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Articles 61 - 90 of 136
Full-Text Articles in President/Executive Department
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash
A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash
Michigan Law Review
The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …
Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley
Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez
Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Lobue V. Christopher: Age-Old Separation Of Powers Debate Rages On As Court Rules Extradition Statute Unconstitutional, Joseph G. Silver
Lobue V. Christopher: Age-Old Separation Of Powers Debate Rages On As Court Rules Extradition Statute Unconstitutional, Joseph G. Silver
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers And Unilateral Executive Action: The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Mexican Loan Initiative, Kimberly D. Chapman
Separation Of Powers And Unilateral Executive Action: The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Mexican Loan Initiative, Kimberly D. Chapman
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla
Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla
Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law
No abstract provided.
Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent Barnett
Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent Barnett
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary
Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to satisfy impartiality …
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg
Michigan Law Review
Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to expand the role of the federal government-—maybe it was civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second president pushes policies—-financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug decriminalization—-that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals. The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances-—from …
Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson
Law Matters, Even To The Executive, Julian Davis Mortenson
Michigan Law Review
In both constitutional and international law, many legal rules cannot be implemented without what most people would describe as the voluntary compliance of their target. Is that really “law”? Or is rule compliance in such circumstances just an expression of “interests”? Forget jurisprudence for the moment. As a practical matter, what does it mean to work as a lawyer in a field where the rules are not coercively enforced against private parties by an independent judiciary whose orders are implemented by a cooperative executive? This question has particularly high stakes for national security policy, where we find judicial deference at …
Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof
Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof
Michigan Law Review
The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff
The President And Congress: Separation Of Powers In The United States Of America, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
Although the framers of the Australian Constitution adopted many features of the United States Constitution, they rejected the separation of legislative and executive power in favour of responsible government in a parliamentary system like that of the United Kingdom. In doing so, Australians depended on existing conventions about the nature of responsible government instead of specification of its attributes in constitutional text. The United States Constitution contains detailed provisions about separation of powers, but unwritten conventions have produced some central features of American government. This article reviews conventions developed by Congress that constrain Presidents in the domestic sphere with regard …
Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley
Treaty Termination And Historical Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley
Faculty Scholarship
The termination of U.S. treaties provides an especially rich example of how governmental practices can provide a “gloss” on the Constitution’s separation of powers. The authority to terminate treaties is not addressed specifically in the constitutional text and instead has been worked out over time through political-branch practice. This practice, moreover, has developed largely without judicial review. Despite these features, Congress and the President—and the lawyers who advise them—have generally treated this issue as a matter of constitutional law rather than merely political happenstance. Importantly, the example of treaty termination illustrates not only how historical practice can inform constitutional understandings …
The Confrontation Of The Legislative And Executive Branches: An Examination Of The Constitutional Balance Of Powers And The Role Of The Attorney General, Robert E. Palmer
The Confrontation Of The Legislative And Executive Branches: An Examination Of The Constitutional Balance Of Powers And The Role Of The Attorney General, Robert E. Palmer
Pepperdine Law Review
The United States Constitution created an internally dependent tripartite governing scheme which relied upon a carefully drafted system of checks and balances as a means of self-regulation. Recent years have seen increased conflicts between the separate branches, the most recent of which is the occasion for this article. The article traces the rise and fall of the power exercised by the various branches and then focuses on the recent confrontation between Congress and the executive branch concerning the actions of the Environmental Protection Agency and the subsequent resignation of Anne McGill Burford. Of particular interest to this inquiry is the …
Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas
Congress Underestimated: The Case Of The World Bank, Kristina Daugirdas
Articles
This article challenges the oft-repeated claim that international organizations undermine democracy by marginalizing national legislatures. Over the past forty years, Congress has established itself as a key player in setting U.S. policy toward the World Bank. Congress has done far more than restrain executive branch action with which it disagrees; it has affirmatively shaped the United States’ day-to-day participation in this key international organization and successfully defended its constitutional authority to do so.
The Pre-Session Recess, Peter L. Strauss
The Pre-Session Recess, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
In the brief remarks following, I do not address the Burkean argument that practice has established the permissibility of recess appointments during the week-or-more adjournments of Congress that modern transportation modalities permit. We can perhaps let President Eisenhower’s recess appointments of Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan, and Justice Stewart stand witness to that understanding. Rather, I want to suggest flaws in the originalist analysis used by the Canning court and in the Senate’s ruse of meeting every three days over the winter period of 2011-12 that many take to place the January 4, 2012 recess appointments President Obama made to …
Boland In The Wind: The Iran-Contra Affair And The Invitation To Struggle , Bretton G. Sciaroni
Boland In The Wind: The Iran-Contra Affair And The Invitation To Struggle , Bretton G. Sciaroni
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Foreign Affairs Federalism And The Limits On Executive Power, Zachary D. Clopton
Foreign Affairs Federalism And The Limits On Executive Power, Zachary D. Clopton
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
On February 23 of this year, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a California statute permitting victims of the Armenian genocide to file insurance claims, finding that the state's use of the label "Genocide" intruded on the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs. This decision, Movsesian v. Versicherung AG, addresses foreign affairs federalism—the division of authority between the states and the federal government. Just one month later, the Supreme Court weighed in on another foreign affairs issue: the separation of foreign relations powers within the federal government. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton, the Supreme Court ordered the lower courts to …
Beyond The Executive Agreement: The Foreign Policy Preference Under Movsesian And The Return Of The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power In Norton Simon, Amir M. Tikriti
Beyond The Executive Agreement: The Foreign Policy Preference Under Movsesian And The Return Of The Dormant Foreign Affairs Power In Norton Simon, Amir M. Tikriti
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
The Auditor For The Auditors' Auditor: Accounting For The Unitary Executive In Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Kelsey Elizabeth Stapler
The Auditor For The Auditors' Auditor: Accounting For The Unitary Executive In Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Kelsey Elizabeth Stapler
Pepperdine Law Review
No abstract provided.
Can The President And Congress Establish A Legislative Veto Mechanism For Jointly Drawing Down A Long And Controversial War?, Charles Tiefer
Can The President And Congress Establish A Legislative Veto Mechanism For Jointly Drawing Down A Long And Controversial War?, Charles Tiefer
All Faculty Scholarship
In the simplest case: Congress declares war, and does not intrude on the President's solo decision about when the troops come home. However, in our time, long wars, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq, occur with great tension between the two elected branches of government over the pace of a drawdown. Sometimes it may be a hawkish Congress that disagrees with a President reluctant to continue the war at full troop levels. To find a joint way to draw down the American troops in the war zone, they may seek congressional mechanisms to resolve their differences with interactive processes. Then, …
Historical Gloss And The Separation Of Powers, Curtis A. Bradley, Trevor W. Morrison
Historical Gloss And The Separation Of Powers, Curtis A. Bradley, Trevor W. Morrison
Faculty Scholarship
Arguments based on historical practice are a mainstay of debates about the constitutional separation of powers. Surprisingly, however, there has been little sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in this context. The scant existing scholarship is either limited to specific subject areas or focused primarily on judicial doctrine without addressing the use of historical practice in broader conceptual or theoretical terms. To the extent that the issue has been discussed, most accounts of how historical practice should inform the separation of powers require “acquiescence” by the branch of government whose prerogatives the practice implicates, something that …
A Skeptical View Of A Skeptical View Of Presidential Term Limits, Jack M. Beermann
A Skeptical View Of A Skeptical View Of Presidential Term Limits, Jack M. Beermann
Faculty Scholarship
Dean Jeremy Paul is concerned that the presidency has been weakened and that the Twenty-Second Amendment’s limitation on presidential service is at least partly to blame. Dean Paul is clearly correct that once a President reaches the point beyond which re-election is not constitutionally possible, the President is effectively a lame duck. Dean Paul further points out that since 1951 when the amendment limiting Presidents to two terms went into effect, there have been several instances of very poor results in the President’s second term. He attributes the second term problems of some recent Presidents at least partly to term …
Head Of State Immunity As Sole Executive Lawmaking, Lewis S. Yelin
Head Of State Immunity As Sole Executive Lawmaking, Lewis S. Yelin
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
At the request of the Executive Branch, courts routinely dismiss private suits against sitting heads of foreign states. Congress has never delegated authority to the Executive Branch to identify principles governing head of state immunity. The courts' practice thus appears inconsistent with the conventional view that the Executive Branch lacks authority to affect private rights unless authorized by Congress to do so. This Article argues that the Executive Branch's practice of determining head of state immunity is an example of sole executive lawmaking, deriving from the President's constitutional responsibility as the only authorized representative of the United States in its …
The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.
The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.
Journal Articles
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …
Placing Your Faith In The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Placing Your Faith In The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff
Publications
No abstract provided.
Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Peter L. Strauss
Free Enterprise Fund V. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Peter L. Strauss
Faculty Scholarship
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) under the aegis of the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), with President Bush’s support. Its purpose was to replace deficient accounting industry self-regulation with effective external regulation. The choices it made in doing so engendered passionate arguments about constitutionally necessary presidential authority and separation of powers. These divided the D.C. Circuit 2-1 and will be rehearsed before the Supreme Court in the coming weeks. President Bush’s administration defended those choices; Judge Rogers, writing for the majority, found no valid constitutional objection …
Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, And Pretextual Justification In The U. S. Attorney Removals, David C. Weiss
Michigan Law Review
The forced mid-term resignations of nine U.S. Attorneys was an unprecedented event in American history. Nearly one year after the administration executed the removals, the House Judiciary Committee was still reviewing and publicizing emails, memoranda, and other documents in an effort to understand how the firings were effectuated. This Note examines many of those documents and concludes that the removals were likely carried out for partisan reasons. It then draws on the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and separation of powers principles to argue that Congress is constitutionally empowered to enact removal limitations for inferior officers such as U.S. Attorneys so …
What's A President To Do? Interpreting The Constitution In The Wake Of Bush Administration Abuses, Dawn E. Johnsen
What's A President To Do? Interpreting The Constitution In The Wake Of Bush Administration Abuses, Dawn E. Johnsen
Articles by Maurer Faculty
President George W. Bush and his executive branch lawyers have earned widespread criticism for extreme positions and practices regarding the scope of presidential authority. The war on terror that followed the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided the context for their most controversial claims of unilateral authority: to override legal prohibitions on the use of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment; to hold "enemy combatants" indefinitely without access to counsel or any opportunity to challenge their detention; and to engage in domestic electronic surveillance without a court order. Our nation's welfare and integrity depend upon continued evaluation, response, and, …
The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun
The Accounting: Habeas Corpus And Enemy Combatants, Emily Calhoun
Publications
The judiciary should impose a heavy burden of justification on the executive when a habeas petitioner challenges the accuracy of facts on which an enemy combatant designation rests. A heavy burden of justification will ensure that the essential institutional purposes of the writ--and legitimate, separated-powers government--are preserved, even during times of national exigency. The institutional purposes of the writ argue for robust judicial review rather than deference to the executive. Moreover, the procedural flexibility traditionally associated with the writ gives the judiciary the tools to ensure that a heavy burden of justification can be imposed.