Securities Law Commons^™

Reforming The Securities Class Action: On Deterrence And Its Implementation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Securities class actions impose enormous penalties, but they achieve little compensation and only limited deterrence. This is because of a basic circularity underlying the securities class action: When damages are imposed on the corporation, they essentially fall on diversified shareholders, thereby producing mainly pocket-shifting wealth transfers among shareholders. The current equilibrium benefits corporate insiders, insurers, and plaintiffs' attorneys, but not investors. The appropriate answer to this problem is not to abandon securities litigation, but to shift the incidence of its penalties so that, in the secondary market context, they fall less on the corporation and more on those actors who …

Executive Compensation: If There's A Problem, What's The Remedy? The Case For "Compensation Discussion And Analysis", Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-length bargaining designed to create the optimum pay and performance nexus. This paper expresses three sorts of reservations with their analysis and advances its own proposals. First, enhancing shareholder welfare is not, as a …

Demystifying Causation In Fraud-On-The-Market Actions, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

An issuer makes a positive, material misstatement in violation of Rule 10b-5. What must an investor who purchases the issuer's shares on the open market show to establish causation in a "fraud-on-the-market" action for damages? After years of confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari on the question in the case of Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals.

This Article argues that the confusion in the lower courts has arisen because they have analyzed the issue in terms of the twin concepts of "transaction causation" and "loss causation." They initially developed this bifurcated framework as a way …

Causation By Presumption? Why The Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom Losses And Reverse Broudo, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Over a quarter of a century ago, Judge Henry Friendly coined the term "fraud by hindsight" in upholding the dismissal of a proposed securities class action. As he explained, it was too simple to look backward with full knowledge of actual events and allege what should have been earlier disclosed by a public corporation in its Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings. Because hindsight has twenty/twenty vision, plaintiffs could not fairly "seize [] upon disclosures" in later reports, he ruled, to show what defendants should have disclosed earlier.

Today, a parallel concept – "causation by presumption" – is before the …

Understanding Dura, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

On April 19, 2005, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous opinion in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, concerning what a plaintiff must show to establish causation in a Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market suit for damages. The opinion had been awaited with considerable anticipation, being described at the time of oral argument in the Financial Times, for example, as the "most important securities case in a decade." After the opinion was handed down, a representative of the plaintiffs' bar lauded it as a unanimous ruling protecting investors' ability to sue. A representative of the defendant's bar equally enthusiastically hailed it as …

Gatekeeper Failure And Reform: The Challenge Of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Securities markets have long employed "gatekeepers" – independent professionals who pledge their reputational capital – to protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action. The clearest examples of such reputational intermediaries are auditors and securities analysts, who verify or assess corporate disclosures in order to advise investors in different ways. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly failed, and a unique concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common denominator .of accounting irregularities. What caused this sudden outburst of scandals, involving an apparent epidemic of accounting and related financial irregularities, that broke over the …

What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social And Economic History Of The 1990s, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The sudden explosion of corporate accounting scandals and related financial irregularities that burst over the financial markets between late 2001 and the first half of 2002 – Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphia and others – raises an obvious question: Why now? What explains the concentration of financial scandals at this moment in time? Much commentary has rounded up the usual suspects and placed the blame on a decline in business morality, an increase in "infectious greed," or other similarly subjective trends that cannot be reliably measured. Although none of these possibilities can be dismissed out of hand, approaches that simply reason …

The Option Element In Contracting, Avery W. Katz

Faculty Scholarship

Most contractual arrangements are either structured as options or include options as important elements. As a result, many of the major doctrines of contract law effectively operate to create or to set the terms of such options. For instance, it has long been recognized that a contract that is enforceable only through monetary liability operates in practice as an option, because as a legal matter the promisor retains the power either to perform or to breach and pay damages. Similarly, the doctrine of promissory estoppel, which attaches liability to precontractual statements in cases where they are reasonably relied upon, effectively …

Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation And Securities Litigation, Eric L. Talley, Gudrun Johnsen

Faculty Scholarship

It is generally accepted that good corporate governance, executive compensation and the threat of litigation are all important mechanisms for incentivizing managers of public corporations. While there are significant and robust literatures analyzing each of these policy instruments in isolation, their mutual relationship and interaction has received somewhat less attention. Such neglect is mildly surprising in light of a strong intuition that the three devices are structurally related to one another (either as complements or substitutes). In this paper, we construct an agency cost model of the firm in which corporate governance protections, executive compensation levels, and litigation incentives are …

Mome In Hindsight, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Two decades ago, the Virginia Law Review published our article “The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency” (MOME), in which we tried to discern the institutional underpinnings of financial market efficiency. We concluded that the level of market efficiency with respect to a particular fact depends on which of several market mechanisms — universally informed trading, professionally informed trading, derivatively informed trading, and uninformed trading (each of which we explain below) — operates to reflect that fact in market price. Which mechanism is operative, in turn, depends on how widely the fact is distributed among traders, which, I turn, depends on the …

Measuring Share Price Accuracy, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This Article concerns how to measure share price accuracy. It is prompted by the fact that many scholars believe that the prices established in the stock market affect the efficiency of the real economy. In their view, more accurate prices increase the amount of value added by capital-utilizing enterprises as these enterprises use society's scarce resources for the production of goods and services. More accurate share prices help improve both the quality of choice among new proposed investment projects in the economy and the operation of existing real assets currently in corporate hands.

The proposition that more accurate share prices …

Prescribing The Pill In Japan?, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Contrary to popular belief, corporate Japan is changing incrementally, to be sure, but changing nonetheless. One of the areas of greatest potential change is the legal and business environment for mergers and acquisitions ("M&A"), including hostile M&A. Recent amendments to Japan's Commercial Code in the areas of stock swaps and divestitures are helping to facilitate M&A transactions. At the same time, the constellation of shareholders in Japanese firms is changing as cross-shareholding declines and foreign investment increases. M&A activity in Japan has increased significantly in recent years.

Optimal Regulatory Areas For Securities Disclosure, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

The corporate governance scandals of 2003 have brought renewed focus on mandatory disclosure. One of the most fundamental questions relating to this kind of regulation is the choice of regulatory area. The United States initially faced this question in the 1930s when, after intense debate, it decided to move from an exclusively state-based system to one primarily relying on federal regulation. It is a hot issue today as well. The countries of Europe, for example, are currently deciding the extent to which the European Community, rather than its member states, should determine securities disclosure in Europe. Canada is deciding whether …

Law, Share Price Accuracy And Economic Performance: The New Evidence, Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung, Artyom Durnev

Faculty Scholarship

Mandatory disclosure has been at the core of U.S. securities regulation since its adoption in the early 1930s. For many decades, this fixture of our financial system was accepted with little examination. Over the last twenty years, however, mandatory disclosure has been subject to intensifying intellectual crosscurrents. Some commentators hold out the U.S. system as the standard for the world. They argue that adoption by other countries of a U.S.-styled system, with its greater corporate transparency, would enhance their economic performance. Other commentators, in contrast, insist that the U.S. mandatory disclosure regime represents a mistake, not a model. These crosscurrents …

Governance Failures Of The Enron Board And The New Information Order Of Sarbanes-Oxley, Jeffrey N. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Analysis of the corporate governance crisis that manifested itself in the United States at the turn of the millennium requires separating its various strands. The Enron Corporation ("Enron") debacle and the dot corn bubble and collapse, for example, share some common elements but in other ways they are quite different. In both cases investors became aggressively enamored of an unsustainable business model. In the dot com case it was the belief that an innovator in a rapidly growing market could attain powerful first mover advantages that would produce an eventual cascade of profits, so that a current and increasing stream …

The Mechanisms Of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Twenty years ago we published a paper, "The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency," that sought to describe the institutional underpinnings of price formation in the securities market. Since that time, financial economics has moved forward on many fronts. The sub-discipline of behavioral finance has struggled to bring yet more descriptive realism to the study of financial markets. Two important questions are (1) how much has this new discipline changed our understanding of the efficiency and nature of the institutional mechanisms that set price in financial markets; and (2) how far does this discipline carry novel implications for the regulation of financial …

Frictions And Tax-Motivated Hedging: An Empirical Exploration Of Publicly-Traded Exchangeable Securities, William M. Gentry, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

As financial engineering becomes more sophisticated, taxing income from capital becomes increasingly difficult. We offer the first empirical study of a high profile strategy known as "taxfree hedging," which offers economic benefits of a sale without tnggering tax. We explore nontax costs that taxpayers face when hedging by issuing so-called "DECS," "PHONES," and other publicly-traded exchangeable securities. Focusing on 61 transactions between 1993 and 2001, we shed light on why taxpayers might prefer to hedge through private "over-the-counter" transactions: An offering of exchangeable securities is announced in advance and implemented all at once, triggering an almost 4 percent decline in …

Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax Explanation For Convertible Preferred Stock, Ronald J. Gilson, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

The capital structures of venture capital-backed U.S. companies share a remarkable commonality: overwhelmingly, venture capitalists make their investments through convertible preferred stock. Not surprisingly, much of the academic literature on venture capital has sought to explain this peculiar pattern. Financial economists have developed models showing, for example, that convertible securities efficiently allocate control between the investor and entrepreneur,signal the entrepreneur's talent and motivation, and align the incentives of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.

In this Article, we examine the influence of a more mundane factor on venture capital structure: tax law. Portfolio companies issue convertible preferred stock to achieve more favorable …

Information Technology And Non-Legal Sanctions In Financing Transactions, Ronald J. Mann

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay investigates the effect of advances in information technology on the private institutions that businesses use to resolve information asymmetries in financing transactions. The first part of the Essay discusses how information technology can permit direct verification of the information, obviating the problem entirely; the Essay discusses the example of the substitution of the debit card for the check, which provides an immediate payment that obviates the need for the merchant to consider whether payment will be forthcoming when the check is presented to the bank on which it is drawn.

The second part of the Essay discusses how …

Disclosure Norms, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

The purpose of this Article is to interrogate the relationship between judicial error and extralegal norms more formally, focusing particularly on typical corporate disclosure contexts. In so doing, I shall argue that this relationship is far less clear-cut than much of the literature suggests. Using a formal, game-theoretic model of information disclosure, I demonstrate that in the presence of judicial error, a society that benefits from extralegal norms of honest disclosure might ironically favor more expansive legal regulation than would a similarly situated society in which norms are weak or nonexistent. Thus, in contrast to the common argument that norms …

Unocal Fifteen Year Later (And What We Can Do About It), Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

The coincidence of the new millennium and the fifteenth anniversary of the Delaware Supreme Court's announcement of a new approach to takeover law provides an occasion to evaluate a remarkable experiment in corporate law – the Delaware Supreme Court's development of an intermediate standard of review for appraising defensive tactics. This assessment reveals that Unocal has developed into an unexplained and likely inexplicable preference that control contests be resolved through elections rather than through market transactions. In doing so, the remarkable struggle between the chancery court and the supreme court for Unocal's soul is canvassed. The author also maintains that …

Competition Among Securities Markets: A Path Dependent Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Today, there are an estimated 150 securities exchanges trading stocks around the world. Tomorrow (or at least within the reasonably foreseeable future), this number is likely to shrink radically. The two great forces reshaping the contemporary world – globalization and technology – impact the world of securities markets in a similar and mutually reinforcing fashion:

1. they force local and regional markets into more direct competition with distant international markets;
2. they increase overall market capitalization and lower the cost of equity capital, as issuers are enabled to access multiple markets; and
3. they permit order flow and liquidity to migrate quickly from …

Do Norms Matter?: A Cross-Country Evaluation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

This Article starts with the recognition that the average private benefits of control vary significantly across countries. But why? The simplest explanation ascribes this variation to differences in law between jurisdictions: for example, the law of jurisdiction X could privilege controlling shareholders by allowing them to extract benefits from their corporation in the form of above-market salaries or non-pro-rata payments in connection with self-dealing transactions. But, this explanation cannot fit all cases. To illustrate, if the substantive law is essentially similar between two jurisdictions while the private benefits of control appear to be significantly different, then some other explanation must …

Company Registration And The Private Placement Exemption, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

Over the last twenty years, there has been a steady shift in securities disclosure regulation away from its traditional transactional basis toward a system of company registration. Under the transaction based approach, each new public offering of a security has to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933 (the "1933 Act"), a requirement that reflects the SEC's traditional concern that the most important time to have high-quality disclosure is at the moment of a securities offering. Under the company registration approach, an established, publicly traded issuer would register just once, provide information thereafter on a periodic basis, and then …

The Securities Globalization Disclosure Debate, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

A global market is developing for the shares of an increasing portion of the world’s 41,000 publicly-traded issuers. This trend has given rise to an active debate concerning what United States policy should be toward regulation of their disclosure practices. This Article is a comment on this debate through the eyes of an active participant

On Insider Trading, Markets, And Negative Property Rights In Information, Zohar Goshen, Gideon Parchomovsky

Faculty Scholarship

Few issues have sparked as much debate and disagreement among Law and Economics scholars as the prohibition on insider trading. Ironically, the Supreme Court's attempts in Chiarella v. United States, Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and, most recently, in United States v. O'Hagan to clarify the scope and content of the ban on insider trading, and the subsequent reaction of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), have only added fuel to the fire of the academic debate already raging on the issue.

The most intriguing feature of the debate on insider trading is that all contributors seek to promote …

Regulation Fd And Foreign Issuers: Globalization's Strains And Opportunities, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

The globalization of the market for securities has a persistent way of straining the traditional rationales for securities regulation. At the same time, the choices it forces upon us create the opportunity to better test empirically the desirability of the regulations being imposed. Regulation FD, which stands for "fair disclosure," is the most recent example where these twin effects of globalization arise. Regulation FD is arguably the most important change to the U.S. disclosure regime since the adoption of integrated disclosure almost two decades ago. Regulation FD is intended to stop the practice of "selective disclosure," whereby an issuer withholds …

Litigation Governance: A Gentle Critique Of The Third Circuit Task Force Report, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The Third Circuit Task Force on the Selection of Class Counsel (the "Task Force") has worked hard, considered everything, and exhaustively summarized the problems associated with class counsel auctions. Its views will undoubtedly resonate with most of the Bench and the vast majority of the Bar-neither of whom were enthusiastic about the prospect of auctions in the first place. Personally, I agree with the Task Force that auctions are not the most promising reform and that they may exacerbate, rather than correct, existing problems. Still, what is missing from the Task Force Report is the candid recognition that the agency …

Tax Constraints On Indexed Options, David M. Schizer

Faculty Scholarship

Indexed stock option grants reward executives for outperforming a benchmark, such as the market as a whole or competitors in the same industry. These options offer superior incentives by limiting the influence of factors beyond an executive's control, such as general market and industry conditions. Yet indexed options are almost never used. Professor Saul Levmore seeks to explain this puzzle with norms. This comment on his article argues that tax plays a larger role in this puzzle than he acknowledges, although tax is not a complete explanation. Accounting and Professor Levmore's norms-based account are then briefly considered.

The Issuer Choice Debate, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This article responds to Professor Romano’s piece in this issue. It concerns our ongoing debate with regard to the desirability of permitting issuers to choose the securities regulation regime by which they are bound. Romano favors issuer choice, arguing that it would result in jurisdictional competition to offer issuers share value maximizing regulations. I, in contrast, believe that abandoning the current mandatory system of federal securities disclosure would likely lower, not increase, U.S. welfare. Each issuer, I argue, would select a regime requiring a level of disclosure less than is socially optimal because its private costs of disclosure would be …