President/Executive Department Commons^™

A Wolf In Sheep’S Clothing: The Unilateral Executive And The Separation Of Powers, Thomas J. Cleary

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “The United States Constitution vests all executive powers in a president. This is the unitary executive theory. By virtue of this, many believe the president is vested with the power to act unilaterally. This is the unilateral executive theory. However, the unilateral executive portends more than action. In reality, the unilateral executive theory provides an opportunity to implement a unilateral agenda. Thus, the aim of this paper is to consider executive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral executive theory to determine if presidential power under the separation of powers doctrine is actually “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” …

International Law And Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander In Chief Clause Reconsidered, Ingrid Brunk Wuerth

Michigan Law Review

The Commander in Chief Clause is a difficult, underexplored area of constitutional interpretation. It is also a context in which international law is often mentioned, but not fully defended, as a possible method of interpreting the Constitution. This Article analyzes why the Commander in Chief Clause is difficult and argues that international law helps resolve some of the problems that the Clause presents. Because of weaknesses in originalist analysis, changes over time, and lack of judicial competence in military matters, the Court and commentators have relied on second-order interpretive norms like congressional authorization and executive branch practice in interpreting the …

Law Casebook Description And Table Of Contents: Constitutional Environmental And Natural Resources Law [Outline], Jim May, Robin Craig

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

6 pages.

"James May, Widener University School of Law" -- Agenda

The Incompatibility Principle, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Avoidance In The Executive Branch, Trevor W. Morrison

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

When executive branch actors interpret statutes, should they use the same methods as the courts? This Article takes up the question by considering a rule frequently invoked by the courts-the canon of constitutional avoidance. In addition to being a cardinal principle of judicial statutory interpretation, the avoidance canon also appears regularly and prominently in the work of the executive branch. It has played a central role, for example, in some of the most hotly debated episodes of executive branch statutory interpretation in the "war on terror." Typically, executive invocations of avoidance are supported by citation to one or more Supreme …

Separation Of Powers And The Governor's Office In West Virginia: Advocating A More Deferential Approach To The Chief Executive From The Judiciary, Jason C. Pizatella

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Can Appropriation Riders Speed Our Exit From Iraq?, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

To explore the implications of riders - provisions added to appropriation bills that "ride" on the underlying bill - on the United States' continued military force in Iraq, the author draws three hypotheticals, each focusing on the debate surrounding the policy and political disputes raised by the use of such riders. A "withdrawal" rider, which would authorize funding only if there exists a plan to withdraw American ground troops by a set deadline, remains the most important - and controversial - rider. Riders may also significantly affect wartime policies, like those that limit the President's use of reservists in combat …

Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, at least since President Reagan's precedent-setting Executive Order 12291, the phenomenon of direct presidential supervision of agencies has received significant attention in legal scholarship. Congress's involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it loses control over how its laws are administered unless it chooses to legislate again. In the political science/public policy literature, the understanding of Congress's role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that Congress is not sufficiently engaged to a recognition …

Internal Separation Of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch From Within, Neal K. Katyal

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The standard conception of separation of powers presumes three branches with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers. Today, however, legislative abdication is the reigning modus operandi. Instead of bemoaning this state of affairs, this piece asks how separation of powers can be reflected within the Executive Branch when that branch, not the legislature, is making much law today. The first-best concept of legislature v. executive checks-and-balances has to be updated to contemplate second-best executive v. executive divisions.

A critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers is bureaucracy. Much maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy serves crucial …

Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Law: The Garvee Bonds Case And Executive Power: Breakthrough Or Blip?, Andrew C. Spiropoulos

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

Executive Power In Youngstown's Shadows, Patricia L. Bellia

Journal Articles

Fifty years after it was handed down, the Supreme Court's decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is among the most important of the Court's separation of powers cases. This Article explores two quite different legacies of the Youngstown case. First, Youngstown has a symbolic or rhetorical power, in that it stands as an example of a court invalidating the actions of a coordinate branch of government in a politically delicate context. When a court wields this weapon, it can take some cover in Youngstown's shadows, and the possibility of a court exercising this power disciplines the executive …

Structural Principles And Presidential Succession, Howard M. Wasserman

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Presidential Non-Enforcement Of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, Dawn E. Johnsen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

This article, published in Law & Contemporary Problems, was presented at a Duke Law School conference, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment. It examines a recurring, unsettled issue of executive power: how the President best fulfills his constitutional responsibilities when confronted with the enforcement of a statute that he believes is unconstitutional. What should the President do if he believes enforcing a statutory provision would violate the Constitution? Should, for example, a President comply with a congressional command that he believes would violate the constitutional rights of individuals or compromise presidential power? The article examines the two prevailing approaches …

Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins

Publications

No abstract provided.

An Original Model Of The Independent Counsel Statute, Ken Gormley

Michigan Law Review

On Friday, October 19, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon took a risky step to de-fang the Watergate investigation that had become a "viper in the bosom" of his Presidency. The U.S. Court of Appeals had just directed him to tum over tape-recordings subpoenaed by Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; these taperecordings might prove or disprove White House involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Rather than challenge this ruling, the President conceived a new plan. The White House would prepare summaries of the nine tape-recordings in question, which would be verified by Senator John Stennis, a seventy-two-year-old Democrat from Mississippi, working alone …

The Specially Investigated President, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

This article argues that the new legal status - the "specially investigated President" - conferred upon recent presidents reflects an unprecedented change in the criminal investigation process of the President. Although recent presidents have experienced formal criminal investigations, each have used creative and legitimate ways to escape indictment, trial, or impeachment. By investigating President Bush and President Clinton's ability to successfully avoid prosecution, this article presents an analytical framework to explain the issues surrounding the "specially investigated President," and offers suggestions on how to reform the process.

In his analysis, the author illustrates the tension between opposing viewpoints regarding the …

The Constitution, The White House, And The Military Hiv Ban: A New Threshold For Presidential Non-Defense Of Statutes, Chrysanthe Gussis

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" implies that the President is entrusted with the responsibility to defend those laws against court challenges. On occasion, however, Presidents faced with legislation that they deem unconstitutional have declined to defend that legislation against legal challenges. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton declined to defend a provision included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that required discharge from the military of all HIV-positive servicemembers because he believed that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Note explores whether …

Twenty-Fifth Amendment: An Explanation And Defense, The, John D. Feerick

Faculty Scholarship

In this article, Dean Feerick reviews the history of presidential succession before the Twenty-fifth Amendment's ratification, the debate and discussion leading to the amendment's adoption, and current criticisms of the amendment from the medical and political community. In particular, Feerick addresses current suggestions for the creation of an independent medical panel to determine presidential inability. He argues that such a panel would be contrary to both the principle of separation of powers and the philosophy of the Twenty-fifth Amendment that those closest to the President ,and those accountable to the public, should be entrusted with the power to declare a …

That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Still Naked After All These Words, A. Michael Froomkin

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Can Buckley Clear Customs?, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

A Two-Tiered Theory Of Consolidation And Separation Of Powers, David S. Yassky

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Note explores the jurisprudential implications of the New Deal watershed and elaborates a post-New Deal theory of allocation of governmental power. Part I begins with a discussion of the Federalist theory of separation of powers. For the Federalists, two conditions ensured an effective separation. First, governmental branches must be institutionally independent; each must be free from control by the others. Second, the branches must be functionally specialized; each must wield a distinct component of governmental power, so that the assent of all three is required for government action.

Until the New Deal, the Supreme Court incorporated this theory into …

Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Executive Branch And International Law, Arthur M. Weisburd

Vanderbilt Law Review

Public international law, through its rules regulating the dealings between independent nations, purports to impose limits on the actions of all governments, including those of the United States. In this context American lawyers interested in foreign relations may reasonably wonder whether American courts would enforce rules of public international law purporting to bind the United States against the United States government, particularly the executive branch. A fair number of Supreme Court cases have dealt with the enforce ability of treaties in American courts.' Treaties, however, are only one source of international law. The other important source, customary international law, is …

Independent Counsels Under The Ethics In Government Act Of 1978: A Violation Of The Separation Of Powers Doctrine Or An Essential Check On Executive Power?, Alexander I. Tachmes

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Removal Power And The Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, And Administrative Independence, Jonathan L. Entin

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.