Law and Politics Commons^™

Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Executive branch officials routinely make thousands of decisions affecting public security and welfare. While it is rare that such discretionary decisions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial review, courts’ role is often so circumscribed or deferential that in some domains the probability of uncovering problems through such review almost certainly falls close to zero. The resulting amount of executive discretion carries considerable risks along with rewards. Some discretionary decisions undoubtedly benefit from the speed and flexibility that results from limiting judicial review. Yet judicial review’s evisceration as a tool to restrain certain forms of discretion also makes it …

Regulatory Status Of Voip In The Post-Brand X World, Jerry Ellig

ExpressO

During the past several years, the Federal Communications Commission has engaged in a series of rulemakings to determine the regulatory status of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). The Supreme Court’s Brand X decision clarifies that even if the FCC’s determination conflicts with that of a court, the FCC’s judgment holds sway as long as the decision is reasonable. We believe that VoIP should be classified as an information service, rather than a telecommunications service, for several reasons. First, the Internet Protocol nature of VoIP technology means that it functions like an information service, rather than a telecommunications service. Second, in …

Legislation And Legitimation: Congress And Insider Trading In The 1980s, Thomas W. Joo

ExpressO

Legislation and Legitimation:

Congress and Insider Trading in the 1980s

Abstract

Orthodox corporate law-and-economics holds that American corporate and securities regulation has evolved inexorably toward economic efficiency. That position is difficult to square with the fact that regulation is the product of government actors and institutions. Indeed, the rational behavior assumptions of law-and-economics suggest that those actors and institutions would tend to place their own self-interest ahead of economic efficiency. This article provides anecdotal evidence of such self-interest at work. Based on an analysis of legislative history—primarily Congressional hearings—this article argues that Congress had little interest in the economic policy …

Reform In Lieu Of Change: Tastes Great, Less Filling, Jonathan G.S. Koppell

Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell

In this response to Light, Koppell argues that the increasing frequency of reform may reflect Congress's inability to make significant changes to the substance of entrenched government programs. Moreover, he observes that the more profound evolution in government has been the movement toward the market-based provision of services, which has created a demand for new competencies in the public sector.

Law, Markets And Democracy: A Role For Law In The Neo-Liberal State, Alfred C. Aman, Jr.

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Antidiscrimination Law In The Administrative State, Julie C. Suk

Articles

The article argues that antidiscrimination law in the U.S. should shift its focus from corrective justice, which addresses individual wrongs, to distributive justice, which aims to eradicate systemic inequalities and promote equal opportunities. This shift would require enhancing the role of administrative agencies, such as the EEOC, to enforce antidiscrimination laws more effectively through proactive regulation and rulemaking. The article draws on the British model, where administrative agencies have stronger enforcement powers, to suggest reforms for the EEOC.

Why Judicial Review Fails: Organizations, Politics, And The Problem Of Auditing Executive Discretion, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

Every day executive branch officials make thousands of decisions affecting our security and welfare. Homeland security officials screen tens of thousands of people at the border. They decide whose name gets on government “no fly lists.” Agencies freeze suspected terrorist assets, choose what companies to inspect for environmental violations, and decide whom to prosecute. This article describes how judicial review predictably and systematically fails to prevent abuse and promote organizational learning when government officials make many such choices using their discretion to target individuals or groups. It then proposes the use of quasi-judicial audits of executive discretion as a remedy. …

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Turning Gold Into Epg: Lessons From Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism For Electronic Rulemaking And Other Ventures In Cyberdemocracy , Peter M. Shane

The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Working Paper Series

Empowered Participatory Governance, or EPG, is a model of governance developed by Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright that seeks to connect a set of normative commitments for strengthening democracy with a set of institutional design prescriptions intended to meet that objective. It is derived partly from democratic theory and partly from the study of real-world attempts to institutionalize transformative strategies for democratizing social and political decision making. This paper reviews Fung and Wright's recent volume, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, and considers the relevance of the authors' and other contributors' insights for the future of a …

The Opacity Of Transparency, Mark Fenster

ExpressO

The normative concept of transparency, along with the open government laws that purport to create a transparent public system of governance promise the world—a democratic and accountable state above all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well. But transparency, in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands, frustrates all parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions. The public’s engagement with transparency in practice yields denials of reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as government meetings that occur behind closed doors. Meanwhile, state officials bemoan the significantly impaired decision-making processes that result …

Stomaching The Burden Of Dietary Supplement Safety: The Need To Shift The Burden Of Proof Under The Dietary Supplement Health And Education Act Of 1994, Morgan J. Wais

Seattle University Law Review

This article gives a brief historical perspective on dietary supplement regulation and discusses the evolution of drug regulation by the FDA. Part II concludes with a discussion of the political environment in which these regulations occur. Part III gives examples and show how the current system has caused injury and harm to consumers of dietary supplements. Part IV discusses the current burden of proof and how it was applied in the case of ephedra. Part V discusses how, under the current regulatory structure, consumers cannot be adequately protected, either by the FDA or the tort system. Part VI discusses the …

Remands In Trade Adjustment Assistance Cases, 39 J. Marshall L. Rev. 9 (2005), Munford Page Hall Ii

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Global Democracy, Joshua Cohen, Charles F. Sabel

Faculty Scholarship

In this Article, we describe an emerging arena of global administration. We claim that this arena, not bounded by a state, raises accountability problems of a kind different from those addressed by conventional administrative law. And we argue that measures designed to address these problems will have potentially large implications for democratic theory and practice.

Our argument starts from the premise – stated here without nuance – that something new is happening politically beyond the borders of individual states and irreducible to their voluntary interactions. To distinguish these developments from what is commonly called "international law and politics," we use …

Executive Power And The Public Lands, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

This article empirically examines democratic participation in three different regulatory proceedings, involving financial privacy, nuclear regulation, and campaign finance. It then uses that analysis to critique -- and suggest alternatives to -- existing mechanisms to achieve public participation in the regulatory state. The current mechanism for structuring public participation in regulatory decisions (or “regulatory democracy”) relies on demand-driven procedures like the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice and comment process. Organized interests and others who decide they have sufficient resources and interest to do so comment on regulations. While some observers consider this process close to ideal, others instead seem to accept …

Securing Truth For Power: Informational Strategy And Regulatory Policy Making, Cary Coglianese

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis Of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain State-Governed. , Chad Emerson

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson

ExpressO

This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.

Rethinking Public Engagement In The Administrative State, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar

ExpressO

This Article presents an empirical, doctrinal, and theoretical critique of public engagement in the modern administrative state. The legitimacy of the administrative state depends on the claim that it provides opportunities for public engagement as well as a mechanism for expert scientific decisionmaking. A typical rulemaking proceeding lets experts make technical judgments about terrorism, transportation, or telecommunications subject to court review guarding against arbitrariness. The whole process is then enmeshed in a system that is supposed to provide engagement – and therefore democratic accountability -- through presidential appointments and control, congressional oversight, and the public notice-and-comment process. This existing approach …

Marbury V. Madison As The First Great Administrative Law Decision, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 481 (2004), Thomas W. Merrill

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Independence In Virginia, W. Hamilton Bryson

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Say Cheese: The Constitutionality Of State-Mandated Airtime On Public Broadcasting Stations In Wisconsin, Andrew D. Cotlar

Federal Communications Law Journal

Last year, the State of Wisconsin passed legislation which would require statechartered public broadcasting television networks to carry political advertising for candidates free of charge. In this article, Andrew Cotlar raises many concerns about the wisdom of such legislation and the impact this trend may have on public broadcasters throughout the nation. The author begins by analyzing the current position of the law on political access requirements, at both federal and state levels, and then argues that the public television stations should continue to be free to exercise substantial editorial discretion. The Article proceeds to critique the Wisconsin statute as …

Grading The Government, Richard Parker

Faculty Articles and Papers

For over a decade, scathing critiques of government have been fueled by a group of studies called regulatory scorecards, which purport to show that the costs of many government regulations vastly outweigh their benefits. One widely-cited study by John Morrall, an OMB economist, claims that government regulations cost up to $72 billion per life saved. Another study, co-authored by Bush's regulatory czar, John Graham, claims that over 60,000 people lose their lives each year due to irrational government regulation. A third group of scorecards - compiled by Robert Hahn of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies - claims that …

Agenda: Water Negotiation Workshop, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation

Water Negotiation Workshop (June 4-5)

"Sponsored by: The Natural Resources law Center of the University of Colorado Law School; Funding provided by: The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation."

"Facilitators: Lucy Moore and Steve Snyder."

"June 4 and 5, 2003, Community House, Chautauqua Park, Boulder, Colorado."

Contents:

Agenda -- Roster of workshop participants -- Biographies of workshop participants -- Maps of Klamath basin -- Key water-related events in the upper Klamath basin -- Federal-state decisionmaking on water : applying lessons learned / David J. Hayes -- Turbulence in the Klamath River basin / Sharon Levy

Maps Of The Klamath Basin And Key Water-Related Events In The Upper Klamath Basin, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Water Negotiation Workshop (June 4-5)

5 pages.

Contents:

Maps of Klamath Basin -- Key water-related events in the Upper Klamath Basin

Excerpted from: Ron Hathaway & Teresa Welch, Water Allocation in the Klamath Reclamation Project, 2001: An Assessment of Natural Resource, Economic, Social, and Institutional Issues with a Focus on the Upper Klamath Basin 31-34, 43 (Oregon State University, University of California, reprinted May 2003). Full report available in Klamath Waters Digital Library at http://digitallib.oit.edu/cdm/ref/collection/kwl/id/9442.

The Freedom Of Information Act Post-9/11: Balancing The Public's Right To Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection, And Homeland Security, Kristen Elizabeth Uhl

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Art Of Legislative Lawyering And The Six Circles Theory Of Advocacy, Chai R. Feldblum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

A "legislative lawyer" is a person who exists in Washington, D.C., and in almost every city and state in this country where legislation and administrative regulations are developed. But most people do not know who that person is or what that person does. In fact, most advocacy organizations that should be hiring legislative lawyers have no idea who a legislative lawyer is.

The author coined the term "legislative lawyer" when she created a Federal Legislation Clinic at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, D.C. over a decade ago. The author needed to explain to her faculty colleagues what type …

Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies And Personnel Before A New President Arrives, Nina A. Mendelson

Articles

This Article examines executive branch agency actions concluded just before a new President takes office, such as "midnight" rulemaking and late-term hiring and promotion, which Professor Mendelson collectively refers to as "agency burrowing." Congress, the media, and some commentators have portrayed such activities as unsavory power grabs that undermine the President-elect's ability to direct the functions of administrative agencies. Rather than dismissing agency burrowing out of hand, however, Professor Mendelson argues for a more nuanced approach. In some cases, burrowing can make positive contributions to the democratic responsiveness of agencies, agency accountability, and the "rule of law." A fuller analysis …

Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories Of The Regulatory State. Foreword: Post-Public Choice?, Cynthia R. Farina, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

The Allocation Of Resources By Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation And Administrative Regulation, John M. De Figueiredo, Rui J.P. De Figueiredo Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

One of the central concerns about American policy making institutions is the degree to which political outcomes can be influenced by interested parties. While the literature on interest group strategies in particular institutions - legislative, administrative, and legal - is extensive, there is very little scholarship which examines how the interdependencies between institutions affects the strategies of groups. In this paper we examine in a formal theoretical model how the opportunity to litigate administrative rulemaking in the courts affects the lobbying strategies of competing interest groups at the rulemaking stage. Using a resource-based view of group activity, we develop a …