Securities Law Commons^™

Misalighned Incentives In Markets: Envisioning Finance That Benefits All Of Society, Dr. Ryan Clements

DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal

No abstract provided.

What’S A Nice Company Like Goldman Sachs Doing In The Supreme Court? How Securities Fraud Class Actions Rip Off Ordinary Investors–And What To Do About It, Richard A. Booth

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

What’S In The Forecast For The Spac Boom & The Pslra?, Nick Krone

SLU Law Journal Online

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have exploded in popularity. These so-called “blank check” companies are used as vehicles to take companies public without going through a traditional IPO process. Financial projections in SPACs are currently protected by the safe harbor for forward-looking statements afforded by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). In this article, Nick Krone examines whether SPACs should be protected by the PSLRA.

Monsanto: Creator Of Cancer Liability

DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Impact Of Corporate Response To Controversial Presidential Statements Or Policies

DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal

No abstract provided.

The New Public/Private Equilibrium And The Regulation Of Public Companies, Elisabeth De Fontenay, Gabriel Rauterberg

Faculty Scholarship

This Symposium Article examines how the public/private divide works today and maps out some of the potential implications for major issues in securities law. Classic debates in securities law were often predicated on the idea that public companies are a coherent class of firms that differ markedly from private companies. For more than fifty years after the adoption of the federal securities laws, this view was justified. During that period, the vast majority of successful and growing private firms eventually accepted the regulatory obligations of being public in order to access a wider and deeper pool of capital, among other …

Taking Misappropriation Seriously: State Common Law Disgorgement Actions For Insider Trading, Jeanne L. Schroeder

American University Business Law Review

This article examines the restitutionary remedy of disgorgement and connects it to the specific context of insider trading. It argues that disgorgement can and should be sought in private rights of actions brought under state common law rather than by the SEC under the federal securities laws.

Shifting Influences On Corporate Governance: Capital Market Completeness And Policy Channeling, Ronald J. Gilson, Curtis J. Milhaupt

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate governance scholarship is typically portrayed as driven by single factor models, for example, shareholder value maximization, director primacy or team production. These governance models are Copernican; one factor is or should be the center of the corporate governance solar system. In this essay, we argue that, as with binary stars, the shape of the governance system is at any time the result of the interaction of two central influences, which we refer to as capital market completeness and policy channeling. In contrast to single factor models, which reflect a stable normative statement of what should drive corporate governance, in …

Virtual Annual Meetings: A Path Toward Shareholder Democracy And Stakeholder Engagement, Yaron Nili, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

Faculty Scholarship

From demanding greater executive accountability to lobbying for social and environmental policies, shareholders influence how managers run modern companies. In corporate doctrine, the principal venue reserved for shareholders to influence and engage with management and each other is the annual share-holders meeting. Historically, the annual meeting was a vibrant forum for share-holder democracy and occasionally even a platform for debating pressing social issues. For decades, however, the role of the annual meeting in corporate governance has been in decline, resulting in today’s largely pro forma annual meetings. This Article explores how technological integration can resurrect the annual meeting as the …

Goodbye Buybacks? Why Recent Stock Buyback Reform Proposals Go Beyond What Is Necessary, Joshua Zelen

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

This note provides an overview of the intensifying debate around the impact that stock buybacks have on economic inequality and the proposals designed to reform the practice. With the advent of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 1982 promulgation of Rule 10b-18, corporations began allocating vast portions of their profits to stock buybacks. In recent years, this practice has become increasingly more common and has surpassed previous historical benchmarks.

Critics of stock buybacks primarily view the practice as a misuse of excess corporate funds that could instead be allocated to improve employee working conditions, benefits, and future outcomes. Opponent’s concerns …

Here To Stay: Wrestling With The Future Of The Quickly Maturing Spac Market, Matthew Diller, Rick Fleming, Stephen Fraidin, Aj Harris, Gregory F. Laufer, Mark Lebovitch, Gregg A. Noel, Hester M. Peirce, Usha R. Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Verity Winship, Douglas Ellenoff

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Temporary Securities Regulation, Anita K. Krug

Washington and Lee Law Review

In times of crisis, including during the 2020–2021 global pandemic, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has engaged in a type of securities regulation that few scholars have acknowledged, let alone evaluated. Specifically, during recent market crises, the SEC adopted rules that are temporary, designed to help the securities markets and their participants— both public companies and public investment funds, such as mutual funds and ETFs—weather the crisis at hand but go no further. Once that goal has been accomplished, these rules usually expire, replaced by the permanent rules that they temporarily supplanted. Although the temporary-rulemaking endeavor is laudable—and …

Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.

As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …

Asset Managers As Regulators, Dorothy S. Lund

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional view of regulation is that it exists to constrain corporate activity that harms the public. But amid perceptions of government failure, many now call on corporations to tackle social problems themselves. And in this moment of dissatisfaction with government, powerful asset managers have stepped in to serve as regulators of last resort, adopting rules that bind corporate America on issues of great social importance, including climate change and workplace diversity. This Article describes this dynamic — where shareholders have become regulators — which has been made possible by the rise of institutional shareholding (and index investing in particular) …

The Educated Retail Investor: A Response To "Regulating Democratized Investing", Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci, Christina M. Sautter

Faculty Works

The diffusion of mobile-first investing apps, like Robinhood, has increased retail investor participation in financial markets, particularly from the Millennial and GenZ generations, and has increased the diversity of retail investors. However, mobile-first investing apps are not free from controversy. In Regulating Democratized Investing, Abraham Cable tackles the debate on regulating mobile-first investing apps and largely opposes paternalistic regulation, which would raise unsurmountable barriers at the entrance of the stock market for retail investors. But it concedes to a form of regulation that in Cable’s own words “serves ultra-retail investors a modest portion of what they really want.” We strongly …

Regulating Dynamic Risk In Changing Market Conditions, Susan Navarro Smelcer, Anne M. Tucker, Yusen Xia

Scholarly Works

How successful are the SEC's attempts to regulate dynamic risk in financial markets? Using mutual fund disclosure data from two financial shocks-the Puerto Rican debt crisis and COVID- 19-this Article finds evidence that SEC open-ended regulations, like the obligation to disclose changing market conditions, are largely successful in capturing dynamic, future risk. Funds engage in wide- spread and, often, detailed disclosures for new risks-although these disclosures vary widely in specificity. But not all funds dis- close new risks. This creates perverse incentives for funds to opt out of disclosure or downplay threats with boilerplate language when new risks are emerging. …

Comments On Proposed Rules For Special Purpose Acquisition Companies, Shell Companies, And Projections, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

In March 2022, the Securities and Exchange Commission released proposed rules for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), shell companies, and projections. In this comment letter, filed with the SEC, I provide a critical assessment of this proposal.

The SEC proposed far-reaching changes intended to enhance investor protections and align disclosure and liability rules in de-SPACs more closely with those in traditional IPOs. An under-appreciated feature of the proposed reforms is that they would subject de-SPACs to provisions closely modeled on Rule 13e-3 of the Exchange Act, which applies to going-private transactions, including management buyouts. Intended to tackle potential conflicts of …

The Further Erosion Of Investor Protection: Expanded Exemptions, Spac Mergers, And Direct Listings, Andrew F. Tuch, Joel Seligman

Scholarship@WashULaw

This Article examines the decades-long decline of investor protections enshrined in the Securities Act of 1933, most notably Section 11, which imposes near strict liability on corporate insiders and certain secondary actors, primarily underwriters. The provision, the most potent in the federal securities regulatory arsenal, popularized the concept of outside gatekeepers and transformed practices in securities offerings, making due diligence a byword for careful investigation of facts whether required by legal process or otherwise. The measures required by Section 11 restored confidence in US capital markets in the wake of the Great Depression and have been instrumental in these markets’ …

Hidden Agendas In Shareholder Voting, Scott Hirst, Adriana Z. Robertson

Faculty Scholarship

Nothing in either corporate or securities law requires companies to notify investors what they will be voting on before the record date for a shareholder meeting. We show that, overwhelmingly, they do not. The result is “hidden agendas”: for 88% of shareholder votes, investors cannot find out what they will be voting on before the record date. This poses an especially serious problem for investors who engage in securities lending: they must decide whether the expected benefit of voting exceeds the expected benefit of continuing to lend their shares (or making them available for lending) without knowing what they will …

The Alchemy Of Effective Auditor Regulation, Sarah J. Williams

Lewis & Clark Law Review

The audit profession has repeatedly failed in its obligation to accurately opine on financial statements prepared by companies that trade in U.S. markets. The list of entities that have contributed to the quest for effective regulation of these auditors is long; it includes the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Congress, outside directors of public companies, and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a recent congressional creation. Yet, despite 50 years of effort, the formula for efficacious oversight of the audit profession remains elusive.

This Article is the first in a …

Securitizing Notes Of Small Businesses And Needy Workers, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

Businesses, whether large ones or small ones, such as restaurants and small shops, are presently closed and some of their employees have been laid off.¹ Currently, the government is lending money to these small businesses² and the now unemployed workers for their sustenance. It then collects the payments from some of the borrowers and the source of the rest of the money is taxes.³ Since not all, or perhaps only a few, small businesses own real estate, they might sign notes promising to repay the loans but can offer no asset backing. Presumably, the nation’s financial deficit …

Circuit Split Analysis: Involuntary Arbitration Agreements, Tyler Blackington

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

Soft Law: The Optimal Legal Framework For Global Financial Regulation, Yussuf A. Aleem

Emory Business Law Review

The regulation of global finance comprises an unorthodox legal framework. Unlike other areas of economic regulation or international law, more generally, this framework is not directed through intergovernmental organizations with formal legal status. Moreover, commitments (or best practice standards) made by various regulatory officials are non-binding and subject to significant variation. This departure is especially unique when comparing financial regulation to areas such as international trade law or environmental law.[1]

The purpose of this Paper is to provide a positive analysis explaining the prevalence of this form of “soft” law, and normatively suggest why such a framework is the …

Realizing Diversity, Sustainability, And Stakeholder Capitalism, Peter H. Huang

Emory Business Law Review

Stakeholder capitalism conceives of capitalism with companies maximizing their long-term value, while considering in addition to the interests of their shareholders, also the interests of all their other stakeholders. Examples of such additional stakeholders include customers, employees, communities, creditors, competitors, society at large, and our planet. America today does not have stakeholder capitalism. Instead, America presently has shareholder capitalism, in which publicly held corporations only maximize their stock value to shareholders.

This Essay analyzes proposals for the United States Securities Exchange Commission to require that all reporting companies make periodic mandatory Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosures of comparable, standardized, …

A Future Of Mandatory Environment, Social, And Governance (Esg) Disclosures: A Review Of Public Comments As A Case Study In The Impact Of Esg, Jessica Dennis Jackson

Emory Business Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Big Ban(G) Theory, Max Chen, Liu Ming Xin

Emory Business Law Review

The term “Big Tech” is referred to: Amazon, Apple, Facebook (Meta), Google and Microsoft. These companies are the five largest multinational online service or computer hardware and software companies and have the top position in the stock market by market share. Data indicated that these five firms have made over 700 acquisitions from 1987 to 2019. (Google 32%, Microsoft 31%, Apple 15%, Amazon 11%, and Facebook 11%). After 2001, The DOJ and FTC began to use NAICS codes to report HSR (Hart-Scott-Rodino) transactions. The code name is NAICS 518 for data processing, hosting, and related services (mainly including Google, Amazon, …

An Ocean Apart: The Mandatory Takeover Rule In Brazil And In Europe, Jorge Brito Pereira

Emory Business Law Review

The common statement that there are two different regulatory systems concerning the mandatory takeover rule – the market rule system and the equal opportunity system – is, in practice, overly simplistic: facing the choice between freedom and strict regulation on whether the control premium should be proportionally shared with all non-controlling shareholders, some jurisdictions have adopted a hybrid solution. The Brazilian mandatory takeover rule (re)approved in 2001 is a good example. This paper will comprehensively analyse the Brazilian and European rules on mandatory takeover bids, using empirical data about the Brazilian markets and details of various cases that tested the …

Universal Owners, Shareholder Primacy, And Stakeholderism, Daniel Irvin

Emory Business Law Review

The rise of massive asset owners like large pension funds and sovereign wealth funds has created interest in the phenomenon of Universal Owners. The climate crisis, environmental degradation, and worsening inequality have also led to challenges to the current models of corporate governance, with a particular interest on the idea of corporate purpose. This paper fills a gap by addressing the intersection of these two trends, proposing a framework by which Universal Owners should view corporate purpose. I argue that from a returns-maximizing perspective, Universal Owners should prefer a flavor of shareholder primacy that believes the corporation’s purpose is to …

Why Antitrust, Not Unionization, Is The Answer To Underpayment Of Student-Athletes, Evan Nelson

Emory Business Law Review

This Comment examines whether student-athletes should be allowed to unionize and collectively bargain for their rights and will present a legal argument against the unionization of student-athletes. The reasoning behind this argument is that student-athletes are not employees, and therefore, are not able to unionize. Even if student-athletes were categorized as employees, they would struggle to collectively bargain for their rights due to various states’ laws that prohibit public employees from unionizing. Rather, this Comment argues that the answer to solving college athlete underpayment is through the remedies that can be provided in antitrust law. The reasoning behind this argument …

The Extraterritorial Reach Of Section 10(B): A Wolf Hunt Off Wall Street, Radley Gillis

Emory Law Journal

Born to combat the market effects of the Great Depression, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 protects American investors and maintains American confidence in the U.S. securities market. These objectives are largely accomplished through the imposition of liability from Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and the SEC’s Rule 10b-5. These federal laws impose civil and criminal penalties for domestic insider trading and securities fraud violations. Because Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only apply domestically, when securities violations occur both within the United States and abroad, the reach of federal law becomes questionable, leaving federal courts with a complex …