Securities Law Commons^™

Australia’S Experience With Foreign Direct Investment By State Controlled Entities: A Move Towards Xenophobia Or Greater Openness?, Greg Golding

Seattle University Law Review

Over the last few years, there has been considerable debate in Australia as to the appropriate regulation of foreign direct investment by entities affiliated with foreign governments. During that time, Australia has been a significant beneficiary of investment by sovereign wealth funds from many foreign jurisdictions, particularly by Chinese state owned enterprises. The Australian government, similar to governments of many developed Western countries, has struggled to properly calibrate its policy settings for regulating this type of investment activity. This Article considers the Australian regulatory regime and assesses Australia’s experience in regulating those investment flows during this period.

Ceo & Employee Pay Discrepancy: How The Government's Policies Have Encouraged The Gap, David R. Meals

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This paper examines the role of the U.S. Government in the CEO versus worker pay gap, both in contributing to its creation and the ability to reverse it. To better understand this issue, this paper includes a survey of current U.S. and foreign CEO compensation practices, a survey of theories proposed to explain the divergence between U.S. and foreign CEO compensation, a review of the social and business impact of excessive CEO compensation, and identifies socioeconomic theories regarding the excessive CEO pay trend. This is followed by a review of the history of attempted solutions along with newly enacted and …

Unfinished Business: Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections Fall Short For Private Companies And Their Employees, Chelsea Hunt Overhuls

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) revolutionized the world of securities law whistleblowing. It encouraged employees to reveal corporate fraud by providing federal anti-retaliation protection to incentivize such reports. Securities law whistleblowing was transformed a second time in 2010 when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Under Dodd-Frank, employees that report information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are not only provided federal anti-retaliation protections but also are eligible for a hefty bounty. Two major differences separate these statutes: (1) SOX is limited to employees of companies who are subject to the reporting …

Stewardship In The Interests Of Systemic Stakeholders: Re-Conceptualizing The Means And Ends Of Anglo-American Corporate Governance In The Wake Of The Global Financial Crisis, Zhong Xing Tan

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Dodd-Frank's Conflict Minerals Rule: The Tin Ear Of Government-Business Regulation, Henry Lowenstein

Marketing and Hospitality, Resort and Tourism Management

This paper examines an unusual provision included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), Section 1502 known as the Conflict Minerals Rule. This provision, having nothing to do with the subject matter of the act itself, attempts to place a chilling effect on the trade of four identified minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo. The provision and its subsequent rule, surprisingly delegated to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (an agency lacking subject matter expertise in minerals) presents a case and object lesson of almost every cost, procedural and legal error that can take place …

Should Courts Do Behavioral Analysis Of Boardroom Conduct?, Dale A. Oesterle

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

From Revolutionary To Palace Guard: The Role And Requirements Of Intermediaries Under Proposed Regulation Crowdfunding, Andrew D. Stephenson, Brian R. Knight, Matthew Bahleda

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Intermediaries in securities crowdfunding face significant requirements as a result of the statutory mandates of Title III of the JOBS Act. The SEC, in its proposed rules, provided structure to these requirements. The proposed rules would create strict requirements for intermediaries regarding their relationships with investors and how they undertake crowdfunding transactions under Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act. The proposed rules would also create and establish the guidelines for funding portals, a new type of limited purpose securities broker. While some commentators decry the SEC for placing undue burdens and legal liabilities on intermediaries in securities crowdfunding, the SEC …

The Jobs Act Trojan Horse: A Gift To Startups With Something Else Inside?, Erik Gordon

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Comment will analyze which provisions of the Act are consistent with the purpose that sponsors would have the public believe, that emphasized by the name “JOBS Act,” and distinguish them from those provisions that serve as menacing soldiers hidden under the cover of a name that diverts attention from the Act’s true purpose.

Enhancing The Legal And Regulatory Environment For Investment In Social Enterprise, Dilpreet K. Minhas

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The objectives of this Note are: 1) to provide readers interested in social enterprise and entrepreneurship an introduction to these endeavors and the growing trend toward using them; 2) to present the challenges stemming from the legal and financial frameworks surrounding social investment activity, which can inhibit the survival and growth of social enterprises; and 3) to propose suggestions for addressing such challenges and limitations in order to better support the survival of social enterprise. Part II and Part III provide a broad perspective of the types of investment in and nurturing of social entrepreneurship in the U.S. Part IV …

Insider Trading And Other Securities Frauds In The United States: Lessons For Chile, Dante Figueroa

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

This Article is a comparative analysis of insider trading law in the United States and Chile. The study summarily reviews the historical, political, and legal foundations of insider trading regulation in both jurisdictions, identifying areas of convergence, as well as areas in which the Chilean securities market could benefit vis- ` a-vis the more advanced experience of the considerably larger American securities market. The Article also highlights the axiological closeness between both jurisdictions concerning the protection of inside corporate information and the fiduciary role of those who intervene in securities markets in their various capacities (as investors, shareholders, corporate officers, …

Legally "Strong" Shareholders Of Japan, Gen Goto

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Foreign investors often criticize Japanese corporations for not paying enough attention to the interests of their shareholders. It might surprise these critics, then, to learn that shareholders’ legal rights under the Japanese Companies Act are actually quite strong. Indeed, many of the rights that shareholders’ rights advocates often support, including shareholders’ power to alter a corporate charter without board consent, shareholders’ power to control dividend payments, majority voting for board elections, shareholders’ power to replace the board of directors, and shareholder access to a corporate ballot—all of which are strongly debated elsewhere— are already effective in Japan. Moreover, derivative suits …

The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Fee-Shifting Bylaw And Charter Provisions: Can They Apply In Federal Court? – The Case For Preemption, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

In the first months after a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court upholding a fee-shifting bylaw under which the unsuccessful plaintiff shareholder was required to reimburse all defendants for their legal and other expenses in the litigation, some 24 public companies adopted a similar provision – either by means of a board-adopted bylaw or by placing such a provision in their certificate of incorporation (in the case of companies undergoing an IPO). In effect, private ordering is introducing a one-sided version of the “loser pays” rules. Indeed, as drafted, these provisions typically require a plaintiff who is not completely successful …

'Quack Corporate Governance' As Traditional Chinese Medicine – The Securities Regulation Cannibalization Of China's Corporate Law And A State Regulator's Battle Against Party State Political Economic Power, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

From the start of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) “corporatization ” project in the late 1980s, a Chinese corporate governance regime subject to increasingly enabling legal norms has been determined by mandatory regulations imposed by the PRC securities regulator, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Indeed, the Chinese corporate law system has been cannibalized by all - encompassing securities regulation directed at corporate governance, at least for companies with listed stock. This Article traces the path of that sustained intervention and makes a case — wholly contrary to the “quack corporate governance” critique much aired in the United States …

Lawyers And Fools: Lawyer-Directors In Public Corporations, Lubomir P. Litov, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The accepted wisdom—that a lawyer who becomes a corporate director has a fool for a client—is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. The results have been an average 9.5% increase in firm value and an almost doubling in the percentage of public companies with lawyer-directors.

This Article is the first to analyze the rise of lawyer-directors. It makes a variety of other empirical contributions, each of which is statistically significant and large in magnitude. First, …

A Canadian Model Of Corporate Governance: Where Do Shareholders Really Stand?, Carol Liao

All Faculty Publications

This feature article in the Director Journal summarizes the findings from the report, "A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance: Insights from Canada's Leading Legal Practitioners," produced for the Canadian Foundation for Governance Research and the Institute of Corporate Directors (also available on SSRN).

In the report, interviews were conducted with 32 leading senior legal practitioners across Canada to opine on the fundamental principles that are driving the development of Canadian corporate governance. The report found that Canadian common law has made the process of considering stakeholders in the "best interests of the corporation" more overt, well beyond what is assumed …

Financial Conglomerates And Information Barriers, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

The organizational structure of financial conglomerates gives rise to fundamental regulatory challenges. Legally, the structure subjects firms to multiple, incompatible client duties. Practically, the structure provides firms with a huge reservoir of non-public information that they may use to further their self-interests, potentially harming clients and third parties. The primary regulatory response to these challenges and a core feature of the financial regulatory architecture is the information barrier or Chinese wall. Rather than examine measures to strengthen information barriers, to date legal scholars have focused on the circumstances in which to deny them legal effect, while economists have focused on …

Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Self-Regulation Of Investment Bankers, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

As broker-dealers, investment bankers must register with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and comply with its rules, including the requirement to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.” As the self-regulatory body for broker-dealers, FINRA functions as the equivalent of the self-regulatory bodies governing other professionals, such as lawyers and accountants. Unlike the self-regulation of these professionals, however, the self-regulation of investment bankers has thus far attracted scant scholarly attention.

This Article evaluates the effectiveness of this self-regulatory system in deterring investment bankers’ misconduct. Based on a hand-collected data set of every disciplinary …

A Canadian Model Of Corporate Governance, Carol Liao

All Faculty Publications

What is Canada’s actual legal model to govern its corporations? Recent landmark judicial decisions indicate Canada is shifting away from an Anglo-American definition of shareholder primacy. Yet the Canadian securities commissions have become increasingly influential in the governance sphere, and by nature are shareholder-focused. Shareholders’ rights have increased well beyond what was ever contemplated by Canadian corporate laws, and the issue of greater shareholder vs. board control has now become the topic of live debate. The future of Canada's overall model seems to rest on what will be more compelling: the constancy of the corporate statutes and trajectory of the …

The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay discusses how comparative law played and plays a role in the statutory development of corporate laws. The influence of laws of other systems on the development of statutory law is common, explicit, and represents a tradition that accompanied legal reforms since the very beginning of the development of legislation.

Focusing on modern corporate law, I argue (but the argument could be extended to many other legal fields) that it is necessary to distinguish two basic ways in which comparative law influences legal reforms in one particular jurisdiction. The first one is through regulatory competition among different systems. In …

Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu

Faculty Scholarship

The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …

The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking — the provision of financial services and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds — is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. This article attempts to rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liability limited to the capital they have invested. In the relatively small and decentralized firms that dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives …

Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen

Faculty Scholarship

Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated change in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that, acting in the interest of shareholders, independent directors are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholders.

Teenage Crowdfunding, Andrew A. Schwartz

Publications

Teenage startups are in the public interest and should be encouraged, yet the federal CARD Act of 2009 eliminated credit card financing for many such companies, cutting off an important source of early-stage business capital for teenage entrepreneurs. Since then, however, Congress passed the CROWDFUND Act of 2012 which will allow teenagers to raise early-stage financing through Internet crowdfunding. Teens, being masters of the Internet, are well positioned to exploit this new opportunity, with the upshot being that securities crowdfunding may become an important way for youthful entrepreneurs to fund their business dreams.

Legal Diversification, Kelli A. Alces

Scholarly Publications

The greatest protection investors have from the risks associated with capital investment is diversification. This Essay introduces a new dimension of diversification for investors: legal diversification. Legal diversification of investment means building a portfolio of securities that are governed by a variety of legal rules. Legal diversification protects investors from the risk that a particular method of minimizing agency costs will prove ineffective and allows investors to own securities in a variety of firms, with each security governed by the most efficient set of legal rules given the circumstances of the investment. Diversification of investment by legal rules is possible …

Resurrecting Deference To The Securities And Exchange Commission: Mark Cuban Trading On Inside Information, Steven J. Cleveland

Florida Law Review

By applying the Supreme Court‘s administrative law jurisprudence to the examination of the validity of Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)—a rule recently adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission)—this Article fills a significant gap in the existing literature. To date, commentators have argued against the rule‘s validity by applying the Supreme Court‘s securities law jurisprudence without considering the role of administrative law—despite the Court‘s comments that the pertinent statute is ambiguous, despite express delegation of rulemaking authority by Congress to the Commission, and despite developments in administrative law subsequent to the Court‘s relevant securities law decisions. By not considering the role of …

The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders & Corporate Alienation, Anne M. Tucker

Faculty Publications By Year

This Article explores the creation and conundrum of citizen shareholders - investors who enter the securities market primarily through employer-sponsored defined-contribution plans, invest in mutual or index funds, and are saving for long-term goals like retirement. Citizen shareholders are a consequence of a retirement revolution, and are the fastest growing group of investors.

Citizen shareholders are distinguishable from other shareholders on the grounds of choice, exit, and the number of intermediaries inserted into the investment chain in defined-contribution plans. They are largely missing from corporate policy and scholarship debates; few discussions have incorporated the growing reality that shareholder status has …

Securities Law's Dirty Little Secret, Usha Rodrigues

Scholarly Works

Securities law’s dirty little secret is that rich investors have access to special kinds of investments—hedge funds, private equity, private companies—that everyone else does not. This disparity stems from the fact that, from its inception, federal securities law has jealously guarded the manner in which firms can sell shares to the general public. Perhaps paternalistically, the law assumes that the average investor needs the protection of the full panoply of securities regulation and thus should be limited to buying public securities. In contrast, accredited—i.e., wealthy— investors, who it is presumed can fend for themselves, have the luxury of choosing between …

The Shareholder Value Myth, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.