offered an unusual experiment to test the impact of retail investors in 2021, when there was a dramatic influx of retail investors into the shareholder base of companies such as GameStop and AMC. The meme surge phenomenon elicited a variety of reactions from scholars and practitioners. While some worried that affected companies’ share prices were becoming disjointed from their financial fundamentals, others predicted that retail shareholders will reduce the power of large institutional investors and democratize corporate governance. This Article presents …

The Securities Law Disclosure Conundrum For Publicly Traded Litigation Finance Companies, Robert F. Weber

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The Article examines a peculiar legal dilemma—implicating securities law, legal ethics, and evidence law—that arises when litigation finance companies (LFCs) become public companies. LFCs provide funding to litigants and law firms for prosecuting lawsuits in exchange for a share of the lawsuit recoveries. In recent years, LFCs have significantly altered the landscape of the civil justice system in common law jurisdictions. But their assets, which are just rights to proceeds from lawsuits, are notoriously opaque— who really can predict what a jury will do when it comes to liability and damages? When LFCs go public, this opacity frustrates public investors’ …

All Stick And No Carrot? Reforming Public Offerings, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Law & Economics Working Papers

The SEC heavily regulates the traditional initial public offering. Those regulatory burdens fuel interest in alternative paths for private companies to go public, “regulatory arbitrage.” The SEC’s response to the emergence of alternatives, most recently SPACs and direct listings, has been to suppress them by imposing heightened liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. The SEC’s treatment of the traditional IPO regulatory process as a one-size-fits-all regime ignores the weaknesses of this process, in particular the informational inefficiency of the book-building process. In this essay we argue that the agency’s focus in regulating issuers going public should be on …

Legal Guardrails For A Unicorn Crackdown, Alexander I. Platt

Michigan Law Review Online

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is undertaking a historic effort to redraw the boundary between public and private companies. After years of watching—and sometimes encouraging—the explosive growth in less tightly regulated private markets and the proliferation of so-called “unicorns,” the agency is now reasserting its authority.

A key arrow in the agency’s regulatory quiver is its authority under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) to force private companies to “go public” when they reach a certain size. The provision requires any company whose shares are “held of record” by more than 2,000 persons to …