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Articles 91 - 120 of 289
Full-Text Articles in Legislation
Statutory Constraints And Constitutional Decisionmaking, Anthony O'Rourke
Statutory Constraints And Constitutional Decisionmaking, Anthony O'Rourke
Journal Articles
Although constitutional scholars frequently analyze the relationships between courts and legislatures, they rarely examine the relationship between courts and statutes. This Article is the first to systematically examine how the presence or absence of a statute can influence constitutional doctrine. It analyzes pairs of cases that raise similar constitutional questions, but differ with respect to whether the court is reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. These case pairs suggest that statutes place significant constraints on constitutional decisionmaking. Specifically, in cases that involve a challenge to a statute, courts are less inclined to use doctrine to regulate the behavior of nonjudicial officials. …
The Ada And The Supreme Court: A Mixed Record, Samuel R. Bagenstos
The Ada And The Supreme Court: A Mixed Record, Samuel R. Bagenstos
Articles
According to conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court has resisted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) at every turn. The Court, the story goes, has read the statute extremely narrowly and, as a result, stripped away key protections that Congress intended to provide. Its departure from congressional intent, indeed, was so extreme that Congress passed a statute that overturned several key decisions and codified broad statutory protections. That statute, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA). passed with widespread bipartisan support, and President George W. Bush signed it into law. The conventional wisdom leaves out a major part of the story. …
Reading Statutes In The Common Law Tradition, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Reading Statutes In The Common Law Tradition, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Journal Articles
There is wide agreement in American law and scholarship about the role the common law tradition plays in statutory interpretation. Jurists and scholars of various stripes concur that the common law points away from formalist interpretive approaches like textualism and toward a more creative, independent role for courts. They simply differ over whether the common law tradition is worth preserving. Dynamic and strongly purposive interpreters claim the Anglo-American common law heritage in support of their approach to statutory interpretation, while arguing that formalism is an unjustified break from that tradition. Formalists reply that the common law mindset and methods are …
Protecting Whistleblower Protections In The Dodd-Frank Act, Samuel C. Leifer
Protecting Whistleblower Protections In The Dodd-Frank Act, Samuel C. Leifer
Michigan Law Review
In 2008, the United States fell into its worst economic recession in over seventy years. In response, Congress enacted the near-comprehensive Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Section 922 of Dodd–Frank, in particular, includes specific provisions designed to incentivize and protect corporate whistleblowers. These provisions demonstrated Congress’s belief that a comprehensive and robust whistleblower protection scheme was essential to preventing many of the abuses that caused the financial crisis. Unfortunately, this section’s inconsistent language has produced conflicting decisions within the federal judiciary. In accordance with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)’s own reading of Section 922, several district …
Introduction To The Micro-‐‑Symposium On Scalia & Garner's “Reading Law”:The Textualist Technician, Karen Petroski
Introduction To The Micro-‐‑Symposium On Scalia & Garner's “Reading Law”:The Textualist Technician, Karen Petroski
All Faculty Scholarship
Recently, the Green Bag issued a call for short (1,000 words) essays on Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, by Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner. We sought “[a]ny theoretical, empirical, or practical commentary that will help readers better understand the book.” The result is this micro-symposium. Our call drew dozens of micro-essays, some thought-provoking, some chuckle-prompting, and some both. Blessed with an abundance of good work but cursed by a shortage of space, we were compelled to select a small set – representative and excellent – of those essays to publish in the Green Bag and its sibling publication, …
Calling On U.S. Courts To Adopt Canada's Unified Approach To Statutory Interpretation, Amir Pichhadze
Calling On U.S. Courts To Adopt Canada's Unified Approach To Statutory Interpretation, Amir Pichhadze
The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process
No abstract provided.
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Enacted Legislative Findings And The Deference Problem, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
The constitutionality of federal legislation sometimes turns on the presence and sufficiency of congressional findings of predicate facts, such as the effects of conduct on interstate commerce, state discrimination justifying the abrogation of sovereign immunity, or market failures justifying intrusions on free speech. Sometimes a congressional committee makes these findings in legislative history. Other times, Congress recites its findings in a statutory preamble, thus enacting its findings as law. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between enacted and unenacted findings in deciding how much deference to accord congressional findings. This is striking because the difference between enactedness and unenactedness …
Missing The Forest For The Trees: Why Supplemental Needs Trusts Should Be Exempt From Medicaid Determinations, Jeffrey R. Grimyser
Missing The Forest For The Trees: Why Supplemental Needs Trusts Should Be Exempt From Medicaid Determinations, Jeffrey R. Grimyser
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Supplemental needs trusts are trusts designed to assist individuals with disabilities by paying for services and items that Medicaid will not pay for. Federal law, however, is unclear as to whether using one of these trusts automatically disqualifies someone from receiving Medicaid, thereby causing the circuit courts to split on their interpretation. Some circuits have held that the Medicaid statute allows states to enact laws prohibiting the use of these trusts while receiving Medicaid benefits based on the federal law’s statutory language. While other circuits have ruled that individuals can simultaneously receive Medicaid benefits and use supplemental needs trusts given …
Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse
Overrides: The Super-Study, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Overrides should be of interest to a far larger group of scholars than statutory interpretation enthusiasts. We have, in overrides, open inter branch encounters between Congress and the Courts far more typically found in the shadows of everyday Washington politics. Interestingly, Christiansen and Eskridge posit the court-congress relationship as more triadic than dyadic given the role played by agencies. One of their more interesting conclusions is that agencie are the big winners in the override game: agencies were present in seventy percent of the override cases and the agency view prevailed with Congress and against the Supreme Court in three-quarters …
Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent And History, Victoria Nourse
Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent And History, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two very basic concepts—legislative intent and legislative history. Textualists urge that to look to legislative history is to seek an intent that does not exist. This article argues we should put this objection to bed because, even if groups do not have minds, they have the functional equivalent of intent: they plan by using internal sequential procedures allowing them to project their collective actions forward in time. What we should mean by legislative “intent” is legislative “context.” For a group, context includes how groups act—their procedures. Once one …
Designing A Flexible World For The Many: "Essential Functions" And Title I Of The Americans With Disabilities Act, Michael J. Powers
Designing A Flexible World For The Many: "Essential Functions" And Title I Of The Americans With Disabilities Act, Michael J. Powers
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
This Note explores how courts interpret the meaning of “essential functions” under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. To be protected under the ADA, a plaintiff must be able to perform the “essential functions” of her job with or without a reasonable accommodation. In general, courts follow one of two approaches when interpreting this phrase. The first approach narrowly focuses on the employer’s judgment regarding which functions are essential. The second approach considers the employer’s judgment, but looks beyond to consider the broader employment relationship. This Note argues that these different approaches have led to varying levels of …
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
The Tempting Of Antitrust: Robert Bork And The Goals Of Antitrust Policy, Daniel A. Crane
Articles
Of all Robert Bork’s many important contributions to antitrust law, none was more significant than his identification of economic efficiency, disguised as consumer welfare, as the sole normative objective of U.S. antitrust law. The Supreme Court relied primarily on Bork’s argument that Congress intended the Sherman Act to advance consumer welfare in making its landmark statement in Reiter v. Sonotone that “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” This singular normative vision proved foundational to the reorientation of antitrust law away from an interventionist, populist, Brandeisian, and vaguely Jeffersonian conception of antitrust law as a constraint on …
Bond V. United States: Concurring In The Judgment, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Bond V. United States: Concurring In The Judgment, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Bond v. United States presented the deep constitutional question of whether a treaty can increase the legislative power of Congress. Unfortunately, a majority of the Court managed to sidestep the constitutional issue by dodgy statutory interpretation. But the other three Justices—Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—all wrote important concurrences in the judgment, grappling with the constitutional issues presented. In particular, Justice Scalia’s opinion (joined by Justice Thomas), is a masterpiece, eloquently demonstrating that Missouri v. Holland is wrong and should be overruled: a treaty cannot increase the legislative power of Congress.
The Search For Legislative Intent, Larry Alexander
The Search For Legislative Intent, Larry Alexander
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Preemption And Textualism, Daniel J. Meltzer
Michigan Law Review
In the critically important area of preemption, the Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation differs from the approach it follows elsewhere. Whether in politically salient matters, like challenges to Arizona’s immigration laws, or in more conventional cases, such as those in which state tort liability overlaps with federal regulation, the Court’s preemption decisions reflect a highly purposive approach to reading statutes, most notably through the application of “obstacle preemption” analysis. Recently, however, Justice Thomas has objected to the Court’s failure in preemption cases to respect its more textualist approach to issues of statutory interpretation, and he has urged that obstacle …
What Would Congress Want? If We Want To Know, Why Not Ask?, Danieli Evans
What Would Congress Want? If We Want To Know, Why Not Ask?, Danieli Evans
Articles
Judges often disagree about which interpretation of a statute is most faithful to 'legislative intent.' If judges are concerned about adhering to democratic preferences when interpreting statutes, why not ask Congress what it would prefer? I propose a procedure that would enable the Court, in a case where Justices are divided over the meaning of a statute, to submit both sides' reasoning to Congress, and Congress may choose to vote on its preferred of the alternative rulings the Court puts before it. Congress's preferences would be evidentiary only; they would not bind the Court to make one decision or another. …
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scaled Legislation & The Legal History Of The Common Good, Jill M. Fraley
Scholarly Articles
None available.
Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Bond V. United States: Can The President Increase Congress's Legislative Power By Entering Into A Treaty?, Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The proposition that treaties can increase the power of Congress is inconsistent with the text of the Treaty Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. It is inconsistent with the fundamental structural principle that "[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited."S It implies, insidiously, that that the President and the Senate can increase their own power by treaty. And it implies, bizarrely, that the President alone--or a foreign government alone--can decrease Congress's power and render federal statutes unconstitutional. Finally, it creates a doubly perverse incentive: an incentive to enter into foreign entanglements simply to increase …
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Congressional Silence And The Statutory Interpretation Game, Paul Stancil
Faculty Scholarship
This Article explores the circumstances under which the federal legislative apparatus may be unable to respond to a politically objectionable statutory interpretation from the Supreme Court. The Article builds upon existing economic models of statutory interpretation, for the first time incorporating transaction costs into the analysis. The Article concludes by identifying recent real-world disputes in which transaction costs constrained Congress and the President from overriding the Court.
The Canon At The Water's Edge, Thomas B. Bennett
The Canon At The Water's Edge, Thomas B. Bennett
Faculty Publications
What motivates substantive presumptions about how to interpret statutes? Are they like statistical heuristics that aim to predict Congress's most likely behavior, or are they meant to protect certain underenforced values against inadvertent legislative encroachment? These two rationales, fact-based and value-based, are the extremes of a continuum. This Note uses the presumption against extraterritoriality to demonstrate this continuum and how a presumption can shift along it. The presumption operates to diminish the likelihood that a federal statute will be read to extend beyond the borders of the United States. The presumption has been remarkably stable for decades despite watershed changes …
When Good Enough Is Not Good Enough, Karl Stampfl
When Good Enough Is Not Good Enough, Karl Stampfl
Michigan Law Review
According to conventional wisdom, the state of statutory interpretation is not strong. Its canons of construction-noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, reddendo singula singulis, and more than a few others-are a morass of Latin into which many law students and even judges have sunk. Its practitioners are unprincipled. Its doctrines are muddied. Its victims are many. In short, the system is broken-unless, of course, it is not. In The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation, Lawrence M. Solan slices through the rhetoric, the fighting, and the law-review-article histrionics in an attempt to show that the …
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Inside Agency Preemption, Catherine M. Sharkey
Michigan Law Review
A subtle shift has taken place in the mechanics of preemption, the doctrine that determines when federal law displaces state law. In the past, Congress was the leading actor, and courts and commentators focused almost exclusively on the precise wording of its statutory directives as a clue to its intent to displace state law. Federal agencies were, if not ignored, certainly no more than supporting players. But the twenty-first century has witnessed a role reversal. Federal agencies now play the dominant role in statutory interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the ascendancy of federal agencies in preemption disputes-an ascendancy …
Text(Plus-Other-Stuff)Ualism:Textualists' Perplexing Use Of The Attorney General's Manual On The Administrative Procedure Act, K. M. Lewis
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
Textualist judges, such as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, are well known for their outspoken, adamant refusal to consult legislative history and its analogues when interpreting ambiguous provisions of statutory terms. Nevertheless, in administrative law cases, textualist judges regularly quote the Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, an unenacted Department of Justice document that shares all the characteristics of legislative history that textualists find odious: unreliability, bias, and failure to pass through the bicameralism and presentment processes mandated by the U.S. Constitution. As a result, judges that rely on the Manual in administrative law cases arguably reach …
A Decision Theory Of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History By The Rules, Victoria Nourse
A Decision Theory Of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History By The Rules, Victoria Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
We have a law of civil procedure, criminal procedure, and administrative procedure, but we have no law of legislative procedure. This failure has serious consequences in the field of statutory interpretation. Using simple rules garnered from Congress itself, this Article argues that those rules are capable of transforming the field of statutory interpretation. Addressing canonical cases in the field, from Holy Trinity to Bock Laundry, from Weber to Public Citizen, this article shows how cases studied by vast numbers of law students are made substantially more manageable, and in some cases quite simple, through knowledge of congressional procedure. …
Interpretive Divergence All The Way Down: A Response To Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl And Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, 79 U Chi L Rev 1215 (2012), Anita S. Krishnakumar
Interpretive Divergence All The Way Down: A Response To Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl And Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges And Statutory Interpretation, 79 U Chi L Rev 1215 (2012), Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
This article is a response to the law review article cited in its title. It focuses on a corollary question raised by the article's analysis: if one takes seriously the proposition that it may make sense for elected judges to interpret statutes differently than do appointed judges, should judicial opinions written by elected judges look substantially different from those written by appointed judges? Part I examines the relative roles of judicial opinions written by elected versus appointed judges in a world in which divergence is practiced. Part II explores specific ways in which we might want or expect an elected …
The Anti-Messiness Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Anita S. Krishnakumar
The Anti-Messiness Principle In Statutory Interpretation, Anita S. Krishnakumar
Faculty Publications
Many of the Supreme Court's statutory interpretation opinions reflect a juisprudential aversion to interpreting statutes in a manner that will prove "messy" for implementing courts to administer. Yet the practice of construing statutes to avoid "messiness" has gone largely unnoticed in the statutory interpretation literature. This Article seeks to illuminate the Court's use of "anti-messiness" arguments to interpret statutes and to bring theoretical attention to the principle of "messiness" avoidance. The Article begins by defining the concept of anti-messiness and providing a typology of common anti-messiness arguments used by the Supreme Court. It then considers some dangers inherent in the …
Distrust And Clarify: Appreciating Congressional Overrides, James J. Brudney
Distrust And Clarify: Appreciating Congressional Overrides, James J. Brudney
Faculty Scholarship
Deborah Widiss continues to make important contributions in an area of statutory interpretation that has been largely neglected: the consequences of congressional overrides. Professor Widiss previously demonstrated how the Supreme Court and lower courts often confine the reach of statutes that purposefully override prior court decisions, thereby reviving aspects of the overridden judicial interpretations as ―shadow precedents.‖ In Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, Professor Widiss addresses the Supreme Court‘s further expansion of judicial power in the aftermath of congressional disapproval. Faced with the override of its textual interpretation in one employment discrimination statute, the Court inferred …
Contemporary Meaning And Expectations In Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin
Contemporary Meaning And Expectations In Statutory Interpretation, Hillel Y. Levin
Scholarly Works
This Article introduces and explores an approach to, or theme within, statutory interpretation, one grounded in contemporary meaning and expectations. This approach posits that judges interpreting ambiguous statutes are and should be constrained by the understanding and expectations of the contemporary public as to the law’s meaning and application. These are developed in response to, and mediated by, the actions and statements of government officials and the broader community. The Article argues that this apparently radical approach is necessary in order for law to maintain its moral force, and further that the principles underlying it are embedded in several doctrines …
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem In Statutory Interpretation, Deborah Widiss
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem In Statutory Interpretation, Deborah Widiss
Articles by Maurer Faculty
Statutory overrides — that is, amendments to supersede a judicial interpretation of a statute — are the primary mechanism by which Congress signals disagreement with court interpretations; they are essential to protect the separation of powers and the promise of legislative supremacy. But in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s override of a judicial interpretation of Title VII did not control the interpretation of identical language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and further that Congress’s “neglecting” to amend the ADEA when it amended Title VII was a clear signal that Congress intended the …
Rethinking Discrimination Law, Sandra F. Sperino
Rethinking Discrimination Law, Sandra F. Sperino
Michigan Law Review
Modern employment discrimination law is defined by an increasingly complex set of frameworks. These frameworks structure the ways that courts, juries, and litigants think about discrimination. This Article challenges whether courts should use the frameworks to conceptualize discrimination. It argues that just as faulty sorting contributes to stereotyping and societal discrimination, courts are using faulty structures to substantively limit discrimination claims. This Article makes three central contributions. First, it demonstrates how discrimination analysis has been reduced to a rote sorting process. It recognizes and makes explicit courts' methodology so that the structure of discrimination analysis and its effects can be …