Law and Economics Commons^™

Banking And Competition In Exceptional Times, Brett Christophers

Seattle University Law Review

This Article has two main aims: to provide a critical consideration of this contemporary antitrust “revival” from an explicitly political–economic perspective and to point toward some theoretical resources that might facilitate such an assessment.Part II looks backward at the evolution and application of competition law in the banking sector over the relatively longue durée. In this Part, I invoke the concept of “exception” to understand how antitrust policy has developed, and my chief interlocutors are the perhaps unlikely figures of Giorgio Agamben and Karl Marx. Part III looks forward and considers the central question around which the recent resurgence of …

Consumer Choice As The Best Way To Describe The Goals Of Competition Law, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This article is both a short introduction to the Consumer Choice explanation for Competition Law or Antitrust Law, and also a short advocacy piece suggesting that Consumer Choice is the best way to articulate the goals of European Competition Law and United States Antitrust Law.

This article briefly:

1. defines the consumer choice approach to antitrust or competition law and shows how it differs from other approaches;
2. shows that the antitrust statutes and theories of violation embody a concern for optimal levels of consumer choice;
3. shows that the United States antitrust case law embodies a concern for optimal levels of consumer …

Compatible Or Conflicting: The Promotion Of A High Level Of Employment And The Consumer Welfare Standard Under Article 101, Tom C. Hodge

William & Mary Business Law Review

The antitrust, or competition, regime of the European Union (EU) differs substantially from that of the United States, because EU competition law forms part of the EU Treaties and is therefore imbibed with the multiple values of the European Union itself. Accordingly, it is by no means clear or settled if the anti-cartel law of the European Union, Article 101 TFEU, must focus solely on a consumer welfare standard or must also consider the broad and multiple policy aims enshrined in the EU Treaties. If Article 101 must balance multiple aims, this would be in stark contrast to Section 1 …

The Market As A Legal Concept, Justin Deystone

Publications

In the wake of the recent financial crisis of 2008, and in the run-up to what some are calling a perfect fiscal storm, there is no shortage of commentary on the need for fundamental market reform. Though there are certainly disagreements about where the real problems are and what to do, almost all the commentary remains wedded to an old and entirely false image of “free competition.” Of course, there is hardly consensus about whether markets require the heavy hand of regulative control, or are better left to regulate themselves, but a belief in the distinction between these two images …

Antitrust, Institutions, And Merger Control, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article makes two primary contributions to the antitrust literature. First, it identifies the dynamic interrelationship across antitrust institutions. Second, it provides new empirical evidence from practitioner surveys to explore how the dynamic institutional interrelationship plays out in the area of merger control. This Article provides a descriptive, analytical overview of the various institutions to better frame the larger institutional interrelations for a comparative institutional analysis. In the next Part it examines mergers as a case study of how one might apply antitrust institutional analysis across these different kinds and levels of antitrust institutions. The Article utilizes both quantitative and …

Congress, Corporate Boards, And Oversight: A Public Law/Private Law Comparison, Paul S. Miller

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Treasure Islands, James R. Hines Jr.

Articles

In movies and novels, tax havens are often settings for shady international deals; in practice, they are rather less flashy. Tax havens are countries and territories that offer low tax rates and favorable regulatory policies to foreign investors. For example, tax havens typically tax inbound investment at zero or very low rates and further encourage investment with telecommunications and transportation facilities, other business infrastructure, favorable legal environments, and limited bureaucratic hurdles to starting new firms. Tax havens are small: most are islands; all but a few have populations below one million; and they have above-average incomes. Tax havens are also …

The Fundamental Goal Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, John B. Kirkwood, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom in the antitrust community is that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote economic efficiency. That view is incorrect. As this article shows, the fundamental goal of antitrust law is to protect consumers.

This article defines the relevant economic concepts, summarizes the legislative histories, analyzes recent case law in more depth than any prior article, and explores the most likely bases for current popular support of the antitrust laws. All these factors indicate that the ultimate goal of antitrust is not to increase the total wealth of society, but to protect consumers from behavior that …

The Politics Of Competition: Review Of Clifford Winston's Government Failure Versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research And Government Performance And Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin & Martin Shapiro, Eds., Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics Of Regulatory Reform, Russell P. Hanser

Federal Communications Law Journal

Two recent books focus attention on the role of regulation in the modem economy and the reasons why efforts at deregulation succeed or fail. Clifford Winston's Government Failure Versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and Government Performance reviews empirical studies of regulation and its alternatives, arguing that economic regulation has quite often done more harm than good. In Creating Competitive Markets: The Politics of Regulatory Reform, editors Mark K. Landy, Martin A. Levin and Martin Shapiro collect essays addressing the political dangers faced by those pursuing market liberalization, both before and (especially) after reform is enacted. Read together, these books …

Trolling For Trolls: The Pitfalls Of The Emerging Market Competition Requirement For Permanent Injunctions In Patent Cases Post-Ebay, Benjamin H. Diessel

Michigan Law Review

In eBay v. MercExchange, a unanimous Supreme Court announced that a new four-factor test should be employed by district courts in determining whether to award an injunction or damages to an aggrieved party whose intellectual property has been infringed. In the context of permanent injunctions in patent cases, district courts have distorted the four-factor test resulting in a "market competition requirement." Under the new market competition requirement, success at obtaining an injunction is contingent upon a party demonstrating that it is a market competitor After consistent application in the first twenty-five district court cases post-eBay, the market competition requirement …

Knowledge, Competition And The Innovation: Is Stronger Ipr Protection Really Needed For More And Better Innovations, Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo, Corrado Pasquali

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

The main questions addressed in this Article are thus: given that growth is a highly desirable phenomenon and that it is primarily spurred by technological innovation, how should society solve the problem of favoring a sufficient level of investments in R&D? In particular, is it necessarily true and always desirable that, independent of any other consideration, society should protect innovators from competition and shelter them in a legally protected and enforced monopoly? Is it true that the real source of economic value of new recipes is only found in the blueprints of ideas that those recipes implement? Is it necessarily …

Using The "Consumer Choice" Approach To Antitrust Law, Neil W. Averitt, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

The current paradigms of antitrust law - price and efficiency - do not work well enough. They were an immense improvement over their predecessors, and they have served the field competently for a generation, producing reasonably accurate results in most circumstances. Accumulated experience has also revealed their shortcomings, however. They are hard to fully understand and are not particularly transparent in their application. Moreover, in a disturbingly large number of circumstances they are unable to handle the important issue of non-price competition.

In this article we suggest replacing the older paradigms with the somewhat broader approach of "consumer choice." The …

Ranks And Rivals: A Theory Of Competition, Avishalom Tor, Stephen M. Garcia, Richard Gonzalez

Journal Articles

Social comparison theories typically assume a comparable degree of competition between commensurate rivals on a mutually important dimension. In contrast, however, the following set of studies reveals that the degree of competition between such rivals depends on their proximity to a standard. Studies 1-3 test the prediction that individuals become more competitive and less willing to maximize profitable joint gains when they and their commensurate rivals are highly ranked (e.g., #2 vs. #3) than when they are not (e.g., #202 vs. #203). Studies 4-6 then generalize these findings, showing that the degree of competition increases not only for high ranks …

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Property Rights And Intrabrand Restraints, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure optimal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some scholars reject both approaches, …

The Internet, Innovation, And Intellectual Property Policy, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

The Internet continues to transform the information industries and challenge intellectual property law to develop a competition policy strategy to regulate networked products. In particular, inventors of "information platforms" that support the viewing of content-be they instant messaging systems, media players, or Web browsers-face a muddled set of legal doctrines that govern the scope of available intellectual property protection. This uncertainty reflects a fundamental debate about what conditions will best facilitate innovation in the information industries--a debate most often played out at the conceptual extremes between the "commons" and "proprietary control" approaches to the Internet and intellectual property policy.

This …

The Fable Of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, And Legal Policy, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

Legal scholars have recently advanced a behavioral approach to the law and economics school of thought, replacing the traditionally assumed rational actor with an empirically based, boundedly rational decision maker. In response, advocates of traditional law and economics have asserted that boundedly rational behavior is of little significance for the analysis of economic activities in market environments, most notably because competitive pressures will eliminate such behavior. This article argues, however, that bounded rationality has important effects on the market even under conditions of intense competition. Through a study of the competition among new entrants into industry, this analysis examines the …

Maximum Vertical Price Fixing From Albrecht Through Brunswick To Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, James M. Fesmire

Seattle University Law Review

The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other …

The Anticompetitive Effect Of Passive Investment, David Gilo

Michigan Law Review

There are many cases in which a firm passively invests in its competitor. For example, Microsoft passively invested in $150 million worth of the nonvoting stock of Apple, its historic rival in the operating systems market. Also, in November 1998, Northwest Airlines, the nation's fourth-largest airline, purchased 14% of the common stock of Continental Airlines Inc., the nation's fifth-largest (and fastest growing) airline. Northwest competes with Continental on seven routes, serving 3.6 million passengers per year. In another example, TCI, the nation's largest cable operator, became a passive investor with a 9% stake (which can be increased, under the terms …

The Price Of Law: How The Market For Lawyers Distorts The Justice System, Gillian K. Hadfield

Michigan Law Review

Bill Clinton's legal bills in connection with the Lewinsky scandal topped $10 million; the bill for Ken Starr's investigation of the President exceeded $50 million. The cost to the eight families portrayed in the bestseller A Civil Action for their tort suit against a manufacturing company accused of dumping hazardous chemicals into the water supply was $4.8 million (paid from a settlement of about $8 million); the cost for the defense exceeded $7 million. Lawyers who represented the three states in the nationwide suit by state attorneys general against tobacco companies to recoup smoking-related health care costs were awarded $8.2 …

The Three Types Of Collusion: Fixing Prices, Rivals, And Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

All Faculty Scholarship

Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, "Type I" collusion is the familiar direct agreement among colluding firms (a cartel) to raise prices or, equivalently, restrict output. Alternatively, firms can collude to disadvantage rivals in ways that causes those rivals to cut output. We term this "Type II" collusion. Its indirect effect is an increase in market prices.

A number of important collusion cases neither direct manipulation of prices or output, nor direct attacks on rivals. Examples include Supreme Court cases such as National Society of Professional Engineers v. US, Bates v. State Bar of …

The Evolution Of United States Antitrust Law: The Past, Present, And (Possible) Future, Albert A. Foer, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

As the world’s nations rapidly move from systems in which central planning and monopoly are replaced by free markets,2 it becomes increasingly valuable to consider the histories of competition policy experienced in different nations, on a comparative basis.3 In this article, we focus on the history of antitrust in the United States, the first nation to develop and fully-articulate a competition policy, drawing out themes that may be useful to other countries as they contemplate the shape and direction of their own competition regimes. We show that the American competition policy has reflected an underlying stability and bi-partisanship, but that …

Creating Competition Policy For Transition Economies: Introduction, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

This is an introduction to a symposium on Creating Competition for Transition Economies. This article provides an overview of the topic, and also briefly introduces the authors of the articles in the symposium; William Kovacic, Eleanor Fox, Spencer Weber Waller, Malcolm Coate, and Armando Rodriguez.

Disciplining Managers: Shareholder Cooperation In The Shadow Of Shareholder Competition, Manuel A. Utset

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Scholarship Of The Absurd: Bob Bork Meets The Bald Soprano, Alex Kozinski

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Antitrust Economics on Trial: A Dialogue on the New Laissez-Faire by Walter Adams and James W. Brock

Defining The Prisoners' Dilemma, Wendy J. Gordon

Scholarship Chronologically

Formally, a prisoner's dilemma is defined as follows: There are two participants symmetrically situated. For each player, her payoff if she refuses to cooperate with the other player is higher than her payoff would be if she cooperated, and this is true whether the other chooses to cooperate, or chooses to defect. If both cooperate, her payoff will be higher than if both defect.

Models Of Market Behaviour And Competition Law: Exclusive Dealing, Marilyn Maccrimmon, Asha Sadanand

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

The paper arose out of the authors' belief that economic principles should, and probably will, play a larger role in the decisions of the new Competition Tribunal. The objective of the paper is to clarify some of the underlying assumptions and choices implicit in the regulation of competitive behaviour by examining the literature on economic analysis of market behaviour written by both economists and lawyers. The authors are especially concerned with the recent emphasis on strategic behaviour and its contrast to the Chicago school approach which recommends less interference with market behaviour. They examine the differences between the assumptions of …

A Micro-Microeconomic Approach To Antitrust Law: Games Managers Play, Harry S. Gerla

Michigan Law Review

If we are to gain an accurate perspective on the impact of antitrust laws and policies on the behavior of firms in the real world, we must adopt a micro-microeconomic approach which focuses not on how rational, profit-maximizing firms will theoretically behave, but upon how late twentieth-century American managers and executives actually behave. This article attempts to begin that task.

Part I of this article examines the justifications for focusing on individual managers rather than profit-maximizing firms as the key actors in antitrust law. Part II looks at contemporary management mores and practices and develops some generalized "rules of the …