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Full-Text Articles in Law and Economics

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese Oct 2005

Exclusive Dealing, The Theory Of The Firm, And Raising Rivals' Costs: Toward A New Synthesis, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley Jun 2005

Unilateral Refusals To License In The Us, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley

All Faculty Scholarship

Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challenges to agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the use or disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products they cover. But sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual property owner's refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhaps coupled with efforts to enforce the intellectual property right against infringers. The allegation may be that the intellectual property right is so essential to competition that it must be licensed across the board, or that a refusal to license it to one particular party was discriminatory, or that …


Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese Jan 2005

Monopolization, Exclusion, And The Theory Of The Firm, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese Jan 2005

Market Failure And Non-Standard Contracting: How The Ghost Of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, Alan J. Meese

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Towards A Differentiated Products Theory Of Copyright, Christopher S. Yoo Jan 2005

Towards A Differentiated Products Theory Of Copyright, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

The well-known “access-incentives” tradeoff that lies at the heart of the standard economic analysis of copyright follows largely from the assumption that copyright turns authors into monopolists. If one instead analyzes copyright through a framework that allows for product differentiation and entry, the access-incentives tradeoff becomes less significant. By increasing producer appropriability and profit, increased copyright protection can stimulate entry of competitors producing similar works, which in turn results in lower prices, increased product variety, and increased access. This approach would also broaden set of available policy instruments, although disentangling the effects of one from another can be quite complicated.