Securities Law Commons^™

Corporate Pro-Choice: New York Assumes An Anti-Takover Position, Paula Walter

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Business Judgment Rule: How Much Board Deliberation Is Enough When A Board Is Under Time Constraints?-Citron V. Fairchild Camera And Instrument Corp., Jeffrey M. Moss

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Bondholder Coercion: The Problem Of Constrained Choice In Debt Tender Offers And Recapitalizations, John C. Coffee Jr., William A. Klein

Faculty Scholarship

The past decade saw the flourishing of risky, high-yield corporate debt, often called "junk" bonds. Too many companies took on too much debt, and the chickens are now coming home to roost as these bonds have begun to default with increasing frequency.The magnitude of the problem is potentially enormous; by one estimate, $318 billion of debt has either defaulted already or trades at yields indicating the market's skepticism that it will be repaid on maturity.

Facing the prospect of default, corporate issuers are seeking to restructure or recapitalize their financial structures at a correspondingly increased pace. The market force driving …

Reinventing The Outside Director: An Agenda For Institutional Investors, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

Managerialist rhetoric puts the institutional investor between a rock and a hard place. The institutional investor is depicted as a paper colossus, alternatively greedy and mindless, but in all events a less important corporate constituency than that other kind of investor, the "real" shareholder. The unspoken corollary is that, regardless of the institution's investment strategy, its interests may appropriately be ignored.

An institution that trades stock frequently is considered a short-term shareholder without a stake in the future of the corporation. According to the familiar argument, the short-term shareholder has no more legitimate claim on management's attention than does a …

Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Within academia, paradigm shifts occur regularly, some more important than others. As the takeover wave of the 1980s ebbs, a significant shift now appears to be in progress in the way the public corporation is understood. Above all, the new thinking emphasizes that political forces shaped the modern corporation. While the old paradigm saw the structure of the corporation as the product of a Darwinian competition in which the most efficient design emerged victorious, this new perspective sees political forces as constraining that evolutionary process and possibly foreclosing the adoption of a superior organizational form. Thus, my colleague Professor Mark …

Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, Bernard S. Black

Michigan Law Review

This article argues that shareholder monitoring is possible: It's an idea that hasn't been tried, rather than an idea that has failed. I defer to a second article currently in draft the question of whether more monitoring by institutional shareholders is desirable. Will direct shareholder oversight, or indirect oversight through shareholder-nominated directors, improve corporate performance, prove counterproductive, or, perhaps, not matter much one way or the other? What are the benefits and risks in giving money managers - themselves imperfectly monitored agents - more power over corporate managers? If more shareholder voice is desirable, how much more and …

The Eec Merger Regulation And Its Impact On Non-Eec Businesses, Alec Burnside, Carl Meyntjens False

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Company Law In The European Single Market, Richard D. English

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Shareholder Access To The Proxy Revisited, Jayne W. Barnard

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Protecting Nonshareholder Interests In The Market For Corporate Control: A Role For State Takeover Statutes, Frank J. Garcia

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note describes a phenomenon of modern corporate activity first identified over fifty years ago as the "separation of ownership and control." This separation gives rise to the need for a governing corporate norm; recognizing the normative aspect of this phenomenon has direct implications for the takeover debate.

Part II analyzes the problem of a target board's fiduciary duty as the modern version of the fundamental normative issue of corporate law. It argues that the norm of shareholder wealth maximization, assumed as the starting point by those most in favor of an active and minimally regulated control …

Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, And Corporate Law, Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Case Beyond Time, Lyman P.Q. Johnson, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.' treats several important questions that arise in connection with hostile corporate takeovers. At the same time, it leaves three critical issues unanswered. In this article, we first briefly describe what the Time decision did, comparing Chancellor William Allen's somewhat discursive Chancery Court opinion with the more peremptory ruling of the Supreme Court. Next, we identify three unarticulated but potentially far-reaching implications of both the Supreme Court's and Chancellor Allen's reasoning that threaten to destabilize seemingly settled doctrine governing the conduct of target company management.

Corporate Scienter Under The Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, Craig L. Griffin

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Independent Motion Picture Financing: Unregistered Limited Partnership Offerings, James L. Thompson

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Iii. Corporate & Securities Law

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Delaware's Intermediate Standard For Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance To Proportionality Review?, Ronald J. Gilson, Reinier Kraakman

Faculty Scholarship

The courts have long struggled with a standard for reviewing management's efforts to deter or defeat hostile takeovers. The usual standards of review in corporate law, the business judgment rule and the intrinsic fairness test, do not seem adequate when courts must evaluate defensive measures that implicate both management's business acumen and its loyalty to shareholder interests. Because evaluating a sale of the company is a complex business decision, management's response to a takeover bid resembles the normal business decisions that the business judgment rule largely insulates from judicial review.At the same time, however, a hostile takeover creates a potential …

Toward An Auction Market For Corporate Control And The Demise Of The Business Judgment Rule, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

No abstract provided.

Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, Alfred F. Conard

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Capitalism, in most large public corporations, has been subtly transformed from a system of dominance by the suppliers of capital to a system of dominance by the managers, dubbed "managerialism." In many respects, managerialism is beneficial to investors and other enterprise constituencies, since managers' rewards typically grow with the profitability of the enterprise. But managerialism permits drastic wastes of resources when managers hang on to their jobs after they have become inefficient or spend lavishly to defend themselves against takeover bids. Derivative suits, shareholder proposals, independent directors, and other prescriptions have failed to stifle managerial abuses. This is the message …

Securities Law—Partnerships—Adoption Of An Expansive Test For Defining A Security. Casali V. Schultz, 292 Ark. 602, 732 S.W.2d 836 (1987)., Charles P. Turley

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

Vii. Corporate & Securities Law

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The S.E.C. And The Sale Of Control: Ambivalence, Vacillation Or Pusillanimity, David Cowan Bayne

Villanova Law Review (1956 - )

No abstract provided.

Corporate Takeovers: Who Wins; Who Loses; Who Should Regulate, John C. Coffee Jr., Joseph A. Grundfest, Roberta Romano, Murray L. Weidenbaum

Faculty Scholarship

On December 3, 1987, during its 11th Annual Policy Conference in Washington, DC, the American Enterprise Institute convened a panel discussion on "Corporate Takeovers and Insider Trading: Who Should Regulate?" The panelists were John C. Coffee, Jr., professor of law at Columbia University; Joseph A. Grundfest, commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission; Roberta Romano, professor of law at Yale Law School; and Murray L. Weidenbaum, Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington University. The panel was moderated by Christopher C. DeMuth, president of AEI. The following discussion is drawn …

The Role Of The Market Model In Corporate Law Analysis: A Comment On Weiss And White, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

In a recent article, Elliott Weiss and Lawrence J. White sought to establish that seven decisions of the Delaware courts concerning corporation law had little value in predicting the future conduct of courts and corporations under the Delaware Corporations Law. Weiss and White relied, in part, on a statistical analysis of changes in the prices of publicly traded shares in Delaware corporations to show that the seven studied decisions had no statistically significant market impact.

In this Comment, Professor Fox takes issue with the explanation Weiss and White give for their data. Although the absence of an observed market impact …

Drafting An Effective Greenmail Prohibition, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

Hostile tender offers have become a recurrent political issue. In recent years Congress has held seemingly endless hearings on the subject, and by now the testimony has settled into a familiar dialogue. Potential acquirers cast themselves as the embodiment of Adam Smith's invisible hand – their activities energize the market for corporate control with the desirable result of improving the efficiency of corporate management. Management of potential targets, in turn, claim the role of Albert Chandler's visible hand – efficient managers who internalize a function previously carried out by an inefficient market. Their argument is that because the market for …

Securities Law Fifth Circuit Symposium, Steve Thel

Faculty Scholarship

The Fifth Circuit decided some important securities cases during the survey period and issued some interesting opinions. Although the court consistently claimed a conservative reliance on precedent and seldom acknowledged making new law, it interpreted some well-established doctrine in surprising ways. The past year's opinions in fraud cases provide guidance in the related areas of reliance, damages, and plaintiff's due diligence. The year also witnessed important developments in the law governing the relationship between brokerage firms and their clients. The most spectacular development in this area during the survey year was the October collapse in security prices. In light of …

Qualitative Standards For Qualified Securities: Sec Regulation Of Voting Rights, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Employee Equity Incentive Plans For Small Companies: A Proposal For A Specific Registration Exemption From The 1933 Act

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Virginia's Affiliated Transactions Article: The Death Of Two-Tiered Takeovers In Virginia?

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Independent Corporate Board: A Means To What End?, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mandatory Disclosure For Municipal Securities: Issues In Implementation, Ann Judith Gellis

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.