Judges Commons^™

Did Justice Scalia Have A Theory Of Interpretation?, Gary Lawson

Notre Dame Law Review

It seems beyond bizarre to ask whether Justice Scalia had a theory of textual interpretation. If he did not have such a theory, what were he and his critics talking about for the past three decades? The answer is that they were talking about part of a theory of textual interpretation but not an actual, complete theory. A complete theory of textual interpretation must prescribe principles of admissibility (what counts towards meaning), significance (how much does the admissible evidence count), standards of proof (how much evidence do you need for a justified conclusion), burdens of proof (does inertia lie with …

Boyle As Constitutional Preemption, Bradford R. Clark

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. arguably departed from his usual preferences by recognizing a government contractor defense as a matter of federal common law. This Essay offers an alternative rationale for the decision in Boyle grounded in constitutional preemption, and explains why this approach is more consistent with Justice Scalia’s broader methodological and constitutional commitments.

Justice Scalia And Sherman Act Textualism, Alan J. Meese

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay offers a defense of Justice Scalia’s approach to the Sherman Act.

Originalism And Stare Decisis, Amy Coney Barrett

Notre Dame Law Review

The question whether stare decisis is compatible with originalism has occupied both originalists and their critics. In this Essay, I explore what light Justice Scalia’s approach to precedent casts on that question. I argue that while he did treat stare decisis as a pragmatic exception to originalism, that exception was not nearly so gaping as his “fainthearted” quip suggests. In fact, a survey of his opinions regarding precedent suggests new lines of inquiry for originalists grappling with the role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication.

Justice Scalia And Class Actions: A Loving Critique, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Notre Dame Law Review

I am not sure any other Justice of the Supreme Court in American history has done more to hinder the class action lawsuit than Justice Scalia did. Under the auspices of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), the Justice authored two majority opinions giving a green light to corporations that want to opt out of class-wide liability entirely so long as they do so using arbitration contracts. It is very hard to square these opinions with either the text or the history of the FAA.

In Part I of this Essay, I review the Justice’s class action opinions; I give special …

The Limits Of Reading Law In The Affordable Care Act Cases, Kevin C. Walsh

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia’s leadership moved the law of interpretation closer to the central case of statutory interpretation appropriate for our constitutional order. He thereby lawfully improved that law over the course of his judicial tenure even though—over time—this involved transforming rather than simply transmitting the law of interpretation that had been handed down to him.

Justice Scalia's Unfinished Business In Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism's Formalism Gave Up, Abbe R. Gluck

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia, in the end, was no interpretive formalist. He would not be pleased to hear this claim, but the fact is that formalism has not succeeded in statutory interpretation, and in fact, the textualism that Justice Scalia deserves so much credit for creating never really embraced formalism at all.

Textualism lacks all the conditions necessary for formalism. It does not have a defined set of predictable rules ordered to ensure objective application. Instead, we have more than one hundred interpretive presumptions—the presumptions favored by textualists—with no defined method of choosing among them. These doctrines of the field are not …

Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay examines a specific area that Justice Scalia influenced through the methods of interpretation that he applied—namely, the question of “implied rights of action.”

The idea that federal courts historically applied common law causes of action to remedy federal statutory violations without congressional authorization is a myth. From the first, federal courts heard only those causes of action that Congress had authorized them to hear. And there is reason to think that early federal courts would not have been understood to have power to define their own causes of action had Congress not provided this authorization from the start. …

Reviewability And The "Law Of Rules": An Essay In Honor Of Justice Scalia, Adrian Vermeule

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia developed a consistent approach to questions of reviewability: roughly, the idea that “general programs” and “general policies” are to be excluded from judicial review, and even general and legally binding agency rules may or may not be reviewable before enforcement. On this approach, the proper business of courts is to review specific applications of agency rules to particular parties.

Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, And Constitutional Argument, William K. Kelley

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay canvasses Justice Scalia’s approach to the nondelegation doctrine by examining his two most prominent opinions in that field, Mistretta and Whitman. It goes on to critically examine the nature of the arguments he makes in those cases, and what his approach has to tell us about his overall approach to the judicial role.

Justice Scalia, Implied Rights Of Action, And Historical Practice, Anthony J. Bellia Jr.

Journal Articles

In the realm of Federal Courts, the question of “implied rights of action” asks when, if ever, may a plaintiff bring a federal right of action for the violation of a federal statute that does not expressly create one. Justice Scalia argued that a court should not entertain an action for damages for the violation of a federal statute unless the text of the statute demonstrates that Congress meant to create a right of action. The Supreme Court adopted this approach in 2001 in Alexander v. Sandoval, with Justice Scalia writing for the majority. Certain judges and scholars have argued …

The Constitution That Couldn’T: Examining The Implicit Imbalance Of Constitutional Power In The Context Of Nominations, And The Need For Its Remedy, James E. Britton

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

The Exceptional Role Of Courts In The Constitutional Order, N.W. Barber, Adrian Vermeule

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article looks at a rare part of the judicial role: those exceptional cases when the judge is called upon to pass judgment on the constitution itself. This arises in three groups of cases, roughly speaking. First, in exceptional cases the validity of the constitution and the legal order is thrown into dispute. Second, on some occasions the judge is asked to rule on the transition from one constitutional order to another. Third, there are some cases in which the health of the constitutional order requires the judge to act not merely beyond the law, as it were, but actually …

Aggregation As Disempowerment: Red Flags In Class Action Settlements, Howard M. Erichson

Notre Dame Law Review

Class action critics and proponents cling to the conventional wisdom that class actions empower claimants. Critics complain that class actions over-empower claimants and put defendants at a disadvantage, while proponents defend class actions as essential to consumer protection and rights enforcement. This Article explores how class action settlements sometimes do the opposite. Aggregation empowers claimants’ lawyers by consolidating power in the lawyers’ hands. Consolidation of power allows defendants to strike deals that benefit themselves and claimants’ lawyers while disadvantaging claimants. This Article considers the phenomenon of aggregation as disempowerment by looking at specific settlement features that benefit plaintiffs’ counsel and …

Judges As Politicians: The Enduring Tension Of Judicial Elections In The Twenty-First Century, Richard Lorren Jolly

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Elections transform the basis of judicial legitimacy. Whereas a permanently appointed judiciary finds support in its supposed neutrality, the democratic judiciary demands responsiveness. Yet while this is obvious to scholars, the electorate, and most judges—and is in fact confirmed by much statistical data—the Supreme Court and others continue to insist that judicial campaigns can be sculpted to ensure robust democratic debate without compromising the bench’s impartiality. This Essay rejects the notion that the court can be both democratic and disinterested. It reviews the volatile history of judicial elections as well as the modern web of distinctions between protected and proscribable …

Multiple Chancellors: Reforming The National Injunction, Samuel L. Bray

Journal Articles

In several recent high-profile cases, federal district judges have issued injunctions that apply across the nation, controlling the defendants’ behavior with respect to nonparties. This Article analyzes the scope of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order. This analysis shows the consequences of the national injunction: more forum shopping, worse judicial decisionmaking, a risk of conflicting injunctions, and tension with other doctrines and practices of the federal courts.

This Article shows that the national injunction is a recent development in the history of equity. There was a structural shift at the Founding from a single-chancellor …

The Missing Justice In Coleman V. Miller, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

All nine of the sitting justices took part in the 1939 case of Coleman v. Miller, which concerned whether the Kansas legislature had ratified the pending Child Labor Amendment. One of the issues in the case was decided by a vote of 5-4, while another was resolved by a vote of 7-2. With respect to a third issue, however, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes reported that it presented “a question upon which the Court is equally divided and therefore the Court expresses no opinion upon that point.”

Scholars understandably have been puzzled by how a decision in which a full …

Inside The 'Constitutional Revolution' Of 1937, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

The nature and sources of the New Deal Constitutional Revolution are among the most discussed and debated subjects in constitutional historiography. Scholars have reached significantly divergent conclusions concerning how best to understand the meaning and the causes of constitutional decisions rendered by the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes. Though recent years have witnessed certain refinements in scholarly understandings of various dimensions of the phenomenon, the relevant documentary record seemed to have been rather thoroughly explored. Recently, however, a remarkably instructive set of primary sources has become available. For many years, the docket books kept by a number …

Evaluating Legislative Justice Sector Reforms: Creating An Environment For Survival, Lauren A. Shumate

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

Inside The Taft Court: Lessons From The Docket Books, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

For many years, the docket books kept by certain of the Taft Court Justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Though the existence of these docket books had been brought to the attention of the scholarly community, access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a review of all of the Taft Court docket books held by the Office of the Curator, which are the only …

Judicial Candor And Extralegal Reasoning: Why Extralegal Reasons Require Legal Justifications (And No More), Eric Dean Hageman

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note’s first Part explores two landmark Supreme Court cases, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and NFIB, that may have been decided based on extralegal considerations. Part II describes three prominent theories of judicial candor with an eye to the results they might yield with respect to extralegal reasoning. Part III offers and defends a new, partial theory of judicial candor. This theory is that a judge who employs extralegal reasoning should omit discussion of her reliance on that reasoning and justify her decision with legal reasoning.

The first two Parts will demonstrate that there is a …

Stare Decisis In The Second-Best World, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

If judges disagree about the proper interpretation of the law, can they find common ground in the treatment of precedent? The doctrine of stare decisis weighs the value of legal continuity against the value of legal accuracy. But that analysis is complicated by pervasive disputes over the implications of legal error. Likewise, the scope of a precedent's impact in future cases depends on underlying assumptions about the ends and means of legal interpretation. When those assumptions vary among judges, so too will applications of stare decisis. For stare decisis to promote the continuity and impersonality of law, it requires an …

The Hughes Court Docket Books: The Early Terms, 1929-1933, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

For many years, the docket books kept by a number of the Hughes Court Justices have been held by the Office of the Curator of the Supreme Court. Yet the existence of these docket books was not widely known, and access to them was highly restricted. In April of 2014, however, the Court adopted new guidelines designed to increase access to the docket books for researchers. This article offers a report and analysis based on a review of all of the docket books that the Curator’s Office holds for the early Hughes Court, comprising the 1929-1933 Terms. Only one of …

Three Things: A Tribute To Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, Nicole Stelle Garnett

Journal Articles

On February 20, 2015, the Arkansas Bar Association hosted a tribute to Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold (8th Cir., retired). I had the privilege of clerking for Judge Arnold in 1995-96 and the great honor of being asked to speak about the Judge at the event. Greenbag graciously agreed to publish my remarks.

The Rule Of Law And The Judicial Function In The World Today, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain

Notre Dame Law Review

The world’s oldest written constitution still in effect has many inspiring lines, but perhaps the one that most stirs the souls of the patriotic appears in Article 30. Delineating a familiar separation of powers, that Article forbids the legislative, executive, and judicial branches from swapping or mixing functions. “[T]o that end”—and here’s the line—“it may be a government of laws and not of men.” John Adams, the author of that line and most of the rest of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, penned those words in 1779, eight years before the adoption of the second oldest written constitution …

The Politics Of Statutory Interpretation, Margaret H. Lemos

Notre Dame Law Review

In a new book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner describe and defend the textualist methodology for which Justice Scalia is famous. For Scalia and Garner, the normative appeal of textualism lies in its objectivity: by focusing on text, context, and canons of construction, textualism offers protection against ideological judging—a way to separate law from politics. Yet, as Scalia and Garner well know, textualism is widely regarded as a politically conservative methodology. The charge of conservative bias is more common than it is concrete, but it reflects the notion that textualism narrows the …

The Unitary Executive And The Plural Judiciary: On The Potential Virtues Of Decentralized Judicial Power, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.

Notre Dame Law Review

The federal judiciary features a highly decentralized system of courts. The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a few dozen cases each year. Meanwhile, regional U.S. courts of appeals operate independently of each other; district courts further divide and separate the exercise of federal judicial power. The role of the state courts in enforcing federal law further subdivides responsibility for the adjudication of federal law claims. Indeed, the Office of Chief Justice itself incorporates and reflects this vesting of the judicial power of the United States exclusively in collegial institutions—literally in a multiplicity of hands—effectively precluding its unilateral …

Foreword: The Confident Court, Jennifer Mason Mcaward

Journal Articles

Despite longstanding rules regarding judicial deference, the Supreme Court’s decisions in its October 2012 Term show that a majority of the Court is increasingly willing to supplant both the prudential and legal judgments of various institutional actors, including Congress, federal agencies, and state universities. Whatever the motivation for such a shift, this Essay simply suggests that today’s Supreme Court is a confident one. A core group of justices has an increasingly self-assured view of the judiciary’s ability to conduct an independent assessment of both the legal and factual aspects of the cases that come before the Court. This piece discusses …

Sotomayor's Empathy Moves The Court A Step Closer To Equitable Adjudication, Veronica Couzo

Notre Dame Law Review

On August 6, 2009, then-Judge, now-Justice, Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed as the nation’s first Latina Supreme Court Justice. While many Latinos embraced the idea of having “Sonia from the Bronx” on the bench, others were fearful that her jurisprudence, combined with her background, would result in “reverse racism.” These fears, while arguably unfounded at the time, have been completely dispelled. Just as Justice Thurgood Marshall transformed the adjudications of the Supreme Court through experiential discourse, so too, to a lesser extent, has Justice Sotomayor. In both oral arguments and written opinions, Justice Sonia Sotomayor has demonstrated educative leadership—enlightening her colleagues …

Federalist Society Panel Discussion: Judicial Selection, Federal And State, Meryl J. Chertoff, William K. Kelley, William P. Marshall, Harold F. See Jr., Diane S. Sykes

Journal Articles

This panel discussion, selected from The Federalist Society's annual National Lawyers Convention, addresses the issue of judicial selection versus election at both the federal and state level. Panelists consider what, if anything, can be done to repair the federal judicial appointment process and address the longstanding debate at the state level over election versus appointment of judges. Finally, panelists reflect on whether merit selection is the answer or whether it would surrender the last vestiges of democratic control over the judiciary to a special interest elite.