Legislation Commons^™

A New Deal Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored By Justice Robert Jackson, Charles Patrick Thomas

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

Picking And Choosing Text: Lessons For Statutory Interpretation From The Philosophy Of Language, Victoria Frances Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Textualists claim that they follow statutory text. This Article argues that, in practice, textualists often create meaning rather than find it. Deploying the analytics of linguistic philosophy, this Article takes a deep dive into textualist methodology. The philosophy of language reveals what legal scholarship has left submerged: The very choice of text can put the thumb on the scales of any interpretation. When one pulls a term out of a statute and isolates it from the rest of the text (what I call “isolationist” method), this decontextualization offers the opportunity for adding and subtracting meaning from the statute by “pragmatic …

Frank Morey Coffin's Political Years: Prelude To A Judgeship, Donald E. Nicoll

Maine Law Review

Each day when I go to my study, I see a wood block print of two owls gazing at me with unblinking eyes. Ever alert, they remind me of the artist, who in his neat, fine hand, titled the print “Deux Hiboux,” inscribed it to the recipients and signed it simply “FMC 8-2-87.” In addition to his talents as an artist and friend in all seasons, FMC was a remarkable public servant in all three branches of the federal government and, with his friend and colleague Edmund S. Muskie, a creative political reformer for the State of Maine. Throughout his …

The Crushing Of A Dream: Daca, Dapa And The Politics Of Immigration Law Under President Obama, Robert H. Wood

Barry Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Gibbons Fallacy, Richard A. Primus

Articles

In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice John Marshall famously wrote that "the enumeration presupposes something not enumerated." Modern courts use that phrase to mean that the Constitutions enumeration of congressional powers indicates that those powers are, as a whole, less than a grant of general legislative authority. But Marshall wasn't saying that. He wasn't talking about the Constitution's overall enumeration of congressional powers at all. He was writing about a different enumeration - the enumeration of three classes of commerce within the Commerce Clause. And Marshall's analysis of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons does not imply that the enumerated …

Self-Driving Cars: Autonomous Technology That Needs A Designated Duty Passenger, Michelle L.D. Hanlon

Barry Law Review

No abstract provided.

Jezebels And Jungle Bunnies: How The Stereotypes Of Black Women Shape Legislation, The Legal Profession, And Feminist Jurisprudence, Kersti Myles

The Modern American

No abstract provided.

Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis Of 212(C) And 212(H) Waivers, Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriguez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judges’ Varied Views On Textualism: The Roberts-Alito Schism And The Similar District Judge Divergence That Undercuts The Widely Assumed Textualism-Ideology Correlation, Scott A. Moss

Publications

No abstract provided.

Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …

Causing A Racket: Unpacking The Elements Of Cultural Capital In An Assessment Of Urban Noise Control, Live Music, And The Quiet Enjoyment Of Private Property, Sara Gwendolyn Ross

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

I examine the tension between and the treatment of the elements of cultural capital within dynamic mixed-use spaces, and posit that Canada's current noise control and noise pollution legislation, by-laws, and case law demonstrate a hierarchical protection framework placing greater importance on the "quiet enjoyment of private property" over live music culture, where performances are often the subject of noise complaints. While the elements of cultural capital valued by those who favour the value of quiet enjoyment of private property is well represented throughout legislation, by-laws, and case law, the elements of cultural capital valued by those who favour the …

Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously In The Judicial Enforcement Of Economic And Social Rights, Richard Stacey

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

The international human rights revolution in the decades after the Second World War recognized economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966, regional treaties, and subject-specific treaties variously describe rights to food, shelter, health, and education, and set out state obligations for the treatment of children. When they first appeared, these international, economic, and social rights instruments raised questions about whether economic and social rights are justiciable in domestic legal contexts and whether they can be meaningfully enforced by courts …

The Legal Climate On Climate Change: The Fate Of The Epa's Clean Power Plan After Michigan And Uarg, Israel Katz

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

One of the centerpieces of the United States’ effort to combat climate change is the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) controversial Clean Power Plan, which consists of the first-ever federal regulations requiring states to achieve massive carbon dioxide emissions reductions from existing fossil fuel-fired power plants. The regulations operate by setting interim and final emissions target dates for states to ultimately reach an aggregate 32% reduction in carbon emissions by the year 2030. This Note argues that the current regulations will not survive judicial scrutiny, because the U.S. Supreme Court has moved away from traditional administrative deference in instances where an …

Where's The Fire?, Burt Neuborne

Journal of Law and Policy

Freedom of speech is priceless, but distressingly fragile. Life, and law, would be much simpler if we could react to free speech's importance and fragility by granting it absolute legal protection. Since, however, absolute protection of speech is not—and should not be—a serious option, we face the legal realist challenge of erecting a First Amendment legal structure capable of providing real-world protection to highly controversial speech, often by weak speakers, without closing the door to government regulation. Given the uncertainty inherent in applying fact-dependent complex rules in protean factual settings, many potential speakers would avoid being drawn into unpredictable and …

Protecting Hatred Preserves Freedom: Why Offensive Expressions Command Constitutional Protection, Andrew P. Napolitano

Journal of Law and Policy

The First Amendment is not the guardian of taste. Instead, the U.S. Constitution wholeheartedly protects freedom of thought and expression, even if generated and defined by hatred, as long as that expression does not produce immediate lawless violence. Although free speech may lead to tenuous relationships or uncomfortable debates, it must be defended unconditionally. Too many politicians and lawmakers believe that the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment attaches only to those ideas and expressions that they approve of; this is not so. This article argues that the Founders intended the First Amendment's free speech principle as a …

Freedom Of Speech And Equality: Do We Have To Choose?, Nadine Strossen

Journal of Law and Policy

As a lifelong activist on behalf of both equality and free speech, I am convinced, based on actual experience, that these core values are mutually reinforcing, and not, as some have argued, in tension with each other. Moreover, I am convinced that this is true even for offensive or hateful speech that affronts our most cherished beliefs. However, defining hateful or offensive speech is inherently arbitrary and subjective, which raises concerns about what speech should be restricted, and how. Empowering government to punish hateful or offensive expresson necessarily vests officials with enormous discretionary power, which will inevitably lead to arbitrary …

A Balancing Act For American Universities: Anti-Harassment Policy V. Freedom Of Speech, Bridget Hart

Journal of Law and Policy

Legal scholars, educational administrators, journalists, and students have all witnessed a rise in students being disciplined by university officials for speech and conduct deemed inappropriate for college campuses. In endeavoring to explain this trend, some academics point to the disconnect between the Department of Education and university administrators regarding the legal standards for campus anti-harassment policies. The lack of clarity regarding what constitutes harassment on college campuses has resulted in the punishment of students by universities for speech and conduct that is normally considered to be protected speech under the First Amendment. This note first provides an overview of the …

When You Come To A Fork In The Road, Take It: Unifying The Split In New York's Analysis Of In-House Attorney-Client Privilege, Thomas O'Connor

Journal of Law and Policy

As one surveys the vast and ever-changing landscape of law and litigation, few things stand out as so unanimously exalted and carefully guarded as the privilege protecting attorney-client communications. Yet there is today a surprising lack of uniformity and predictability in the reasoning by which New York courts determine whether a communication made by in-house counsel to its corporate client will – or will not – enjoy the protection of that privilege. Rather than follow a single and predictable analysis to resolve the question, New York courts have oscillated between one line of decisions focusing primarily on the purpose of …

Understanding Wellness International Network, Ltd. V. Sharif: The Problems With Allowing Parties To Impliedly Consent To Bankruptcy Court Adjudication Of Stern Claims, Elizabeth Jackson

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

The 2011 Supreme Court case Stern v. Marshall defined which claims bankruptcy courts had the authority to adjudicate, but it’s complicated holding left lower courts perplexed. Specifically, the Stern decision created “Stern claims”—claims that bankruptcy courts have the statutory, but not the constitutional, authority to adjudicate. Subsequent cases, such as Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, have grappled with whether Stern claims should be treated as “core” claims, which bankruptcy courts can enter final judgments on, or “non-core” claims, which bankruptcy courts can only enter final judgments on if the litigating parties consent. …

The Roberts Court And The New Textualism, Anton Metlitsky

Cardozo Law Review

The article explores the Roberts Court's approach to statutory interpretation, focusing on its adherence to the "new textualism," a methodology emphasizing the plain meaning of statutory text. While recent cases like King v. Burwell, Bond v. United States, and Yates v. United States appear to prioritize statutory purpose over textual meaning, the Court's reasoning reinforces its commitment to textualism by framing decisions within textualist methodology, even when outcomes seem to depart from strict textual interpretation.

State-Action Immunity And Section 5 Of The Ftc Act, Daniel A. Crane, Adam Hester

Michigan Law Review

The state-action immunity doctrine of Parker v. Brown immunizes anticompetitive state regulations from preemption by federal antitrust law so long as the state takes conspicuous ownership of its anticompetitive policy. In its 1943 Parker decision, the Supreme Court justified this doctrine, observing that no evidence of a congressional will to preempt state law appears in the Sherman Act’s legislative history or context. In addition, commentators generally assume that the New Deal court was anxious to avoid re-entangling the federal judiciary in Lochner-style substantive due process analysis. The Supreme Court has observed, without deciding, that the Federal Trade Commission might …

Trademarks “Lanham Act” Foreign Registrants Need Not Allege Use In The United States And May Waive Filing Requirements Required For Domestic Applications (Scm Corporation V. Langis Foods, Ltd., D.C. Cir. 1976), John A. Cutler

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Superfund Chaos Theory: What Happens When The Lower Federal Courts Don't Follow The Supreme Court, Steven Ferrey

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

There is legal chaos in the national Superfund. The Supreme Court reversed decisions of eleven federal circuit courts in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. There is no instance in modern Supreme Court history where the Court reversed every federal circuit court in the country, as it did in Atlantic Research. The Supreme Court’s reversal was through a unanimous decision. This was extraordinary: It not only reversed the entire legal interpretation of one of America’s most critical statutes, but also re-allocated billions of dollars among private parties.

The Supreme Court, when it rendered its decision, seemed to be rectifying a …

Defining Ambiguity In Broken Statutory Frameworks And Its Limits On Agency Action, Amanda Urban

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

“The Problem” occurs when a statute’s provisions become contradictory or unworkable in the context of new or unforeseen phenomena, yet the statute mandates agency action. The application of an unambiguous statutory provision may become problematic or unclear. Similarly, unambiguous provisions may become inconsistent given a particular application of the statute. During the same term, in Scialabba and UARG, the Supreme Court performed a Chevron review of agency interpretations of statutes facing three variations of the Problem, which this Note characterizes as direct conflict, internal inconsistency, and unworkability. In each case, the Court defined ambiguity in various, nontraditional ways and …

Inefficient Inequality, Shi-Ling Hsu

Scholarly Publications

For the past several decades, much American lawmaking has been animated by a concern for economic efficiency. At the same time, broad concerns over wealth and income inequality have roiled American politics, and still loom over lawmakers. It can be reasonably argued that a tension exists between efficiency and equality, but that argument has had too much purchase over the past few decades of lawmaking. What has been overlooked is that inequality itself can be allocatively inefficient when it gives rise to collectively inefficient behavior. Worse still, some lawmaking only masquerades as being efficiency-promoting; upon closer inspection, some of this …

New Judicial Review In Old Europe, Alyssa S. King

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Customary International Law, The Separation Of Powers, And The Choice Of Law In Armed Conflicts And Wars, John C. Dehn

Cardozo Law Review

After over fourteen years of continuous armed conflict, neither courts nor commentators are closer to a common understanding of how, or the extent to which, international and U.S. law interact to regulate acts of belligerency by the United States. This Article articulates and defends the first normative theory regarding the general relationship of customary international law to the U.S. legal system that fully harmonizes Supreme Court precedent. It then applies this theory to customary international laws of war to articulate the legal framework regulating the armed conflicts of the United States. It demonstrates that the relationship of customary international law …

The Device Of Fiction In Public International Law, Jean J. A. Salmon

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

The Scrivener’S Error, Ryan D. Doerfler

Northwestern University Law Review

It is widely accepted that courts may correct legislative drafting mistakes, i.e., so-called scrivener’s errors, if and only if such mistakes are “absolutely clear.” The rationale is that if a court were to recognize a less clear error, it might be “rewriting” the statute rather than correcting a technical mistake.

This Article argues that the standard is much too strict. The current rationale ignores that courts can “rewrite,” i.e., misinterpret, a statute both by recognizing an error and by failing to do so. Accordingly, because the current doctrine is designed to protect against one type of mistake (false positives) but …

The “Changed Circumstances” Clause After The United Nations Conference On The Law Of Treaties (1968-69), Heribert F. Koeck

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.