Securities Law Commons^™

Securities - Insider Trading - The Effects Of The New Eec Draft Insider Trading Directive, Douglas A. Nystrom

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Securities Regulation - Great Expectations And The Reality Of Rule 144a And Regulation S; The Sec's Approach To The Internationalization Of The Financial Marketplace, R. Brandon Asbill

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

China - A National Regulatory Framework For The Prc's Stock Markets Begins To Emerge, Benjamin R. Tarbutton

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

From German Shepherds To Wet Poodles: The Sec Exacts Concessions From Daimler-Benz Concerning Disclosure Of Its Hidden Reserves, Andrew H. Walcoff

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Value Of Public-Notice Filing Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 9: A Comparison With The German Legal System Of Securities In Personal Property, Jens Hausmann Dr.

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Secured Credit And Insolvency Law In Argentina And The U.S.: Gaining Insight From A Comparative Perspective, Guillermo A. Moglia Claps, Julian B. Mcdonnell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Regulation By Hypothetical, Mehrsa Baradaran

Scholarly Works

A new paradigm is afoot in banking regulation—and it involves a turn toward the more speculative. Previous regulatory instruments have included geographic restrictions, activity restrictions, disclosure mandates, capital requirements, and risk management oversight to ensure the safety of the banking system. This Article describes and contextualizes these regulatory tools and shows how and why they were formed to deal with industry change. The financial crisis of 2008 exposed the shortcomings in each of these regimes. In important ways, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) departs from these past regimes and proposes something new: Call it …

Revamping International Securites Laws To Break The Financial Infrastructure Of Global Terrorism, Sireesha Chenmolu

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

A Comparative Study Of Monitoring Of Management In German And U.S. Corporations After Sarbanes-Oxley: Where Are The German Enrons, Worldcoms, And Tycos?, Florian Stamm

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Key Elements For Developing A Securities Market To Drive Economic Growth: A Roadmap For Emerging Markets, Ziven Scott Birdwell

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …

In Search Of Safe Harbor: Suggestions For The New Rule 506(C), Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

I devote most of this essay to exploring how, exactly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) should go about providing guidelines to implement the statutory requirement that issuers have a reasonable belief that a purchaser is accredited. The SEC has proposed rules, but these rules merely restate what Congress has already required, thus sidestepping Congress’s direction that the agency itself articulate some verification methods. Taking the SEC’s decidedly amorphous proposal to task, I recommend that the SEC offer two nonexclusive safe harbors for issuers to guide them in determining whether a natural person is an accredited investor. The paragraphs below …

The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & Corporate Alienation, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

This Article explores the creation and conundrum of citizen shareholders-investors who enter the securities market primarily through employer- sponsored defined-contribution plans, invest in mutual or index funds, and are saving for long-term goals like retirement. Citizen shareholders are a consequence of a retirement revolution, and are the fastest growing group of investors. Citizen shareholders are distinguishable from other shareholders on the grounds of choice, exit, and the number of intermediaries inserted into the investment chain in defined-contribution plans. They are largely missing from corporate policy and scholarship debates; few discussions have incorporated the growing reality that shareholder status has changed …

Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks In The Defined Contribution Society, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

A revolution in the retirement landscape over the last several decades shifted the predominant savings vehicle from traditional pensions (defined benefit plans) to self-directed accounts in defined contribution plans like the 401(k) and has drastically changed how people invest in the stock market and why. The prevalence of these self-directed accounts has created our defined contribution society and a new class of investors-the citizen shareholders-who enter the private securities market through self-directed retirement plans, invest for long-term savings goals, and are predominately indirect shareholders. With 90 million Americans invested in mutual funds, and nearly 75 million who do so through …

Employers United: An Empirical Analysis Of Corporate Political Speech In The Wake Of The Affordable Care Act, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Susan Scholz, Raquel Meyer Alexander

Scholarly Works

Is the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) bad for business? Did the countries' most prominent companies game the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure process to make negative political statements about ObamaCare? Immediately following the ACA's enactment on March 23, 2010, a number of companies drew scrutiny for issuing SEC filings writing off millions – and in AT&T's case, one billion dollars – against expected earnings for 2010 alone, based on a single, discrete tax-law change in the ACA. Congressional and Administration officials accused the firms of being "irresponsible" and using "big numbers to exaggerate the health reform's …

Is The Corporate Director's Duty Of Care A "Fiduciary' Duty? Does It Matter?, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

While reference to "fiduciary duties" (plural) is routinely employed in the United States as a convenient short-hand for a corporate director's duties of care and loyalty, other common-law countries generally treat loyalty as the sole "fiduciary duty." This contrast prompts some important questions about the doctrinal structure for duty of care analysis adopted in Delaware, the principal jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. Specifically, has the evolution of Delaware's convoluted and problematic framework for evaluating disinterested board conduct been facilitated by styling care a "fiduciary" duty? If so, then how should Delaware lawmakers and judges respond moving forward?

In …

Much Ado About Nothing: How The Securities Sro State Actor Circuit Split Has Been Misinterpreted And What It Means For Due Process At Finra, Jerrod M. Lukacs

Georgia Law Review

Traditionally, the U.S. securities exchanges were self-
regulated, governing trading, setting rules, and carrying
out disciplinary procedures against member trader-
brokers. In the past five decades, however, the SEC has
divested the exchanges of their regulatory authority,
transferring it to independent, private bodies.
Concomitantly, the SEC's ability to control the rule-
making and enforcement powers of these private bodies
has increased. Recently, this process culminated in the
creation of FINRA, a monopolized, private self-regulatory
organization (SRO) under comprehensive SEC control
responsible for regulating the entire U.S. secondary
securities market. The SEC's ever-growing control over
securities SROs has called into question …

Spacs And The Jobs Act, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

The law has long confined the average investor to trading in public securitieswhile allowing wealthy—or “accredited”—individual investors access to a panoply of private securities, including investment vehicles such as hedge funds and private equity funds. Nevertheless, pressure to let the general public into private equity has been growing. Two forces have contributed to this mounting pressure. First, public investors are eager to try their hand at investing in private enterprise. Second, private firms need capital. In the face of these forces, the sharp line that has long separated public and private firms has become increasingly blurred

Consider the story of …

Social Proposals Under Rule 14a-8: A Fall-Back Remedy In An Era Of Congressional Inaction, Margaret V. Sachs

Scholarly Works

More than a decade ago, institutional investors, notably labor unions and pension plans, began using shareholder proposals as a vehicle for advancing progressive social causes. These proposals have recently garnered heightened levels of shareholder support. While even majority support for a proposal does not insure its adoption by the board of directors, appreciable (even if not majority) support can nonetheless sometimes precipitate adoption, or at least negotiation (which can lead to adoption). This Essay argues, first, that with Congress now largely dysfunctional, social proposals have acquired a whole new role—that of a company-by-company, fall-back mechanism for solving social problems that …

Mutual Fund Performance Advertising: Inherently And Materially Misleading?, Alan R. Palmiter, Ahmed E. Taha

Georgia Law Review

Mutual fund companies routinely advertise the past
returns of their strong-performing, actively-managed
equity funds. These performance advertisements imply
that the advertised high past returns are likely to
continue. Indeed, investors flock to these funds despite
high past returns being a poor predictor of high future
returns. Thus, fund performance advertising is inherently
and materially misleading and violates federal securities
antifraud standards. In addition, the SEC-mandated
warning in these advertisements that "past performance
does not guarantee future results"fails to temper investors'
focus on past returns.
The SEC should do more to prevent investors from being
misled by fund performance advertisements. It …

Skimming From The 2%: The Status Of Georgia's Restrictions On Shareholder Access To Corporate Information, Ruari J. O'Sullivan

Georgia Law Review

The Georgia Court of Appeals, in Mannato v. SunTrust
Banks, Inc., held that O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602 abrogated all
common law rights to inspect corporate records. As a
result, shareholders in Georgia owning less than 2% of a
corporation'soutstandingshares suddenly lost the right to
petition a court to grant access to a corporation's books
and records. This Note argues that the Mannato decision
was incorrect. The Georgia Court of Appeals failed to
notice the significant procedural differences that existed
between the statutory and common law right of inspection
and erroneously applied Georgia's established law of
statutory abrogation. The court also brushed …

Governing Securities Class Actions, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

This short essay, written for a symposium on The Principles and Politics of Aggregate Litigation: CAFA, PSLRA, and Beyond, decouples due process from a proceduralist’s intuition and explains why it matters in securities class actions. It begins by exploring several analytical models that shed light on the representative relationship in class actions, including a public law analogy to the administrative state, a private law analogy to corporate law, and another, more modern public law analogy to political governance. After finding that the political-governance model best addresses both sources of inadequate representation in securities class actions — rifts between class members …

Corporate Governance In An Age Of Separation Of Ownership From Ownership, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

The shareholder empowerment provisions enacted as part of the recent bailout legislation are internally incoherent because they fail to address the short-termist realities of shareholder ownership today. Ownership has separated from ownership in modern corporate America: individual investors now largely hold stock through mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds. The incentives of these short-term financial intermediaries only imperfectly reflect the interests of their long-term holders - an imbalance only exacerbated by the bailout’s corporate governance legislation. The bailout’s focus on shareholder empowerment tactics - such as proxy access, say-on-pay, and increased disclosure - makes little sense if shareholders are …

Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach To The Shareholder Bylaw Debate, Christopher M. Bruner

Scholarly Works

Over recent decades, shareholders in public corporations have increasingly sought to augment their own power - and, correlatively, to limit the power of boards - through creative use of corporate bylaws. The bylaws lend themselves to such efforts because enacting, amending, and repealing bylaws are essentially the only corporate governance actions that shareholders can undertake unilaterally. In this Article I examine thecontested nature of bylaws, the fundamental issues of corporate power and purpose that they implicate, and the differing ways in which state and federal lawmakers and regulators may impact the debate regarding thescope of the shareholders' bylaw authority.

The …

Placebo Ethics, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller

Scholarly Works

While there are innumerable theories on the best remedy for the current financial crisis, there is agreement on one point, at least: increased transparency is good. We look at a provision from the last round of financial regulation, the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which imposed disclosure requirements tailored to prevent some of the kinds of abuses that led to the downfall of Enron. In response to Enron's self-dealing transactions, Section 406 of SOX required a public company to disclose its code of ethics and to disclose immediately any waivers from that code the company grants to its top …

Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis Of Free Speech And Corporate Personhood In Citizens United, Anne M. Tucker

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

From Loyalty To Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty At The Officer Level, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Conflicts of interest are the quintessential agency cost-the constant, lurking danger that agents may seek their own personal gain, rather than the good of the corporation. Yet many corporate employees lack knowledge as to exactly what constitutes a conflict of interest. This ignorance facilitated the kind of fraud seen in Enron, WorldCom, and the options backdating scandals, and may help explain the out-sized payouts that many high-level corporate officers received even as the financial institutions they headed verged on self-destruction. Each case required not only affirmative fraudulent behavior on the part of a few, but also the tacit acceptance of …

Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

Securities class actions are on the chopping block-again. Traditional commentators continue to view class actions with suspicion; they see class suits as nonmeritorious byproducts of self-interest and the attorneys who bring them as rent-seekers. Their conventional approach has popularized securities class actions' negative effects. High-profile commissions capitalizing on this rhetoric, such as the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, have recently recommended eliminating or severely curtailing securities class actions. But this approach misses the point: in the ongoing push and pull of securities regulation, corporations are winning the battle.

Thus, understanding the full picture and texture of securities class actions necessitates …

The Fetishization Of Independence, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

According to conventional wisdom, a supermajority independent board of directors is the ideal corporate governance structure. Debate nevertheless continues: empirical evidence suggests that independent boards do not improve firm performance. Independence proponents respond that past studies reflect a flawed definition of independence.

Remarkably, neither side in the independence debate has looked to Delaware, the preeminent state source for corporate law. Comparing Delaware's notions of independence with those of Sarbanes-Oxley and its attendant reforms reveals two fundamentally different conceptions of independence. Sarbanes-Oxley equates independence with outsider status. An independent director is one who lacks financial ties to the corporation and is …

Securities Class Actions As Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, Elizabeth C. Burch

Georgia Law Review

Securities class actions are on the chopping block--again. Traditional commentators continue to view class actions with suspicion; they see class suits as nonmeritorious byproducts of self-interest and the attorneys who bring them as rent-seekers. This approach has popularized securities class actions' negative effects. High-profile commissions capitalizing on this rhetoric, such as the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, have recently recommended eliminating or severely curtailing securities class actions. But this approach misses the point: in the ongoing push and pull of securities regulation,corporations are winning the battle. Thus, understandingthe complete picture of securities class actions necessitates a positive pragmatic account. This …