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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Logic And Elements. (Premises And Conclusions: Symbolic Logic For Legal Analysis)." , Richard D. Friedman Jan 1998

Logic And Elements. (Premises And Conclusions: Symbolic Logic For Legal Analysis)." , Richard D. Friedman

Articles

We may happily agree with Holmes that logic is not the life of the law' and yet contend that logic should play a significant role in legal discourse. Logic cannot demonstrate the truth of premises, and so by itself it cannot demonstrate the merits of a legal argument. Moreover, even given the premises, it may be that a leap of faith, or intuition, has an irreducible role at least in some good legal arguments.2 But at least a sound legal argument will not be an illogical one. An argument will not be persuasive if it appears to violate basic principles …


Ex Post Facto Laws: Supreme Court New York County People V. Griffin (Decided December 5, 1996 Jan 1997

Ex Post Facto Laws: Supreme Court New York County People V. Griffin (Decided December 5, 1996

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Washington Defendants' New Right Of Pre-Trial Flight, Christopher T. Igielski Jan 1996

Washington Defendants' New Right Of Pre-Trial Flight, Christopher T. Igielski

Seattle University Law Review

Certainly, it is only by disregarding the "victim's rights" that one can begin to fathom the Washington Supreme Court's decision in State v. Jackson. This decision reversed the conviction of a man who raped his four-year-old niece on Christmas Eve in 1979, causing her to contract gonorrhea. Following his arraignment, Jackson fled and failed to appear at his trial. After attempts to locate Jackson failed, a trial was held in absentia' and he was found guilty of rape, with sentencing suspended pending his return to custody. Jackson evaded the law for nearly thirteen years.'0 Shortly after his eventual capture …


Reflections On From Slaves To Citizens Bondage, Freedom And The Constitution: The New Slavery Scholarship And Its Impact On Law And Legal Historiography, Robert J. Kaczorowski Jan 1995

Reflections On From Slaves To Citizens Bondage, Freedom And The Constitution: The New Slavery Scholarship And Its Impact On Law And Legal Historiography, Robert J. Kaczorowski

Faculty Scholarship

The thesis of Professor Donald Nieman's paper, "From Slaves to Citizens: African-Americans, Rights Consciousness, and Reconstruction," is that the nation experienced a revolution in the United States Constitution and in the consciousness of African Americans. According to Professor Nieman, the Reconstruction Amendments represented "a dramatic departure from antebellum constitutional principles,"' because the Thirteenth Amendment reversed the pre-Civil War constitutional guarantee of slavery and "abolish[ed] slavery by federal authority." The Fourteenth Amendment rejected the Supreme Court's "racially-based definition of citizenship [in Dred Scott v. Sandford4], clearly establishing a color-blind citizenship” and the Fifteenth Amendment "wrote the principle of equality into the …


Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog Jan 1994

Democratic Credentials, Donald J. Herzog

Articles

We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary representatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't mean to argue that …


Natural Law Ambiguities, Robin West Jan 1993

Natural Law Ambiguities, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

I share with Fred Schauer the relatively unpopular belief that the positivist insistence that we keep separate the legal "is" from the legal "ought" is a logical prerequisite to meaningful legal criticism, and therefore, in the constitutional context, is a logical prerequisite to meaningful criticism of the Constitution. As Schauer argues, despite the modern inclination to associate positivism with conservatism, the positivist "separation thesis," properly understood, facilitates legal criticism and legal reform, not reactionary acquiescence. If we want to improve law, we must resist the urge to see it through the proverbial rose-colored glasses; we must be clear that a …


What Is A Postmodern Constitutionalism?, J. M. Balkin Jun 1992

What Is A Postmodern Constitutionalism?, J. M. Balkin

Michigan Law Review

I begin with a puzzle. It must certainly strike one as odd that the subject of postmodern constitutional law arises at a time when the actual arbiters of the Constitution - the federal judiciary and in particular the Supreme Court of the United States - appear to be more conservative than they have been for many years, and indeed, are likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Postmodernism is often associated with what is new, innovative, and on the cutting edge of cultural development. Yet if we were to define the elements of a postmodern constitutional culture, it would …


Constitutional Scepticism, Robin West Jan 1992

Constitutional Scepticism, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Interpretive constitutional debate over the last few decades has centered on two apparently linked questions: whether the Constitution can be given a determinate meaning, and whether the institution of judicial review can be justified within the basic assumptions of liberalism. Two groups of scholars have generated answers to these questions. The "constitutional faithful" argue that meaning can indeed be determinately affixed to constitutional clauses, by reference to the plain meaning of the document, the original intent of the drafters, evolving political and moral norms of the community, or the best political or moral philosophical theory available and that, because of …


Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, Robert S. Summers May 1991

Judge Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, Robert S. Summers

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Problems of Jurisprudence by Richard A. Posner


Rights, Communities, And Tradition, Brian Slattery Jan 1991

Rights, Communities, And Tradition, Brian Slattery

Articles & Book Chapters

This paper argues that there is a close connection between basic human rights and communal bonds. It criticizes the philosophical views of Alan Gewirth and Alasdair MacIntyre, which in differing ways deny this connection.


Retrieving Positivism: Law As Bibliolatry, Frederick C. Decoste May 1990

Retrieving Positivism: Law As Bibliolatry, Frederick C. Decoste

Dalhousie Law Journal

Legal positivism is a curious phenomenon in both its theoretical and sociological parts. It is curious as theory because its very existence, as theory, is often questioned, and because, even when its existence is admitted, the nature of the theory, and who does and does not qualify as an adherent most often remains in dispute. It is curious sociologically because rare is the legal theoretician who forthrightly endorses positivism: positivists, it would appear, are as scarce as the formalists among whom they used to be numbered.


Progressive And Conservative Constitutionalism, Robin West Jan 1990

Progressive And Conservative Constitutionalism, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

American constitutional law in general, and fourteenth amendment jurisprudence in particular, is in a state of profound transformation. The "liberal-legalist" and purportedly politically neutral understanding of constitutional guarantees that dominated constitutional law and theory during the fifties, sixties, and seventies, is waning, both in the courts and in the academy. What is beginning to replace liberal legalism in the academy, and what has clearly replaced it on the Supreme Court, is a very different conception - a new paradigm - of the role of constitutionalism, constitutional adjudication, and constitutional guarantees in a democratic state. Unlike the liberal-legal paradigm it is …


Critical Legal Theory And The Politics Of Pragmatism, Peter D. Swan Oct 1989

Critical Legal Theory And The Politics Of Pragmatism, Peter D. Swan

Dalhousie Law Journal

In this century mainstream legal scholarship in the United States has been subjected to various "crises of confidence" over the nature of the adjudication process. One of the key features of more traditional legal scholarship has been a belief in legal texts such as the constitution, statutes and precedents which are said to possess discrete and objective meaning capable of being discovered by objective detached observers. This belief in the authority of the text has been most clearly expressed in American constitutional law scholarship which has been dominated until recently by the quest to reveal the public moral values that …


Are Constitutional Cases Political?, Brian Slattery Jan 1989

Are Constitutional Cases Political?, Brian Slattery

Articles & Book Chapters

To argue that constitutional adjudication is political does not carry us very far unless we go on to specify what the pursuit of politics entails, the goals it seeks to attain, and the basic principles informing its practice. The word political has no clearly defined meaning in modern usage. Rather, it has the chameleon-like capacity to change colours so as to blend with a variety of different conceptual backgrounds. Of course, if we adopt an Aristotelian notion of politics as the pursuit of the common good of a community and the individual goods of its members, we can agree that …


Particularism And The Struggle For Coherence In The Common Law Literary Tradition, E. P. Krauss Jan 1989

Particularism And The Struggle For Coherence In The Common Law Literary Tradition, E. P. Krauss

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.


Law, Literature, And The Celebration Of Authority, Robin West Jan 1989

Law, Literature, And The Celebration Of Authority, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Richard Posner's new book, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, is a defense of “liberal legalism” against a group of modern critics who have only one thing in common: their use of either particular pieces of literature or literary theory to mount legal critiques. Perhaps for that reason, it is very hard to discern a unified thesis within Posner's book regarding the relationship between law and literature. In part, Posner is complaining about a pollution of literature by its use and abuse in political and legal argument; thus, the “misunderstood relation” to which the title refers. At times, Posner suggests …


Jurisprudence And Gender, Robin West Jan 1988

Jurisprudence And Gender, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings. The task has not proven to be divisive. In fact, virtually all modern American legal theorists, like most modern moral and political philosophers, either explicitly or implicitly embrace what I will call the "separation thesis" about what it means to be a human being: a "human being," whatever else he is, is physically separate from all other human beings. I am one human being and you are another, and that distinction between you and me is central to the meaning of …


The Moral Dilemma Of Positivism, Anthony D'Amato Jan 1986

The Moral Dilemma Of Positivism, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

I think there has been an advance in positivist thinking, and that advance consists of the recognition by MacCormick, a positivist, that positivism needs to be justified morally (and not just as an apparent scientific and objective fact about legal systems). But the justification that is required cannot consist in labelling "sovereignty of conscience" as a moral principle, nor in compounding the confusion by claiming that positivism minimally and hence necessarily promotes sovereignty of conscience. We need, from the positivists, a more logical and coherent argument than that. Until one comes along, I continue to believe that positivists inherently have …


Book Review Of Passion: An Essay On Personality , Richard F. Devlin Frsc Jan 1985

Book Review Of Passion: An Essay On Personality , Richard F. Devlin Frsc

Articles, Book Chapters, & Popular Press

Passion is a cogently structured, compel Jingly argued and seductively enthralling masterpiece which, in years to come, will undoubtedly stand out as an inspirational source for many who seek social transformation. Unger's style, in this essay at least, is lucid and inviting. Substantively, Passion demonstrates not only the depth of his penetrating intellect but also his command of an array of' disciplines. Unger's polymathy is all the more impressive when we remember that ours is an era in which idiosyncratic specialization is the norm.


The Emergence Of Critical Social Theory In American Jurisprudence: An Introduction To Professor Rosenberg's Perspective, Harlan S. Abrahams Jan 1980

The Emergence Of Critical Social Theory In American Jurisprudence: An Introduction To Professor Rosenberg's Perspective, Harlan S. Abrahams

Seattle University Law Review

Norman Rosenberg's treatment of Thomas Cooley, liberal jurisprudence, and the law of libel exemplifies both a difficulty with and an opportunity for traditional law review scholarship. The difficulty arises from the failure of many legal writers to identify and explain the jurisprudential perspectives that define their substantive approach. This problem is particularly acute when, as in Professor Rosenberg's article, the jurisprudential perspective deviates from the mainstream. The opportunity lies in bringing the problem of perspective out of the closet and legitimating its critical treatment as an integral element of all legal scholarship.


Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal Jurisprudence, And The Law Of Libel, 1868-1884, Norman L. Rosenberg Jan 1980

Thomas M. Cooley, Liberal Jurisprudence, And The Law Of Libel, 1868-1884, Norman L. Rosenberg

Seattle University Law Review

During the past two decades, and especially since 1970, there has been a steadily growing interest in American legal history, including the work of nineteenth-century legal figures, including Thomas M.Cooley. Most scholars once dismissed Cooley as a simplistic apologist for laissez faire economics and late nineteenth-century capitalism. Recently, however, legal and constitutional historians have realized that his legal thought was much more complex. In part, this article seeks to extend recent work on Cooley and to examine his ideas and judicial opinions on freedom of expression and the law of libel. Cooley's views about free expression, defamation law, and American …


Keeping Pace With Change - New Vistas For Lawyers, James D. Fellers Oct 1974

Keeping Pace With Change - New Vistas For Lawyers, James D. Fellers

North Carolina Central Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Supreme Court-October 1959 Term, Bernard Schwartz Jan 1961

The Supreme Court-October 1959 Term, Bernard Schwartz

Michigan Law Review

A country's constitutional law is but a reflection of its political, economic, and social life. Not unnaturally, the external conditions of any particular period are bound to have their effects in the legal sphere as well-especially in the field of public law. This is as true of the United States as it is of other countries. From this point of view, the constitutional jurisprudence of the American Supreme Court is only the juristic mirror of the different stages through which American history has passed. 'Our jurisprudence is distinctive,' said Justice Jackson on the 150th anniversary of the Supreme Court, 'in …


Full Faith And Credit To Judgments And Public Acts, Kurt H. Nadelmann Nov 1957

Full Faith And Credit To Judgments And Public Acts, Kurt H. Nadelmann

Michigan Law Review

Interest here is concentrated on full faith and credit for public acts. But what led to insertion of the command respecting public acts cannot be divorced historically from the study of the command of full faith for judgments. The whole field, therefore, has been included in the reexamination. Clarifications obtainable on the "judgments" side, it will be seen, help also on the "public acts" side. On both sides there are historical facts which deserve greater attention than has been hitherto given, and if, as a result, some of the myths surrounding the' Lawyers Clause are exploded, the rethinking may have …


The Position Of Statutory Construction In Present Day Law Practice, John W. Macdonald Apr 1950

The Position Of Statutory Construction In Present Day Law Practice, John W. Macdonald

Vanderbilt Law Review

Even the title assigned to this article emphasizes a point of view. We will consider the position of statutory construction not from the aspect of judges, appellate or trial, who must decide cases. Instead we are to look at the subject from the point of view of the practitioner, the lawyer himself. The practice of law is of course varied. And there are many fields of knowledge which control that practice. Some of these obviously do not involve law at all. The lawyer is a litigator, an advocate in court or before quasi-judicial bodies. He is also a counsellor, an …


What Is Law, Roscoe Pound Dec 1940

What Is Law, Roscoe Pound

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.


Book Reviews Apr 1925

Book Reviews

Michigan Law Review

A collection of book reviews by multiple authors.


Book Reviews, Nathan Isaacs, Horace Lafayette Wilgus, Arthur H. Basye, Leonard D. White, Victor H. Lane, Edwin D. Dickinson Apr 1922

Book Reviews, Nathan Isaacs, Horace Lafayette Wilgus, Arthur H. Basye, Leonard D. White, Victor H. Lane, Edwin D. Dickinson

Michigan Law Review

What does a judge do when he decides a case? It would be interesting to collect the answers ranging from those furnished by primitive systems of law in which the judge was supposed to consult the gods to the ultra-modern, rather profane system described to me recently by a retrospective judge: "I make up my mind which way the case ought to be decided, and then I see if I can't get some legal ground to make it stick." Perhaps the widespread impression is the curiously erroneous one lampooned by Gnaeus Flavius (Kantorowitz). The judge is supposed to sit at …