Jurisprudence Commons^™

Teaching The Lochner Era, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

This article, prepared for the St. Louis University Law Journal's issue on “Teaching the Fourteenth Amendment,” develops a taxonomy of the Supreme Court's economic substantive due process jurisprudence during the so-called “Lochner Era” of the late-19th and early-20th centuries, and offers an assessment of the trajectory and mechanisms of the decline of that body of doctrine.

The Limits Of Natural Law Originalism, Mikolaj Barczentewicz

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In Enduring Originalism, Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin C. Walsh outline how originalism in constitutional interpretation can be grounded in modern natural law theory as developed by John Finnis. Their argument to that effect is powerful and constitutes a welcome addition both to natural law theory and to originalist theory. However, the authors chose to present their account as a superior alternative to, or modification of, the “positive” (“original law”) originalism of Stephen Sachs and William Baude. It is that aspect of the paper that I focus on in this short Essay. Contrary to their strong claims in that direction, …

Chevron Step Two's Domain, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker

Notre Dame Law Review

An increasing number of judges, policymakers, and scholars have advocated eliminating or narrowing Chevron deference—a two-step inquiry under which courts defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes the agencies administer. Much of the debate centers on either Chevron’s domain (i.e., when Chevron should apply at all) or how courts ascertain statutory ambiguity at Chevron’s first step. Largely lost in this debate on constraining agency discretion is the role of Chevron’s second step: whether the agency’s resolution of a statutory ambiguity is reasonable. Drawing on the most comprehensive study of Chevron in the circuit courts, this …

Originalism, Cass R. Sunstein

Notre Dame Law Review

Originalism might be defended on two very different grounds. The first is that it is in some sense mandatory—for example, that it follows from the very idea of interpretation, from having a written Constitution, or from the only legitimate justifications for judicial review. The second is that originalism is best on broadly consequentialist grounds. While the first kind of defense is not convincing, the second cannot be ruled off limits. In an imaginable world, it is right; in our world, it is usually not. But in the context of impeachment, originalism is indeed best, because there are no sufficiently helpful …

Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional Implications Of A Neglected History, Randy Beck

Notre Dame Law Review

The Supreme Court concluded twenty-five years ago, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, that uninjured private plaintiffs may not litigate “generalized grievances” about the legality of executive branch conduct. According to the Lujan Court, Congress lacked power to authorize suit by a plaintiff who could not establish some “particularized” injury from the challenged conduct. The Court believed litigation to require executive branch legal compliance, brought by an uninjured private party, is not a “case” or “controversy” within the Article III judicial power and impermissibly reassigns the President’s Article II responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” …

The Canon Of Rational Basis Review, Katie R. Eyer

Notre Dame Law Review

The modern constitutional law canon fundamentally misdescribes rational basis review. Through a series of errors—of omission, simplification, and recharacterization—we have largely erased a robust history of the use of rational basis review by social movements to generate constitutional change. Instead, the story the canon tells is one of dismal prospects for challengers of government action—in which rational basis review is an empty, almost meaningless form of review.

This Article suggests that far from the weak and ineffectual mechanism that most contemporary accounts suggest, rational basis review has, in the modern era, served as one of the primary equal protection entry …

Irreconcilable Differences? Whole Woman’S Health, Gonzales, And Justice Kennedy’S Vision Of American Abortion Jurisprudence, O. Carter Snead, Laura Wolk

Journal Articles

A law is unconstitutional if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."' Twenty-five years have elapsed since a plurality of the Supreme Court articulated this undue burden standard in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, yet its contours remain elusive. Notably, two current members of the Court-Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy-seem to fundamentally differ in their understanding of what Casey requires and permits. In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy emphasized a wide range of permissible state interests implicated by abortion and indicated …

The Force Of Law, Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

SCHAUER, Frederick. The Force of Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015. xiv + 239 pp. Cloth, $35.00.

So long as our task is, Schauer writes, "the pursuit of law's essential properties in all possible legal systems in all possible worlds, there would be little point in being concerned with force, sanctions, coercion." But perhaps there is another, equally important, task to perform. Schauer writes that one could view his book as an "attempt [] to account for what seems to be an obviously important fact about the world: law is commonly and valuably coercive." Indeed, "[i]t has long …

A New Deal Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored By Justice Robert Jackson, Charles Patrick Thomas

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

The Case Against Oral Argument: The Effects Of Confirmation Bias On The Outcome Of Selected Cases In The Seventh Circuit Court Of Appeals, Christine M. Venter

Journal Articles

Scholars have long been divided over the role, function, and significance, if any, of oral argument in judicial decision-making.' Federal courts seem similarly divided, as some circuits routinely grant oral argument in almost every case, while others grant oral argument in only a small fraction of appeals. This divide should not be dismissed as merely an idiosyncratic debate or as a response to excessive workload, particularly when one considers that approximately 53,000 appeals were filed in federal courts of appeals in the year ending September 30, 2016.2 Since the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only approximately eighty cases each year, …

Dead Precedents, Riley T. Svikhart

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Part I explores the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents more thoroughly. Part II provides a modest account for this phenomenon. Section II.A considers the relationship between the Roberts Court’s reluctance to overrule Supreme Court precedents and its law declaration bent. Section II.B evaluates this reluctance in light of the doctrinal commitment of stare decisis. Finally, Section II.C examines the link between the Roberts Court’s treatment of dying precedents and its trademark adherence to the constitutional avoidance doctrine.

Interview With Christoph Möllers: On The Possibilities And Afacticity Of Norms, Christoph Moellers

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

Christoph Möllers, Professor of Public Law and Jurisprudence at the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, discussed his recent book, The Possibility of Norms, and related concepts of jurisprudence on June 16, 2016 with Alex Holznienkemper, Ph.D. of Baylor University. The following is an edited transcript of their interview as translated by Dr. Holznienkemper.

The Exceptional Role Of Courts In The Constitutional Order, N.W. Barber, Adrian Vermeule

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article looks at a rare part of the judicial role: those exceptional cases when the judge is called upon to pass judgment on the constitution itself. This arises in three groups of cases, roughly speaking. First, in exceptional cases the validity of the constitution and the legal order is thrown into dispute. Second, on some occasions the judge is asked to rule on the transition from one constitutional order to another. Third, there are some cases in which the health of the constitutional order requires the judge to act not merely beyond the law, as it were, but actually …

Dynamic Regulatory Constitutionalism: Taking Legislation Seriously In The Judicial Enforcement Of Economic And Social Rights, Richard Stacey

Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy

The international human rights revolution in the decades after the Second World War recognized economic and social rights alongside civil and political rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966, regional treaties, and subject-specific treaties variously describe rights to food, shelter, health, and education, and set out state obligations for the treatment of children. When they first appeared, these international, economic, and social rights instruments raised questions about whether economic and social rights are justiciable in domestic legal contexts and whether they can be meaningfully enforced by courts …

Truth And Politics: A Symposium On Peter Simpson's Political Illiberalism: A Defense Of Freedom., Gerard V. Bradley

Journal Articles

There is no more important question in thinking about life-and actually living-in political community than whether it is to be permeated by, and purposefully oriented around, the main truths about human flourishing. It is at least paradoxical that, precisely when the state and its law and political life are shaping people's lives more and more, the professed roots of all this influence are growing thinner, more shallow. Lawmakers who profess and in many cases even think they should be "neutral" about values are more involved with how persons' lives go than, perhaps, ever before.

Of course, any community which has …

Neoclassical Administrative Common Law, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay reviews John Dickinson’s neglected classic, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States. Writing on the cusp of the New Deal, Dickinson helped establish a mainstream, moderate stance about the shape and legitimacy of the administrative state. A closer reading of this work, which is rich in jurisprudential reflection and historical learning, offers a better idea about the structure, promise, and limits of the doctrinal world he helped create.

The Unconscionable War On Moral Conscience, Michael Stokes Paulsen

Notre Dame Law Review

My thesis in this review builds on and is inspired in part by George’s book: Where, or to the extent that, a conflict between conscience and authority reduces to a pure stand on principle by each side—sincere conscience for its sake versus authority for its—in a free society conscience should almost always win. The only time that claims of government authority should triumph over genuine claims of religious conscience is when religiously motivated conduct would produce essentially intolerable harm to others—harm of a kind and degree that would lead one to conclude (in effect, not literally) that it is inconceivable …

Inside The Taft Court: Lessons From The Docket Books, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

For many years, the docket books kept by certain of the Taft Court Justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Though the existence of these docket books had been brought to the attention of the scholarly community, access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a review of all of the Taft Court docket books held by the Office of the Curator, which are the only …

Realising The Promise Of Costs Budgets: An Economic Analysis, Jay Tidmarsh

Journal Articles

The costs-budget system implemented in the Jackson reforms promises to keep litigation costs within socially appropriate bounds. To realise this promise fully however; the goal of this reform must be reoriented. Using real-options analysis, this article demonstrates that costs budgeting in its present form often fails to achieve a reduction of litigation costs to the socially appropriate level–defined to be the point at which the social benefits of litigation exceeds its costs–because parties may have a private incentive to invest socially excessive amounts on litigation. This result is true under both the English ("loser pays") and the American ("bear your …

Judicial Candor And Extralegal Reasoning: Why Extralegal Reasons Require Legal Justifications (And No More), Eric Dean Hageman

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note’s first Part explores two landmark Supreme Court cases, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and NFIB, that may have been decided based on extralegal considerations. Part II describes three prominent theories of judicial candor with an eye to the results they might yield with respect to extralegal reasoning. Part III offers and defends a new, partial theory of judicial candor. This theory is that a judge who employs extralegal reasoning should omit discussion of her reliance on that reasoning and justify her decision with legal reasoning.

The first two Parts will demonstrate that there is a …

Assessing The Role Of History In The Federal Courts Canon: A Word Of Caution, Amanda L. Tyler

Notre Dame Law Review

In undertaking historical inquiry in the field of federal courts, one must be careful about assigning certain data points from the Founding period determinative weight, rather than treating them as part of a larger conversation about the role of the judicial power in our constitutional framework. This is because in studying the early years following ratification of the Constitution, one tends to find both examples of major principles that remained the subject of disagreement as well as examples of early legislation and practices that today we would reject as plainly inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers. In support of …

Stare Decisis In The Second-Best World, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

If judges disagree about the proper interpretation of the law, can they find common ground in the treatment of precedent? The doctrine of stare decisis weighs the value of legal continuity against the value of legal accuracy. But that analysis is complicated by pervasive disputes over the implications of legal error. Likewise, the scope of a precedent's impact in future cases depends on underlying assumptions about the ends and means of legal interpretation. When those assumptions vary among judges, so too will applications of stare decisis. For stare decisis to promote the continuity and impersonality of law, it requires an …

The Place Of Force In General Jurisprudence, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Journal Articles

This essay reviews Frederick Schauer’s book, The Force of Law (2015). Schauer argues that coercion is central to legal practice and should be no less important in legal theory. In doing so, Schauer presents formidable challenges to standard versions of legal positivism—and does so from within the positivist framework. Much of Schauer’s criticism on that score is sound. His analysis of the role coercion can play in accomplishing law’s moral tasks is also welcome and important. Nevertheless, Schauer’s jurisprudential framework comes up short in its inability to distinguish law from other social practices that also use force. The Force of …

A Judicial Cure For The Disease Of Overcriminalization, Stephen F. Smith

Journal Articles

The dangers of “overcriminalization” are widely appreciated across the political spectrum, but confusion remains as to its cause. Standard critiques fault legislatures alone. The problem, however, is not simply that too many criminal laws are on the books, but that they are poorly defined in ways that give unwarranted sweep to the criminal law, raising the danger of punishment absent or in excess of moral blameworthiness. Instead of narrowing ambiguous criminal laws to more appropriate bounds, courts frequently expand them, even when this ratchets up the punishment that offenders face, and fail to insist on proof of sufficiently culpable states …

The Jurisprudence Of The Hughes Court: The Recent Literature, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

The balance of this Article is devoted, after a fashion, to an exploration of the extent to which the recent literature on the Hughes Court seeks to incorporate the internal point of view. In Part I, I seek to identify the historiographical premises undergirding each author’s treatment of the subject. In Part II, I explore how those historiographical premises are reflected in each author’s treatment of the substantive development of constitutional doctrine during the period. In Part III, I examine the ways in which those historiographical premises inform each author’s analysis of the causal forces driving that doctrinal development. Part …

Communicative Content And Legal Content, Lawrence B. Solum

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay investigates a familiar set of questions about the relationship between legal texts (e.g., constitutions, statutes, opinions, orders, and contracts) and the content of the law (e.g., norms, rules, standards, doctrines, and mandates). Is the original meaning of the constitutional text binding on the Supreme Court when it develops doctrines of constitutional law? Should statutes be given their plain meaning or should judges devise statutory constructions that depart from the text to serve a purpose? What role should default rules play in the interpretation and construction of contracts? This Essay makes two moves that can help lawyers and legal …

Hierarchically Variable Deference To Agency Interpretations, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl

Notre Dame Law Review

When courts review agency action, they typically accord agency decisions a degree of deference. As many courts and commentators have recognized, the law in this area is complicated because it features numerous standards of review, including several distinct regimes for evaluating agencies’ legal interpretations. There is, however, at least one important respect in which uniformity rather than variety prevails: the applicable standards of review do not vary depending on which court is reviewing the agency. Whichever standard governs a particular case—Chevron, Skidmore, or something else—all courts in the judicial hierarchy are supposed to apply that same standard.

This Article proposes …

The Politics Of Statutory Interpretation, Margaret H. Lemos

Notre Dame Law Review

In a new book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner describe and defend the textualist methodology for which Justice Scalia is famous. For Scalia and Garner, the normative appeal of textualism lies in its objectivity: by focusing on text, context, and canons of construction, textualism offers protection against ideological judging—a way to separate law from politics. Yet, as Scalia and Garner well know, textualism is widely regarded as a politically conservative methodology. The charge of conservative bias is more common than it is concrete, but it reflects the notion that textualism narrows the …

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court's broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta.

This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent's forward-looking effect should not depend on the superficial …

Law As Fact And As Reason For Action: A Response To Robert Alexy On Law's 'Ideal Dimension', John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

Robert Alexy’s 2013 Natural Law Lecture, published in vol. 58 of the American Journal of Jurisprudence, presents law as having two dimensions, ideal and real, and thus a dual nature, to be elucidated by a conceptual analysis distinguishing between the observer’s and the participant’s perspective. It argues on this basis for a “non-positivist” theory of law that is “inclusive” in that it classifies some unjust laws as laws, but not all (and is thus not “super-inclusive”); it rejects the “exclusive non-positivism” that would treat every injustice in a law’s making or content as excluding it from the class of valid …