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Articles 241 - 256 of 256
Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Their Futures, So Full Of Dread: How Barefoot's Contamination Of The Death Penalty Trial Process Continues, Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon, Maren Geiger, Moana Houde-Camirand
Their Futures, So Full Of Dread: How Barefoot's Contamination Of The Death Penalty Trial Process Continues, Michael L. Perlin, Talia Roitberg Harmon, Maren Geiger, Moana Houde-Camirand
Articles & Chapters
Forty years ago, in its most roundly-criticized criminal procedure decision in modern history, the Supreme Court, in Barefoot v. Estelle (463 U.S. 880 (1983)), a decision premised on testimony by the responses to a hypothetical of a witness who had never directly evaluated the defendant, ruled that such testimony as to future dangerousness – testimony that had concluded there was a “100% chance” the defendant would commit more crimes if released into society -- was permissible. Over a stinging dissent by Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court had ruled in Barefoot that it was not constitutional error for psychiatrists to testify …
Court Review: Journal Of The American Judges Association, Vol. 60, No. 2, Eve M. Brank, David Dreyer, David Prince
Court Review: Journal Of The American Judges Association, Vol. 60, No. 2, Eve M. Brank, David Dreyer, David Prince
Court Review: Journal of the American Judges Association
Anniversary Year Brings a Look at Our Past, Court Review Editors
Judicial Independence, John Owens
Remarks on Judicial Independence by Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Anniversary Reprint), John Owens
So You’re Going to Be a Judge, Cynthia Gray
Religion’s Role in Judicial Decision-Making: an Update (Anniversary Reprint), Tiffany M. Williams, Alaina L. Warrior, Logan A. Yelderman, Monica K. Miller, and Brian H. Bornstein
Does A Judge’s Religion Influence Decision Making? Brian H. Bornstein and Monica K. Miller
How to Make Better Decisions, John F. Edwards
Editor’s Note, David Prince
President’s Column, Catherine Carlson
The Law of Sniffer-Dog Searches in Canada [Thoughts from …
Blunt Speech Rights, Nicholas Almendares
Blunt Speech Rights, Nicholas Almendares
Articles by Maurer Faculty
There is a lot to be said about the Supreme Court’s decision in 303 Creative LLC. In the wake of the decision there will be a range of commentaries like those presented in this Issue. I want to draw attention to a particular aspect of the opinion, part of a broader trend in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, towards blunt, sweeping rules. By a blunt rule, I mean a simple, coarse one that lacks nuance or distinctions. Blunt rules, by their nature, tend to be sweeping: nuance, that is, distinguishing cases based on various factors, limits the scope of a …
Interpretive Divergence In The New York Court Of Appeals, Ethan J. Leib
Interpretive Divergence In The New York Court Of Appeals, Ethan J. Leib
Faculty Scholarship
This Article focuses attention on the New York Court of Appeals, which is decidedly formalist about contract interpretation but decidedly contextualist about statutory interpretation. It explores some recent exemplary cases to show where the New York Court of Appeals tends to land in what turns out to be, for this court at least, two different battlefields in the law of interpretation. Finding that there is “interpretive divergence” between statutory and contract cases, the Article then reflects on the practice of divergence more generally, revisiting assumptions about why anyone might have thought harmonization was sensible in the first place.
Interpreting Religious Doctrine: The Third Rail That Wags The Dog In Religion Clause Jurisprudence, Samuel J. Levine
Interpreting Religious Doctrine: The Third Rail That Wags The Dog In Religion Clause Jurisprudence, Samuel J. Levine
Scholarly Works
This Article is part of a broader project exploring and assessing the United States Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to interpreting religious doctrine. The mixed metaphor that constitutes the title of this Article incorporates various aspects of the project’s interrelated themes and claims. First, as a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court has repeatedly and increasingly refused to adjudicate issues that require the interpretation, evaluation, and resolution of substantive areas of religious practice and belief. Thus, like the third rail of train tracks, interpreting religious doctrine is deemed off-limits and better left untouched. Indeed, the Court’s justifications for the hands-off approach rely …
The Crime Of Aggression: Its Nature, The Leadership Clause, And The Paradox Of Immunity, David Luban
The Crime Of Aggression: Its Nature, The Leadership Clause, And The Paradox Of Immunity, David Luban
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The paper, written for a research handbook, critically surveys some fundamental philosophical, historical, and doctrinal issues in the crime of aggression. The two introductory sections set the theoretical issues in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and explain the origins of criminalizing aggression under the heading of “crimes against peace.” Section 3 explores an ambiguity between aggression as first use of force and aggression as unprovoked use of force, while section 4 discusses the doctrinal distinction between acts of aggression and wars of aggression.
Sections 5 and 6 turn to the theory of aggression. Section 5 examines modern versus …
Fears, Faith, And Facts In Environmental Law, William W. Buzbee
Fears, Faith, And Facts In Environmental Law, William W. Buzbee
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Environmental law has long been shaped by both the particular nature of environmental harms and by the actors and institutions that cause such harms or can address them. This nation’s environmental statutes remain far from perfect, and a comprehensive law tailored to the challenges of climate change is still elusive. Nonetheless, America’s environmental laws provide lofty, express protective purposes and findings about reasons for their enactment. They also clearly state health and environmental goals, provide tailored criteria for action, and utilize procedures and diverse regulatory tools that reflect nuanced choices.
But the news is far from good. Despite the ambitious …
Brown Now: The Surprising Possibility Of Progressive Reform, Louis Michael Seidman
Brown Now: The Surprising Possibility Of Progressive Reform, Louis Michael Seidman
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
For four decades, the Supreme Court has engaged in a determined, systematic and successful effort to transform and tame Brown v. Board of Education. But in this article, written for a symposium on Brown at 70, I suggest a surprising counterweight to the standard narrative. If one takes modern doctrine seriously -- a big if, I concede-- it has the potential to support some progressive goals.
In particular, modern doctrine might provide progressives answers to three questions:
- Are race-conscious but facially neutral means of increasing diversity at state institutions of higher education constitutional?
- Are legacy admissions to state run institutions …
The (Still) Unexplored Possibilities Of A Poetics Of Law, Naomi Mezey
The (Still) Unexplored Possibilities Of A Poetics Of Law, Naomi Mezey
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this contribution to the symposium celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of James Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination, I have accepted White’s invitation in the last chapter of his magisterial book to think about poems and judicial opinions as compatible acts of imagination and meaning making. White asks brilliant questions, and his book is full of them, each a nugget of insight and also a prod that asks the reader to think harder, think deeper, revisit her first thoughts, to perhaps change her mind, and above all, with guidance, to educate herself. In this chapter of the book, White is …
Loper Bright In A Larger Interpretive Perspective: Is This Justice Scalia’S Court Anymore?, Victoria Frances Nourse
Loper Bright In A Larger Interpretive Perspective: Is This Justice Scalia’S Court Anymore?, Victoria Frances Nourse
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo has left administrative lawyers agog: Could the Supreme Court really reverse the “goliath” known as Chevron deference? For those who study the Court’s interpretive landscape more broadly, however, Chevron reversal may not be as unexpected as administrative lawyers believe. This Article will look at Loper Bright by linking three notable interpretive developments: the major questions doctrine, Chevron skepticism, and strict constructions of statutory text. These developments share the same risk: the Court is imposing a new “clarity tax” on both Congress and administrative agencies. Having said this, others’ grave worries about changes in Chevron are …
The Catholic Modernity Of Pope Benedict Xvi: Healthy Secularity And Christian Jurisprudence, Zachary R. Calo
The Catholic Modernity Of Pope Benedict Xvi: Healthy Secularity And Christian Jurisprudence, Zachary R. Calo
Scholarly Works
This article examines the concept of healthy secularity in the thought of Pope Benedict XVI. In developing the idea of healthy secularity, Benedict builds upon longstanding themes in Catholic social thought while also provoking a deeper engagement with western modernity. Rather than placing Christianity and the secular in an oppositional framework, Benedict positions Christianity as the foundation of an authentic secular order. In so doing, he opens up new modes of critical engagement with western legal and political thought. Yet, while the concept offers a creative theological method for addressing contemporary issues, it depends for its realisation on vanishing cultural …
Originalism And Historical Fact-Finding, Joseph Blocher, Brandon L. Garrett
Originalism And Historical Fact-Finding, Joseph Blocher, Brandon L. Garrett
Faculty Scholarship
Historical facts are more central to constitutional litigation than ever before, given the Supreme Court’s increasing reliance on originalism and other modes of interpretation that invoke historical practice and tradition. This raises a central tension. The case for originalism has rested largely on the idea that it is simultaneously fact-bound and a theory of adjudication capable of resolving questions of constitutional law. In practice, however, the historical facts central to originalism typically are not litigated in accordance with standard practices for fact-finding: introduction at trial, expert testimony, adversarial testing, deference on appeal, and so on.
In the absence of the …
Taking Liberties: The Supreme Court’S New Hierarchy Of Rights And Its Victims, Richard B. Katskee
Taking Liberties: The Supreme Court’S New Hierarchy Of Rights And Its Victims, Richard B. Katskee
Faculty Scholarship
The legitimacy of our unelected Supreme Court comes from the nature and structural limitations on judicial power. Courts do not make policy in the abstract. Rather, Article III requires federal judges to decide only real, live disputes, on the facts before them. Stare decisis then prevents the courts from changing legal rules willy-nilly. The big, important changes come instead through collective decision-making by our elected representatives. When courts do break from stare decisis, it is normally to expand protections for the politically disempowered. Those protections then make legislatures more representative and act as brakes on abuses of minorities by an …
Why Equity Follows The Law, Adam J. Macleod
Why Equity Follows The Law, Adam J. Macleod
Faculty Articles
Renewed attention to equity in higher education is welcome because true equity helps us to reason together well. When administered correctly, the jurisprudence of equity models civil discourse and, therefore, can teach us how to carry out civic engagement reasonably. Equitable interpretation of the law teaches us how to understand each other charitably. And equity’s deference to law teaches us how to reason well together about our practical problems. Law is the practical reasoning that we do together. Equity serves the ends of justice by serving law, rather than undermining it. These functions of equity in adjudication point toward a …
Reasons For Interpretation, Francisco J. Urbina
Reasons For Interpretation, Francisco J. Urbina
Journal Articles
What kinds of reasons should matter in choosing an approach to constitutional or legal interpretation? Scholars offer different types of reasons for their theories of interpretation: conceptual, linguistic, normative, legal, institutional, and reasons based on theories of law. This Article argues that normative reasons, and only normative reasons, can justify interpretive choice. This is the "normative choice thesis." This Article formulates the normative choice thesis and offers a systematic analysis of the different kinds of reasons usually canvassed to defend theories of interpretation, showing why each type of non-normative reason cannot justify interpretive choice. In doing this, this Article also …
St. John Henry Newman's Development Of Doctrine And Law: Some Preliminary Notes And Questions, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
St. John Henry Newman's Development Of Doctrine And Law: Some Preliminary Notes And Questions, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Journal Articles
This essay, presented at a conference at the Catholic University of America's Columbus School of Law, considers how Newman's theory of development of church doctrine can illuminate the development of human law. The argument, which focuses primarily on constitutional law and tradition, identifies promising parallels but also offers cautionary notes about straightforward analogies between the two bodies of doctrine.