Property Law and Real Estate Commons^™

Political Institutions, Judicial Review, And Private Property: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Since Madison, jurists of all ideological stripes have more or less casually presumed that constitutional judicial review is absolutely necessary to protect private property rights against over-regulation by political bodies. During the twentieth century, this presumption led directly to the institution of regulatory takings doctrine.

Recently, the economist William Fischel and the legal scholar Neil Komesar have raised important questions about, respectively, the utility and the sufficiency of constitutional judicial review for protecting private property. This article supports their arguments with theoretical and historical evidence that constitutional judicial review (1) is not strictly necessary for protecting private property rights, and …

The Police Power And 'Public Use': Balancing The Public Interest Against Private Rights Through Principled Constitutional Distinctions, Christopher D. Supino

ExpressO

The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London sparked nationwide outrage. The American public was shocked to learn that the Fifth Amendment’s Taking Clause could be interpreted to allow the government to seize a non-blighted residence and convey it to another private party to help facilitate a development project. Yet, contrary to popular belief, the Kelo decision did not mark a significant departure from the Court’s early eminent domain jurisprudence. This article traces the judicial history of the Public Use Clause and the police power of the states, and demonstrates the Court’s historical inability to clearly …

Justice Thomas' Kelo Dissent, Or, "History As A Grab Bag Of Principles", David L. Breau

ExpressO

In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held 5-4 that creating jobs and increasing tax revenues satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that property be "taken for public use." Justice Thomas joined the dissenters, but authored a separate opinion arguing that the Public Use Clause was originally understood as a substantive limitation that allowed the government to take property only if the government owns, or the public actually uses, the taken property. This article demonstrates that much of the historical evidence that Justice Thomas provides in his dissent to support a narrow original understanding of public use in …

The "Public Use" Requirement In Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based On Secret Purchases And Private Influence, Daniel B. Kelly

ExpressO

This article provides a rationale for understanding and interpreting the “public use” requirement within eminent domain law. The rationale is based on two factors. First, while the government often needs the power of eminent domain to avoid the problem of strategic holdout, private parties are usually able to purchase property through secret buying agents. The availability of these buying agents makes the use of eminent domain for private parties unnecessary (and indeed, undesirable). The government, however, is ordinarily unable to make secret purchases because its plans are subject to democratic deliberation and known in advance. Second, while the use of …

The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process Of Constitutional Property Rights, Mark Fenster

ExpressO

The three takings decisions that the Supreme Court issued at the end of its October 2004 Term marked a stunning reversal of the Court’s efforts the past three decades to use the Takings Clause to define a set of constitutional property rights. The regulatory takings doctrine, which once loomed as a significant threat to the modern regulatory state, now appears after Lingle v. Chevron to be a relatively tame, if complicated, check on exceptional instances of regulatory abuse. At the same time, the Public Use Clause, formerly an inconsequential limitation on the state’s eminent domain authority, now appears ripe for …

The Robin Hood Antithesis – Robbing From The Poor To Give To The Rich: How Eminent Domain Is Used To Take Property In Violation Of The Fifth Amendment, Daniel C. Orlaskey

University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class

No abstract provided.

Kelo V. City Of New London: Supreme Court Refuses To Hamstring Local Governments, James C. Smith

Popular Media

The Court's decision last term in Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005), has drawn heavy fire, most of it unmerited. By the narrowest of margins, the Court held that the city could take single-family homes to develop an office park and to provide parking or retail services for visitors to an existing state park and marina. Many observers thought the Court would take this opportunity to display its "conservative" activism by reining in the power of eminent domain. After all, the Court has grown increasingly protective of property rights during the past two decades. See …

The Neglected Political Economy Of Eminent Domain, Nicole Stelle Garnett

Journal Articles

This Article challenges a foundational assumption about eminent domain - namely, that owners are systematically undercompensated because they receive only fair market value for their property. The Article shows that, in fact, scholars have overstated the undercompensation problem because they have focused on the compensation required by the Constitution, rather than on the actual mechanics of eminent domain. The Article examines three ways that Takers (i.e., non-judicial actors in the eminent domain process) minimize undercompensation. First, Takers may avoid taking high-subjective-value properties. Second, Takers frequently must pay more compensation in the form of relocation assistance. Third, Takers and property owners …

Regulating Land Use In A Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts Of Exactions, Mark Fenster

UF Law Faculty Publications

The regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court declared in Lingle v. Chevron, concerns the effects of a regulation on the incidents of property ownership. It serves as a constitutional protection against regulations that impose the functional equivalent to a classic taking of private property (an appropriation by the state or an ouster), and it requires compensation for owners who are subject to such regulations. Just as significant as declaring what the regulatory takings doctrine is, theCourt in Lingle also declared what it is not: it is not a judicial check onthe validity or reasonableness of a regulation that …

Visions Of Guadalupe: Traces Of The Ghost Panel, Gerald Torres

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

U.S. Supreme Court’S 2004 Term Includes Significant Land Use Decisions With A Trilogy Of Takings Cases, Patricia E. Salkin

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Michigan Supreme Court Overturns Landmark Eminent Domain Case, Patricia E. Salkin

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

The Rhetorics Of Taking Cases: It's Mine V. Let's Share, Susan Ayres

Faculty Scholarship

Regulatory takings cases originated in 1922 when Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, ruled that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if a regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." This simple rule has resulted in over eighty years of case law that Carol Rose states has left takings law to "muddle along." While many legal scholars decry the incoherence and inconsistency of takings case law, this article provides a rhetorical analysis that explains the "muddle" as a result of rhetorical tensions between a Sophistic approach ("Let's Share") and an Aristotelian …

Takings Formalism And Regulatory Formulas: Exactions And The Consequences Of Clarity, Mark Fenster

UF Law Faculty Publications

A vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced its suspicion that lower courts and state and local administrative agencies are systematically ignoring constitutional rules intended to limit, through heightened judicial review, exactions as a land use regulatory tool. This article argues that the Court's suspicions are well founded but that blame for judicial and administrative noncompliance lies with the Court's bifurcated approach to the Takings Clause.

From The Lighthouses: How The First Federal Internal Improvement Projects Created Precedent That Broadened The Commerce Clause, Shrunk The Takings Clause, And Affected Early Nineteenth Century Constitutional Debate, Adam S. Grace

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

A New Time For Denominators: Toward A Dynamic Theory Of Property In The Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, Danaya C. Wright

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article explores the question of how the courts should calculate the denominator in the just compensation equation. The denominator is the amount of property a claimant owns, against which the effects of regulation will be measured. If a landowner owns a single acre that is severely regulated, the takings fraction for the amount of property taken compared to that owned will approach one. If, on the other hand, the landowner owns 100 acres and only one is regulated, the amount of harm is only 1% in comparison to the total amount owned. This Article advocates a paradigm shift in …

Tahoe's Requiem: The Death Of The Scalian View Of Property And Justice, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Public Ruses, James E. Krier, Christopher Serkin

Articles

The public use requirement of eminent domain law may be working its way back into the United States Constitution. To be sure, the words "public use" appear in the document-and in many state constitutions as well, but the federal provision applies to the states in any event-as one of the Fifth Amendment's limitations on the government's inherent power to take private property against the will of its owners. (The other limitation is that "just compensation" must be paid, of which more later.) Any taking of private property, the text suggests, must be for public use. Those words, however, have amounted …

Takings Formalism And Regulatory Formulas: Exactions And The Consequences Of Clarity, Mark Fenster

ExpressO

A vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced its suspicion that lower courts and state and local administrative agencies are systematically ignoring constitutional rules intended to limit, through heightened judicial review, exactions as a land use regulatory tool. Exactions are the concessions local governments require of property owners as conditions for the issuance of the entitlements that enable the intensified use of real property. In two cases decided over the past two decades, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), the Court has established under the Takings Clause a logic and metrics …

Taking The Takings Claim: A Policy And Economic Analysis Of The Survival Of Takings Claims After Property Transfers, Carol N. Brown

Law Faculty Publications

What ought to be the nature of an owner's right to pursue a regulatory takings claim when the regulation the owner seeks to challenge was in place when the owner acquired the regulated property? Some argue that an owner should not be entitled to challenge such a restriction as a Fifth Amendment taking if the property was already impaired by the regulation at the time the owner acquired it. Proponents of this view contend that allowing subsequent owners to challenge the enforcement of regulations, pre-dating their acquisition of title, and of which they had notice, would confer undeserved windfalls and …

U.S. Supreme Court Hands Two Big Wins To Municipal Governments In 2001-2002 Term, Patricia E. Salkin

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause And Local Land Use Decisions, Melvyn R. Durchslag

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Uncoupling The Law Of Takings, Michael A. Heller, James E. Krier

Articles

The law of takings couples together matters that should be treated independently. The conventional view, shared by courts and commentators alike, has been that any takings case can be resolved in one of two ways: either there is a taking and compensation is due, or there is no taking and no compensation is due. These results are fine as long as one holding or the other serves the two central concerns of the Takings Clause - eficiency and justice. But a problem arises when the two purposes behind the law of takings come into cordhct, as they readily might. It …

The Missing Pieces Of The Debate Over Federal Property Rights Legislation, Richard Henry Seamon

Articles

No abstract provided.

Making Something Out Of Nothing: The Law Of Takings And Phillips V. Washington Legal Foundation, Michael A. Heller, James E. Krier

Articles

Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation held that interest on principal amounts deposited into IOLTA accounts is the property of the various clients who handed over the money but expressed no view as to whether the Texas IOLTA program worked a taking, or, if it did, whether any compensation was due. The debates among the justices about the meaning of private property, argued in terms of contextual and conceptual severance, are unlikely to prove fruitful. We elaborate a better approach in terms of the underlying purposes of just compensation. We conclude that efficiency and justice are best served by uncoupling matters …

The Boundaries Of Private Property, Michael A. Heller

Articles

If your house and fields are worth more separately, divide them; if you want to leave a ring to your child now and grandchild later, split the ownership in a trust. The American law of property encourages owners to subdivide resources freely. Hidden within the law, however, is a boundary principle that limits the right to subdivide private property into wasteful fragments. While people often create wealth when they break up and recombine property in novel ways, owners may make mistakes, or their self-interest may clash with social welfare. Property law responds with diverse doctrines that prevent and abolish excessive …

Deterrence And Distribution In The Law Of Takings, Michael A. Heller, James E. Krier

Articles

Supreme Court decisions over the last three-quarters of a century have turned the words of the Takings Clause into a secret code that only a momentary majority of the Court is able to understand. The Justices faithfully moor their opinions to the particular terms of the Fifth Amendment, but only by stretching the text beyond recognition. A better approach is to consider the purposes of the Takings Clause, efficiency and justice, and go anew from there. Such a method reveals that in some cases there are good reasons to require payment by the government when it regulates property, but not …

The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, James E. Krier

Articles

My aim here is to unpack the regulatory takings problem in a way that suggests why it is intractable. The idea is to reveal some of the different types of ambiguity necessarily entailed in takings cases. Seeing these ambiguities, we readily can understand why the doctrine in this area is so confused and confusing; why there is, in short, a "takings puzzle." To my mind, it is much more difficult to understand why anyone would expect matters to be otherwise. This oddity I call the "takings-puzzle puzzle."

Why Is This Man A Moderate?, Richard A. Epstein

Michigan Law Review

A Review of William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics

Takings And Property Rights Legislation, John R. Nolon

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Over the years, regulatory takings case law has supported land use regulations by cloaking them with a presumption of validity and placing a heavy burden on their challengers of proving either that the regulation fails to substantially advance a legitimate public purpose or that it deprives the owner of all economically beneficial use of the land. Insulated in this way, regulators, on occasion, have transgressed the boundaries of fundamental fairness.