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Articles 121 - 124 of 124
Full-Text Articles in Law and Politics
Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Presidential Influence On Congressional Appropriations Decisions, D.Roderick Kiewiet, Mathew D. Mccubbins
Faculty Scholarship
We investigate the extent to which possession of the veto allows the president to influence congressional decisions regarding regular annual appropriations legislation. The most important implication of our analysis is that the influence the veto conveys is asymmetrical: it allows the president to restrain Congress when he prefers to appropriate less to an agency than Congress does; it does not provide him an effective means of extracting higher appropriations from Congress when he prefers to spend more than it does. This asymmetry derives from constitutional limitations on the veto, in combination with the presence of a de facto reversionary expenditure …
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act And The Pursued Refugee: Lessons From Letelier V. Chile, Michael E. Tigar
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act And The Pursued Refugee: Lessons From Letelier V. Chile, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy, And Corporatism, Lawrence G. Baxter
Constitutionalism, Bureaucracy, And Corporatism, Lawrence G. Baxter
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The Mccarthy Era: History As Snapshot, Michael E. Tigar
The Mccarthy Era: History As Snapshot, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.