Legislation Commons^™

Putting Legislative History To A Vote: A Response To Professor Siegel, John F. Manning

Vanderbilt Law Review

In a previous article, I argued that, properly understood, textualism implements a special form of the nondelegation doctrine, one that prohibits legislative self-delegation.' If the judiciary accepts certain types of legislative history (committee reports and sponsors' statements) as "authoritative" evidence of legislative in- tent in cases of ambiguity, then the particular legislators who write that history (the committees and sponsors) effectively settle statutory meaning for Congress as a whole. Against the background of such a judicially fashioned interpretive practice, when Congress passes a vague or ambiguous statute, it thereby implicitly delegates its law-elaboration authority to legislative agents, who effectively fashion …

The Use Of Legislative History In A System Of Separated Powers, Putting Legislative History To A Vote: A Response To Professor Siegel, Timing And Delegation: A Reply, Jonathan R. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

The debate over the legitimacy of judicial use of legislative history has significant legal and political ramifications that have long sparked controversy. As additional commentators join this long-running engagement, the focus of the debate necessarily changes.

In a previous article, John Manning argued that the use of legislative history violates the constitutional rule barring congressional self-delegation. Jonathan Siegel argues here that judicial reliance on legislative history does not implicate that rule, because a statute's legislative history already exists at the time of the statute's passage, and statutory incorporation of preexisting materials operates as an adoption of those materials, not as …

The Use Of Legislative History In A System Of Separated Powers, Jonathan R. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

Legislative history is the ultimate bugaboo of the textualists-those judges and scholars who assert that in statutory interpretation, "[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." The textualists have unleashed argument after argument against legislative history. Textualists assert that judicial use of legislative history seeks a collective legislative intent that does not exist and that would not be law if it did exist. They claim that congressional committees deliberately manipulate legislative history in order to influence statutory interpretation. They argue that legislative history is more ambiguous than the statutes it supposedly clarifies, that …

Timing And Delegation: A Reply, Jonathan R. Siegel

Vanderbilt Law Review

For two authors who come to such different conclusions, Professor Manning and I agree on a good deal. We agree that courts, in considering whether to consult legislative history in the course of statutory construction, must take heed of the special constitutional rule against congressional self-aggrandizement.' Thus, we agree that the Constitution forbids courts to give authoritative weight to post-enactment legislative history, because the effect of such a judicial practice is to permit Congress to delegate a very important power, the power to elaborate the meaning of statutes, to its committees or Members. We also agree, however, that Congress may, …

The Reconceptualization Of Legislative History In The Supreme Court, Charles Tiefer

All Faculty Scholarship

In 1995, the Supreme Court began to embrace a approach to interpreting Congressional intent. From that year forward, the Breyers-Stevens model of legislative history, or "institutional legislative history," has seen significant success, emerging in the shadows of the success Justice Scalia's enjoyed while promoting his brand of textualism in the early 1990s. In developing a new way to view Congressional intent, Justices Breyers and Stevens synthesize information gathered from congressional report details, preferably attached to bill drafting choices, thereby renouncing Scalia's reliance on the purposes espoused by the Congressional majority. This new approach, the author contends, rejuvenated the court's approach …

Congress' Arrogance, Yale Kamisar

Articles

Does Dickerson v. U.S., reaffirming Miranda and striking down §3501 (the federal statute purporting to "overrule" Miranda), demonstrate judicial arrogance? Or does the legislative history of §3501 demonstrate the arrogance of Congress? Shortly after Dickerson v. U.S. reaffirmed Miranda and invalidated §3501, a number of Supreme Court watchers criticized the Court for its "judicial arrogance" in peremptorily rejecting Congress' test for the admissibility of confessions. The test, pointed out the critics, had been adopted by extensive hearings and debate about Miranda's adverse impact on law enforcement. The Dickerson Court did not discuss the legislative history of §3501 at all. However, …

Using Immigration Law To Protect Human Rights: A Legislative Proposal, William J. Aceves, Paul L. Hoffman

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Article suggests that the rationale underlying the Nazi persecution and genocide provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act should be extended to all cases where aliens have participated in gross human rights violations. Quite simply, the logic underlying these provisions applies with equal rigor and intensity to all forms of human rights violations regardless of where or when they took place. Immigration relief is truly a priceless treasure. The United States should not become a haven for those aliens who have violated the most fundamental norms of international human rights law. Accordingly, immigration relief must not be provided to …

Legislative History In Ohio: Myths And Realities, Maureen Bonace Mcmahon

Cleveland State Law Review

In this article I will explore what seems to be a prevailing formal view about Ohio legislative history, and the contradictory signals expressed by the Ohio Revised Code and the courts, particularly the Ohio Supreme Court. In Part Two, I consider the prevailing assumptions about legislative history in Ohio. In Part Three, I examine the reality of judicial use of legislative history in Ohio; Part Four describes the Ohio Legislative Service Commission and its non-partisan legislative staff. Part Five compares federal and Ohio legislative history, and argues that Ohio's legislative process and history are rooted in its political culture. In …

How The Wagner Act Came To Be: A Prospectus, Theodore J. St. Antoine

Articles

The Wagner Act of 1935, the original National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), has been called "perhaps the most radical piece of legislation ever enacted by the United States Congress."' But Supreme Court interpretations supposedly frustrated the utopian aspirations for a radical restructuring of the workplace." Similarly, according to another commentator, unnecessary language in one of the Court's earliest NLRA cases "drastically undercut the new act's protection of the critical right to strike."'

Evaluating Purely Reproductive Disorders Under The Americans With Disabilities Act, Todd Lebowitz

Michigan Law Review

Approximately 2.8 million American couples suffer from infertility, a condition generally defined by the medical community as the failure to conceive after one year of unprotected intercourse. During the past thirty years, diagnostic and therapeutic techniques for treating infertility have improved drastically, enabling many previously infertile couples to bear children. These techniques, however, involve considerable expense and inconvenience, frequently requiring patients to take time off from work. Disputes with employers may follow, sometimes resulting in the infertile employee's termination. Some terminated employees, claiming that infertility constitutes a disability, then sue their former employers under the Americans with Disabilities Act of …

The Chaotic Pseudotext, Paul F. Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Claims By Plaintiffs In Diversity Cases: Making Sense Of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (B), Darren J. Gold

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the language and legislative history of section 1367(b) and proposes a uniform test for determining the circumstances in which subsection (b) authorizes the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Part I of this Note explains the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and examines how the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United States called these doctrines into question. Part II examines the language and legislative history of section 1367 and concludes that the statute only prohibits the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs in diversity cases when doing so would permit plaintiffs to circumvent the complete …

Decreasing The Costs Of Jurisdictional Gridlock: Merger Of The Securities And Exchange Commission And The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Mark Frederick Hoffman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Jurisdictional conflict exists between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), primarily due to the language of the 1974 CFTC Act. This Act grants the CFTC exclusive jurisdiction to regulate certain financial instruments which, given the increasing complexity and "hybrid" nature of such instruments, might simultaneously be subject to SEC regulation. This Note first explores the history of the two agencies and the statutory language giving rise to the jurisdictional conflict. This Note then examines several instances of jurisdictional conflict that resulted in extensive costs for the respective agencies and the United States' financial …

Interpreting Tax Legislation: The Role Of Purpose, Deborah A. Geier

Law Faculty Articles and Essays

This 1995 article uses tax cases to explore various methods of statutory interpretation.

Congressional Commentary On Judicial Interpretations Of Statutes: Idle Chatter Or Telling Response?, James J. Brudney

Michigan Law Review

There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disapproval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, imposes significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The consequent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is unhealthy from a democratic perspective …

Extraterritorial Application Of Rico: Protecting U.S. Markets In A Global Economy, Kristen Neller

Michigan Journal of International Law

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was enacted by Congress in 1970 to combat organized crime in America. Since its enactment, it has been used extensively in both the civil and criminal arenas. With the participation of foreign corporations, foreign subsidiaries, and foreign actors in general in the U.S. economy, it is only a matter of time before foreign defendants will be sued under RICO. This Note will discuss whether RICO should be applied extraterritorially: that is, whether federal courts should assume jurisdiction over foreign entities as defendants in RICO claims. First, RICO's language, legislative history and application …

That Obscure Object Of Desire: Hermeneutics And The Autonomous Legal Text, Paul Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

Close Enough For Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its Job, Thomas C. Arthur, Richard Freer

Faculty Articles

There's the beef. The supplemental jurisdiction statute, particularly section 1367(b), is a nightmare of draftsmanship. The problems that flow from that fact are more than aesthetic. The sloppiness makes easy cases hard and sows confusion in areas where there should be, and so easily could have been, clarity. It creates that most wasteful type of litigation - fights over jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction rules ought to be clear and capable of near-mechanical application whenever possible. Such pre­cision was possible in the supplemental jurisdiction, if only someone had spent as much time writing the statute as the trio has spent writing …

The Rehnquist Court, Statutory Interpretation, Inertial Burdens, And A Misleading Version Of Democracy, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

No one theory or school of thought consistently dominates judicial application of statutes, but the basic methodology employed by courts seems well-established if not always well-defined. Most mainstream judges and lawyers faced with a statutory construction task will look at (although with varying emphasis) the text of the statute, the legislative history of the provision, the context of the enactment, evident congressional purpose, and applicable agency interpretations, often employing the canons of construction for assistance. Although orthodox judicial thought suggests that the judge's role is confined to discerning textual meaning or directives of the enacting legislature, courts also often examine …

The First Word: The President's Place In "Legislative History", Kathryn Marie Dessayer

Michigan Law Review

This Note examines the extent to which courts interpreting statutes should consider presidential participation in the legislative process. Part I concludes that courts should afford presidential input greater weight in statutory interpretation given the constitutional foundations and the empirical reality of the President's involvement in the lawmaking process. This conclusion follows from an examination of the President's authority to propose legislation and his power to review legislation via the presentment clause. To demonstrate the advantages of using presidential documents, Part II considers a series of cases in which courts used executive documents in the statutory interpretation process. Although federal courts …

Panel Iii: Congressional Control Of The Administration Of Government: Hearings, Investigators, Oversight, And Legislative History, Stephen Williams, Griffin Bell, L. Gordon Crovitz, Peter L. Strauss, Michael Davidson

Faculty Scholarship

My remarks will be the first on the panel to address the problems of legislative history. We have heard two quite illuminating discussions of congressional oversight activities, with which I largely agree philosophically. When one then reaches the questions of why is this happening, and whether anything can be done about it, the issues become more difficult. My remarks address some complications that may arise from the current distaste for legislative history that may make the oversight problem a little bit worse.

Copyright Legislation And Technological Change, Jessica D. Litman

Articles

Throughout its history, copyright law has had difficulty accommodating technological change. Although the substance of copyright legislation in this century has evolved from meetings among industry representatives whose avowed purpose was to draft legislation that provided for the future,6 the resulting statutes have done so poorly. The language of copyright statutes has been phrased in fact-specific language that has grown obsolete as new modes and mediums of copyrightable expression have developed. Whatever copyright statute has been on the books has been routinely, and justifiably, criticized as outmoded.7 In this Article, I suggest that the nature of the legislative process we …

Section 1404(A), "Where It Might Have Been Brought": Brought By Whom?, Michael J. Waggoner

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Clean Water Act, Water Quality, And Water Use, Bruce D. Ray

Water as a Public Resource: Emerging Rights and Obligations (Summer Conference, June 1-3)

56 pages.

Includes unsigned annotations by David Getches.

Citizen Suits And Civil Penalties Under The Clean Water Act, James L. Thompson

Michigan Law Review

Part I briefly describes the division that currently exists between the Fourth, Fifth, and First Circuits. Part II analyzes the arguments relating to statutory construction, focusing on statutory language and structure as illuminated by legislative history. Part III examines the broader policy considerations arising when courts decide questions of citizen suit jurisdiction under section 505. Resolution of this issue has usually entailed an extreme interpretation of section 505, either very rarely allowing suits for past violations or allowing them in all cases. Parts II and III argue that the most appropriate response to this problem is actually the less frequently …

Copyright, Compromise And Legislative History, Jessica D. Litman

Articles

Copyright law gives authors a "property right." But what kind of property right? Indeed, a property right in what? The answers to these questions should be apparent from a perusal of title seventeen of the United States Code-the statute that confers the "property" right.' Courts, however, have apparently found title seventeen an unhelpful guide. For the most part, they look elsewhere for answers, relying primarily on prior courts' constructions of an earlier and very different statute on the same subject. 2

Erisa Preemption: Judicial Flexibility And Statutory Rigidity, Leon E. Irish, Harrison J. Cohen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Article attempts to describe the ways in which, and the reasons why section 514(a) has caused the courts and Congress so much difficulty. Part I reviews the legislative history of section 514(a), with emphasis on the ambivalence Congress has shown toward its 1974 draftsmanship. Part II attempts to provide a coherent description of the case law that has developed under section 514(a). Part III completes the legislative history by examining the two instances in which experience compelled Congress to revise section 514. Finally, Part IV discusses examples of problems courts have faced when crafting a federal common law of …

The Distinction Between The Scope Of Section 2(A) And Sections 2(D) And 2€ Of The Robinson-Patman Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that sections 2(d) and 2(e) were meant to cover only disguised discriminations not within the scope of section 2(a). If the seller's conduct falls within the scope of section 2(a), that section must be applied regardless of whether or not the conduct also falls within the language of section 2(d) or 2(e). Only when section 2(a) does not apply is recourse available under sections 2(d) and 2(e). Part I of this Note looks at general antitrust policy, the limitations of the Clayton Act that led to the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, and the legislative history of …

Land And Resource Planning In The National Forests, Charles F. Wilkinson, H. Michael Anderson

Publications

No abstract provided.

Exemption Of Erisa Benefits Under Section 522(B)(2)(A) Of The Bankruptcy Code, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that the two federal statutes are exempting statutes under section 522(b)(2)(A), and thus BRISA funds should be exempt in a bankruptcy action when the debtor uses the state exemption scheme. Part I argues that standard principles of statutory interpretation, as applied to the language of the bankruptcy statute, refute the possibility that Congress intended the list of statutes in the legislative history to be exclusive. Having established that statutes other than those listed may be included under section 522(b )(2)(A), Part II first refutes the argument that the absence of BRISA from the list of exempting statutes …