Law and Politics Commons^™

How Jon Stewart And Lady Gaga Made Congress Less Lame: The Impact Of Social Media On The Passage Of Bills Through The "Lame Duck" Session Of The 111th Congress And Beyond, Onika K. Williams

Indiana Law Journal

The lame duck 111th Congress saw tremendous action in a relatively short period of time, and it was also witness to a phenomenon of social media. Users on websites such as Facebook and Twitter employed social media to send messages to their representatives and to actively participate in the lame duck session. Jon Stewart used television to advocate for Congress’s passing of the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, and Lady Gaga employed Twitter to support the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010. Both bills subsequently passed Congress. The social media phenomenon did not end with the …

Congressional Inquiry And The Federal Criminal Law, J. Richard Broughton

University of Richmond Law Review

This article supports constraint of the modern federal criminal law regime through greater attention to, and use of, congressional investigation and over =sight powers. Through an analysis of the 2009 and 2010 United States House of Representatives hearings on over-criminalization, this article asserts that Congress has political and constitutional incentives to use its investigation and oversight powers to address these problems. Conventional wisdom asserts that political disincentives to reduce the federal criminal law regime and weaknesses in investigative and oversight powers limit congressional effectiveness.

Congress In Court, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Congress rarely participates in litigation about the meaning of federal law. By contrast, the executive branch joins in federal litigation on a regular basis as either a party or amicus curiae. Congress simply assumes that the president’s lawyers adequately represent its interests save in those rare instances when the two branches have a direct conflict. This Article questions that assumption.

The federal judiciary’s approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation diminishes Congress’s influence, often to the benefit of the executive branch. The rise of textualism, the canon of constitutional avoidance, the reliance on Chevron deference, and the courts’ reluctance to second-guess …

The Unconstitutionality Of The Filibuster, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

This Article, written for the Connecticut Law Review's 2010 "Is Our Constitutional Order Broken?" symposium, argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional.

After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of "unlimited debate," this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate.

Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words "passed" …

Federal Earmarks In The State Of Georgia, Jeffrey Lazarus

Georgia Journal of Public Policy

Earmarks have been controversial ever since becoming a prominent part of the congressional spending process. Critics charge that earmarks fund projects with little or no economic value (for instance Ted Stevens’ “Bridge to Nowhere,”) but instead allow Congress members to direct government spending to campaign contributors (the charge leading to a federal investigation of the now-defunct lobbying firm PMA Group). On the other side of the controversy, congressional earmarks do fund a number of community improvements which are very valuable, at least locally. In Georgia, the fiscal 2010 appropriations bills included earmarks which allocated $450,000 to update College Park’s emergency …

Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, The Supermajoritarian Difficulty, And The Separation Of Powers, Victoria Nourse

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Every lawyer's theory of statutory interpretation carries with it an idea of Congress, and every idea of Congress, in turn, carries with it an idea of the separation of powers. In this article, the author critiques three dominant academic theories of statutory interpretation--textualism, purposivism, and game theory--for their assumptions about Congress and the separation of powers. She argues that each academic theory fails to account for Congress's dominant institutional features: "the electoral connection," the "supermajoritarian difficulty," and the "principle of structure-induced ambiguity." This critique yields surprising conclusions, rejecting both standard liberal and conservative views on statutory interpretation.

"Plain" meaning, it …

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

Journal Articles

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …

Agency Hygiene, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

Prof. Bagley notes that reshaping captured agencies using the structural reforms suggested by Prof. Barkow may be politically infeasible and offers an alternative solution for eliminating interest-group capture. First, he suggests establishing a body within the Executive Branch that proactively investigates and documents capture dynamics. Second, he suggests creating legislative mechanisms that will encourage Congressional action on the body’s recommendations, and perhaps, more provocatively, requiring the Executive Branch to enact any such recommendations in the absence of Congress’s formal objection.

The Long War, The Federal Courts, And The Necessity/Legality Paradox, Stephen I. Vladeck

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Politics Of Intellectual Property, Jessica D. Litman

Articles

In May 2005, Keith Aoki invited me to participate on a panel on "The Politics of Copyright Law" at the 2006 Association of American Law Schools ("A.A.L.S. ") mid-year meeting workshop on Intellectual Property in Vancouver, British Columbia. The panel, renamed "The Politics of Intellectual Property," and moderated by Keith, included talks by Justin Hughes, Mark Lemley, Jay Thomas, and me, and it was followed by three concurrent sessions on "The Politics Concerning Moral Rights," "The Politics of Global Intellectual Property, " and "The Politics of Patent Reform." I'm not sure what the organizing committee had in mind when it …

Slides: Water Needs And Strategies For A Sustainable Future, Shaun Mcgrath

Shifting Baselines and New Meridians: Water, Resources, Landscapes, and the Transformation of the American West (Summer Conference, June 4-6)

Presenter: Shaun McGrath, Program Director, Western Governors’ Association

25 slides

Close To Crucial: The H-2b Visa Program Must Evolve, But Must Endure, Lindsay M. Pickral

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Senator Mccain's Corporate Tax Proposals A Critical Examination, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah

Other Publications

Senator John McCain (R-AZ) has proposed two major changes to the corporate tax code: cutting the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 25 percent and allowing corporations to deduct the full cost of investments in technology and equipment in the first year, an accounting process known as expensing. The first proposal aims to enhance U.S. economic competitiveness, create jobs, and increase wages. The second proposal aims in particular to boost capital expenditures and “reward investment in cutting-edge technologies.”1

"Now For A Clean Sweep!": Smiley V. Holm, Partisan Gerrymandering, And At-Large Congressional Elections, Benedict J. Schweigert

Michigan Law Review

The 1930 Census reduced Minnesota's apportionment in the U.S. House of Representatives from ten to nine, requiring the state to draw new congressional districts. The Republican-led state legislature passed a gerrymandered redistricting bill in an attempt to insulate its nine incumbents in the state's delegation from the party's expected loss of the statewide popular vote to the insurgent Farmer-Labor Party. When the Farmer-Labor Governor, Floyd B. Olson, vetoed the redistricting bill, the legislature claimed the bill could take effect without the governor's signature. In Smiley v. Holm, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the veto was effective and that …

The Nsa Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis Of Congressional Oversight During An Era Of One-Party Rule, Tara M. Sugiyama, Marisa Perry

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm when it revealed that, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W Bush had issued a secret executive order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless surveillance on individuals to unearth nascent terrorist activity. Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic surveillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties. This Note argues that when a single party controls both the executive and the legislative branches, the fire-alarm model fails to provide sufficient congressional oversight. Short of future elections altering the balance …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …

The Congressional Caucus For Women's Issues: An Inside Perspective On Lawmaking By And For Women, Julia L. Ernst

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

This Article is written to inform constituencies who seek to advance the status of women through the federal legislative process- including lawmakers, Congressional staff, women's organizations, and interested individuals of the general public-about the inner workings of the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues during the 108th Congress, particularly in the second session. Historians and academics studying women and the law may also find this Article useful. Commonly known as the Women's Caucus, this bipartisan group consists of women Representatives who work together to advance women's issues through raising awareness of and taking action on federal legislation and policy particularly affecting …

Viewpoint: Legislating Without Deliberation, Carl W. Tobias

Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress's Latest Challenge To Judicial Review, Helen Norton

Publications

This Article examines growing congressional interest in a specific legislative check on judicial power: controlling the types of cases judges are empowered to decide by expanding and/or contracting federal subject matter jurisdiction. Congress has recently sought to shape judicial power through a range of proposals that variously enlarge and compress federal subject matter jurisdiction. In 2004, for example, the House of Representatives voted to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act and the Pledge of the Allegiance. Just a few months later, the new 109th Congress undertook a groundbreaking expansion of federal subject …

The Case For Federal Anti-Gerrymandering Legislation, Brian O'Neill

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Partisan gerrymandering is a political tradition the United States can no longer afford. Due in part to the effects of partisan gerrymandering, very few congressional elections are meaningfully competitive. This Note argues that partisan gerrymandering damages both the quality of American democracy and the federal system of the United States. This Note concludes that the important federal interests at stake warrant action by Congress to halt partisan gerrymandering. The Note further concludes that any action by Congress should incorporate the principles of federalism by resisting the temptation to micromanage and Congress should instead require state commissions to draft the boundaries …

No Constitutional Right To A Rubber Stamp, Richard J. Durbin

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Selection As . . . Talk Radio, Michael J. Gerhardt

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Schiavo And Klein (Symposium), Evan H. Caminker

Articles

When teaching federal courts, I sometimes find that students are slow to care about legal issues that initially seem picayune, hyper-technical, and unrelated to real-world concerns. It takes hard work to engage students in discussion of United States v. Klein,1 notwithstanding its apparent articulation of a foundational separation of powers principle that Congress may not dictate a "rule of decision" governing a case in federal court. A Civil War-era decision about the distribution of war spoils, one the Supreme Court has hardly ever cited since and then only to distinguish it, in cases involving takings and spotted owls? Yawn.

The Politics And Policy Of Media Ownership, Ben Scott

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hope On Consent Decrees, David Schoenbrod, Ross Sandler

Other Publications

No abstract provided.

The Recusal Alternative To Campaign Finance Legislation, John Copeland Nagle

Journal Articles

Typical campaign finance proposals focus on limiting the amount of money that can be contributed to candidates and the amount of money that candidates can spend. This article suggests an alternative proposal that places no restrictions on contributions or spending, but rather targets the corrupting influence of contributions. Under the proposals, legislators would be required to recuse themselves from voting on issues directly affecting contributors. I contend that this proposal would prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption while remedying the first amendment objections to the regulation of money in campaigns.

Book Review. Courts, Congress, And The Constitutional Politics Of Interbranch Restraint, Charles G. Geyh

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The Battle That Never Was: Congress, The White House, And Agency Litigation Authority, Neal Devins, Michael Herz

Articles

No abstract provided.

The Political Economy Of The Bankruptcy Reform Act Of 1978, Eric A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

These are the goals of this article. In particular, this article analyzes the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19783 and related materials, in the hope of describing the influence of interest groups on the final statute. It has, of course, long been assumed that certain narrow provisions of the 1978 Act reflect the influence of interest groups - for example, the section that gives special protection to security and lease interests in aircraft. This article goes farther and argues that fundamental elements of the 1978 Act reflect political compromises among competing interest groups. In particular, I claim …

Chief Justice Hughes' Letter On Court-Packing, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

After one of the great landslides in American presidential history, Franklin D. Roosevelt took the oath of office for the second time on January 20, 1937. As he had four years before, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, like Roosevelt a former governor of New York, administered the oath. Torrents of rain drenched the inauguration, and Hughes’ damp whiskers waved in the biting wind. When the skullcapped Chief Justice reached the promise to defend the Constitution, he “spoke slowly and with special emphasis.” The President responded in kind, though he felt like saying, as he later told his aide Sam Rosenman: …