Jurisprudence Commons^™

Johnson V. Transportation Agency: The United States Supreme Court Weighs Statistical Imbalance In Favor Of Affirmative Action, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 593 (1988), Denise C. Hockley-Cann

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Affirmative Action: A Divided Supreme Court, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 99 (1988), Arthur J. Marinelli

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Doing Politics In The United States Supreme Court, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 265 (1988), John D. Gorby

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Costello V. Capital Cities Communications, Inc.: Illinois' Innocent Construction Rule Prevails Over The Constitutional Privilege For Expression Of Opinion, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 427 (1988), Jerald B. Holisky

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Hazelwood School District V. Kuhlmeier: How Useful Is Public Forum Analysis In Evaluating Restrictions On Student Expression In The Public Schools, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 403 (1988), Mark N. Bonaguro

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Jurisprudence And Gender, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings. The task has not proven to be divisive. In fact, virtually all modern American legal theorists, like most modern moral and political philosophers, either explicitly or implicitly embrace what I will call the "separation thesis" about what it means to be a human being: a "human being," whatever else he is, is physically separate from all other human beings. I am one human being and you are another, and that distinction between you and me is central to the meaning of …

Comment On Fikentscher's Paper -- Modes Of Thought In Law And Justice -- A Preliminary Report On A Study In Legal Anthropology, Jerome Hall

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The Evolution Of Law: Continued, Alan Watson

Scholarly Works

In my book The Evolution of Law I sought to give a general theory of legal evolution based on detailed legal examples from which generalizations could be drawn, offering as few examples as were consistent with my case in order to present as clear a picture as possible. I was well aware as I was writing that some critics would regard the examples as mere isolated aberrations and for them and for other readers who, whether convinced of the thesis or not, would like further evidence, I want here to bring forward a few extra significant examples.

The Activity Of Being A Lawyer: The Imaginative Pursuit Of Implications And Possibilities, Thomas D. Eisele

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

If law as an activity emerged naively and unpremeditated, as a direction of attention pursued without premonition of what it would lead to, then by now it has hollowed out a character for itself, as Oakeshott says, and has become specified in a "practice." Having acquired this firmness of character, as Oakeshott further says, law may present itself as a puzzle, thus provoking reflection. Thinking about law in this manner or mood is something that I wish to call "philosophy of law," and this is itself an honorable activity with a character and mannerisms of its own.2 In law school, …

Dworkin And The Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy Of Hart & Sacks, Vincent A. Wellman

Law Faculty Research Publications

No abstract provided.

Foreword: On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, And Original Intent, Lewis E. Lehrman

Seattle University Law Review

This Foreword introduces the article to follow written by Harry V. Jaffa, scholar of Abraham Lincoln’s political philosophy. The Foreward provides background material necessary to contextualize the ongoing debate surrounding constitutional interpretation emphasizing original intent addressed in Jaffa's article.

Judicial Conscience And Natural Rights: A Reply To Professor Jaffa, Bruce Ledewitz

Seattle University Law Review

This Article replies to Professor Harry V. Jaffa’s article “What Were the ‘Original Intentions’ of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?” The Article focuses on the gap the author argues Professor Jaffa left between the consciousness of the Framers and the practice of judicial review today. The author argues that the understanding that Professor Jaffa brings to the intent of the Framers is one that opens up the Constitution to the call of justice, but the author critiques the utility of Professor Jaffa’s work in resolving the contentious constitutional issues of today, including abortion and capital punishment.

Sanctuary: The Legal Institution In England, Steven Pope

Seattle University Law Review

This Article discusses the institution of sanctuary that was recognized under the Common Law of England from at least the early Middle Ages until the Jacobean period, that is, from about the seventh to the seventeenth centuries A.D. This Article does not include a specific discussion of the modern American idea of sanctuary as the term is applied to the act of aiding an alien to remain illegally in the United States to escape political persecution in the alien’s own country. However, a consideration of the historical institution of sanctuary may shed light on the contemporary issue in two ways. …

Seven Questions For Professor Jaffa, George Anastaplo

Seattle University Law Review

This Article poses questions inspired by the four essays collected in Professor Harry V. Jaffa’s article “What Were the ‘Original Intentions’ of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?” The Article offers, in addition to fresh reflections upon these questions, three appendices, which bear upon various matters touched upon by Professor Jaffa. These appendices include, “The Founders of Our Founders: Jerusalem, Athens, and the American Constitution,” “The Ambiguity of Justice in Plato’s Republic,” and “Private Rights and Public Law: The Founders’ Perspective.” The Epilogue provides informed observations of a scholar who comments on the differences between Professor …

Legality And Empathy, Lynne Henderson

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

Professor Harry V. Jaffa Divides The House: A Respectful Protest And A Defense Brief, Robert L. Stone

Seattle University Law Review

This Article replies to Professor’ Jaffa’s article, “What Were the ‘Original Intentions’ of the Framers of the Constitution of the United States?,” and book, The Crisis of the House Divided. The Article argues that Professor Jaffa’s method throughout his indictment of legal scholars has three flaws. First, the Article argues that Professor Jaffa takes statements of sensible political compromises-such as support for judicial restraint, British traditions, and local self-government-and treats them as if they were philosophical statements. Second, the author contends that Professor Jaffa assembles a composite indictment, which in law is appropriately applied only to an indictment against …

Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The Law-As-Literature Movement, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Among other achievements, the modern law-as-literature movement has prompted increasing numbers of legal scholars to embrace the claim that adjudication is interpretation, and more specifically, that constitutional adjudication is interpretation of the Constitution. That adjudication is interpretation -- that an adjudicative act is an interpretive act -- more than any other central commitment, unifies the otherwise diverse strands of the legal and constitutional theory of the late twentieth century.

In this article, I will argue in this article against both modern forms of interpretivism. The analogue of law to literature, on which much of modern interpretivism is based, although fruitful, …

Book Review. Virtue, Commerce, And History: Essays On Political Thought And History, Chiefly In The Eighteenth Century By J.G.A. Pocock, Stephen A. Conrad

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

What Were The "Original Intentions" Of The Framers Of The Constitution Of The United States?, Harry V. Jaffa

Seattle University Law Review

This Article explains how the doctrine of original intent might be defended as the basis for interpreting the Constitution. The deepest political differences in American history have always been differences concerning the meaning of the Constitution, whether as originally intended, or as amended. Since the Civil War, the debate has often taken the form of a dispute over whether or not the Civil War amendments, notably the fourteenth, have changed the way in which the whole Constitution, and not only the amended parts, is read or interpreted. It is not possible to even discuss how or whether the Civil War …

Legal Fiction, James Boyle

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Moral Dilemma Of Positivism, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

I think there has been an advance in positivist thinking, and that advance consists of the recognition by MacCormick, a positivist, that positivism needs to be justified morally (and not just as an apparent scientific and objective fact about legal systems). But the justification that is required cannot consist in labelling "sovereignty of conscience" as a moral principle, nor in compounding the confusion by claiming that positivism minimally and hence necessarily promotes sovereignty of conscience. We need, from the positivists, a more logical and coherent argument than that. Until one comes along, I continue to believe that positivists inherently have …

The Ninth Amendment: Source Of A Substantive Right To Privacy, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 959 (1986), Gerald G. Watson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Future Of Legal Scholarship And The Search For A Modern Theory Of Law, Donald H. Gjerdingen

Articles by Maurer Faculty

In this Article, Professor Gjerdingen argues that the current crisis in legal scholarship can be traced to a change in the dominant concept of American law. He argues that virtually all of the significant schools of American legal thought during the last century, from Langdellian orthodoxy to realism to the legal process school, were dominated by a concept of law that separated law and politics. This concept of law, which he terms "conventionalism," presumed that law was an autonomous, apolitical discipline dominated by the study of adjudication and classical common law categories. In contrast, the new legal scholarship of the …

Summers's Primer On Fuller's Jurisprudence – A Wholly Disinterested Assessment Of The Reviews By Professors Wueste And Lebel, Robert S. Summers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Uncertainty In Law And Its Negation: Reflections, Gordon A. Christenson

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

For this issue of the Review, the editors invited me to reflection. In response, I wish to consider some aspects of a problem that has bothered me over the past quarter-century. This problem arises from radical subjectivism and its effect on the legal order. I believe that something is radically subjective in law when one norm is considered as valid as any other, or when one perception of facts is thought as valid as any other, for the reason that any objective principles for determining validity are either inadequate or considered meaningless tautologies, masking the subjective preference of those with …

Whither Jurisprudence?, Anthony D'Amato

Faculty Working Papers

After considering the side road of critical legal studies, I shall try to indicate the major signposts to a more complete jurisprudence. These signposts take the form of questions or anomalies in our present understanding of law. I will conclude that only by following these signposts, by exploring these questions and anomalies, will we begin to uncover the nature of law and justice.

Not-So-Critical Legal Studies, Stephen Diamond

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Manners, Metaprinciples, Metapolitics And Kennedy's Form And Substance, William W. Bratton Jr.

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses Of History, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

The Future Of The Common Law Tradition, Alan Watson

Scholarly Works

What, then, can one say about the common law tradition as it will develop in the relatively near future? In terms of the future development of the common law systems, three facts seem certain and decisive. In the first place, there has been, as a matter of observable fact, a great shift in the balance of lawmaking in the common law world from judicial precedent to legislation, which together comprise the two main sources of law. In the second place, there is a deep awareness in the common law countries of a crisis in lawmaking, an awareness that is probably …