Jurisprudence Commons^™

Splitting The Statute: Severability As A Canon Of Construction Or Constitutional Concern?, Amy L. Moore

Catholic University Law Review

Severability doctrine stands at the crossroads of statutory interpretation and constitutional structure. This Article traces how the Supreme Court has struggled to define whether severability is merely an interpretive presumption designed to preserve as much of Congress’ work as possible, or a constitutional limit on judicial power that forbids courts from reconstructing statutes Congress never enacted. Beginning with Marbury v. Madison and running through cases like Alaska Airlines, Booker, Ayotte, Seila Law, and Loper Bright, this Article charts the Court’s shifting rationales from legislative intent and functional operability to structural separation-of-powers concerns. It distinguishes between …

Rethinking Judicial Power & Remedial Restraint, Caprice L. Roberts

Catholic University Law Review

This Article maintains that groundbreaking Supreme Court cases reshaping judicial power and restraint are frequently remedies centric. The much- anticipated ruling in Trump v. CASA illustrates this correlation. Interpreting traditional equity, the Supreme Court circumscribed federal judicial power to issue universal relief. The Court relied on Marbury v. Madison to bolster its reasoning on the limits of judicial power. Ironically, both cases denied any remedy while enhancing the potential for future judicial power. Whether via judicial review and supremacy power or the Court’s future ability to now be the only federal court able to issue universal remedies—the Court’s role in …

Disregarding Severability, Kevin C. Walsh

Catholic University Law Review

The infirmities of severability doctrine have elicited increased attention at the Supreme Court. In his application of severability doctrine for a five-Justice majority in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., Chief Justice Roberts began to reformulate the doctrine in a way that can free the Court from the misleading mental imagery conjured by the conception of courts as “severing” provisions from a statute. Roberts's reformulation more properly depicts the relevant judicial activity to be judicial disregard of statutory rules to avoid unconstitutional applications of law rather than judicial severance of textual provisions to fix a problem that inheres in the …

Defining Deference: Impacts Of Abandoning Chevron On Emerging Technology Governance And Administrative Law, R. Aubrey Davis Iii

Seattle University Law Review

Emerging technologies, particularly Artificial Intelligence (AI), often lead to unforeseen legal outcomes. Notable abuses in areas such as facial recognition, employment bias, and housing discrimination are well known. However, legislative responses to these issues either have been largely reactive or there has been no legislative response at all. In lieu of legislation, agencies have sought to fill the gap. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently proposed a rule mandating voter notification for all AI-generated political phone calls citing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991 as authority. However, the TCPA was originally passed to curtail telemarketing, not …

Constraining The Executive Branch: Delegation, Agency Independence, And Congressional Design Of Judicial Review, Jennifer L. Selin, Pamela J. Clouser Mccann

Northwestern University Law Review

While scholarship examining the relationship between Congress, federal agencies, and the judiciary reveals variation in the statutory details that affects administrative and judicial decision-making, few studies explore the extent to which congressional delegation decisions balance both the substantive and procedural independence of agencies against the possibility of the federal judiciary’s review of administrative action.

This Article enhances scholarly understanding of delegation by providing a qualitative, theoretical, and empirical account of the circumstances under which Congress manipulates federal agency exposure to the federal judiciary. Ironically, combined with statutory provisions dictating agency independence, increasing an agency’s exposure to unelected federal judges can …

The Great Unsettling: Administrative Governance After Loper Bright, Cary Coglianese, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

“Chevron is overruled.” These three words surely captured more attention than any others in the U.S. Supreme Court’s thirty-five-page opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. For forty years, the Chevron doctrine had been virtually synonymous with administrative law. Now that the Court has taken a step that many scholars thought unfathomable even just a few years ago, speculation abounds about the possible downstream impacts of Loper Bright on both what agencies will be able to do in the future and how lower courts will respond when reviewing agency action. The vast majority of early expert commentaries suggest …

Mutual Recognitions Across Generations, Steven L. Winter Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor Of Constitutional Law

Law Faculty Research Publications

“Sovereignty,” Arendt says, “is contradictory to” the human condition. It is not, in any event, the kind of thing that can be shared across generations. Subsequent generations lack sovereignty to the precise degree that they are bound by the decisions of their predecessors. It is no answer to say that contemporary citizens participate in the sovereignty of a whole, transgenerational people. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, later generations are not free because they are not entirely equal, and they are not equal because they are not entirely free.

Where “sovereignty” is a metaphysical concept that transcends time, recognition is an act …

Arbitrary And Capricious X Artificial Intelligence, Zoe Niesel

Faculty Articles

The "arbitrary and capricious" review standard has been interpreted to govern the judicial review of agency factual findings that are produced through informal rulemaking or informal adjudication. In contrast, agency factual findings that are produced through formal rulemaking or adjudication will be reviewed under the Administrative Procedure Act, Section 706(2)(E), which states that such findings can be set aside if they are "unsupported by substantial evidence." While the standards technically vary-factual findings that are the product of informal procedures will warrant arbitrary and capricious review, while factual findings that are the product of formal procedures will warrant substantial evidence review …

Following The Science: Judicial Review Of Climate Science, Maxine Sugarman

Washington Law Review

Climate change is the greatest existential crisis of our time. Yet, to date, Congress has failed to enact the broad-sweeping policies required to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at the rate scientists have deemed necessary to avoid devastating consequences for our planet and all those who inhabit it. In the absence of comprehensive legislative action to solve the climate crisis, the executive branch has become more creative in the use of its authorities under bedrock environmental statutes to develop new climate regulations. Environmental advocates, states, and industry groups that oppose such regulations or assert that agencies could accomplish more under existing …

The Roberts Court’S Anti-Democracy Jurisprudence And The Reemergence Of State Authoritarian Enclaves, Reginald Oh

Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity

This Essay argues that the Roberts Court has been a pivotal institutional player in destabilizing constitutional democracy. It has enabled states to freely pursue agendas that are authoritarian in nature. And because authoritarianism is contrary to core principles of the Constitution, the Roberts Court’s constitutional jurisprudence has no basis in the Constitution and must ultimately be rejected.

Instead of taking steps to block authoritarian legislation and promote a fair and open political process, the Court has issued rulings catalyzing and reinforcing the authoritarian impulses of the former Jim Crow states. The Roberts Court has engaged in judicial review reinforcing authoritarianism, …

Zombie Laws, Howard M. Wasserman

Lewis & Clark Law Review

A judicial declaration of constitutional invalidity does not erase a challenged law. Such a law is “dead” in that enforcement efforts will not succeed in court, where judicial precedent binds and dictates the outcome in future litigation. But such a law is “alive” in that it remains on the books and may be enforced by a departmentalist executive acting on an independent constitutional judgment. Judge Gregg Costa has labeled these statutory remainders “zombie laws.”

This Article describes several principles that define constitutional litigation, how those principles produce zombie laws, and the scope and nature of zombie laws. It then describes …

The Global Rise Of Judicial Review Since 1945, Steven G. Calabresi

Catholic University Law Review

This article expands upon the theory put forth in Professor Bruce Ackerman’s book, Revolutionary Constitutions: Charismatic Leadership and the Rule of Law, in which he posits that twentieth century revolutions in a variety of countries led to the constitutionalization of charisma, thus binding countries to the written constitutions established by their revolutionary leaders.

Constitutional law scholar, Steven G. Calabresi, argues here that world constitutionalism, in fact, existed prior to 1945, and what is especially striking about the post-1945 experience is that the constitutionalism of charisma included not only the adoption of written constitutions, but also the adoption of meaningful …

The Constitution And Democracy In Troubled Times, John M. Greabe

Law Faculty Scholarship

Does textualism and originalism approach positively impact democracy?

Supreme Court Journalism: From Law To Spectacle?, Barry Sullivan, Cristina Carmody Tilley

Faculty Publications

Few people outside certain specialized sectors of the press and the legal profession have any particular reason to read the increasingly voluminous opinions through which the Justices of the Supreme Court explain their interpretations of the Constitution and laws. Most of what the public knows about the Supreme Court necessarily comes from the press. That fact raises questions of considerable importance to the functioning of our constitutional democracy: How, for example, does the press describe the work of the Supreme Court? And has the way in which the press describes the work of the Court changed over the past several …

Coronavirus, Civil Libertities, And The Courts: The Case Against Suspending Judicial Review, Lindsay Wiley

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

Introduction: For obvious reasons, local and state orders designed to help “flatten the curve” of novel coronavirus infections (and conserve health care capacity to treat coronavirus disease) have provoked a series of constitutional objections — and a growing number of lawsuits attempting to have those orders modified or overturned. Like the coronavirus crisis itself, much of that litigation remains ongoing as we write this Essay. But even in these early days, the emerging body of case law has rather elegantly teed up what we have previously described as “the central (and long-running) normative debate over emergency powers: Should constitutional constraints …

Beyond Samuel Moyn's Countermajoritarian Difficulty As A Model Of Global Judicial Review, James T. Gathii

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law

This Article responds to Samuel Moyn's critique of judicial review and his endorsement of judicial modesty as an alternative. By invoking the countermajoritarian difficulty, Moyn argues that judicial overreach has become an unwelcome global phenomenon that should be reexamined and curbed. I reject Moyn's claim that this kind of judicial modesty should define the role of courts for all time. By applying the countermajoritarian difficulty beyond its United States origins, Moyn assumes it is an unproblematic baseline against which to measure the role of courts globally. Moyn's vision says nothing about when it would be appropriate for courts to rule …

The Well-Intentioned Purpose But Weak Epistemological Foundation Of Originalism, George C. Christie

Faculty Scholarship

The attraction of an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation is understandable. It is maintained that only that method can provide the judicial objectivity and certainty that constitutional adjudication requires. They claim that the traditional common-law evolutionary approach leads Supreme Court Justices to succumb to the temptation to fill in gaps in constitutional law and thereby ignore that major expansions in constitutional meaning and should be made in the way the Founders envisioned, namely by amendment of the Constitution. However difficult or impractical that process may be, it is the only way to avoid the politicization of the Court. Whether that …

Bans, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

In the universe of legal restrictions subject to judicial review, those characterized as fully denying some aspect of a constitutional right—bans—are often subject to per se rules of invalidity. Whether the subject of the restriction is a medium of expression, the valuable use of property, or a class of weapons, courts in such cases will often short-circuit the standard doctrinal machinery and strike down the law, even if it might have survived heightened scrutiny. Identifying laws as bans can thus provide an end run around the tiers of scrutiny and other familiar forms of means-ends analysis.

And yet it is …

Of Judicial Review, High Standards And Edward S. Godfrey, David P. Cluchey

Maine Law Review

At the end of 1994 Dean Edward S. Godfrey III stepped down from his teaching position as Professor Emeritus of the University of Maine School of Law. In honor of his service to Maine’s only law school, to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, to the Maine Bar, and to the people of the State of Maine, the Board and Staff dedicate Volume 47 of the Maine Law Review to Dean Edward Godfrey. Reviews by Maine Law School faculty members of Dean Godfrey’s Law Court decisions in several areas of the law follow.

Chevron In The Circuit Courts, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Scholarly Works

This Article presents findings from the most comprehensive empirical study to date on how the federal courts of appeals have applied Chevron deference—the doctrine under which courts defer to a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it administers. Based on 1,558 agency interpretations the circuit courts reviewed from 2003 through 2013 (where they cited Chevron), we found that the circuit courts overall upheld 71% of interpretations and applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. But there was nearly a twenty-five-percentage-point difference in agency-win rates when the circuit courts applied Chevron deference than when they did not. Among …

From Parliamentary To Judicial Supremacy: Reflections In Honour Of The Constitutionalism Of Justice Moseneke, Peter G. Danchin

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Core Of An Unqualified Case For Judicial Review: A Reply To Jeremy Waldron And Contemporary Critics, Alexander Kaufman, Michael B. Runnels

Brooklyn Law Review

No abstract provided.

An Empirical Study Of Implicit Takings., James E. Krier, Stewart E. Sterk

Articles

Takings scholarship has long focused on the niceties of Supreme Court doctrine, while ignoring the operation of takings law "on the ground" in the state and lower federal courts, which together decide the vast bulk of all takings cases. This study, based primarily on an empirical analysis of more than 2000 reported decisions ovcr the period 1979 through 2012, attempts to fill that void. This study establishes that the Supreme Court's categorical rules govern almost no state takings cases, and that takings claims based on government regulation almost invariably fail. By contrast, when takings claims arise out of government action …

Thin Rationality Review, Jacob Gersen, Adrian Vermeule

Michigan Law Review

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent, it simply rests on an …

A Look Back: Developing Indiana Law; Post-Bench Reflections Of An Indiana Supreme Court Justice; Selected Developments In Indiana Administrative Law (1989-2012), Frank Sullivan Jr.

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

What's A Lower Court To Do? Limiting Lawrence V. Texas And The Right To Sexual Autonomy, John Tuskey

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review And The Challenge Of Partisan Polarization, Terri Peretti

Utah Law Review

This Article recommends abandoning the democracy-assisting idea and instead exploring ways to prevent the Court from being enlisted in extreme and unrepresentative causes. Reform ideas should focus on increasing and regularizing turnover on the Court and encouraging the selection of more representative Justices, an outcome made more likely by increasing the representativeness of the elected officials who choose the Justices. Absent a crisis, of course, it is highly unlikely that any such reforms will be adopted. Nonetheless, it is a worthwhile exercise to think about how to enhance representational and consensus-building processes in the presence of growing partisan polarization. And …

The Puzzling Presumption Of Reviewability, Nicholas Bagley

Articles

The presumption in favor of judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of administrative law, accepted by courts and commentators alike as both legally appropriate and obviously desirable. Yet the presumption is puzzling. As with any canon of statutory construction that serves a substantive end, it should find a source in history, positive law, the Constitution, or sound policy considerations. None of these, however, offers a plausible justification for the presumption. As for history, the sort of judicial review that the presumption favors - appellate-style arbitrariness review - was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but …

Fernandez-Vargas V. Gonzales: An Examination Of Retroactivity And The Effect Of The Illegal Immigration Reform And Immigrant Responsibility Act, Brooke Hardin

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

The Supreme Court's Take On Immigration In Nken V. Holder: Reaffirming A Traditional Standard That Affords Courts More Time And Flexibility To Decide Immigration Appeals Before Deporting Aliens, Elizaveta Kabanova

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.