President/Executive Department Commons^™

Presidential Systems In Stress: Emergency Powers In Argentina And The United States, William C. Banks, Alejandro D. Carrió

Michigan Journal of International Law

This article offers three comparative insights. First, it concludes that comparative inquiries into presidential systems may be useful for those interested in constitutional government, regardless of historical, cultural, or other contextual differences among nations. Thus, nations with presidentialist constitutional systems may have common problems because of the institutional presidency. The article maintains that our presidential systems are in such states of disrepair that a fundamental reinvigoration of the legislative and judicial branches is required, so that government may better serve important constitutional values in our nations.

The Federalist Papers: The Framers Construct An Orrery, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Item Veto In State Courts, Richard Briffault

Faculty Scholarship

Contemporary debates about state constitutional law have concentrated on the role of state constitutions in the protection of individual rights and have paid less attention to the state constitutional law of government structure.This is ironic since the emergence of a state jurisprudence of individual rights has been hampered by the similarity of the texts of the state and federal constitutional provisions concerning individual rights, whereas many state constitutional provisions dealing with government structure have no federal analogues, and thus state jurisprudence in this area is free to develop outside the dominating shadow of the Federal Constitution and the federal courts. …

The Protective Power Of The Presidency, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

Walter Bagehot's still-admired study of the English Constitution distinguished between its "dignified" and "efficient" parts. Bagehot argued that the English Constitution's "dignified" theory of parliamentary supremacy masked the (then) dominant reality of cabinet government. Attacking what he described as the "literary" theory of the American Constitution, Woodrow Wilson posited a similar distinction. Writing in 1885, Wilson asserted that the "literary" theory of American government embodied in Federalist's "ideal checks and balances of the federal system" obscured its efficient principle: "government by the chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress." An ardent admirer of ministerial government, Wilson especially lamented the condition …

Advice And Consent In Theory And Practice, Roger J. Miner '56

Federal Court System and Administration

No abstract provided.

Ronald V. Dellums V. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae Of Law Professors, Bruce A. Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Erwin N. Griswold, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Kurland, Laurence H. Tribe, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

This joint memorandum is submitted to the court hearing Dellums v. Bush. This amicus brief advocates that the President may not order American armed forces to make war without consultation with and approval by Congress. The brief also argues that the case is justiciable.

Ronald V. Dellums V. George Bush (D.D.C. 1990): Memorandum Amicus Curiae Of Law Professors, Bruce A. Ackerman, Abram Chayes, Lori Fisler Damrosch, John Hart Ely, Erwin N. Griswold, Gerald Gunther, Louis Henkin, Harold Hongju Koh, Philip B. Kurland, Laurence H. Tribe, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

This joint memorandum is submitted to the court hearing Dellums v. Bush. This amicus brief advocates that the President may not order American armed forces to make war without consultation with and approval by Congress. The brief also argues that the case is justiciable.

Accountability To The Law, Walter F. Mondale

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Using The Constitution: Separation Of Powers And Damages For Constitutional Violations, James A. Thomson

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Shutting Down The Government, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

Actions of the federal government cost money. Legislative processes that specify the amounts and purposes of governmental expenditures control the scope and content of government actions.¹ To paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall, the power to withhold spending involves the power to destroy.²

Those involved in the legislative process ordinarily do not engage in wholesale or sudden dismantling of government activities through unheralded failures to provide funds. While disputes over funding constitute a regular part of the nation's political activity, these controversies usually concern adjustments in the level of spending and of agency operations. A decision to terminate an agency …

Publish And Perish: Congress's Effort To Snip Snepp (Before And Afsa), Michael J. Glennon

Michigan Journal of International Law

Over three million present and former federal employees, of the Executive as well as the Congress, are parties to so-called "pre-publication review agreements," which require that they submit any writings on topics related to their employment for Executive review prior to publication. In Section 630 of the Omnibus Continuing Resolution for Fiscal Year 1988, Congress attempted to restrict the use of funds to implement or enforce certain of those agreements. On May 27, 1988, however, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in American Foreign Service Association v. Garfinkel ("AFSA "), struck that section down, …

A Two-Tiered Theory Of Consolidation And Separation Of Powers, David S. Yassky

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This Note explores the jurisprudential implications of the New Deal watershed and elaborates a post-New Deal theory of allocation of governmental power. Part I begins with a discussion of the Federalist theory of separation of powers. For the Federalists, two conditions ensured an effective separation. First, governmental branches must be institutionally independent; each must be free from control by the others. Second, the branches must be functionally specialized; each must wield a distinct component of governmental power, so that the assent of all three is required for government action.

Until the New Deal, the Supreme Court incorporated this theory into …

Presidential Management Of Agency Rulemaking, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality Of Arbitration In Federal Programs, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

A Comment On The Rule Of Law Model Of Separation Of Powers, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

What The Constitution Means By Executive Power, Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rowstow, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Independent Counsel And The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Confirmation Process: Law Or Politics?, Henry Paul Monaghan

Faculty Scholarship

In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I argued (and still believe) that Judge Robert Bork possessed surpassing qualifications for an appointment to the Supreme Court. Subsequently, I became persuaded that my submission was incomplete. Additional argument was necessary to establish that my testimony, if accepted, imposed a constitutional duty on senators to vote for confirmation. To my surprise, further reflection convinces me that no such argument is possible.

The President’S Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress’ War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse Jr., Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The President's Powers As Commander-In-Chief Versus Congress' War Power And Appropriations Power, Charles W. Bennett, Arthur B. Culvahouse, Geoffrey P. Miller, William Bradford Reynolds, William W. Van Alstyne

Faculty Publications

This joint work explores a variety of viewpoints all centered around the War Powers Resolution and its application to the situation in the Persian Gulf.

Some Modest Proposals On The Vice-Presidency, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

There are many good things in the Constitution, but the vice-presidency isn't one of them. In Part I of this essay, I will argue that there are three basic problems with the vice-presidency: the method of nomination, the method of election, and the office itself. That just about covers the waterfront.' If we had to do it all over again, we almost certainly would not" create the system we currently have. We cannot undo history, but we do have a very strong incentive to develop a better system of succession to the presidency. Whom we choose as vice-president is a …

Why The Reagan Administration Resists Radical Transformation Of The Constitution, Gary C. Leedes

University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Removal Power And The Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, And Administrative Independence, Jonathan L. Entin

Kentucky Law Journal

No abstract provided.

On The Constitutional Status Of The Administrative Agencies, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Symposium: Bowsher V. Synar: Introduction, Alfred C. Aman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

The papers in this symposium examine constitutionally significant separation-of-powers themes that were particularly controversial in Franklin Roosevelt's administrations and once again command our attention. The Supreme Court's decision in cases such as Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha I and Bowsher v. Synar2 have helped to resurrect questions that have been ignored, if not resolved, since the 1930s. This symposium focuses on the contemporary debate that these issues have generated, and it provides us with an array of approaches to and perspectives on that debate. As this Introduction emphasizes, that these issues have arisen before is significant, both legally and …

Averting Government By Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits On The Enforcement Of Settlements With The Federal Government, Jeremy A. Rabkin, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Legislative Veto, The Constitution, And The Courts, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

How Successfully Can The States' Item Veto Be Transferred To The President?, Louis Fisher, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Role Of The President And Omb In Informal Rulemaking, Peter L. Strauss, Cass R. Sunstein

Faculty Scholarship

Regulatory reform has been a subject of frequent discussion in the last decade, especially in the context of presidential efforts to assert control over the rulemaking process. Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan have all attempted to increase presidential authority over regulation. In particular, President Reagan has issued two executive orders that give the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) considerable power over the rulemaking activities of executive agencies.

In this article, we set forth our views on the role of presidential supervision in the regulatory process, with particular attention to the questions raised by the recent executive orders.

Separation Of Political Powers: Boundaries Or Balance, Alan L. Feld

Faculty Scholarship

One of the most significant structural elements of the United States Constitution divides the political power of the government between two discrete political institutions, the Congress and the President, in order to prevent concentration of the full power of the national government in one place. This governmental structure has posed a continuing dilemma of how to allow for the shared decisionmaking necessary to effective government while maintaining the independence of each political branch. As the United States Congress reaches its two hundredth anniversary, questions concerning the relationship between Congress and the President, for a substantial time thought by legal scholars …