Legislation Commons^™

Reply: Did The Fourteenth Amendment Repeal The First?, Jed Rubenfeld

Michigan Law Review

To get right to the point: Mr. Hacker does not disagree that the Establishment Clause would, in the absence of the Fourteenth Amendment, have prohibited Congress from passing a nationwide religion law like RFRA. He believes, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has in part repealed the First. Of course, he doesn't want to say repealed. The language of repeal is not pleasant to the ears of those who would like to forget about First Amendment antidisestablishmentarianism. The Fourteenth Amendment did not "repeal any aspect of the text of the [Establishment] Clause," Hacker says, but only "change[d] profoundly the meaning of …

Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, William N. Eskridge Jr.

Michigan Law Review

In May 1997, the New York Knickerbockers basketball team was poised to reach the finals of its division in the National Basketball Association (NBA). The Knicks led the rival Miami Heat by three games to two and needed one more victory to win the best-of seven semifinal playoff series. Game six would be in New York; with their star center, Patrick Ewing, playing well, victory seemed assured for the Knicks. A fracas during game five changed the odds. During a fight under the basket between Knicks and Heat players, Ewing left the bench and paced in the middle of the …

A Tempered "Yes" To The "Exculpatory No", Scott D. Pomfret

Michigan Law Review

What circumstances trigger a person's duty to tell the truth? Immanuel Kant claimed without qualification that all circumstances require truthtelling, even when speaking the truth injures the speaker. John Henry Cardinal Newman made exceptions for lies that achieved some positive end. Hugo Grotius permitted lies to adversaries. The philosophy of twentieth-century common sense largely permits white lies. Perhaps surprisingly, some courts have found that Kant's absolute prohibition of falsehood more accurately characterizes a speaker's duty to tell the truth to the federal government under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 than these other, more relaxed standards. According to this view, the prohibition …

The Path To Habeas Corpus Narrows: Interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(D)(1), Sharad Sushil Khandelwal

Michigan Law Review

The enforcement of the U.S. Constitution within the criminal justice system is an odd subspecies of constitutional law. In areas other than criminal law, federal courts act as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights by providing remedies whenever violations occur. Criminal law, however, is different by necessity; the bulk of criminal justice occurs in state courthouses, leaving constitutional compliance largely to state judges. The U.S. Supreme Court, of course, may review these decisions if it chooses, but a writ of certiorari can be elusive, especially given the Court's shrinking docket. After World War II, however, this feature of criminal constitutional …

Equal Protection, Class Legislation, And Colorblindness, Melissa L. Saunders

Michigan Law Review

Scholars and judges have long assumed that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned only with state action that has the effect of singling out certain persons or groups of persons for special benefits or burdens. Under the traditional doctrinal framework, state action that has this purpose and effect bears a certain burden of justification under the clause, a burden whose stringency varies, depending on the criteria used to define the class being singled out for special treatment and the importance of the interest affected. But state action that lacks such a "discriminatory effect" is not, on the traditional understanding, subject …

Doma: An Unconstitutional Establishment Of Fundamentalist Christianity, James M. Donovan

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

According to the text of the Act, DOMA's purposes are "to define and protect the institution of marriage," where marriage is defined to exclude same-sex partners. To be constitutionally valid under the Establishment Clause, this notion that heterosexual marriages require "protection" from gay and lesbian persons must spring from a secular and not religious source. This Article posits that DOMA has crossed this forbidden line between the secular and the religious. DOMA, motivated and supported by fundamentalist Christian ideology, and lacking any genuine secular goals or justifications, betrays the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

"A Government Of Limited And Enumerated Powers": In Defense Of United States V. Lopez, Steven G. Calabresi

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez marks a revolutionary and long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers. After being "asleep at the constitutional switch" for more than fifty years, the Court's decision to invalidate an Act of Congress on the ground that it exceeded the commerce power must be recognized as an extraordinary event. Even if Lopez produces no progeny and is soon overruled, the opinion has shattered forever the notion that, after fifty years of Commerce Clause precedent, we can never go back to the …

Foreword, Louis H. Pollak

Michigan Law Review

Introduction to the Symposium Reflections on United States v. Lopez

Enumerated Means And Unlimited Ends, H. Jefferson Powell

Michigan Law Review

United States v. Lopez can be read as a fairly mundane disagreement over the application of a long-settled test. The Government defended the statute under review in the case, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, along familiar lines as a permissible regulation of activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce.

In this essay, I do not address the question whether Lopez was an important decision. My concern instead is with the problem that underlies Lopez's particular issue of the scope of the commerce power: Given our commitment to limited national government, in what way is the national legislature actually limited? …

Commerce!, Deborah Jones Merritt

Michigan Law Review

In this article, I explore the Supreme Court's new definition of "Commerce ... among the several States."9 In Part I, I examine three new principles that Lopez announces and that could significantly rework the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Part II, however, shows that these principles must be understood in the context of almost a dozen factors narrowing the Supreme Court's Lopez decision. Part II also demonstrates that the lower courts have understood the contextual uniqueness of Lopez and already have distinguished the decision in upholding more than half a dozen broad exercises of congressional authority. Part III then shows that …

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the language and legislative history of section 1367(b) and proposes a uniform test for determining the circumstances in which subsection (b) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Part I of this Note explains the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States called these doctrines into question. Part II examines the language and legislative history of section 1367 and concludes that the statute only prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases when doing so would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the complete …

The Emerging Role Of The Quid Pro Quo Requirement In Public Corruption .Prosecutions Under The Hobbs Act, Peter D. Hardy

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note discusses the quid pro quo requirement under the Hobbs Act, a federal criminal statute which applies to bribery by public officials. The author first describes two recent decisions by the Supreme Court, McCormick v. United States and Evans v. United States, which established slightly different versions of a quid pro quo requirement in public corruption prosecutions under the Hobbs Act. The author then explains that the lower federal courts interpreting McCormick and Evans have molded the quid pro quo requirement so that a prosecutor must prove in all public corruption cases under the Hobbs Act that the …

How To Think About The Federal Commerce Power And Incidentally Rewrite United States V. Lopez, Donald H. Regan

Articles

Almost sixty years after the "revolution" of 1937, we still do not have an adequate theory of the commerce power. The Court was right to abandon the theory of dual federalism epitomized by Carter v. Carter Coal Co.;' and it has got the right results in the major cases decided since then. But our post-1937 theory, whether before or after Lopez, is a mess. On the one hand, we have a collection of doctrinal rules that, if we take them seriously, allow Congress to do anything it wants under the commerce power. On the other hand, we continue to pay …

Judging Girls: Decision Making In Parental Consent To Abortion Cases, Suellyn Scarnecchia, Julie Kunce Field

Articles

Judges make determinations on a daily basis that profoundly affect people's lives. On March 28, 1991, the Michigan legislature enacted a statute entitled The Parental Rights Restoration Act (hereinafter "the Michigan Act" or "the Act"). This statute delegated to probate court judges the extraordinary task of deciding whether a minor girl may have an abortion without the consent of a parent. Nothing in law school and little in an average judge's experience provide a meaningful framework for making such a decision. Although many commentators, including the authors, argue that decisions about abortion should be left to the woman regardless of …

Taxation Of Damages After Schleier - Where Are We And Where Do We Go From Here?, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

This article will examine the reasoning of the Schleier decision and speculate as to how taxation of pre-1996 damages will likely apply in light of Schleier. First, the article will set forth a very brief history of the judicial and administrative constructions of the statutory exclusion, and explore tax policy justifications for providing an exclusion from gross income for certain damages. These latter two items (set forth in Parts II and III of this article) are areas that have been extensively addressed previously by several commentators, including the author of this article.' The reason for exploring tax policy issues is …

Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disapproval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, imposes significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The consequent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is unhealthy from a democratic perspective …

Divergent Strategies: Union Organizing And Alternative Dispute Resolution, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Articles

The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, the so-called "Dunlop Commission," is focusing on three principal subjects: (1) union organizing, (2) worker participation in management decision making, and (3) alternative dispute resolution (ADR). I am going to concentrate on the last, but first I would like to say a few words about union organizing. After all, unionization and collective bargaining - and for that matter, worker participation as well - can fairly be viewed as special forms of alternative dispute resolution.

Taxation Of Punitive Damages Obtained In A Personal Injury Claim, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

The author explains that in recent court opinions and commentaries concerning whether punitive damages are taxable, considerable weight has been given to a negative inference that appears to lurk in a 1989 amendment to the relevant code provision, section 104(a)(2). To the contrary, he argues, the legislative history of that amendment and the form that the bill had when it was reported out of the Conference Committee establish beyond doubt that no such inference is warranted.

Social Justice And Fundamental Law: A Comment On Sager's Constitution, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

Professor Sager begins his very interesting paper by identifying what he considers a puzzling phenomenon: the Constitution, as interpreted by courts, is not coextensive with "political justice." "This moral shortfall," as he refers to it, represents not merely a failure of achievement, but a failure of aspiration: as customarily interpreted, the Constitution does not even address the full range of issues that are the subject of political justice. Sager regards that failure as surprising-so surprising that, in his words, it "begs for explanation."'

The Meaning Of "Under Color Of" Law, Steven L. Winter

Michigan Law Review

The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I examine why the conceptual problem of who or what is "the State" is so intractable. In Part II, I present the historical evidence that establishes beyond doubt the pedigree and meaning of the phrase under color of law. I explain why Frankfurter would have indulged in such an obvious historical error to take the position he did. I suggest that, as was the case with the invention of modem standing doctrine, Frankfurter was here engaged in a stealthy, anachronistic campaign against the jurisprudence of the Lochner era - attempting to …

Legal Interpretation And A Constitutional Case: Home Building & Loan Association V. Blaisdell, Charles A. Bieneman

Michigan Law Review

The approaches of Hughes and Sutherland are but two extremes in constitutional interpretation. Though only two results were possible in the case - either the Act was constitutional or it was not - there are more than two methods by which an interpreter could reach those results. This Note explores possible ways of deciding Blaisdell, using the case as a vehicle for delimiting the boundaries of a positive constitutional command. As a sort of empirical investigation of legal philosophy, the Note examines how various interpretive theories affect an interpreter's approach to the case, and the results these theories might …

Retroactive Application Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1991 To Pending Cases, Michele A. Estrin

Michigan Law Review

This Note addresses the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to cases pending on the Act's date of enactment. Part I discusses current Supreme Court doctrine on the issue. This Part finds that the Court has endorsed two conflicting views on retroactively applying statutes to pending cases and that the lower federal courts consequently lack a principled framework for dealing with retroactivity issues in the 1991 Act. Part II describes the battle over the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 and the subsequent confusion over the enacted statute's reach. This Part finds that Congress provided conflicting textual …

Section 1983 And Implied Rights Of Action: Rights, Remedies, And Realism, Michael A. Mazzuchi

Michigan Law Review

This Note criticizes the Court's current reconciliation of the implied right of action and section 1983 inquiries, and argues that the availability of lawsuits under section 1983 should be the same as under an implied right of action test. Part I, by offering a working definition of rights, suggests an approach to identifying statutorily created rights. Part II discusses the evolution of the Court's implied right of action ' jurisprudence, and explores several explanations for the Court's hesitancy to create implied rights of action. Part III examines the influence of the Court's implied right of action test on its jurisprudence …

Compensatory And Punitive Damages For A Personal Injury: To Tax Or Not To Tax, Douglas A. Kahn

Articles

Since the adoption in 1919 of the Revenue Act of 1918, damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness have been excluded by statute from gross income.1 This exclusion, which does not apply to reimbursements for medical expenses for which the taxpayer was previously allowed a tax deduction,2 is presently set forth in section 104(a)(2). One might expect that a provision having recently attained the ripe age of 75 years without change in its basic language would have a settled meaning. However, recent litigation under section 104(a)(2) bristles with unsettled issues. Does the exclusion apply to punitive damages? To …

A Rule Unvanquished: The New Value Exception To The Absolute Priority Rule, Clifford S. Harris

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines whether the new value exception remains part of the revised Bankruptcy Code. Part I discusses the background of the new value exception. Part II traces the development of the conflict concerning the survival of the new value exception subsequent to the adoption of the Code. It then discusses the Supreme Court's opinions in Mid/antic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and its progeny, which established the methodology for determining the impact of the revised Bankruptcy Code on preexisting bankruptcy law. Based on an analysis of the Midlantic doctrine, Part II concludes that Congress did …

Ex Proprio Vigore, James J. White

Articles

The National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) is a legislature in every way but one. It drafts uniform acts, debates them, passes them, and promulgates them, but that passage and promulgation do not make these uniform acts law over any citizen of any state. These acts become the law of the various states only ex proprio vigore - only if their own vitality influences the legislators of the various states to pass them.

Absolute Priority And New Value, James J. White

Articles

This paper is based on a lecture given on December 6, 1990 ast the Second Annual Robert E. Krinock Lecture. The absolute priority rule is a specific application of the broader doctrine that reorganization plans must be "fair and equitable." Both have their origins in the railroad reorganization cases of the early 20th century. The general doctrine is now codified in section 1129(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code and the rule is codified in subsection 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) which provides that the debtor must pay a nonconsenting class of unsecured creditors in full or "the holder of any claim or interest that is …

Putting The Dormancy Doctrine Out Of Its Misery, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Justice Antonin Scalia has put on the academic table the question of whether the doctrine of the dormant commerce clause should be abandoned. That is a significant contribution, for this is an issue that should be debated thoroughly. But Justice Scalia's campaign against the doctrine has been notably ambivalent. On the one hand, he argues that the doctrine lacks justification in constitutional text, history, and theory.1 On the other hand, assertedly feeling the pressure of stare decisis,2 he has gone along with, and even led, applications of the doctrine, although within narrow limits.3 In this essay, I argue that Justice …

Legislative Inaction And The Patterson Case, Earl M. Maltz

Michigan Law Review

In its October 1988 issue,1 the Michigan Law Review published a symposium on Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, a case in which the Supreme Court has requested reargument on the question of whether Runyon v. McCrary should be overruled or modified. Each of the three distinguished contributors to the symposium concludes that the Court should not overrule Runyon. In reaching this conclusion, Professor William N. Eskridge and Professor Daniel A. Farber rely heavily on the view that because Congress has recognized the existence of the Runyon doctrine and has refused to overrule the decision, the doctrine of stare decisis …

Public Official's Qualified Immunity In Section 1983 Actions Under Harlow V. Fitzgerald And Its Progeny: A Critical Analysis, Stephen J. Shapiro

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Article discusses the development of immunities in section 1983 actions. Part II examines the application of Harlow and its progeny to a variety of situations. This discussion shows that broadened qualified immunity produces anomalous results under some circumstances by granting immunity to officials who have acted in a clearly culpable manner. Part III discusses the appropriateness of the Harlow standard and determines that it is neither supported by the legislative history of section 1983 nor by legitimate policy concerns. Finally, Part IV proposes several solutions that would protect deserving public officials from personal damage liability without …