President/Executive Department Commons^™

The President As His Own Judge And Jury: A Legal Analysis Of The Presidential Self-Pardon Power, Robert Nida, Rebecca L. Spiro

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Historical And Constitutional Significance Of The Impeachment And Trial Of President Clinton, Michael J. Gerhardt

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Lessons Of Impeachment History, Michael J. Gerhardt

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Nineteenth-Century Orthodoxy, Richard B. Collins

Publications

No abstract provided.

Beyond The Independent Counsel: Evaluating The Options, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

The Independent Counsel Act expires on June 30, 1999. Should it be extended? Extended with modifications? Radically reformed? Or should it be allowed to sunset with nothing put in its place? To answer these questions, we need to address some more fundamental questions: (1) Do we truly need an independent office to investigate alleged wrongdoing by high-ranking officers of the executive branch? (2) If so, what are the options for the organizational structure of such an office? (3) By what criteria should the different institutional options be evaluated? (4) Under these criteria, which option represents the best, or perhaps more …

An Original Model Of The Independent Counsel Statute, Ken Gormley

Michigan Law Review

On Friday, October 19, 1973, President Richard M. Nixon took a risky step to de-fang the Watergate investigation that had become a "viper in the bosom" of his Presidency. The U.S. Court of Appeals had just directed him to tum over tape-recordings subpoenaed by Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox; these taperecordings might prove or disprove White House involvement in the Watergate cover-up. Rather than challenge this ruling, the President conceived a new plan. The White House would prepare summaries of the nine tape-recordings in question, which would be verified by Senator John Stennis, a seventy-two-year-old Democrat from Mississippi, working alone …

The Treaty Power And American Federalism, Curtis A. Bradley

Michigan Law Review

For much of this century, American foreign affairs law has assumed that there is a sharp distinction between what is foreign and what is domestic, between what is external and what is internal. This assumption underlies a dual regime of constitutional law, in which federal regulation of foreign affairs is subject to a different, and generally more relaxed, set of constitutional restraints than federal regulation of domestic affairs. In what is perhaps its most famous endorsement of this proposition, the Supreme Court stated in 1936 that "the federal power over external affairs [is] in origin and essential character different from …

Without Justification: Misplaced Reliance On United Nations Security Council Resolutions For Presidential War Making, 31 J. Marshall L. Rev. 583 (1998), Timothy D. A. O'Hara

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

High-Level, "Tenured" Lawyers, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

Government lawyers can be broadly categorized as either political or civil service appointees. The political appointees constitute a thin layer at or near the top of the hierarchy of government lawyers. They include, most prominently, presidential appointees – "Officers of the United States" who must be nominated and confirmed by the Senate prior to their appointment. They also include a variety of lesser lawyers who are exempt from most of the civil service laws. Such exempt "inferior Officers" include, for example, the lawyers in the White House Counsel's office and so-called "Schedule C" lawyers who hold positions "of a confidential …

The Constitution, The White House, And The Military Hiv Ban: A New Threshold For Presidential Non-Defense Of Statutes, Chrysanthe Gussis

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed" implies that the President is entrusted with the responsibility to defend those laws against court challenges. On occasion, however, Presidents faced with legislation that they deem unconstitutional have declined to defend that legislation against legal challenges. On February 10, 1996, President Clinton declined to defend a provision included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that required discharge from the military of all HIV-positive servicemembers because he believed that the provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Note explores whether …

Federal Reserve: History, Purposes And Functions - An Analysis, Mukunda Lakshamanarao

LLM Theses and Essays

On December 23, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson signed into law the Federal Reserve Act. With this law, Congress established a central banking system which would enable the world’s most powerful industrial nation to manage its money and credit more effectively than ever before. The political and legislative struggle to create the Federal Reserve System was long and often bitter, and this final product in 1913 was the result of a carefully crafted and somewhat tenuous political compromise between national and regional powers. Since its founding, the Federal Reserve System has evolved to meet the needs of a changing financial system …

Administrative Rulemaking (Testimony), David Schoenbrod

Other Publications

This post originally appeared on https://www.cato.org/publications/congressional-testimony/administrative-rulemaking

Foreign Policy: Can The President Act Alone?Gaps And Conflicts In The Constitutional Grants Of Power, Dana C. Makielski

Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest

The Framers did not intend the Constitution to be an all-inclusive "bill of lading," for we cannot forget John Marshall's famous admonition "that it is a constitution we are expounding."' Nonetheless, there are many large gaps and conflicts in the allocation of power among the three branches, most in the area of foreign relations, that have caused serious problems for our nation's leaders and constitutional scholars over the past two centuries. How have our presidents reacted? Certainly the President can and has acted on his own in negotiating, enacting, and implementing foreign policy, despite the lack of any express executive …

The Third House Of Congress Versus The Fourth Branch Of Government: The Impact Of Congressional Committee Staff On Agency Regulatory Decision-Making, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 247 (1986), James P. Hill

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Pragmatism And Parity In Appointments, Yxta Maya Murray

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This review uses Carter's two foci as a springboard for analyzing the Article II, Section II appointment process. First, Carter's discussion of indecency in modern appointments may be a valuable theoretical insight into the process instead of a mere sociological observation. "Indecency" in appointments, or what is known as "borking" in Carter parlance, may also be a symptom of race and gender bias in the administration of the Article II, Section II power. To ameliorate the effects of this bias, I suggest the incorporation of pragmatism (a thread of philosophical and legal thought) and parity concepts into the existing appointments …

Adventures In The Zone Of Twilight: Separation Of Powers And National Economic Security In The Mexican Bailout, Russell D. Covey

Faculty Publications By Year

No abstract provided.

Foreign Policy: Can The President Act Alone?Gaps And Conflicts In The Constitutional Grants Of Power, Dana C. Makielski

Richmond Public Interest Law Review

The Framers did not intend the Constitution to be an all-inclusive "bill of lading," for we cannot forget John Marshall's famous admonition "that it is a constitution we are expounding."' Nonetheless, there are many large gaps and conflicts in the allocation of power among the three branches, most in the area of foreign relations, that have caused serious problems for our nation's leaders and constitutional scholars over the past two centuries. How have our presidents reacted? Certainly the President can and has acted on his own in negotiating, enacting, and implementing foreign policy, despite the lack of any express executive …

Tragic Irony Of American Federalism: National Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty In Slavery And In Freedom, The Federalism In The 21st Century: Historical Perspectives, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

A plurality on the Supreme Court seeks to establish a state-sovereignty based theory of federalism that imposes sharp limitations on Congress's legislative powers. Using history as authority, they admonish a return to the constitutional "first principles" of the Founders. These "first principles," in their view, attribute all governmental authority to "the consent of the people of each individual state, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." Because the people of each state are the source of all governmental power, they maintain, "where the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a particular power-that is, …

Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal - Do Nothing, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Introduction, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

As citizens, we ought to ensure that our criticisms of Congress are constructive, lest we damage ourselves. In that spirit, the American Bar Association's Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice created a special Congressional Process Committee to study selected aspects of congressional procedures and to recommend appropriate reforms. The Committee, which I chair, is composed of administrative lawyers who are experienced in legislative practice, or who have worked in Congress. We decided to address selected aspects of congressional structure and procedure for which we believe administrative lawyers possess relevant expertise.

The articles that form this Symposium grew out of …

International Trade Relations And The Separation Of Powers Under The United States Constitution, John Linarelli

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

That The Laws Shall Bind Equally On All: Congressional And Executive Roles In Applying Laws To Congress, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

When Is The Senate In Recess For Purposes Of The Recess Appointment Clause?, Michael A. Carrier

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that courts should interpret the Constitution to allow the President to make recess appointments only during intersession recesses of the Senate. Part I chronicles the history of presidential recess appointments. This Part highlights the increasing frequency of, and questionable need for, intrasession recess appointments in the past twenty-five years. Part II examines the text of the Recess Appointments Clause and the intentions of the Framers regarding the scope of the clause and the appointment power in general. This Part argues that the text and the Framers' intentions indicate that the President's power to make recess appointments should …

Still Naked After All These Words, A. Michael Froomkin

Articles

No abstract provided.

Graveyard Robbery In The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act Of 1993: A Modern Look At The Constitutionality Of Retroactive Taxes, 27 J. Marshall L. Rev. 775 (1994), Andrew G. Schultz

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Challenging The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Compromise: A Practical Alternative To The Military's Don't Ask, Don't Tell Policy, 28 J. Marshall L. Rev. 179 (1994), Kenneth S. Mclaughlin Jr.

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, A. Michael Froomkin

Articles

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Law And International Law In The United States Of America, Lung-Chu Chen

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

Unitariness And Independence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, Neal Devins

Faculty Publications

With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand, Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decision making. In this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency litigation in the …

Article Ii Revisionism, Cass R. Sunstein

Michigan Law Review

One of the most striking developments of the last decade has been the new use of Article II in public law adjudication. Article II is a prominent feature not only of cases involving the creation of federal institutions that are independent of the President, but also of new disputes involving reviewability, scope of review, and standing.

Professor Krent and Mr. Shenkman have performed a valuable service in spelling out the argument that Article II, rather than Article III, justifies constitutional limits on legislative grants of standing. Indeed, on several important matters, we are very much in agreement. In this brief …